TITLES                        

Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamikakarikas (part 1)
Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamikakarikas (part 2)
Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamikakarikas (part 3)
Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamikakarikas (part 4)
Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamikakarikas (part 5)
Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamikakarikas (part 6)
The Doctrine of Anatta
Culasunnata_Sutta.
002-The Diamond Sutra
Manuscripts about budh
The World As Emptinessbyalanwatts.
Zen Quotes D_ T_ Suzuki painting
The Mirror Of Essential Points.
Essential Advice On Meditation by Sogyal Rinpoche
Definitions of buddhism terms
The Heart Sutra


 

Thinking in Buddhism: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamikakarikas (part 1) by Jonah Winters

Introduction

The study of Buddhism has in recent years become quite a vogue in the West.
Post-Enlightenment Europe found Buddhism to offer an attractive alternative to
the authoritarianism implicit in Christianity's doctrine of revelation and in
its priestly structure. Buddhism seemed to offer a "natural" religion, one based
on common sense and teaching truths accessible to anyone, yet without
surrendering mysticism. FOOTNOTE: Cf. Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 300 Buddhism also seemed curious
to the Western mind because, like so many Oriental philosophies, it was neither
really a philosophy nor a religion, but something with elements of both. As
such, it posed unique solutions to the problems of Western thought, as well as
whole new types of problems of its own.
The form of Buddhism that has most captured the attention of the West,
especially America, is Japan's Zen. Zen represents a religion that is in many
ways a diametrical opposite to America's Protestant Christianity. Its unorthodox
means of transmission, complete rejection of ritual, doctrine of the spiritual
nature of all beings, and emphasis on direct, personal perception of the Truth
have proven fascinating to the American mind. Unfortunately, this is often all
that is known of Buddhism. It is not uncommon to encounter the belief that Zen
represents the culmination of or even the entirety of Buddhism. This is far from
true. In fact, it could be defended that the history of Buddhism has witnessed
more internal philosophical diversity than almost any other religion, with the
possible exception of Hinduism. Even more egregious, the non-doctrinal nature of
Zen has allowed Westerners to conflate Buddhism with a number of other systems
of thought, be they "Eco- spirituality" or watery "New-Ageism," declaring them
all to be compatible. That Buddhism has dogma and is a widely variegated,
autonomous religion not always reconcilable with modern philosophies and
movements is often not seen.
The uniqueness of much of Buddhism lies in the way it seeks "Ultimate Truth" and
the manner of Ultimate Truth it finds. Truth, for Buddhism, is relative. There
is no single, unchanging, absolute ground of being like there is in most of the
world's thought. To make a broad generalization of Occidental philosophy, the
entire Abrahamic tradition, stretching from the pre-Israelites to the Baha'i
religion, sees the universe as in some way contingent on a transcendent,
absolute level of Being. Even the most mystical or skeptical of the early
Western schools of thought accepted an ultimate essence of reality. For
Pythagoras it was numbers, for Heraclitus it was a reification of process
itself, for Plotinus it was Mind, and for the Jewish Qabala it was a
super-attenuated form of divine light. Even the most skeptical of philosophers,
such as Zenoo or Pyrrho, did not deny an ultimate ground of being. Rather, they
just said that it was inconceivable. The Oriental religions, too, agree that
there is an ultimate essence in things. The Taoists insist that it is utterly
ineffable, Advaita Vedanta declares it to be beyond existence itself, and the
Materialists deny that it is of the nature of spirit. Nonetheless, all agree
that there is an "Ultimate." FOOTNOTE: This generalization is not meant to
suggest that the philosophies listed agree in any way on the nature of the
Ultimate. More, there were trends of thought within some of these philosophies
that come very close to the Buddha's theory of the Ultimate; the Rg-veda X.129,
for example, states that in the beginning "there was neither existence nor non-
existence, ...neither death nor immortality," and the Tao te Ching chapter II
says that "being and non-being create each other." Nonetheless, the general
trend within all of these schools of thought was to seek and find some form of
"Absolute."
In contrast with all of these is Buddhism. The Buddha did not teach that there
is an Ultimate, nor did he deny it. He did not declare the Ultimate to be
ineffable because mystical and inherently beyond the scope of thought, nor did
he embrace agnosticism and say that we just can never know its nature. The
Buddha simply would not talk about it. When a concept was discussed in relation
to a metaphysical thing, he would declare this concept to be neither wrong, nor
right, nor both, nor neither. It just should not be discussed. This approach has
no parallels. It is not a form of skepticism, for the Buddha was very clear in
enunciating doctrines that his followers must accept on at least a conventional
level. It is not agnosticism, for the Buddha did not just say that we cannot
know about the nature of Ultimate reality, but rather he said that it truly is
"not this, not that, not both, and not neither." It is not pessimism, for the
Buddha taught that all unpleasantries can be overcome and that there is a
definite goal to be striven for. Finally, it is not mere mysticism, for the
Buddha stressed the importance of directing one's consciousness to concrete
affairs.
This unique non-affirming non-negating approach of the Buddha is implicit in all
schools of Buddhism. It is the most explicit in three: the Perfection of Wisdom
school of the first centuries BE., the Madhyamika and Yogacara movement of the
first millenium C.E., and Zen and its predecessor, Ch'an, of the modern era. All
of these teach the non-dual, non-conceptual, non-existential nature of reality
and the applicability of mentation to the pragmatic sphere only. Any one of
these three would have been desirable subjects for study.
The one school I chose to research and explain here is Madhyamika. This school
has been chosen partly because early Buddhism has been little studied in the
West. Madhyamika has, of late, begun to attract much scholarly attention, but it
is still a little-recognized word and an even less- understood philosophy. The
Perfection of Wisdom school was, for my purposes, too early to be the focus of
study here. It was superseded by and amalgamated into the Madhyamika-Yogacara
movement, and so a discussion of the latter will explain much of the former.
Yogacara would also have been a fascinating object of study, but I feel that the
Yogacara school introduced concepts into Buddhism which were somewhat foreign to
the tradition. This is not a criticism, but what I desired to study was Buddhism
as expressed by the Buddha. Madhyamika seems to be the better of the two in
representing this. FOOTNOTE: Cf. Gadjin M. Nagao, "Yogacara, a Reappraisal" in
Madhyamika and Yogacara (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991),
219-225, where Yogacara is represented as adding to the tradition of Buddhism
and completing the move from the original Theravada to the innovative Mahayana.
Whether Madhyamika represents the original essence of the Buddha's teaching is a
matter of speculation that can never be fully resolved. However, many if not
most scholars of Madhyamika are of the opinion that it is perhaps the truest
philosophical systematization of the Buddha's ontology. Cf., for example,
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, volume I (London: George Allen and
Unwin Ltd., 1929), 643, or T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960), 55 Perhaps my main reason for
selecting Madhyamika was the same as that felt by Europeans over a hundred years
ago when they first "discovered" Buddhism: it represents a fascinating approach
to philosophy and a general worldview the likes of which are not to be found in
the history of Western thought.
Finally, Zen, too, would have been a compelling research topic, and, unlike
Yogacara, it does not seem to conflict with or add to the philosophy of the
Buddha as preserved in the earliest writings. There is, however, one difficulty
in approaching Zen from an academic perspective. Both Zen and Madhyamika agree
that concepts have no final applicability, but they differ in their
internalization of this fact. If one asks a Zen master what the nature of
reality is, one is likely either to be hit or to be told "this flax weighs three
pounds." FOOTNOTE: Cf. the anecdotes told of Zen teaching methods in Paul Reps,
ed., Zen Flesh, Zen Bones (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books (no impress
date)) This may be an appropriate way of expressing the school's philosophy of
the nature of reality, but it does little good to one who needs to write about
that philosophy. A proponent of the Madhyamika school may, in essence, give the
same answer as the Zen master. He or she will, though, at least be kind enough
to explain the answer in words and sentences, making this school more amenable
to the scholarly approach.
Notes on the Methodology of this Thesis
The goal of this thesis is to present the philosophy of Madhyamika in as clear
and concise a manner as possible. Given both the length and time constraints of
this research project and the limited degree of education I have thus far
enjoyed, it was necessary to investigate this topic with a tight focus. I have
chosen to use only Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika, "Verses on the Fundamentals
of the Middle [Way]," as the lens through which to view Madhyamika. This
treatise is the premier work both of Nagarjuna and of the school as a whole. It
includes all of the main themes of the school, it serves as the model for the
school's method of argumentation, and it is the focus of the subsequent history
of the school. Following Nagarjuna, Madhyamika commentaries addressed, not just
"what did the Buddha mean?", but also "what did Nagarjuna mean?"
In following this procedure of discussing only the Mulamadhyamakakarika, I often
faced the tantalizing temptation to draw quotes from other of Nagarjuna's works.
There are instances where a concept in this treatise may be spelled out
gradually over the course of five or so verses, while the same concept in
another text may be expressed succinctly and pithily. Unfortunately, these
cannot be quoted in such a context as this. Once another text of Nagarjuna's is
used, it is only a short step to back up Nagarjuna by quoting aryadeva, and then
only another short step to explain Nagarjuna by recourse to Candrakirti. Since
this would ultimately result in a distortion of the treatise, I have deemed it
best neither to quote nor discuss any other works.
The other methodological issue I had to consider is whether to use any concepts
or tools from Occidental philosophy in this analysis of Madhyamika. There are
numerous parallels between Madhyamika and various schools of thought in the
Western tradition. These parallels include concepts, intentions, methods, and
results. Once again, though, I chose to examine the Mulamadhyamakakarika on its
own and within the tradition of Buddhism only. It must be admitted that much
understanding of the work may have been lost by such a limitation.
Notwithstanding, there are two definite advantages of bringing to bear no
Western philosophy here. First, and most simply, I had neither room, nor time,
nor sufficient education. Even had I those luxuries, though, I doubt that I
would have utilized them. Interpreting Nagarjuna using Occidental tools may
seriously misrepresent him. For example, a major criticism of T.R.V. Murti's
analysis of Madhyamika is exactly this; in contrasting Nagarjuna with Kant, even
favorably, Murti may have seen Nagarjuna through distorting lenses. The approach
of this research project is thus to try to arrive at an understanding of
Madhyamika by examining only the central work of its central figure with as few
contrasts and comparisons as possible.
A final note of the methodology of this project regards which things were
selected for examination, and in what depth. What has been chosen was to explain
the philosophy as well as possible to the lay, not the scholarly, reader. An
extra chapter, "The Buddha and His Teachings," has been included that would not
have been necessary had the intended audience been a specialized one. This has
resulted in extra length of the thesis, but I deemed it well worth while. The
philosophy of the Buddha is not just foreign and difficult for a modern Western
audience, but was found to be abstruse even by the Buddha's ancient and Eastern
one. Providing plenty of background can only help in understanding this topic.
The depth of this study proved to be a trickier issue. On the one hand, each
chapter of the Mulamadhyamakakarika could be summarized in a mere five
sentences. On the other hand, fifty pages or more would not be sufficient to
explain fully any chapter, and entire books could be devoted to some of them.
Likewise for the three subjects highlighted as foundational for the school, i.e.
self-nature, dependent arising, and emptiness---each could have been explained
in one page or one hundred. The depth I have chosen is thus completely
arbitrary, guided only by considerations of what could investigated in one year
and in less than two hundred pages total.


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Thinking in Buddhism: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamikakarikas (part 2) by Jonah Winters

The Buddha and His Teachings

The Life of the Buddha

Siddhartha Gautama, the sage of the \'Sakya clan, founded a religion that is in
many ways the most anomalous of those surviving in the world today. He claimed
access to no divine wisdom, no unique intuition, no worldly or spiritual
authority, and no super-human status of any kind. The philosophy he taught
subverts common-sense notions about what the nature of the world is and uproots
the very beliefs that people tend to cherish the most: the existence of God, the
reality of the self, the promise of an afterlife, and the availability of
happiness. In their place he taught reliance on personal understanding and the
pragmatic uselessness of mere belief. FOOTNOTE: Walpola Sri Rahula, What the
Buddha Taught (New York: Grove Press, 1959), 3, 8-10 He taught that all
phenomena are impermanent and nothing can be counted on to endure; that there is
no soul to be found at any time, in any thing, anywhere; and that the
fundamental quality of life, even when it seems pleasant, is radically
unsatisfactory. And yet, the religion that has grown out of Gautama's teachings
has become a major world religion known for its equanimity, its compassion, and,
even, its joy.
Gautama was born in northeastern India in what is modern day Nepal in either 566
or 448 BE. and died eighty years later. FOOTNOTE: For a full discussion of the
Buddha's dates, see Etienne Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, trans. Sara
Webb-Boin (Louvain-La-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1988), 13-14 Gautama's
father Suddhodana was a minor king, the head of the Sakyas. Legend holds that
Gautama was so remarkable as a child that soothsayers predicted that he would
one day become either a universal monarch or an "awakened one," a "Buddha."
FOOTNOTE: The following biography of the Buddha is culled from a variety of
sources. The scriptural accounts of his life vary, and so this often-imaginative
biography is not to be taken as authoritative. Suddhodana wanted his son to be
the next head of the clan, and so did everything in his power to keep him
attached to the world and oblivious of things spiritual. Gautama was provided
with fine clothing, expensive perfumes, courtyard gardens and lily pools, and
all worldly delights, and was attended by female musicians in three palaces, one
for each season. Strict orders were given that he was not to be exposed to any
uglinesses or unpleasantries. He married a neighboring princess, Yasodhara, at
age sixteen, and they had a son, Rahula, when he was twenty-nine.
Legend relates that one day, shortly after the birth of Rahula, Gautama
requested to see the city that he had never before seen. Unable to dissuade him,
his father had runners clear the streets of all unpleasant sights and then
allowed Gautama to be taken out in a chariot. Serendipitously, or, as some
legends hold, at the will of the far-seeing God, the young prince was exposed to
four shocking sights which the runners had missed. First, Gautama saw a decrepit
man, gray-haired, broken-toothed, and bent with age, by the side of the road.
Since he had seen few humans other than his family and his 40,000 dancing girls,
he asked his charioteer in astonishment what sort of creature the man was. That
is what happens when people get old, explained the driver. The next day, the
prince asked to go out again. Though his father doubled his efforts to clear the
streets of all unpleasant sights, a sick person was missed. On seeing the person
lying by the side of the road, racked with disease, Gautama again turned to his
charioteer in surprise. That is illness, he was told. The following day he
embarked on another tour on which he was exposed to the sight of a human corpse,
and thus learned of the fact of death. Legend or not, this story portrays an
important element of the Buddha's later teachings: while the facts of age,
sickness, and death are known to us, it is still easy to forget them, and a
direct confrontation with their reality is often a novel and disturbing insight.
FOOTNOTE: Harvey, 18 Unless one is aware of suffering, one will never seek to
improve one's condition, a fact of which the Buddha was to make much use.
The prince made one more excursion into the city the next day, and, again, he
was exposed to something he had never before seen---a saffron- robed renunciant
with a shaven head, a begging bowl, and, most importantly, a tranquil and serene
demeanor. That night, after returning to his palace, he realized that all of his
previous pleasures were now but hollow delights. He waited until Yasodhara and
Rahula were asleep, took one last look at his son lying in his wife's arms,
kissed them both, and left. Such an exit was seen by some of the later writings
as setting a precedent for the renunciant monastic disciplines the Buddha later
organized, and the seeming callousness of it is mitigated by the claim that he
had to leave his family for the future benefit of all beings, that is, so that
he could attain his enlightenment and then teach it to others. FOOTNOTE: ibid.,
18 It is also pointed out that he was clearly not abandoning his family, for his
son later became one of his greatest disciples. However, the sense of solitude,
spiritual desperation, and determination portrayed by this episode is not
lessened.
It was with such a sense of determination that Gautama embarked on the next
stage of his life. He had seen the suffering from which he had been sheltered
for so long, and then he had seen proof in the form of the renunciant that such
suffering can be conquered. He now set himself the goal of learning how to
conquer it. He saw that his many years of living in opulence had not taught him
the way to enlightenment, so he now tried the opposite path. For six years he
practiced renunciation and asceticism. He first practiced raja yoga in an
attempt to conquer suffering through meditation and the control of
consciousness. Gautama soon surpassed his teachers by attaining states of
elevated awareness higher than the ones of which they were capable, but did not
feel that he had reached his goal yet. He left his yoga teachers and joined a
group of ascetics to practice rigorous physical austerities. His strong sense of
determination led him to practice self-mortifications so severe that he nearly
died.
By the time he could barely stand up and all of his hair had fallen out, Gautama
realized that asceticism was not going to bring him to his goal, either. He
recollected that he had once spontaneously experienced a certain meditative
state that could provide a path to awakening, and decided to give it one last
try. He took food, left the group of ascetics, and sat under a tree, determined
to gain enlightenment or die. As he began to meditate, the legendary demon
tempter, Mara, assailed him first with visions of beautiful women and then with
violent storms in an attempt to prevent Gautama's immanent enlightenment.
Gautama ignored Mara and entered deeper into meditation. He passed through state
after state of consciousness until he achieved the enlightenment he had so long
sought, nirvana. He was now a "Buddha," an "awakened" one. Reflecting on what he
had found, he saw himself as presented with a difficult choice, which is
sometimes portrayed as being Mara's final assault. He could either selfishly
enter parinirvana, the state of "nonreturning" liberation, or he could postpone
the final, ultimate freedom and return to the world to teach. The latter option
seemed pointless, for the awakening that he had experienced was so profound, so
subtle, and so "beyond the sphere of reason" that he feared it would be
pointless to try to teach it to anyone else. The deciding factor was the
Buddha's enlightened insight into the oneness of all beings, which led him to
sympathize with the suffering of others. He felt compassion and realized that he
must return, even if for the sake of only one person's understanding. Thus began
the ministry of the Buddha.
The biographies in the canonical texts, the sutras, give only sparse information
of the Buddha's life following his nirvana. A likely explanation for the greater
emphasis on his earlier life than on his later is that the core teaching of the
Buddha is the "path" to follow, the process one must go through to realize
nirvana for oneself. Thus, the Buddha's personal search for awakening is more
important than what he did after he had found his goal. The general picture
conveyed by the few details available is that he spent the rest of his life
wandering around the Ganges basin area on foot, with few possessions, teaching
his ever-growing group of disciples. Much of his teaching method would have been
seen as subversive by the society around him. He taught in the local languages
and dialects, spurning the Sanskrit which by this time was already associated
exclusively with the educated, elite priestly caste of Hinduism. FOOTNOTE:
Michael Coulson, Sanskrit (Chicago: NTC Publishing Group, 1992), xvii He taught
with no distinction, associating with all classes and castes of men and women.
He also shunned both the isolation of the forest and the community of the
cities, preferring to reside and teach in the outskirts of the urban areas.
After wandering and teaching for forty-five years, the Buddha prepared for his
death. He asked his followers if they had any last questions. When no one spoke,
he told them "All conditioned things are impermanent. Work out your salvation
with diligence!" FOOTNOTE: Maha-Parnibbana-Sutta in T.W. Rhys- Davids, trans.,
Buddhist Suttas (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1969), VI.10 and entered
parinirvana, the final liberation.

The Thought of the Buddha

The philosophical system that the Buddha taught is remarkably clear and simple.
It would, however, be very easy for a presentation of his thought to degenerate
into hundreds of pages of confusion and nonsense, and it could be argued that
much of the history and doctrinal development of Buddhism has been just such an
endeavor of obfuscation. His teaching is simple in that it can be summed up in
two words: the keyword of his philosophy is "impermanence" (anitya) and the
keyword of his religion is the "path" . FOOTNOTE: The question of whether or not
Buddhism is a religion will not be considered here. For purposes of this
discussion, "philosophy" will be taken to mean the intellectual explanation of
reality, and "religion" will be taken to mean the quest for salvation. Further
discussion of this question can be found in Regington Rajapakse, "Buddhism as
Religion and Philosophy," Religion 16 (January, 1986): 51-56 All elements of the
Buddha's teachings fall out from these two concepts. The purpose of the Buddha's
teachings is to bring people to their own enlightenment by means of the "Noble
Eightfold Path," the prescriptions for living the "noble" and beneficent life.
Thus, while his philosophy is the subject of this thesis, a brief presentation
of his soteriological teachings will be apposite here. The key to the moral life
is following the "middle way" between extremes. The Buddha had attained
enlightenment by renouncing the two extremes of worldliness and
world-renunciation. Neither his twenty-nine years of living in luxury nor his
six years of living in self-denial had led him to his goal; it was only after he
abandoned such extremes that his search came to an end. The first sermon the
Buddha delivered after his enlightenment opened with an admonition to give up
both the seeking after pleasure and the practice of asceticism. The correct way
to lead a proper life, he taught his first audience, is "the middle path, ...a
path which opens the eye, and bestows understanding, which leads to peace of
mind," and eventually to nirvana. FOOTNOTE: Dhamma-Cakka- Ppavattana-Sutta 3 in
Rhys-Davids The significance of following the middle way is greater than merely
the renouncing of the two extremes of hedonism and asceticism: the middle way is
the principle which infuses the entire corpus of moral teachings of Buddhism.
FOOTNOTE: Whether or not, and in what way, such "middle-ism" also defines
Buddhist philosophy will be discussed in chapters four and five.
Buddhism is primarily a path, not a philosophy. As has been aptly stated,
Buddhists often insist "If you wish to understand the Buddha's doctrine, you
must practice it!" FOOTNOTE: Geoffrey Parrinder, ed., World Religions (New York:
Facts on File Publications, 1983), 271 (italics in original) The Buddha likened
the human situation to a man who has just been shot with a poisoned arrow by an
unknown assailant. If the man refuses to have the arrow removed until he finds
out who shot him, what caste the assailant is from, what color his skin is, how
tall he is, what kind of bow he used, and what types of feathers were on the
arrow, that man will die. The important thing for the man to do is to remove the
arrow. The arrow in the side of humanity is afflicted existence, duhkha. The
poison on the arrow is the cause of duhkha, which cause is craving. The way to
remove the arrow of duhkha and the poison of craving is by following the
Buddha's path and teachings, the Dharma. FOOTNOTE: The complete parable can be
found in Henry Clarke Warren, ed. and trans., Buddhism in Translations (Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1987), 117-122 Duhkha cannot be satisfactorily translated
into English. It conveys the sense of the words "evil," "unsatisfactoriness,"
"unpleasantness," "imperfection," and "disease." The most felicitous single
translation is "suffering." Even if not exact, this is the term encountered most
commonly in translations. The fact of suffering constitutes the first of the
Buddha's four "Noble Truths." All things that are temporary and conditioned are
suffering, duhkha. Encounters with unpleasant things are, of course, suffering,
but even pleasant things are suffering because of the fact that, being
conditioned, they are subject to ending. FOOTNOTE: It may be important to
introduce here the concept of conditionality, for it is a concept that will
surface again and again in the following thesis. Briefly, a thing is conditioned
if it arose depending on a cause, such as a sprout arises depending on the
existence of the seed, or if it exists depending on a ground of support, as fire
exists depending on the fuel it is burning. A thing is also called "conditioned"
if it depends on something else for its differentiation and definition, as
"shortness" only exists in relation to "longness." Only something which is
uncaused and has an autonomous identity can be unconditioned. The cause of
suffering is the second Noble Truth. Suffering is occasioned by desire, be it
the thirst for pleasure or the craving for existence itself. This desire, having
impermanent things as its object, will always be frustrated because it can never
be satisfactorily fulfilled. The third Noble Truth is that it is possible to put
an end to such desire and thus rid oneself of suffering. Ridding oneself of
suffering occurs when one realizes the nonreality of existence in a peculiar
state known as nirvana, or freedom. Thus far, the Buddha presented an analysis
of the human experience which states that all existence is inherently unpleasant
due to its impermanency, that the reason we find impermanent phenomena to be
unpleasant is because we entertain desires and cravings which cannot be
satisfied by ephemeral things, and that the key to finding satisfaction is to
put an end to such desires.
The fourth and final Noble Truth is that there is a method available to us by
which we can appease desires and thus attain nirvana. This way is presented as
the Eightfold Path. The path is a systematized guide for living which will
enable one to curtail attachment to transitory things and to train oneself in
proper modes of thought and behavior to eventually achieve liberation. The eight
limbs of the path prescribe behavior which is "samyak." "Samyak" will here be
translated as "right," but it also carries the overtones of "complete" and
"perfect." FOOTNOTE: cf. Sir Monier Monier-Williams, ed., A Sanskrit-English
Dictionary (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993), 1181 A fuller understanding of
"samyak" can be had by keeping in mind the importance of "middle-ism" as
described above. Renouncing all behavioral extremes leads to a comportment that
could best be described as "moderate;" observing moderation in all actions and
thoughts and desires will lead, not just to proper behavior, but also to the
very enlightenment which is the goal of Buddhism. The Eightfold Path opens with
two guidelines for perfecting wisdom, namely right (samyak) views and right
thought. Personal apprehension of the Buddha's teaching, his Dharma (henceforth
translated as "Law"), is an essential aspect of accepting the Law and proceeding
on the path. This understanding must be translated into right thought, the
attitudes of the individual towards the rest of the world. Right thoughts are
selflessness, compassion, and non- violence. This is followed by three
guidelines for morality, namely right speech, right conduct, and right
livelihood. The moral life is not required merely for reasons of compassion for
others; appeasing the desires that cause one to suffer will be accomplished in
large part by leading a life free from egocentricity, greed, and selfish goals.
The final three steps on the path, right effort, right mindfulness, and right
concentration, detail the spiritual ascesis without which the attainment of
nirvana would be impossible. Right effort and mindfulness prescribe the
importance of being focused on the goal of liberation, and avoiding all things
which would be karmically unwholesome. Right concentration, samadhi, is that
drive of pointed meditation which allows for liberation, the final abandonment
of all desires and the attainment of alert equanimity and bliss.
The philosophy of the Buddha rests on one simple observation: all things are
impermanent (anitya). Impermanence is the first of three fundamental marks of
existent things, and from it follow the other two: suffering, and
"soul-less-ness." Transitorinessis the fundamental property of all existent
things, for all things come into being, persist for a time, and then pass out of
being again. Without such impermanence, no change would be possible, and thus
neither would liberation be possible. That is, it is the susceptibility of all
things to change that allows one the option of controlling one's life and
following the Eightfold Path. The Buddha's emphasis on the reality of
impermanence should not be seen as a doctrinal dogma as much as a simple
perception. Not only is continual flux perceptible to all who have insight, but,
moreover, a balance in reality requires that any thing which comes into
existence must also, some day, go out of existence. FOOTNOTE: The use of the
problematic term "reality'' must be explained. That signified by "reality" is
usually taken to be the real, i.e. that which exists. Here, it will occasionally
be used to refer to the cosmos as a whole, to the entirety of nature, yet
without expressly signifying "existence.'' For lack of a better term, the reader
is asked to accept that "reality," used here, is not necessarily meant to imply
existence as such, and the meaning of the term will vary according to context.
The significance of impermanence is beautifully expressed by the parable of the
conversion to Buddhism of the two friends Sariputta and Moggallana. Seeking
enlightenment and having found it nowhere, they made the pact that they would
split up and whoever should first realize nirvana would come and teach the
other. Sariputta went his way, and encountered a saintly monk, placid of
disposition and perfect of deportment. What is your secret, brother? asked
Sariputta. Whom do you follow, and what is the truth you have found? The monk
replied that he was but a novice and a new-comer to the doctrine that he had
found, and so could not expound the doctrine or describe its teacher. He could,
however, offer to Sariputta this tidbit of the teaching: all things that arise
will cease, said the monk. On hearing this, Sariputta suddenly understood,
clearly and distinctly, the noble doctrine, and became enlightened. He returned
to his friend Moggallana who, upon seeing Sariputta from afar, immediately
perceived that a profound change had come over his friend. What is the truth you
have found? asked Moggallana. I don't know the doctrine or its teacher, replied
Sariputta, but I can tell you this: all things that arise will cease. On hearing
this, Moggallana, too, became enlightened. FOOTNOTE: Warren, 87-89 A refusal to
accept transitoriness is the cause of suffering, as briefly discussed above. A
perception of such impermanence and of suffering, its corollary, is the key to
liberation. Humans tend to desire, and desires do not exist in a vacuum---they
are always desires for something, and if the object of the desire is subject to
flux, then the desire will, sooner or later, be frustrated.
The third mark of existence is also a direct corollary of impermanence: there is
no permanent, abiding, unchanging soul, atman, to be found in any existent
thing. This is perhaps the most revolutionary of all elements of the Buddha's
philosophy, for his time period was one of great emphasis on the reality of the
soul in the dominant zeitgeist of India, Hinduism. FOOTNOTE: Rahula, 55 The
period of the writing of the principal Upanisads had only recently ended, and
the orthodox schools of Indian thought were abuzz with theories of the
individual soul and its relation to Brahman, the universal soul. By denying the
reality of atman, the Buddha was subverting one of the most cherished of all
concepts in Indian religion. However, the doctrine of soullessness, anatman, was
an inescapable conclusion of the perception of flux; if all existent things are
subject to change, then there can be no unchanging essence that exists. And if
one tries to escape that conclusion by positing a soul "beyond" the realm of
existence, then one arrives at the same answer: the soul does not exist. It is
meaningless to posit something that is beyond existence, for it would be in no
way real.
The three marks of existence---impermanence, suffering, and
soullessness---define the nature and quality of reality as taught by the Buddha.
Inquiring into the ultimate cause and purpose of existence and its ontological
nature is fruitless. It is not that the answers to such metaphysical questions
are beyond human understanding, nor that the answers sought are conceptually
inexpressible; it is simply that they are irrelevant. If you do not remove the
arrow now, said the Buddha, you will die. One must leave metaphysics alone, for
the only thing of importance is to follow the path. FOOTNOTE: A usage note is
required here. The term "metaphysical" will be encountered often in this thesis,
and so a clarification of its meaning is crucial. Metaphysics must not be
understood as pertaining to the study of the supernatural, the mystical, or the
New Age movement; this is a very recent use of the word. Metaphysics is the
branch of rational philosophy that examines the nature of reality, especially
the relationships between mind and matter and substance and attribute. This
includes the connotational meaning of a priori speculation upon questions that
are unverifiable by observation, analysis, or experimentation.
Notwithstanding, the Buddha was in no way misologistic. That he did not scorn
the use of reason and philosophy is demonstrated by the fact that the first two
limbs of the Eightfold Path are right views and right thought. He offered a
positive metaphysics by presenting a complete teaching of causation known as the
theory of pratitya-samutpada, "interdependent origination," or "dependent
arising." As a teaching of the nature of all existent things, dependent arising
is a comprehensive philosophy which explains the origin of perception, the
essence of the individual, the workings of karma, and the nature of previous,
present, and future lives. Dependent arising is an extremely lucid and rational
explanation of the nature of all existent things, but not one that is easy to
understand without a great deal of reflection. The following explication of
dependent arising is thus not intended to be an explanation as much as a brief
introduction. (No more than an introduction is necessary here, because the
theory will be discussed extensively in chapter five.) Dependent arising,
simply, is the principle that all existent things are conditioned and relative
by virtue of having come into existence as interrelated phenomena. When this
arises, that arises; when this ceases, that ceases, explained the Buddha.
Impermanence and its corresponding dictum of soullessness preclude the
possibility of there being permanently-enduring or independent and
self-subsisting phenomena.
The "chain" of dependent arising consists of "links" of mutually interacting
causes and effects. The root of the chain is ignorance, avidya, on which basis
the second link, preferences and dispositions, comes to be. On the basis of
these preferences arises the third link, volitional will and consciousness. This
consciousness gives birth to the fourth link, the psychophysical individual. The
individual then experiences sensory stimulation which creates in him or her
desires to have certain sensations and to avoid others, which is a process of
the next three more links. On the basis of these desires one develops cravings,
link nine, and grasps onto perceived existence itself, link ten. This grasping
and clinging to existence is the cause of all suffering, for it leads to the
eleventh link, birth and rebirth, which is followed by the final link of old
age, disease, and death. The key to enlightenment, or cessation of afflicted
existence, is the reversal of the process by which afflicted existence has
arisen. One must appease, or let go of, cravings. In order to do this one must
seek wisdom, which wisdom will undercut ignorance, the initial cause of the
chain.
Although presented as a linear chain, dependent arising should be understood as
a circle, for all of the links of the chain influence all of the other links. It
is tempting to look at the ultimate cause of the chain, ignorance, and ask what
caused it to come into being, and thus embark upon infinite regress. There are
two reasons that this would not be appropriate, one philosophical and the other
pragmatic. First, it would not be proper to seek a cause for ignorance avidya),
for ignorance is not a positively existing entity. Rather, it is a lack. One
does not inquire into the cause of darkness, for darkness is nothing but the
lack of light. Second, the "cause" of ignorance is utterly irrelevant for the
Buddha's teaching. Ignorance is a deadly poisoned arrow which must be removed;
where the arrow came from is not important.
It is often said that the Buddha was neither a prophet nor simply a teacher, but
was a spiritual doctor. His presentation of the four Noble Truths paralleled the
practice of medical doctors in his day which was to 1) diagnose a disease, 2)
identify its cause, 3) determine whether it is curable, and 4) outline a course
of treatment to cure it. FOOTNOTE: Harvey, 47 This was exactly the Buddha's
method. All humans are afflicted with the disease of suffering; this disease is
caused by ignorance and the cravings which can follow ignorance; this disease is
not an unregenerate condition but can be cured; the cure is to follow the
Eightfold Path of moderation and understanding, which will lead to enlightenment
and freedom.
The Buddha's teachings may thus far appear simple and straightforward. This may
be true, but for one condition. All unenlightened humans, according to the
Buddha, are immersed in the mud of ignorance, and are thus incapable of seeing
clearly. "Men who are overcome by passions and surrounded by a mass of darkness
cannot see this truth," he once thought to himself. FOOTNOTE: Source not named:
quoted in Rahula, 52 However, there were also times when he reassured his
disciples that his philosophy was inherently difficult to grasp. Speaking to his
disciple Vaccha, he said "Profound, O Vaccha, is this doctrine, recondite, and
difficult of comprehension, ...and it is a hard doctrine for you to learn."
FOOTNOTE: Majjhima-Nikaya, quoted in Warren, 126 Whether the difficulty of
comprehending the Buddha's teachings is due only to the obscuring passions of
humans or whether it is indeed inherently abstruse, the subsequent history of
Buddhism demonstrates that the Buddha's teachings were anything but unambiguous
to his disciples and later Buddhist thinkers. The varieties of interpretation of
the Buddha's thought that have been propounded in the last two-and-a-half
millenia bear ample witness to this. It is this diversity of interpretation that
was to engender the Madhyamika school six hundred years after the Buddha's
death.


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Thinking in Buddhism: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamikakarikas (part 3) by Jonah Winters

Early Buddhism and The Historical Context of Nagarjuna

The Person of Nagarjuna

Legend reports that, in the second or third century C.E., a young Brahmin named
Nagarjuna mastered the Vedas and all of the existing Hindu sciences, including
magic, while still a young boy. When he was a teenager he used his magical
abilities to render himself and two of his friends invisible so that they might
slip unnoticed into the royal harem of the local king's palace. They took
advantage of the situation and then made their escape. On attempting to leave,
however, his friends neglected to make themselves sufficiently invisible and
were caught and executed. Nagarjuna escaped, but this experience caused him to
reevaluate the desires which had caused him to come so close to peril.
Inspired by this episode, Nagarjuna entered a Buddhist monastery. In a mere
ninety days he studied and mastered the whole of the Pali canon, the early
writings of Buddhism. He left the monastery in search of more advanced teachings
of the Buddha that he felt sure must exist. One day he was expounding upon the
doctrine of the Buddha to a group of listeners and noticed that, following the
lecture, two members of the audience disappeared into the ground. He followed
them to what proved to be their home, the kingdom of the Nagas, a land inhabited
by beneficent, half-divine, serpent- like beings. Here the Nagas presented
Nagarjuna with occult teachings and with several volumes of sutras, canonical
scriptures. These writings were the Prajnaparamitas, the "Perfection of Wisdom"
sutras. The Buddha had delivered these sacred teachings centuries before but had
decided that they were too profound for his contemporaries. He arranged to have
them hidden for safekeeping in the nether world until humankind had acquired the
necessary sophistication and spiritual development to allow them to appreciate
these teachings of "perfect wisdom." Now that the world was ready, Nagarjuna was
permitted to spread the Buddha''s final teachings. FOOTNOTE: One of the most
complete Buddhist accounts of Nagarjuna's life is to be found in the
eighteenth-century Tibetan text "Presentation of Tenets" by Jang-gya. cf. Donald
S. Lopez, Jr., A Study of Svatantrika (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications,
1987), 245- 252. A comprehensive account by a modern scholar can be found in K.
Venkata Ramana, Nagarjuna's Philosophy (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle
Company, 1966), 25-70
This colorful legend, like most, is told with many minor variations.
Unfortunately, there is not much known about Nagarjuna besides these legends. It
is certain that he was an actual historical person remarkable for his brilliant
and energizing philosophical spirit. FOOTNOTE: Heinrich Zimmer, Philosophies of
India (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), 520 His influence was so great that he
was regarded as more than merely an important philosopher. The teachings of the
Buddha were seen as the "first ``turning of the wheel,''" the setting in motion
of the dispensation of universal law, Dharma. The teachings of Nagarjuna came to
be regarded by the majority of Buddhism as the "second turning of the wheel,"
i.e. the renewal of and expansion of the Buddha's original doctrine. Throughout
northern India he is still spoken of as a veritable manifestation of the Buddha,
and his teachings are revered equally with "the sutras from the Buddha's own
mouth." FOOTNOTE: ibid., 520 Aside from such fanciful reverence of Nagarjuna,
this much is certain: he is generally agreed to be, by his admirers and
detractors alike, the acutest thinker in Buddhist history. FOOTNOTE: Mervyn
Sprung, trans., Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: The Essential Chapters of
the Prasannapada of Candrakirti (Boulder: Prajna Press, 1979), 1 His
commentaries on Buddhist philosophy had such a great effect on the world of
Buddhism that a schism which had been brewing for some time, that of the new
"Greater School" of Mahayana diverging from the "Older School" of the Theravada,
now became crystallized and irrevocable. FOOTNOTE: cf. D.T. Suzuki, Outlines of
Mahayana Buddhism (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), 60 Nagarjuna's alleged
"authorship" and elucidation of the Prajnaparamita writings seems to have
provided the Mahayana with a claim to unique mystical insight which allowed this
school to divorce itself from what it considered to be the "lesser" teachings of
the Theravada.
Some of Nagarjuna's contemporaries found his thought to be so unique and worthy
that they regarded him as the founder of an entirely new school of wisdom, the
Madhyamika. New "Madhyamika" texts sprung up, many of which aimed to be nothing
more than interpretations of Nagarjuna's writings. This new school was so
compelling and vibrant that it, too, witnessed schisms into sub-schools.
Some scholars have interpreted the philosophy of Nagarjuna as an innovation, a
revolution in Buddhism. Others see Nagarjuna's philosophy as being little more
than a clarification and restatement of the Buddha's doctrines. To investigate
the thought of Nagarjuna and to address these claims, a brief summary of
Buddhist intellectual history from the time of the Buddha to the time of
Candrakirti, Nagarjuna's most famous commentator, is apposite. When Nagarjuna
completed his study of the original Pali canon and went in search of more
teachings of the Buddha, it appears that he was confronted with a multitude of
contending schools of philosophy. FOOTNOTE: Ramana, 37 The debates which both
preceded and were contemporary with Nagarjuna surely influenced his thought and
a summary of them will help in achieving an understanding of the Madhyamika
school.

Some Early Controversies

A central point of the Buddha's thought is that all is in flux; nothing which
exists can remain unchanged. A natural implication of this is that the Law, the
Buddha's teaching itself, would also suffer corruption and change. The original
scriptures announced various prophesies regarding this change. Some predicted
that the Law would remain pure for only 500 years, others that it would endure
for a thousand. Following this period of pure understanding, mere scholarship
would replace spiritual achievement. FOOTNOTE: Edward Conze, Buddhism: Its
Essence and Development (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), 114-6 The simple fact
of the Buddha's historical life becoming a more and more distant memory is only
part of the story. It appears that the very methods of the Buddha's teaching
began to lose their efficacy, for the early writings contain accounts of large
numbers of people, sometimes thousands at a time, achieving sudden enlightenment
merely by hearing the Law. FOOTNOTE: cf., for example, Warren 302, where a sutra
reports that "the conversion of eighty-four thousand living beings took place."
Gradually fewer and fewer cases of conversion were reported, until the
conviction spread that the time of sainthood was over. One sutra conveys this
sentiment clearly by describing the death of the last saint at the hands of one
of the scholars. FOOTNOTE: Conze 1975, 116
Setting aside the fact that, according to the Buddha, flux is inevitable, there
are three obvious reasons why the Law witnessed change and reinterpretation. One
reason is simple geography. FOOTNOTE: ibid., 119 The teachings of the Buddha
were born in northern India and from there rapidly spread east and west,
eventually becoming diffused across the whole of southern and eastern Asia.
Following the death of its founder, such broad decentralization of the message
and the concomitant divergence of interpretations was inevitable. A second
factor which precipitated change was the fact of applying the Law to daily life
and all of its concerns. No matter how complete the Buddha's teachings,
inevitably some question would arise which he had not addressed. These were
usually precise disagreements over proper comportment of the monk, such as when
to eat food and whether to accept money as a gift. FOOTNOTE: Michael H. Kohn,
trans., The Shambhala Dictionary of Buddhism and Zen (Boston: Shambhala, 1991),
37 A third and perhaps principal source of contention and change was the
somewhat agnostic stance of the Law itself. The Buddha did not leave the
community with a single source of authority following his death, telling the
monks to seek and follow the Law for themselves. This likely left the monks with
a sense of freedom to interpret the Law as they wished. FOOTNOTE: David J.
Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1992), 125 He also had consistently refused to give conclusive answers to
many types of metaphysical questions, as the parable of the arrow shows.
However, as the Buddha fully knew, the human tendency to enquire into such
intangibilities is practically ineradicable. People were wont to philosophize on
even those very subjects about which the Buddha forbade speculation. This
inevitably led to differing opinions about the nature of reality. Even some
modern scholars have been misled by the Buddha's apparent agnosticism, calling
it a "vagueness" in the Buddha's teachings, a vagueness which caused "a great
divergence of views" to arise. FOOTNOTE: M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian
Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1967), 196
Buddhism remained relatively free of internal controversy for the first two
centuries after the Buddha's death. Minor disagreements over points of doctrine
persisted, but were not a major cause for concern. Then, during the reign of
King Asoka, 272-236 BE., another disagreement, this one regarding the nature of
the saint, arose and threatened the unity of the Order. King Asoka, a nominal
Buddhist whose influence in Buddhist history was enormous, wished to restore
peace to the Order. While the precise history of the debate is uncertain, a few
elements of it are widely accepted as being authentic and, more important to the
topic at hand, had a direct bearing on Nagarjuna's work. FOOTNOTE: A more
comprehensive discussion of the dates and the background of Asoka can be found
in Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, A History of India (London: Routledge,
1990), 64-70 Asoka invited a respected monk, Moggaliputtatissa, to convene a
synod of monks to discuss and settle disagreements. Moggaliputtatissa compiled
the proceedings of this council in a text that, despite being written two and a
half centuries after the Buddha, was so influential that it quickly was accorded
canonical status. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1992, 126 Although two hundred and
eighteen specific topics of monastic discipline and philosophy were debated, the
key philosophical issues boil down to three: "Personalism," "Realism," and
"Transcendentalism." FOOTNOTE: This division, which is perhaps somewhat
simplified and artificial, will be encountered repeatedly in this thesis. It can
also be quite confusing, and, hence, it should be summarized and more
technically clarified here. The Personalists were the Vatsiputriya, nicknamed
the Pudgalavada after "pudgala" = "person;" The Realists were the Vaibhasika and
Sautrantika sects of the Sarvastivada, the latter nicknamed after their belief
that "all," "sarva" exists (on the Sautrantika, see also page 124f.); The
Transcendentalists were the Lokattaravada sect of the Mahasanghika, so nicknamed
due to their belief in the " lokuttarra," the "supramundane." This factional
history, though technically confusing and incompletely documented, has extensive
import, for it was a precursor to the bifurcation into the "Greater" and "Lesser
Schools" of Buddhism. Broadly speaking, the Mahasanghika led to the formation of
Mahayana, while their opponents, the Sthaviravada, became the Hinayana, or
Theravada. These three will be summarized here and treated more fully later.
Broadly speaking, Indian philosophy has witnessed two opposing traditions
regarding the ultimate nature of reality. One tradition, which is represented by
practically the whole of Hinduism, asserts the existence of an immanent and
transcendent "soul," the atman. The atman is the soul both of the human
individual and of the universal God. It is the ultimate ground of being and is
immutable and eternal. Buddhism, on the other hand, denies this substratum. It
presents a doctrine of anatman, "soullessness." The Buddha taught that there is
no abiding self, but rather just five ever-changing aggregates (skandhas) of
elements: physical substance, sense-contacts, perceptions, psychological
tendencies, and consciousness. The individual person is an aggregate of these
five categories, and each category is in itself an aggregate of composite
elements (dharmas and dhatus). For example, the category of physical substance
is an aggregate of earth, air, water, and fire, and the category of
psychological tendencies is an aggregate of habits, likes, dislikes, greed,
willfulness, etc. The idea of a "person" is just a convenient way to refer to
these five categories and aggregates of elements. It is a mistake to believe
that there is an underlying and unchanging self in this dynamic agglomeration of
fluctuating elements. However, a small group of monks insisted that,
nonetheless, the individual self must be in some way real. If there is no self
more real than and transcending the aggregates of elements, they argued, still
at the very least it should not be wrong to say that the self is no less real
than the aggregates. They claimed that there is a subtle self which is neither
identical with nor different from the agglomeration of elements. FOOTNOTE:
Harvey, 85 Although Moggaliputtatissa and all other Buddhist schools rejected
this "Personalist" argument, the notion proved to be tenacious and long-lived.
As late as the seventh century C.E. a full one-quarter of Indian monks claimed
adherence to the Personalist school, FOOTNOTE: ibid., 85 and Nagarjuna as well
as numerous later writers, both Madhyamika and otherwise, felt compelled to
address this misbelief. FOOTNOTE: Nagarjuna, David J. Kalupahana, trans.,
Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way: the Mulamadhyamakakarika of
Nagarjuna (New York: State University of New York Press, 1986), XVI.2 and
XXIV.29-30 The "heresy" of Personalism presumably arose because some Buddhists
were unwilling to abandon completely the belief in the soul, and so claimed that
the aggregate of elements did not fully preclude the possibility of a self. The
controversy of "Realism" also arose from the doctrine of the aggregates, but for
an exactly opposite reason. The Realists asserted that, if there is no
metaphysical soul behind the aggregates, then the aggregates themselves must be
real. If the soul is not an ultimate entity, then the individual atomistic
elements (dharmas) of which the world is composed must be ultimately real. These
elements are reified, they taught, and each has its unique and individual atomic
"self-nature," svabhava. Only thus could the Buddha's teaching that all
aggregates are in perpetual flux be reconciled with the fact that objects are
observed to have individual and continuous identities. FOOTNOTE: ibid., 22
Furthermore, these atomistic elements are themselves eternal and unchanging;
while their form and the objects of which they are a part may change, their
self- nature, svabhava, remains real and constant. Hence the label "Realism."
The Realists were quite vocal against the concept of Personalism and insisted
that the Buddha's doctrine of anatman allowed no room for any type of belief in
self-hood. However, their assertion that the atoms comprising the world have
individual self-natures was seen by other Buddhists as being an unjustified
realism or as just another form of Personalism. Criticism of their concept of
self-nature became one of the key issues of the Madhyamikas.
The third false doctrine which Moggaliputtatissa reports being discussed was
Transcendentalism. The Buddha had left the community of his followers with no
single source of authority following his death, telling them instead to "be
lamps unto [them]selves." "The truths and rules of the order which I have set
forth and laid down for you all, let them, after I am gone, be the Teacher to
you." FOOTNOTE: Maha-parinibbana Suttanta II.33 and VI.1, in Rhys Davids Despite
these words which the Buddha delivered from his deathbed, many disciples came to
believe that the Buddha had totally transcended the world, not just ceased to
exist. Mahayana Buddhists came to believe that, although the physical Buddha was
dead, his intelligence and his teachings remained in a form called the "Dharma
Body." FOOTNOTE: Paul Williams, Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations
(London: Routledge, 1989), 176 Although it was claimed that this transcendent
form did not really exist (for that would contradict the Buddha's doctrines),
still the Dharma Body is an expression of the ultimate reality, the true nature
of things. FOOTNOTE: ibid.,175 The Dharma Body came to be known by diverse
terms, such as "Buddha- nature," "Thusness," or "Suchness of Existents," and its
nature has been interpreted in many ways. Moggaliputtatissa refuted this belief
in a transcendent nature of the Buddha by demonstrating that it is incompatible
with the Buddha's historicity. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1992, 141-3 Nagarjuna dealt
little with the theories of Transcendentalism, but it became an important topic
for later Madhyamikas. FOOTNOTE: cf. Williams, 175-179
Abhidharma and the Perfection of Wisdom Writings
Between the third century BE. and the third century C.E. a group of writings
whose purpose was the systematization of certain elements of the Buddhist
philosophy took shape. This was the Abhidharma, "Further Teachings." This
collection of writings purported to be, not a new set of teachings, but merely a
codification of the old. As such, it was accorded a canonical status and, along
with the sutras, the Buddha's discourses, and the Vinaya, the monastic rules,
comprises the official three-tiered Pali canon. There was little controversy
over the sutras and the Vinaya; although there is some variation in the latter
between schools, the two are almost universally accepted in Buddhism. The
Abhidharma, however, elicited a certain amount of conflict in subsequent
Buddhist thought.
The purpose for compiling the Abhidharma was to distill the essentials of the
Buddha's teachings on philosophy and psychology from the discourses and attempt
to avoid the inexactitudes and ambiguities occasionally found in these
scriptures. This codification was achieved by stating everything in exact
language and thereby providing a detailed enumeration of the elements of reality
(dharmas), the basic causal processes observed to operate between the elements
(pratyayas), the exact constituents of the human personality and consciousness
(skandhas and ayatanas) and, finally, to draw out the relations and
correspondences between all of these factors. FOOTNOTE: Harvey, 83
The endless lists and classifications found in the Abhidharma, which one modern
commentator has characterized as "ten valleys of dry bones," FOOTNOTE:
Nyanatiloka Mahathera quoted in Kalupahana 1992, 147 might seem to be of little
interest to all but the most devout Buddhist. There are, however, two reasons
why the Abhidharma directly relate to the study of later Buddhist philosophy:
the Abhidharma provided an exhaustive analysis of the base constituents of
reality, and it uncovered much of the implications of dependent arising, the
process by which these elements come into being and are perceived. What the
Abhidharma achieved was also twofold: its analysis of the elements coherently
and comprehensively described reality without any recourse to a theory of
self-hood or ultimate reality, and it refined the doctrine of dependent arising
by showing how the basic patterns of causation condition each other in a web of
complex ways. FOOTNOTE: Harvey, 83 Notwithstanding, the Realist school managed
to find in the Abhidharma classifications support for their view that the
elements do have a self-nature, svabhava, a view which had definite
repercussions on the doctrine of dependent arising. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986,
22
The Abhidharma literature was avowedly part of the "Older School," Theravada.
Its sole purpose was to systematize the teachings found in the Pali scriptures,
and it made no use of the innovative interpretations and doctrines that were
becoming an important aspect of the "Greater School," Mahayana. The Abhidharma
was, however, being written during approximately the same time as the
Prajnaparamita writings. These "Perfection of Wisdom (Prajnaparamita)" writings
mark the inception of and the core teachings of the Mahayana, FOOTNOTE: based on
distinctions made by Edward Conze. cf. Conze 1975, 121-125 a school which
defined itself in large part as being the "new" Buddhism no longer bound by the
limitations of the old. The Abhidharma provided the starting point for the
Perfection of Wisdom school, both as historical influencer and by being the
focal point of criticism. Further, the Abhidharma thinkers did their job so well
that subsequent thinkers, such as those of the Prajnaparamita, had no choice but
to adopt a different tack in interpretating and expounding the Buddha's
teachings. That is, the general approach of the Abhidharma thinkers was to take
the agenda of analysis and systematization to its furthest extreme. "Rarely in
the history of human thought has analysis been pushed so far," said the scholar
of Buddhism Etienne Lamotte. FOOTNOTE: Lamotte, 605 The result of this is that
the Perfection of Wisdom writings, representing a reaction to this influence,
are quite unlike those of the Abhidharmas in style, thought, and intent.
The Perfection of Wisdom scriptures are a collection of voluminous writings from
ca. 100 BE. to 100 C.E. which emphasize the ultimate incomprehensibility of the
world. They utilized paradox and even nonsense to demonstrate that true wisdom
is intuitive and cannot be conveyed by concepts or in intellectual terms.
FOOTNOTE: Kohn, 171 The writers of the Prajnaparamitas regarded the Abhidharma
of the Older School of Buddhism, with its dry emphasis on the proper path
towards and means of achieving enlightenment, the rules of the Order, and the
niggling debates over fine points of ethics, as being on the wrong track.
FOOTNOTE: Zimmer, 485 This approach stifled the essence of the Buddha's
teaching, which essence is that all doctrines are empty of reality and are but
mental creations. According to the Prajnaparamitas, true wisdom consists, not in
cataloguing doctrines, but in intuitively understanding that the true nature of
the universe is this emptiness, sunyata.
The Perfection of Wisdom writings were in many ways a reaction to certain trends
found in Abhidharma thought, particularly that of Realism. The Realist school,
though refuted by Moggaliputtatissa, remained a potent force in philosophical
discussion for some time. A primary Prajnaparamita criticism of this realist
trend was that it did not go far enough in understanding the Buddha's doctrine
of anatman. FOOTNOTE: Harvey, 97 The Realists accepted that there is no
substantial soul abiding in the person, but just a series of fluctuating
elements whose agglomeration gives the appearance of a self- identity. However,
as explained above, the Realists took this analysis of elements too far. To
explain reality without invoking atman, the Realists defined the elements as
being point entities having absolutely small spatial and temporal extension. To
reconcile this infinitesimal atomism with the fact that the individual elements
still interrelate and that continuity is experienced, the Realists had to posit
a form of self-nature. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986, 22 The Prajnaparamitas saw
this explanation as falling short of the mark.
The predominant themes of the Perfection of Wisdom teachings do not differ
either from the teachings of the Buddha as recorded in the discourses or from
the explanations of reality given in the Abhidharma. That is, the essence of
reality does not allow for real change or decay, origination or extinction,
identity or differentiation, unity or plurality, existence or non-existence. All
of the above are imagined only by the ignorant. The criticism lies in the fact
that some Buddhist schools were not satisfied with this description of reality
and felt the need to add the notion of svabhava, self-nature. This is not
necessary, the Prajnaparamitas taught, for the Buddha's theory of dependent
arising is alone sufficient to explain all perceptions of the world and its
elements as well as fully explain the ways in which these elements exist and
interrelate.
The authors of these texts most likely had no intention of producing innovative
theories and saw themselves as just explaining the teachings of the Buddha in a
deeper and more profound way, relying more on insight than on intellect.
Nonetheless, the Perfection of Wisdom writings are often defined as marking a
clear transition from old to new, Theravada to Mahayana. The emphasis on
emptiness as a characteristic of reality "revolutionized" Buddhism "in all
aspects," writes modern commentator T.R.V. Murti. FOOTNOTE: Murti 1960, 83 While
the intention of these writings was not to produce innovations in philosophy but
just to teach with a different emphasis, their method of philosophizing was
decidedly original. The Prajnaparamita adopted a dialectic that was only implied
in the original discourses, that of seeking the middle between all extremes, and
utilized this dialectic to a much fuller extent. This rejection of extremes led
to the assertion that all dualities are empty of reality. Notions whose basis is
one half of a duality, such as existence and nonexistence or atman and anatman,
can be used to speak of common, everyday truths, but their applicability fails
when referring to ultimate truths. The ultimate reality is devoid of all
dualities and thus is wholly impervious to conceptual thinking. It can only be
accessed in non-dual intuition, prajna. FOOTNOTE: ibid., 86 There are thus two
levels of truth: the everyday, relative truth and the higher, absolute truth.
One should not be confused, the Prajnaparamita taught, by the Buddha's use of
words like "person" or verbs like "exist," for he used these words only
pragmatically, as a necessity for discussing commonly perceived things. He in no
way intended for such relative concepts to be reified or applied to the absolute
sphere. FOOTNOTE: Peter Della Santina, Madhyamaka Schools in India (Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1986), 12-13
The Perfection of Wisdom writings set the tone for what would become the
majority of Buddhism, the Mahayana. Its anti- dogmatic rejection of extremes,
mystical mood, use of paradox, and emphasis on intuitive wisdom are still famous
in the form of Prajnaparamita that has come down to us today, Zen. FOOTNOTE: cf.
David J. Kalupahana, "Reflections on the Relation between Early Buddhism and
Zen," in Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis (Honolulu: The University of
Hawaii Press, 1976), 163-176, or Kalupahana 1992, 228-236 This collection of
works was also found quite compelling by Nagarjuna and the subsequent Madhyamika
school.

The Main Figures of Madhyamika

It was to the exposition of the philosophy of the Perfection of Wisdom
scriptures that Nagarjuna, "one of the subtlest metaphysicians the human race
has yet produced," FOOTNOTE: Zimmer, 510 devoted himself. Although it is almost
certain that Nagarjuna did not write or discover them, as legend claimed, he may
have been influential in the formation of some of them, and he certainly is to
be credited with systematizing them and offering the most coherent and
authoritative interpretations of them. FOOTNOTE: Richard H. Robinson, Early
Madhyamika in India and China (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin
Press, 1967), 61-65 Furthermore, many scholars, both ancient and modern, regard
Nagarjuna's Madhyamika as the proper systematization of the voluminous and often
unorganized Prajnaparamita writings. His philosophy, though, is not to be seen
as a mere commentary on these sutras. He offers slightly revised interpretations
of their key concepts, i.e. dependent arising, emptiness, and self-nature, and
he draws out more fully the implications of the two truths. His basic
philosophical method is to take the Buddha's exhortation to follow the "middle
way" and apply this "middle-ism" to all sets of dualities. Hence the appellation
for this school: "madhyama" simply means "middlemost." FOOTNOTE: Monier-
Williams, 782 The Madhyamika method does not deal with dualities by attempting
to arrive at a compromise between the two sides or by formulating a position
that lies between the two. Rather, it attempts to supersede the sphere of
conceptual thinking and its attendant dualistic modes.
As Nagarjuna's philosophy is the primary subject of this investigation, no more
than the briefest summary of his school will be presented here. Conceptual
thinking operates using dualities, especially that of subject versus object,
perceiver versus the external world. However, Nagarjuna taught, it is this very
process of intellection and our grasping onto its products, i.e. concepts, which
prevents us from realizing enlightenment. One must "appease" the tendency to
conceptualize, and it is this appeasement which will allow one to see through
the illusions of dualities and grasp the "true nature" of things, the tathata.
This true nature is formless and beyond conceptual distinctions. It is devoid of
self-nature, and so is described as being "empty," sunya. The fact of dependent
arising, i.e. the fact that all existing things come into and go out of being
only in dependence with other existing things and that no thing can exist "on
its own," as it were, also demonstrates the fundamental "emptiness" (sunyata) of
all things. If one wished to speak in absolute terms and seek the ultimate
ground of being of the universe, one could say no more than that the universe is
characterized by ultimate emptiness. This is not a pessimistic denial of
existence, though, but rather just a description of the way things are. One who
sees the true nature of things simply perceives that they are empty of self-
nature. This realization, far from being nihilistic, is actually the very means
by which liberation is achieved.
Nagarjuna is credited with a great number of writings. Even excluding those
which are possibly or definitely not his, we are still left with a large body of
work. Nagarjuna wrote theoretical scholastic treatises, collections of verses on
moral conduct, teachings on Madhyamika practice and the Buddhist path, and a
collection of hymns. FOOTNOTE: cf. Chr. Lindtner, Nagarjuniana: Studies in the
Writings and Philosophy of Nagarjuna (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987), 10-8,
for a list of writings attributed to Nagarjuna and a discussion of their
relative authenticity. This range of works demonstrates that his concern was not
just scholastics and theory but also monastic discipline and, as attested by his
hymns, religious veneration. The range of his thought, its acuity, and his
genuine devotional attitude to the Buddha inspired a number of subsequent
commentaries and independent works. The Madhyamika tradition enjoyed a vibrant
history in its native India until at least the eighth century C.E. The
philosophy was around this time imported to Tibet, where the Tibetan king
declared it to be his country's authoritative form of Buddhism. FOOTNOTE: Kohn,
132 Despite encountering various historical vicissitudes, it remains the
foundation for Tibetan Buddhism even today. FOOTNOTE: Santina, 23. It must be
admitted that this latter point is uncertain. Herbert Guenther writes that
"Reports coming from Tibet are uncertain... With the annexation of Tibet by
China, a chapter in the history of Buddhism... came to a close. (Encyclopedia of
Religion, 1987 ed., s.v. "Buddhism: Tibetan Schools.") Notwithstanding the
uncertainty of the situation in Tibet, though, the exiled Buddhist community
outside of Tibet is definitely keeping the Madhyamika tradition alive. Cf. C.W.
Huntington, Jr., The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian
Madhyamika (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 9
aryadeva was the chief disciple and successor of Nagarjuna, and it is to him
that the Madhyamika system owes much of its popularity and stability. Nagarjuna
directed his dialectic primarily against the Abhidharma philosophy, but, by the
time of aryadeva, there was need to consolidate the Madhyamika system against
non-Buddhist systems as well. FOOTNOTE: Murti 1960, 92 Aryadeva can be credited,
along with Nagarjuna, with founding and systematizing the school of Madhyamika.
FOOTNOTE: ibid.
The school began to encounter internal controversy approximately three centuries
later. A monk named Buddhapalita produced a commentary on Nagarjuna's major
work, the Mulamadhyamakakarika (henceforth abbreviated as karika). In his
commentary, Buddhapalita refuted the positions of his opponents using the tactic
of "reductio ad absurdum," a logical method whereby a position is shown to
result in unresolvable absurdities. The true Madhyamika can have no position of
his or her own, Buddhapalita wrote, and thus has no need to construct syllogisms
and defend arguments. His or her sole endeavor is to demonstrate that no
philosophical position whatsoever is ultimately acceptable; upon scrutiny of a
theory and its consequences, the theory inevitably dissolves into nonsense. This
section of Madhyamika is known as the Prasangika, after prasanga, "[logical]
consequences."
Buddhapalita's near contemporary, Bhavaviveka, also wrote a commentary on
Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika, in which he disagreed with the Prasangika
refusal to adopt a philosophical position. He argued that one must advance a
theory that is independent, svatantra, to provide a proper counter-argument to
the opponent's position and thus establish the Madhyamika position. Buddhapalita
used logic only to demonstrate the untenability of an opposing theory, and then
abandoned the logic. In contrast, Bhavaviveka felt that the Madhyamika did have
a certain justification for using and defending logical argumentation. This
school became known as the Svatantrika, the "Independents." FOOTNOTE: The names
Prasangika and Svatantrika are not found in any Sanskrit texts, and were
probably coined by later Tibetan scholars. Cf. The Encyclopedia of Religion,
1987 ed., s.v. "Madhyamika," by Kajiyama Yuichi The main difference between the
two schools was that they disagreed on the proper way to interpret Nagarjuna's
karika. As such, it may seem that the dispute is trifling. This may be true---it
may be the case that the only real difference between the two is the character
of the arguments which they employed in order to convince their opponents of the
truth of the Madhyamika, a philosophy which they mutually shared. However, the
significance of their different approaches may go deeper than that. The issue
which divides the two schools may be the result of their very interpretations of
reality and the degree to which they accepted Nagarjuna's wholesale denial of
self-nature. FOOTNOTE: Santina, xvii-xviii
The last figure in the history of Madhyamika who will be discussed here is
Candrakirti, who lived in the first half of the seventh century. He was the
chief and most famous exponent of the Prasangika school. His commentary on
Nagarjuna's karika, the Prasannapada, is of the utmost importance to us today
because in this work is the only copy of the karika which has survived in the
original Sanskrit, and, moreover, the Prasannapada is the only commentary on the
karika which has itself survived in Sanskrit. This fortuity aside, his influence
on the Madhyamika school is second only to that of Nagarjuna. His contribution
to Madhyamika literature is immense and erudite. He reaffirmed the reductio ad
absurdum approach of Buddhapalita, and, largely through Candrakirti's efforts,
the Prasangika school became the norm of the Madhyamika. The form of Madhyamika
which he championed was still studied in the monastic schools of Tibet and
Mongolia as late as this century, where it was considered to represent the true
philosophical basis of Buddhism. FOOTNOTE: Theodore Stcherbatsky, The Conception
of Buddhist Nirvana (London: Mouton & Co, 1965), 67. (It is no longer studied in
the Tibetan monasteries, because they have been destroyed. Cf. Guenther.)


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Thinking in Buddhism: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamikakarikas (part 4) by Jonah Winters

Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika

Structure of the Karika

A study of Nagarjuna's philosophy encounters many initial obstacles. Not only
can his thought itself seemingly be impenetrable, but also the mythical stature
he has acquired obscures much understanding of him. One modern scholar of
Nagarjuna has admitted that the veneration of Nagarjuna "at times reached such
ridiculous heights that his name was sanctified and stamped everywhere with
reckless abandon." FOOTNOTE: Kenneth Inada, quoted in Kalupahana 1986, 3 One
result of this is that often it cannot be determined precisely which works
attributed to him are authentically his.
Of the more than one hundred texts bearing Nagarjuna's name, only thirteen are
almost certainly his. FOOTNOTE: Lindtner, 9-11 There are two reasons that it is
difficult to determine which of these many works are his: One, his influence was
extensive and his name venerated. It was not uncommon in Indian tradition for an
adherent of a school to attribute a work to the school's original founder, as a
means of paying respect. This certainly happened within Madhyamika. Two, there
was likely more than one author actually named Nagarjuna, and there may have
even been many. FOOTNOTE: A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1980), 375 Of these thirteen works that were authentically written
by the Nagarjuna in question, one stands out as being his chief work: the
Mulamadhyamakakarika, "Verses on the Fundamentals of the Middle [Way]."
FOOTNOTE: Nagao writes that the name of this work was likely given to it by the
Sino-Japanese tradition. This tradition found one verse of the treatise,
XXIV.18, to be paramount; this verse concluded with the term madhyama pratipat,
"Middle Path," and the treatise was named after it. (Nagao 1991, 190) This work
stands supreme primarily because of its inherent merit, both in terms of
philosophical acuity and innovativeness. It is also one of the few works that
are indubitably his. The treatise also deserves to be regarded as unique because
it was historically pivotal; it inspired a number of subsequent commentaries by
other acclaimed thinkers and galvanized Buddhism into developing a wholly new
school of thought based on this work, the Madhyamika, the "Middle Way" school.
Finally, the Indian, Chinese, and Tibetan traditions are all unanimous in
considering the karika as Nagarjuna's magnum opus. FOOTNOTE: Lindtner, 10
The karika consists of 450 sententious verses. FOOTNOTE: (448 verses plus 2 in
the dedication) These verses have been preserved in the form of twenty- seven
short chapters, each dealing with one topic. (For sake of clarity, it was
necessary to differentiate between Nagarjuna's chapters and the chapters of this
thesis. To solve this, Nagarjuna's chapters will henceforth be referred to as
"sections," and the word "chapter" shall be taken to refer to chapters of this
thesis.) The entire karika, minus commentary, would only run to thirty or forty
pages. The chapter (section) structure in which the text is preserved is
possibly a later formalization, most likely by Candrakirti. This is evidenced by
the fact that the section titles provided by Candrakirti are often misleading as
to the actual contents of the section, and also because copies of the karika
preserved in Chinese and Tibetan occasionally contain very different section
headings. FOOTNOTE: Sprung, xv
The verses are written in a precise metered form which was the staple of
classical Sanskrit composition. FOOTNOTE: Coulson, 250 Each verse consists of
two lines of exactly sixteen syllables each which, while not rhyming, are very
poetic and rhythmic when read aloud or chanted. Part of the reason for this
writing style was to facilitate memorization. Books were often preserved in
writing by this period in time, but the chief means of transmission was still
oral. However, this is not the only import of the karika's poetic structure.
Nagarjuna was not merely a reflective philosopher. He was a monk, and the
purpose of monasticism was to facilitate meditation and traveling the path to
enlightenment. This work, like his hymns, was surely intended to be an aid in
meditation. One could memorize the karika and meditate on it by contemplating
one verse at a time. The verses were not intended to be prosaic explanations of
a philosophical position, but rather were meant to illuminate, in a terse and
often aphoristic manner, certain precise aspects of the Buddha's teachings about
the nature of reality and the proper path. Although the meaning of the verses is
usually clear, there are many that defy interpretation. Like the famous Zen
koans, some verses seemingly make no attempt to explain a philosophical theory
but instead aim to provoke an immediate transcendence of conceptual limitations.

Methodology of this Examination of the Karika

There is no easy and obvious way to approach the karika. Most modern
interpreters have opted to approach it by analyzing in isolation the broader
topics with which it deals, such as anatman or dependent arising, and pulling
quotes and examples from all sections of this work and from other works to
explain each topic. Other scholars have chosen to select merely one subject of
Madhyamika to address, such as emptiness, or one methodological consideration,
such as the use of dialectic. Such approaches seem unsatisfactory for the
present examination of Madhyamika because only the karika and its themes are the
focus here, not the spectrum of Madhyamika as a whole. Attempts have also been
made to categorize the sections of the karika into larger groupings of several
chapters each and indicate the broad themes which Nagarjuna supposedly had in
mind with each section. FOOTNOTE: cf. Kalupahana 1986, 27-31 This approach, too,
can be misleading and has no definitive validity; ultimately it may reveal
little more than the interpretive bias of the interpreter. The most fruitful
approach in the present context will be first to present in summary form the
scope and thought of the karika itself and only afterwards to discuss its
broader philosophical meaning and possible intent.
There are two admitted drawbacks of this approach, i.e. examining the karika and
the karika alone. One, it will not be possible to present "the thought of
Nagarjuna" as a whole. Other of his works show different sides to his thought
and character and provide fruit for differing interpretations of his place in
the broad spectrum of Buddhist thought. For example, the karika makes almost no
mention of any of the themes which came to be emblematic of the "Greater School"
of Mahayana, FOOTNOTE: The only exception is one mention of the
Bodhisattva-career in XXIV.32. However, even this mention does not demonstrate
Nagarjuna to be an advocate of Mahayana. and so it could be objected that an
examination of the karika only would attribute too much "Older School"-ness to
him. A second drawback is that presentations of his concepts could often be made
clearer by recourse to other of his or his follower's works. It will be
responded that these two drawbacks are not debilitating, and may not even be
handicaps. An exposition of solely the karika can be defended because this work
is truly the cornerstone of the entire subsequent Madhyamika school in all of
its variety. The karika is the vitalizing influence of Madhyamika and all the
main themes of the school are to be found in it. As mentioned above, the
Buddhist tradition is unanimous in considering it to be the keystone of
Madhyamika and perhaps even the single most influential work in all of Buddhism
after the original sutras.
What would perhaps be most desirable would be to skip a section-by-section
analysis of the karika and jump straight to a discussion of its broader themes
and significances. An attempt to do this was the initial intent of this thesis.
What quickly became apparent, though, was how great the amount of background
knowledge necessary to make sense of this work and how little of this knowledge
could be presupposed on the part of the reader. Take, for example, this
wonderfully cryptic verse: "The arising of arising is exclusively the arising of
primary arising. Again, the primary arising produces the arising of arising."
FOOTNOTE: karika VII.4. (All quotations from the karika, unless otherwise noted,
are from the translation of David J. Kalupahana in Kalupahana, 1986.) Lest the
reader be kept in suspense, this verse is explained in context below, page 57.
The obscurity of such a statement is not the fault of the translation; the above
is perhaps the clearest translation of this verse available. It is not to be
assumed that the meaning of a verse like this automatically becomes pellucid if
one has a background in Buddhist philosophy, but it does illustrate the
difficulties one faces in attempting to comprehend and communicate Nagarjuna's
thought. It was thus deemed necessary to summarize the basic themes of each of
the twenty-seven sections, one by one, and briefly introduce the reader to the
concepts contained therein. Only after this has been done can broader
observations be made and the philosophical significances extracted. Certain
translations of Madhyamika thought have presented only selections from the
original works, sometimes calling them the essential selections. FOOTNOTE: e.g.
Sprung 1979 The implication of this pointed out by David Kalupahana, translator
of and commentator on the Mulamadhyamakakarika, is that the remaining sections
are inessential. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986, 27 This thesis will not adopt that
approach. While the following exposition of the karika may appear lengthy, the
reader must be assured that prolixity has been scrupulously avoided and only the
few most essential themes of each section have been mentioned.
Nagarjuna was both a Buddhist monk and an apologist for Buddhism. It is the
Buddha's philosophy, and this philosophy only, that engaged his thought and
veneration, as evidenced by frequent references to "the Buddha(s)" and "the
fully enlightened one." One thought informs the whole karika: the Buddha taught
that there is no substantial essence underlying and supporting the manifest
world. FOOTNOTE: The reader's attention is called to the etymology of the word
"substantial:" the Latin roots are sub = "under" + stare = "to stand." A
"substance" is that which stands under something and provides the ground of
being for it. The abiding soul and/or an absolute God posited by some schools of
thought is, by definition, not dependent upon any element of the world for its
existence, and the Buddha's philosophy holds that anything that is not dependent
cannot be real. It would either transcend or precede existence, and thus could
not exist. Notwithstanding, the mass of humanity perceives and believes in the
real existence of the world, all the elements contained therein, and the
characteristics of and relations between these elements. Nagarjuna devotes the
majority of his sections to an analysis of these aspects of the putative world,
such as cause-and-effect, the senses, action, and time. Following this, he
examines the Buddha's teachings themselves, focusing on the nature of the
enlightened being, the Noble Path, enlightenment itself, and dependent arising.

A Presentation of the Treatise

Section one--Causation, and some Initial Problems

Nagarjuna devotes his first section, "Examination of Conditions (pratyayas)," to
the subject of causation. A discussion of causation had to precede his
examination of the elements of reality (dharmas), for it is a thing's origin
that determines its ontological status. Discussion of causal theories held a
paramount place in Indian philosophy, because it was felt that a system's theory
of causality reveals the method of the entire system. FOOTNOTE: Murti 1960, 166
The Buddha's explanation of the causal process is dependent arising: "if this
arises, that arises. If this ceases, that ceases." It is unlike any of the
non-Buddhist theories of causation which fall in one of four categories: self-
causation, other-causation, a combination of the two, or no causation. The
first, self- causation, is exemplified by the Vedic tradition of asserting the
reality of the immutable Universal Soul, atman. Briefly, this declares all
effects to be inherent in their cause, which cause is in every case some form of
the eternal atman. FOOTNOTE: cf. David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central
Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1975), 6-15 A
problem with self- causation is that the effect must be inherent in the cause.
If so, then nothing new has occurred or come to be. Other- or external-
causation declares all change to be produced by some form of a deus ex machina,
such as God, fate, or a deterministic self- nature. FOOTNOTE: ibid., 5 A problem
with other-causation is that if cause and effect are different then the relation
is lost, and, for example, fire could be produced from water. A third type of
causal theory advocated by some schools is basically a combination of the self-
and other-causation. The problem with this is that both of the above two
problems are compounded. The final option is that neither self- nor
other-causation operates, which position is in effect an indeterminism that
denies all causation. If anything were to emerge ever, anywhere, then everything
could emerge at all times, everywhere.
The philosophy of Nagarjuna almost defies interpretation. By the second verse of
the first section, one is already hard-pressed to explain exactly what Nagarjuna
is saying. Following an introductory dedication to the Buddha, FOOTNOTE:
discussed below, pages 115-118 he opens the karika with, in the first verse,
what would appear to be an unqualified rejection of all the possible theories of
causation. "No existents whatsoever are evident anywhere that are arisen from
themselves, from another, from both, or from a non-cause," he declares.
FOOTNOTE: karika I.1 This can be, and has been, interpreted to be a pure denial
of causation. In the next verse, though, he lists the four conditions
(pratyayas) that function causally: "There are only four conditions (pratyayas),
namely, primary condition, objectively supporting condition, immediately
contiguous condition, and dominant condition." FOOTNOTE: karika, I.2 The word he
uses here for "condition," pratyaya, was often found in the early Buddhist texts
as a synonym of "cause." FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1975, 54 A condition, in this
context, is a foundation on the basis of which a thing can come to be: "[There]
are conditions (pratyayas), because, depending on them, [things] arise," defines
Nagarjuna. FOOTNOTE: karika I.7 A condition (pratyaya) seems to be a cause which
is necessary but not sufficient. It is that which cooperates in causing a thing
to arise, but is not the sole cause of its arising. The difficulty of
interpreting Nagarjuna's statements lies in the fact that, even if a condition
is only a part of the cause, it is still a cause. He has thus, in the first two
verses, denied the tenability of the four non-Buddhist theories of causation,
only to follow it with an assertion that conditioned causal relations do exist.
FOOTNOTE: A comprehensive discussion of the four conditions (pratyayas)
Nagarjuna mentions in verse two is beyond the scope of this examination.
There are a few very different ways to interpret Nagarjuna's stance on
causation. Of the hundreds of commentaries on and studies of Nagarjuna's
philosophy since his death, the main hermeneutical approaches boil down to only
a very few, and these few come into play even at this early point in the karika.
A brief summary of the various hermeneutical approaches is necessary here, at
the outset, partly because they offer differing ways to reconcile verse one
(denial of causality) and verse two (affirmation of causality), but also because
they will be seen to surface again and again in various guises throughout this
presentation of the karika. One way to interpret the disparity between the two
verses is that Nagarjuna is being selective about what type of causation he
admits. A "cause" in the sense of an active and determinate force that effects
change is rejected. What is admitted is only that, if certain conditions
(pratyayas) are present, a thing can arise dependent on them. A second possible
interpretation is that Nagarjuna in verse one is only denying that a
causally-arisen existent is evident; the causal process could perhaps be claimed
to be either hidden or transcendent, and thus not accessible to human
perception. A third interpretation also rests on the word "evident:" Nagarjuna
could be claiming that, while causal relations are perceived by an unenlightened
person, they are seen as illusory and unreal by the one who has realized
nirvana. Fourth, the crux of the argument could be the concept of real
existence. Verse one declares that no existents are evident that have come to be
through the workings of causation. Perhaps things do arise from causes, but
these things do not really exist. Whereas the previous interpretation holds that
the causal processes are illusory, this position would state that it is the
ontic status of the elements themselves that is under attack. A final exegesis
is that mentioned earlier: Nagarjuna can perhaps be seen as rejecting causation
in all its forms and manifestations. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana solves this apparent
contradiction between the first two verses simply by stating that Nagarjuna was
denying causation but was neither denying nor confirming conditionality. This
interpretation is questionable and, even if it is valid, the problem is not
wholly resolved.
It may seem hasty to present so many interpretations so soon. However, as
mentioned, an immediate discussion of them is warranted, for, while here the
various positions relate only to Nagarjuna's treatment of causation, they can
and have been applied to almost all of the topics he examines. The five
interpretations as they relate to this context and their broader implications
can be summarized as follows: 1) Nagarjuna accepts causation, but selectively.
He isolates exactly which theory of causation he supports, clarifies this
theory, and rejects the rest. 2) Nagarjuna rejects the human ability to
understand the process, in this case the workings of cause-and-effect. The
mysterious mechanics of the universe are either too transcendent or too esoteric
for human investigation to access. 3) The whole process as well as its products
are illusory. The individual mired in the sphere of relativities may believe
that the world has certain qualities, but these specious beliefs evaporate when
one attains enlightenment and sees the true nature of things. 4) The issue
arises due to a mistaken understanding of existence. There are conditions
(pratyayas) dependent upon which things come to be, and one can speak of cause
and effect relative to these things, but they do not enjoy the status of having
substantial existence. Having no measure of independence, they cannot be said to
be real. 5) Nagarjuna is rejecting everything for the sake of nonsense. He
denies causation only to follow it with an assertion of causation. The point of
this is to force his readers to abandon concepts altogether and achieve an
unmediated awareness of the absolute, and nonconceptual, nature of the world.
These five opinions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It will be seen that
most or all are accurate in certain situations and that there may not be any one
single exegesis that will be accurate in all situations.
The following summary of the karika will first present Nagarjuna's basic
arguments on each topic and reserve commentary until all elements have been
examined. The above five interpretations can be kept in mind to help understand
his themes and what to make of them. It is hoped that this will not prove too
confusing at times; the reader is to be reassured that generalized elucidation
is forthcoming.
The majority of this first section seems to be an examination of what type of
relation holds between the effect and the conditions pratyayas) which gave rise
to it. The self-nature of the effect is not evident in the conditions
(pratyayas), he says in verse three, so the relation between cause and effect is
not one of identity. The effect is not inherent and preexisting in the cause. If
it were, then the self-nature of the effect would have to exist before the
effect itself came into manifestation. Yet this implies eternalism and leads to
a philosophical impasse like that the atman school faced when forced to explain
how change could occur if self- nature is eternal and immutable. Neither,
however, is the effect a new creation that is wholly different from the cause.
If the effect were not preexistent in the condition, then effects would not
depend on causes. This would allow for utter randomness---anything could arise
at any time. FOOTNOTE: karika I.12 It is thus not appropriate to see the effect
as arising either from conditions (pratyayas), which implies eternalism, or from
non-conditions (pratyayas), which implies anarchy.
Nagarjuna also demonstrates that one cannot view either conditions (pratyayas)
or the effects arising from them as existent. The two options are that an effect
either existed or did not exist at the time it was brought into being, but
neither position withstands scrutiny. The reason is that neither of the two
elements of the equation, the "effect" and its "cause," can exist independently.
They come into being only in dialectical relation to each other, and neither can
be isolated and examined separate from its dialectical component. If the effect
is said already to exist at the time of its rising, then what is the use of
saying it had a cause? If it already existed, then the concept of a cause
becomes superfluous. However, neither can one say that the effect did not yet
exist at the time of its arising. If so, then what would be the function of a
cause? "Of what use is a [cause] of the existing [effect]?" asks Nagarjuna.
FOOTNOTE: karika I.6. (pratyaya translated by me as "cause." cf. Monier-Williams
673) Neither can one attempt to resolve the dilemma by positing some agency that
is either a combination of existence and nonexistence or is a rejection of both.
There is thus no way to attribute any form of existence to an effect and still
speak of its cause. "Since a thing that is existent or non-existent or both
existent and non-existent is not produced, how pertinent in that context would a
producing cause be?" Nagarjuna summarizes. FOOTNOTE: karika I.7 Nagarjuna's
clear presentation of the implications of cause-and-effect demonstrates that the
entire problem stems from an over-analysis of the categories. There is only a
problem if one attempts to separate cause and effect and speak of each in
isolation. While the argument is clear and seemingly incontrovertible as he
presents it, the consequences of his conclusion are far- reaching. If cause and
effect arise only in mutual dependence, as the Buddha taught, then all talk of
real existence must be abandoned, a radical conclusion indeed. FOOTNOTE: It may
seem that an inherent contradiction in Nagarjuna's philosophy is exposed by his
language: in the very act of denying the reality of either existence or
non-existence the verb "to be" is used. For example, verse XXV.10 reads "nirvana
is neither existence nor non- existence" (italics mine). This problem stems from
translation only. Unlike English, Sanskrit does not rely on the verb "to be" to
express relations. In this example, the original is "na bhavo nabhavo nirvanam,"
which literally reads "Neither existence nor non- existence nirvana."
(Curiously, though Sprung pointed out this problem, he neglected to answer it.
Cf. Sprung 12)

Section two--The Relationship between Nominal and Verbal Subjects

Section one does not exhaust Nagarjuna's explanations of causality, for he
discusses it throughout the entire work and examines it in greater depth
especially in sections four and twenty. His intent in opening the karika with a
brief examination of causality probably was to preclude any initial
misunderstandings and to refute the theories of causality which were both the
dominant theories in the non-Buddhist world and which also had become prevalent
within Buddhist philosophy. His next subject, "Examination of the Moved and the
Not-Moved," is an investigation of the process, rather than the elements, of
dependent arising. The Buddha's doctrine of dependent arising shifted the
ontological emphasis from one of static "being" to one of dynamic "becoming." It
is the use of verbs rather than nouns that can express reality and its intrinsic
fluctuant nature. Nagarjuna discusses the notions of change by examining one
concrete example: motion and rest. He breaks down the verb into its three
components of the verb in the abstract, its subject, and its sphere of activity,
in this case motion, the mover, and the space within which motion occurs.
The concept of "movement" is dissected and scrutinized to demonstrate that the
three categories of the verb, its subject, and its sphere are all untenable.
There is indisputably a perception of action, but this perception cannot be
explained in a way that withstands logical inspection. First, a span of time is
necessary for activity to take place. Activity, of any kind, requires a process
of changing physical position or changing attributes. This change requires a
temporal extension, for an instantaneous change would be tantamount to the
complete disappearance of one thing and the appearance in its place of a wholly
new thing. Nagarjuna first points out that to speak of motion in the present
requires isolating the present moment. Movementin the past or in the future
obviously does not constitute present moving; neither the "has moved" nor the
"will move" is presently moving. When, though, did the motion of the
presently-moving object commence? Prior to its commencement it was the "will
move," but a "will move" is not moving. "How could there be a movement in the
not [yet] moved?" he asks. FOOTNOTE: karika II.13 Likewise, movement is not
initiated in the "has moved," for the "has moved," by definition, is not
partaking of present movement. Further, movement does not commence in the
"presently moving," for this is already moving---an action cannot begin anew in
a place where it is already present. The exact commencement of motion can never
be perceived, for, no matter how infinitesimally small the atomistic division of
time, there will always be one point at which the object is not yet moving.
"When the commencement of movement is not being perceived in any way, what is it
that is discriminated as the moved, the present moving, or the not [yet] moved?"
FOOTNOTE: karika II.14 Thus movement can only be perceived in the present
moment, and the activity's necessary time span is lost. With the loss of
temporal extension, the verbal activity becomes unfathomable, and hence unreal.
Even assuming that one could still speak of motion even when confined to a
single present moment only, one now has the problem of what moves. By
definition, only a mover can partake of movement. Likewise, separated from a
mover, there can be no such thing as movement in the abstract. The relation
between these two, the moverand the fact of its movement, is logically
meaningless. To say that a mover moves is redundant and superfluous. To say that
a non-mover moves is to state a contradiction. But these are the only two
options, for, "other than a mover and a non-mover, what third party moves?"
FOOTNOTE: karika II.8 It may sound reasonable to say that it is a mover who
partakes of movement. But it is not appropriate to speak of a mover without
movement for, if it does not move, then by what is it a mover? Either option
creates a disjunction between the subject and its actionthat is unacceptable.
The subject of motion is only half the story. One must further examine the lack
of motion, or rest. The problems encountered by the issue of rest are identical
as those faced by motion: a mover is not stationary, for this is a
contradiction, a non-mover is not stationary, for this is a needless tautology,
and there is no third party that is stationary. Further, a movercannot come to
rest, for it would then cease to be a mover. If a mover were to become a
"rester," then its identity would change and it would no longer be the same
subject; there would be the dissolution of the moving object and the instant
creation of the stationary object.
The obvious objection to the above arguments is to say that they assume an
untenable identity of a mover and its movement. This identity should be replaced
with a concept of difference, the opposition could declare: the mover is not the
same as its movement, but merely possesses movement. If this were so, though,
then movement would exist in the abstract and be independent of the mover. There
would be motion but nothing moving. Another problem of isolating the subject
from its movement is that this subject is not perceived in any way. This subject
devoid of attributes, what Western philosophy calls the "bare particular," would
be a metaphysical creation produced purely by the imagination, for it could
never be experienced. Nagarjuna closes this section with the summary statement
that neither motion, nor the mover, nor the space moved in is evident. FOOTNOTE:
karika II.25 He has up to this point not offered an explicit discussion of the
spatial dimension, but he states that the reality of space is to be negated in
the same way that motionand rest were.
The reader is at this point likely to be left with the thought that Nagarjuna
was a rampaging nihilist. All concepts are being summarily denied for some
obscure and perverse purpose. Admittedly, this is a conclusion that has
occasionally been drawn by admirers and detractors alike, both ancient and
modern. However, while it is not yet clear what Nagarjuna's intent is, it is
likely not one so simple. He appears to be negating, not the reality of subject
and object and their attributes, but rather just some way of thinking about
them. Regarding the topic of this section, he wrote "The view that movement is
identical with the mover is not proper. The view that the mover is different
from motionis also not proper." FOOTNOTE: karika II.18 It remains to be seen,
though, what view is proper.

Sections three through six--Factors of Personal Existence: Elements and Passions

Nagarjuna moves from these foundational examinations to an analysis of each of
the specific categories delineated by the Abhidharma: the spheres of sense
(ayatanas), the factors comprising the individual (skandhas), and the physical
elements dharmas). He begins with an examination of the sense faculty of the
eye, its function, and its object. He uses seeing as a paradigm for all of the
senses, because an examination of one sense faculty is sufficient to explain the
function of all of the senses. FOOTNOTE: More than this, the faculty of vision
was paramount in Indian philosophy. Truths were seen as being self- evident, so
much so that the term for a system of thought was darsana, "sight." The Buddha
also emphasized the unique significance of sight by telling his followers, not
to "believe" him, but to "come and see [for yourself]." Cf. Rahula, 8-9
The theory of perception explained in section three of the karika, ``Examination
of the Faculty of the Eye,'' is nothing more than a restatement of the Buddha's
teaching of dependent arising. On the one side are the six sense faculties, and
on the other are their six objective spheres. When these two come together,
sensory perception arises. (The mind is considered the sixth organ of sense. It
is not to be confused with consciousness, which infuses all six faculties, not
just the mental.) There was little controversy about the senses themselves,
FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1992, 164 so what likely inspired this section was a debate
regarding the specific functioning of the faculties. Hindu philosophy posited
two distinct elements necessary for seeing: the seeing of the object, and the
abstract noun "seeing." FOOTNOTE: ibid., 164 This is analogous to the
above-mentioned debate over motion, in which there was a tendency to isolate and
make abstract the process of "movement" as separate from the actual instance of
moving. There was also a disagreement regarding the functioning of the senses
within Buddhism. The older Theravada tradition held that the sensory objects
exist outside of and independent of the act of perception. This may not
necessarily violate dependent arising, for the sensory object consists only of
infinitesimal and momentary atoms and the functioning of the faculty of
perception is required to impose order on the atoms and create a perception.
FOOTNOTE: Hiriyanna, 204 While this theory may not be wrong per se, Nagarjuna
was still uncomfortable with the substantialism it implied. To clarify exactly
what dependent arising says about the function of perception, he used an
illustration: perceptions depend on their physical objective sphere "just as the
birth of a son is said to be dependent upon the mother and the father."
FOOTNOTE: karika III.7 That is, perception is wholly dependent upon the object
perceived for its functioning. Perception as an independent process or entity
cannot exist in the abstract, separate from the object perceived.
The other aspect of perception that he felt compelled to examine, after
perception and the perceived, was the subject perceiver. Again, the immediately
obvious alternative to the Buddha's teaching was the Hindu. The Upanisads
asserted an unchanging and eternal agent perceiver, and declared that this
eternal soul is the ultimate object of all perceptions. The truest and most
primal perception is that of the atman, the soul, being aware of itself. This
concept is surely what Nagarjuna had in mind in the second verse of this section
when he says that "seeing does not perceive itself, its own form." There must be
two separate elements for seeing to arise: the seer and the seen. Yet on the
other hand, seeing must in some way perceive itself, for "how can that which
does not see itself see others?" FOOTNOTE: karika III.2 A further confusion lies
in the seer's relation to his or her seeing. Like the mover and movement, "a
seer does not exist either separated or not separated from seeing." FOOTNOTE:
karika III.6 If the seer exists separate from the action of seeing, then there
will be some point at which the seer is not presently seeing, and thus is not
yet a "seer." If they are not separated, then there is no one engaging in the
activity of seeing, but rather one whose nature it is always to see. This theory
can perhaps be asserted metaphysically, but it is never experienced in fact. The
way to disentangle the paradox is by not positing either a strict bifurcation
between seer and seen, which would preclude their possibility of interacting, or
an identity between the two, which would obviate perception as a faculty. The
proper description of the relation between the two, i.e. dependent arising, is
yet to be explained.
Section four, ``Examination of the Aggregates,'' discusses the Buddha's insight
into the transitoriness of all phenomena. He saw that impermanency requires that
there be no permanent entities. Conversely, if there are permanent entities,
then these can never be phenomenal, and thus are pure abstractions that are too
metaphysical to have any relevance. The apparent permanence of the noumenal
individual was explained as a mere contiguity of phenomenal elements. The Buddha
analyzed these units of phenomena into two categories: the aggregates of factors
that constitute the apparent personality, the skandhas, and the physical
elements comprising these aggregates, the dhatus. These two categories, along
with the spheres of sense, comprised the base constituents of reality as
analyzed and classified by the Abhidharma. Having discussed the senses,
Nagarjuna now devotes two sections to an examination of the remaining two
categories.
Reacting to the schools that asserted a transcendent and immanent soul, the
Buddha analyzed the psychophysical personality into five aggregates to show that
there was no permanent soul in the individual and then to explain what does
comprise the individual. On the opposite end of the spectrum, he reacted to the
materialist theory that it is only matter which is eternal by analyzing the
physical elements themselves and exposing their transience. There was no debate
within Buddhism about the validity of these theories; the skandhas and the
dhatus were accepted by all. However, it appears that there was a tendency to
read more into these theories than the Buddha intended. The "Realists" posited
some form of a self-nature that resided in the elements, and the "Personalists"
asserted that there was some form of a self-hood that transcended but was
neither identical with nor different from its component aggregates.
Nagarjuna chose to approach these heretical theories in this section by
demonstrating first that it is not possible to think of the aggregates as real.
The aggregates into which the Buddha analyzed the individual were material form
(the body), sense-contacts, perceptions, psychological tendencies (the
characteristics that most evidently distinguish one personality from another),
and consciousness. These could be reified by positing a base foundation for
each. For example, the foundation for material form would be the elements of
earth, air, fire, water, and space, and the foundation of sense-contact, or
feeling, would be pleasure, pain, gladness, sadness, or indifference. FOOTNOTE:
Kalupahana 1992, 146 Such a reification, Nagarjuna argued, requires an untenable
division between the foundations of an aggregate and the aggregate itself. Any
attempt to relate an aggregate and its foundation dissolves into nonsense in
exactly the same way that a mover and its movementcannot be related. Consider,
for example, feeling and one of its constituents, pleasure. Are they two
different things? If so, then they will exist independently, and will lose their
dialectic identity. The various perceptions and sensations will not be a
foundational constituent for the human category of feeling if feeling is not
contingent upon them, and vice versa. Then are they identical? If so, the
division between an aggregate and its foundation would become meaningless, for
they would then be one and the same. Feeling would be both pleasure and pain
always and at the same time. The only relation they could have is one of
complete dependence, which is exactly what the Buddha taught. Neither the
aggregates nor that which comprises them have any existence on their own: in
this example, pleasure does not exist until it is felt, and feeling has no
function until there is pleasure. FOOTNOTE: It may be noted that the paradigm
offered by the Buddha is wholly antithetical to that of Platonism: the Platonic
``theory of Forms'' represents an epitome of the worldview Nagarjuna was
rejecting. It seems that Nagarjuna's only grievance about the theory of the
aggregates was the tendency to seek a substantial reality underlying each
aggregate. While the systematization of the categories produced by the
Abhidharma was not necessarily wrong, Nagarjuna wanted to ensure that no
excessive metaphysical theorizing resulted from it.
Section five, "Examination of the Physical Elements," is along similar lines.
The Buddha spoke of the elements as each having a specific characteristic, e.g.
the nature of earth is hardness and the nature of water is fluidity. However,
cautions Nagarjuna, this distinction between an element and its characteristic
cannot be pressed too far. If the characterized, e.g. earth, exists separately
from its characteristic, e.g. hardness, then one is left with two independent
and meaningless abstractions: a piece of earth that is not yet associated with
hardness, and a piece of hardness that exists only in the potential. "An
existent that is without characteristics is nowhere evident," he said.
Furthermore, "in the absence of the [existent], there is no occurrence of the
characteristic." FOOTNOTE: karika V.2 and V.4, respectively The relation of
elements and their qualities, if scrutinized closely enough in this manner,
produces a rather startling conclusion: "There is neither an existent nor a non-
existent, neither the characterized nor the characteristic," nor even any of the
elements comprising physical existence! FOOTNOTE: karika V.7 A statement such as
this obviously is subject to many and diverse interpretations, such as the five
summarized above. FOOTNOTE: The reader is reminded that the word ``is'' in
``there is neither an existent nor a non-existent'' is problematic in English
translation only. The original reads na bhavo nabhavo, literally ``neither
existent nor non-existent.''
Nagarjuna devotes section six to an ``Examination of Lust and the Lustful One.''
The word used here for ``lust,'' raga, can mean any general feeling of passion
or strong interest. FOOTNOTE: Monier-Williams, 872 (To express their broad
meanings, lust and its opposite, hate, will often be translated here as
``passionate attraction and aversion.'') His purpose here is to show that, like
movement and the one who moves, lust and the one who is lustful are
interdependent and cannot be ontologically distinguished. There is no such thing
as a subject who is a tabula rasa, who is not presently lustful but who either
was or will be, for then in what abstract realm could the unmanifest lust
possibly exist? Further, neither can lust and the lustful one be one and the
same, for then there would be no such thing as the noun "lust"---there would
only be one entity, the lustful one, and speaking of two different things would
be a superfluity.
There are two possible significances of this section. The one favored by
translator David Kalupahana is that Nagarjuna was here addressing one of the
issues that the Buddha said was chiefly to blame in committing the individual to
bondage. Greed, hatred, and lust are all instances of the thirst tanha) that
binds the individual to the cycle of unpleasant birth-and- death, especially the
misguided greed and lust for continued existence. FOOTNOTE: Rahula, 29 Freedom,
nirvana, was defined as the absence of lust, and therefore, Kalupahana seems to
say, Nagarjuna demonstrated the independent unreality of lust to facilitate
escaping from it and realizing nirvana. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986, 40-41 and
153-4
A slightly different significance is hinted at by the placement of this section.
It immediately follows an examination of the components of reality and the
individual, i.e. the physical elements (dhatus) and the constituent aggregates
of the psychophysical individual (skandhas). Nagarjuna has already examined two
of the five aggregates, perception in section three and material form in section
four. The fourth constituent aggregate of the individual is samskara, mental
formations and dispositions. These dispositions include any volitional activity
or habitual tendency, good and bad, that creates karma and thus binds one to the
cycle of birth-and-death. Dispositions include confidence and conceit, wisdom
and ignorance, lust and hatred. FOOTNOTE: Rahula, 22 Since Nagarjuna examines
one of these dispositions, lust, shortly after a discussion of the aggregates as
a whole, it is likely that he is using lust as a paradigmatic example of all the
dispositions. His intention then would be to demonstrate in yet another way that
there is to be found no transcendent Self separate from its psychophysical
constituents. That Nagarjuna intended this section to be more comprehensive than
an examination of lust only is indicated by this section's concluding verse:
"Thus, with or without the lustful one, there is no establishment of lust. Like
lust, there is no establishment of anything with or without [accompaniments]."
FOOTNOTE: karika VI.10 (italics mine) That is, all dispositional constituents of
the individual are ultimately dependent. Any real existence of them is illusory,
whether the individual exists or not.

Section seven--Cohesion of Disparate Elements (Samskrta)

The basic elements necessary for the manifestation of the physical world, i.e.
causal conditions (pratyayas), verbs, the factors of the perceiving individual,
and the physical elements have now been briefly examined. It is now possible to
examine the way the elements combine to make phenomena. Nagarjuna proceeds to do
this in section seven, "The Examination of Composite Things." FOOTNOTE: The word
used here, samskrta, is usually translated as "conditioned." To avoid confusion
with "conditions (pratyayas)," pratyaya, it will be clearer to translate
samskrta as "composite." (cf. Monier-Williams, 1120) The Buddha described all
composite elements, i.e. all phenomena, as partaking of three characteristics:
arising, enduring, and ceasing. Things come to be, remain for a time, and then
go away. Nagarjuna accepts these three processes of existence, but cautions
against hypostatizing any of them. If a thing were defined by either real
arising, real enduring, or real ceasing, then there would be the oddity of the
origination of a thing which has no duration or cessation, of something that
endures but has no origination or decay, or of a thing that dies but which was
never born. FOOTNOTE: Murti 1960, 192
The obvious way out of the dilemma is to say that a thing merely can be
described in terms of one of the three processes, rather than partaking of the
nature of one of the three. This response may, at first, seem to be the proper
one. For example, a phenomenon can be said to arise, but that does not mean that
it partakes of a separate and real thing called "arising." If arising, enduring,
and ceasing were real, then they would be discrete entities and thus "not
adequate to function as characteristics of the composite [thing]." FOOTNOTE:
karika VII.2 The reason for this is that if they were real and discrete
entities, then a phenomenon could obviously not partake of all three at the same
time, which would mean that it would be arising at the same time that it was
ceasing. Neither could it partake of one after the other, for this would imply
that at the time of arising a thing was permanent, i.e. non-arisen, and then
becomes temporary between the moments of arising and ceasing, and then suddenly
shifts from a state of enduring to the process of decaying. One could never find
the precise moment when, for example, endurance gives way to cessation. Infinite
regress becomes unavoidable. Each of the three processes would itself have to
arise, endure, even if only but for an instant, and then cease. "If arising were
to produce this present arising, which arising would again produce that arising
of that arising?" Nagarjuna wryly asks. FOOTNOTE: karika VII.18. (This is the
context of the "wonderfully cryptic" verse quoted on page 40, i.e. "The arising
of arising is exclusively the arising of primary arising..." A further
elucidation of this, though, would not be proper here. Cf. karika VII.4)
The ineluctable conclusion of a close examination of the three processes is that
not one of them exists as real, and so the above response, though seemingly
acceptable, also breaks down. "As an illusion, a dream, a [mythical city], so
have arising, endurance, and destruction been exemplified." And, further, "with
the non-establishment of arising, duration, and destruction, the composite
[thing] does not exist." FOOTNOTE: karika VII.33-34 That is, if the three phases
of the process are negated, then the processed thing itself must be illusory.
Therefore, even the notion that a thing can be described in terms of one of the
three processes must fail, even if the processes themselves are not reified.
Sections eight through eleven--The Ontological Status of the Individual
Having discussed the elements both singly and in combination, Nagarjuna briefly
looks at the agent which appears to underlie or precede these phenomena. He does
this with the next four sections, in which he first examines the nature of the
agent and its action, then the preexistent self, then the relation between the
self's existence and its temporal states, and finally the prior and posterior
extremes of the self's existence.
There are two primary ways that philosophers have tended to approach the subject
of the self: one empirical, the other speculative. The empirical approach is
famously expressed by the Cartesian dictum "I think, therefore I am." Nagarjuna
analyzes this approach with the example of "I act, therefore I am" in section
eight, ``Examination of Action and Actor.'' It could be said that the agent
actor must exist, for it is apparent that activity exists. In section two
Nagarjuna removed the substantial basis for activity and change, but it is not
denied that both are still perceived by the ignorant and the enlightened alike.
The crux is what is the proper way to regard, or believe in, this activity and
change. It is not possible to say that there is a really existent agent who
performs a really existent action. Real existence implies immutability, for if
the entity's essence changed then it would no longer be the same entity.
However, this immutability would require an impassable dichotomy between the
ground of being and the sphere of activity. Neither is it possible to say that
the agent who acts is in some abstract way "non-existent." If this were so, then
change and activity would be effected without having been existentially caused.
Despite the above problems, Nagarjuna does not deny the occurrence of activity.
A flat denial of activity would undercut the entire foundation of the Buddha's
teachings on morality and, by extension, the Noble Path leading to enlightenment
would be lost. FOOTNOTE: karika VIII.5 The proper relation between agent and
actionis once again nothing more than dependent arising, for neither of the two
can have either a real or an unreal status. "We do not perceive any other way of
establishing [them]," he concludes. FOOTNOTE: karika VIII.12
The speculative approach to establishing the reality of the agent is logical
induction. Nagarjuna examines and refutes this approach in the next section,
"Examination of the Prior [Entity]." If there is the fact of perception, then
there is the entity of a perceiver, this approach would hold. "Therefore, it is
determined that, prior to [perceptions], such an existent is," asserts the
opponent. FOOTNOTE: karika IX.1-2 This could be expressed by slightly rephrasing
the Cartesian dictum to "How could I think were there not a thinker?" The
immediate problem with this is that such a "prior subject" could be nothing more
than a speculative abstraction. If the subject is said to exist prior to
perception, then "by what means is it made known?" FOOTNOTE: karika IX.3 There
is no way to be aware of or even to posit the existence of a subject prior to
and thus intrinsically devoid of its characteristic functioning. Further, if
such a prior entity were posited, then perceptions would exist independent of
the perceiver, which is absurd. The analysis of perception undertaken above in
section three of the karika focused on the impossibility of independence
specifically of perceiver and perceiving. This section, though, is slightly
different in scope---it analyzes the impossibility of the subject's existence
independent of any of its experiences by virtue of existing prior to them. The
consequence of this is broad. "Someone prior to, simultaneous with, or posterior
to [perception] is not evident," and therefore neither are the experiences
themselves evident. The upshot is that "thoughts of existence and non-existence
are also renounced." FOOTNOTE: karika IX.11-12
Section ten is, prima facie, an examination of one dualism: fire and the fuel
which it burns. Actually, though, Nagarjuna was using this example to discuss
from yet another angle the issue of the essence and temporal manifestation of
the self. One school of Personalism asserted that there is a person who is
neither identical with nor different from its constituent aggregates, skandhas.
Adherents of this school used the metaphor of fire and fuel to explain their
position. Fire is not identical to its fuel, for then that which is burned would
be the same as the process of burning. Nor is fire different from fuel, for then
they could not be explained in the same terms; for example, that which is
burning would not be hot. FOOTNOTE: Lamotte, 608 Notwithstanding the fact that
the individual cannot be explained ontologically, the Personalists held, it was
still necessary to assert its reality, for otherwise karma could not appertain
and rebirth would not occur. FOOTNOTE: Kohn, 243 It was this doctrine which
Nagarjuna criticized through his analysis of fire and fuel.
Nagarjuna agrees that fire and fuel cannot be identical, for then there would be
only one entity, and he agrees that they cannot be separate, for then there
could be heat and flame but nothing burning. While the Personalists were
maintaining that fire and fuel were neither identical nor different, they were
still admitting the reality of both. Their agenda would then have been to
deconstruct the ontological independence of the two for the sake of arriving at
a higher synthesis midway between the two halves of the dualism. FOOTNOTE:
Kalupahana 1986, 197 It is difficult to explain what Nagarjuna's position is in
this section, for he seems to say two different things. One verse especially
makes it unclear what exactly Nagarjuna's stance on the identity/difference was.
"If fire is different from fuel it would reach the fuel, just as a woman would
reach for a man and a man for a woman," he says. FOOTNOTE: karika X.6 He follows
this with a statement that fire and fuel could reach for each other in the same
way as do the man and the woman "only if fire and fuel were to exist mutually
separated." FOOTNOTE: karika X.7 On the one hand, he denied difference in the
first verse of this section by pointing out that if they are different then each
would exist on its own, an absurd conclusion. On the other, the fact that woman
and man interact is empirically validated and indisputable. One interpretation
of this disparity is based on the fact that there are numerous instances in the
Mulamadhyamakakarika in which Nagarjuna quotes an opponent's position and
refutes it in the next verse. Some commentators have interpreted the first verse
of these two as the opponent's wrong view, followed by Nagarjuna's assertion of
the correct view. FOOTNOTE: Cf. the translation of the karika verses X.8-9 in
Frederick Streng, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (Nashville: Abingdon
Press, 1967). (It has been claimed that this translation is not by Streng, as
claimed, but by J. A. B. van Buitenen. Cf. Kees W. Bolle, review of A History of
Buddhist Philosophy, by David J. Kalupahana, in Journal of Oriental Studies
(1994, page number unknown). However, since it is Streng's name only listed in
Emptiness and cross-references are to Streng, this translation will be referred
to here as his.) This interpretation would have Nagarjuna say that, while fire
and fuel are not the same, they are not really different, either. Man and woman,
though, are non-dependent and hence different.
Another interpretation does not disagree with the above, but lends it a slightly
different character. One could interpret both verses as Nagarjuna's, from which
it would follow that he is recognizing there to be different types of
complementary relationships. While on the one hand fire and fuel are mutually
dependent for their very definition, on the other the human genders are observed
to be complementary but separate. This would declare there to exist dualisms the
individual elements of which are dependently arisen, not contingent on the other
half of the pair, but merely contingent upon internal factors. The perception
and conceptual differentiation of each half of the duality would of course be
dependent on the other half---one could not define "woman" without defining
"man"---but the ontic status of the entity would not be dependent on the other
half. While it is not certain which of the above two interpretations is the
better, an example Nagarjuna used in section six, i.e. that of lust and the
lustful one, may provide a clue. There, he made it clear that, though lust and
the lustful one are differentiable, neither can exist without the other. Not
only are their identities mutually contingent, but further they cannot be found
in separate temporal or spatial locations. Likewise, fire and fuel are
ultimately inseparable. Man and woman, though, are obviously separate. If
nothing else, the two genders can be seen to exist when in separate spatial
locations, when not "reaching for" each other. Nagarjuna is thus demonstrating
that complementary relationships can take different forms, which relationships
allow varying degrees of independence of each half of the pair.
Section eleven, "Examination of the Prior and Posterior Extremities," is devoted
to an address of one last element of the belief in the soul, namely the
eternalism it implies. The Buddha spurned discussions of etiology and teleology
both because the only important things to worry about are those in the present,
and also because ultimate beginnings and ends can only be speculative. Nagarjuna
here examines the meaning and relevance of the latter, the ultimate prior and
posterior ends. The Buddha clearly stated that the ultimate ends of the universe
are not evident and hence inconceivable. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986, 206
Furthermore, it is not even appropriate to speak of the ultimate ends of an
individual life-span, for they cannot be "real." If birth were real, then three
undesirable options would arise. If birth preceded the entity of death, then
there would be a birth without old age and death, and all arisen things would be
immortal. If death is inherent in birth, then something will be dying at the
same moment it is being born. Finally, if it is flatly stated that birth and
death are separate, then no born things will die and the things that die will
never have been born. The only correct way to view birth-and-death is that, if
something is born, then it will die. This is not merely a slightly different way
to phrase the relationship between the two, but rather a whole different way of
viewing the nature of birth and death: they do not exist on their own, and
therefore one can in no way speak of origins or ends. Of effect and cause,
characterized and characteristic, "of the entire life process as well as of all
existents, the prior [and posterior] ends [are] not evident." FOOTNOTE: karika
XI.7-8. (The addendum "[and posterior]" is mine. It was left out of the sentence
most likely only to preserve the meter, so its inclusion is justified.)
Sections twelve and thirteen--Suffering and its Cause
Nagarjuna has now analyzed almost all of the elements into which the Abhidharma
subdivided reality. Only one percept has not yet been mentioned. This is duhkha,
the all-encompassing universal suffering. The Buddha spoke of "three marks of
existence": impermanence, soullessness, and suffering. Impermanence and
soullessness are descriptions of the ontological status of phenomena, and
suffering is the consequence of these for the individual. The next two sections
of the karika discuss, first, the nature and origin of suffering itself and
second, the dispositions which cause all phenomena to be experienced as
suffering.
Buddhism does not see duhkha as just a regrettable fact of life that must be
accepted. This would be simple pessimism. Since Buddhism is preeminently a
soteriology, the fact of suffering is exploited to spur the unhappy individual
on to the proper goal of nirvana. FOOTNOTE: Santina, 31-33 The Buddha was very
clear that one must have a proper understanding of suffering and its origin if
one is to utilize this understanding and ultimately escape from suffering.
Nagarjuna examined all the possibilities of the cause of suffering, namely
self-causation, other-causation, both, or neither, and found that none were
tenable. The result of considering suffering to be self-caused would be that one
person acts in a way that causes suffering, and then this same person
experiences the suffering. This would mean that the same person existed in at
least two separate moments, which would lead to the belief in eternalism. If
suffering is considered to be caused by another, then there would not be a firm
connection between an act and its consequences. This could lead to a denial of
moral responsibility. A further objection to both of the above is that any
distinction between the agent and the suffering caused by the agent's act would
allow for there to be a person existing separate from suffering. Who is this
person who can exist unsullied by duhkha? asks Nagarjuna. FOOTNOTE: karika
XII.4,6 Finally, if caused by both, then the above difficulties are just
compounded, and if caused by neither, then it would be deterministic and nirvana
forever unattainable. When a disciple asked the Buddha if suffering is
self-caused or is caused by another, the Buddha did not answer "yes" or "no" to
either question. He merely remarked, in answer to each, "one should not put it
that way." FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986, 45 To preclude the false and harmful
beliefs mentioned above, the fact of suffering was neither explained nor
explained away. The only important thing is its eradication, which is indirectly
the subject of the next section.
Nagarjuna examined briefly in section six the nature of passions like lust and
hatred, or passionate attraction and aversion, and demonstrated that they are
dependent upon the one who grasps. This proves that the constraining passions
are ultimately illusory and can have no real claim on the one who understands
them. An understanding of this dependence paves the way for the possibility of
freeing oneself from the passions and discovering nirvana. He examines the
nature of dispositions once again in section thirteen, "Examination of
Dispositions," but with a different emphasis. Whereas in the earlier section he
focused on the dependence of the dispositions on the subject, here he explains
in greater detail why the dispositions can have no independent reality.
FOOTNOTE: The importance of this section is hinted at by the difficulty the
Buddhist tradition has had in naming it. Most interpreters have entitled it
"Samskara-pariksa," the analysis of "Dispositions" (Kalupahana) or "Conditioned
Elements" (Streng), even though the term samskara appears in the chapter only
once. The Tibetan texts gave it the title "Tattva-pariksa," analysis of "Truth,"
though the term tattva does not appear in the chapter once. Sprung's title of
"The Absence of Being in Things" may be the most accurate, for the terms "sunya"
or "sunyata" appear in half the verses. However, since this debate is too
involved for the context at hand, Kalupahana's translation is accepted here.
This section, at eight verses in length, is one of the shortest in the karika.
However, it is one of the most important examinations of the entire treatise.
The dispositions have a unique place in the Buddha's ontology, for they hold a
very influential place in his two formulations of reality, i.e. dependent
arising and the aggregates of personal existence skandhas). As the second link
in the chain of dependent arising, dispositions are that which, conditioned by
ignorance, bring the world into existence. In the five categories comprising the
individual, dispositions both shape the personality and condition rebirth.
In placing this discussion immediately after the one of suffering, Nagarjuna
apparently had in mind the Buddha's "three marks of existence," impermanence,
suffering, and soullessness. The Buddha's exact wording here is important. He
did not indiscriminately ascribe these marks to all aspects of existence.
Specifically, he said "All conditioned things are impermanent. All conditioned
things are suffering. All phenomena are soulless." FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986,
218 An implication of this is, not that conditioned things are not soulless, but
that not all phenomena are suffering. FOOTNOTE: Neither may this be interpreted
to mean that phenomenal things are permanent. Admittedly, this is confusing.
Likely the Buddha just used the formulation that "all phenomena are soulless" to
be more comprehensive--- had he said "all conditioned things are soulless," one
would not be prevented from erroneously seeking a soul residing outside of the
conditioned things. cf. Rahula, 57-58. If the Buddha were to have said that all
phenomena are suffering, he would have been promoting an unreserved pessimism,
for there is no escaping phenomena while alive. By saying that all conditioned
things are suffering, he was showing a way to escape from suffering while in
this life. A person may be a part of the phenomenal world but not regard it in a
way that creates suffering, i.e. not seek reality in conditioned things. One
needs only an understanding of this unreal nature of things, which will allow
one to give up the grasping thirst for existence and the passions inspired by
experience. This, in turn, will pacify the dispositions, and most suffering will
be avoided. FOOTNOTE: Etymology provides an intriguing coincidence: the root of
the English word "passion" is the Latin pati, "to suffer." The cause of all of
this self-entrapment is a lack of proper understanding. "The dispositions depend
on ignorance," the Buddha said, and "the entire mass of suffering thus comes
into existence." FOOTNOTE: Ramana, 111 The key that Nagarjuna holds to all of
this is that he can clarify the nature of the passions and dispositions, which
will help to dispel the ignorance which causes duhkha.
The aggregate of dispositions is of crucial importance, for it is this aggregate
which, more than any of the other four, flavors the character of the whole
bundle. In terms of the human individual, dispositions are most directly
responsible for giving shape and uniqueness to the personality. The importance
of this aggregate and the frequency of Nagarjuna's reference to it warrants
further elucidation of its nature. The first three aggregates provide for the
material world, sensations of it, and the resultant cognizing of sensation
called perception. For example, the first aggregate may be an object, the second
aggregate senses the light reflecting from the object and reports the frequency
of the light, and the third aggregate identifies that frequency as "blue." The
fourth aggregate is a mix of attitudes, habits, emotions, passions, and thoughts
which cause the person to react to this perception, e.g. ``I like blue.''
This is also the place where, if one is not careful, such preferences and
attitudes can lead to grasping. These dispositions are what turn an otherwise
passive receiver of perceptions into a conceptualizing and acting individual.
These four all provide first an awareness of the external world and then
reactions to it. The fifth and final aggregate, consciousness, is not a sort of
higher result arising from the first four, for the internal mental life is found
in the fourth aggregate. Rather, consciousness is a term for the all-pervading
awareness which makes possible sensations, perceptions, and dispositions.
A quote from the philosopher William James, while written in reference to a
different tradition, is nonetheless one of the clearest and most cogent
expressions of the function and importance of the dispositions this author has
yet found.
"Conceive yourself, if possible, suddenly stripped of all the emotion with
which your world now inspires you, and try to imagine it as it exists, purely
by itself, without your favorable or unfavorable, hopeful or apprehensive
comment. It will be almost impossible for you to realize such a condition of
negativity and deadness. No one portion of the universe would then have any
importance beyond another; and the whole collection of its things and series
of its events would be without significance, character, expression, or
perspective." FOOTNOTE: William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience
(New York: The Modern Library, 1929), 147 (italics in original)
The dispositions are thus vital if the person is to act in and react to the
world, and action and reaction are themselves vital if one is to follow the
Eightfold Path. On the other hand, the dispositions can also be the chief cause
of grasping and will bind one to the cycle of suffering if one is not careful.
It is dispositions which constitute preferences, but it is these preferences
which can easily become passionate attractions and aversions. As Kalupahana puts
it, "we are, therefore, in a double-bind." We need the dispositions in order to
live, but they can also contribute most to our suffering. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana
1986, 48 The key is to use dispositional preferences without being used by them.
Nagarjuna's section here offers explanations and guidance about how one is to do
this.
To help to pacify, or break free from the clutch of the dispositions, Nagarjuna
introduces here his famous concept of emptiness, sunyata. FOOTNOTE: Emptiness
was first mentioned at the end of his fourth section. In that context, however,
it was mentioned for a different reason and may have even had a different
meaning. Cf. pp. 148f. First, he repeats his negation of the possibility of real
change. "Neither change of something in itself nor of something different is
proper. The youth does not age nor does an aged person age." FOOTNOTE: karika
XIII.5 An entity cannot both have a real identity and experience a change. If,
in the example, the person were youthful, then he or she would partake of no
agedness and thus could not remain a youth and still age. If the person were
aged, then it would be ludicrous to say that he or she ages. This would be
tantamount to saying, for example, that a red thing turns red: real change would
not have occurred. The solution is to say that all existent things have no
self-nature, svabhava. Substances do not have attributes---they are "empty."
Nagarjuna seems to feel that removing the possibility of holding false beliefs
is the best way to preclude dispositional grasping and the suffering concomitant
with it. If one understands that all things are empty, then ignorance will be
removed, the dispositions will lose their foundation, and "the entire mass of
suffering" will go out of existence.
Sections fourteen and fifteen--Identity/Difference: Self-nature vs. Association
of Distinct Elements
Nagarjuna has devoted the majority of the first thirteen sections to
examinations of each of the elements into which the Abhidharma classified
reality and some of the causal and dependence relations between these elements.
The problems he has with most of these elements boil down to the fact that they
cannot be considered in isolation. When any element is seen as being in some way
independent, logical paradoxes result. In section fifteen he addresses the root
cause of these problematic theories, which problem is the assertion of
self-nature, svabhava. Before tackling this pivotal issue, though, there was one
last point he wanted to clarify.
Nagarjuna has amply demonstrated that one cannot conceive of things in
isolation, because the identity which makes each a separate and distinguishable
"thing" depends wholly on its relation to other things. What he has not
addressed as fully as he would like is the relation itself. This he does in
section fourteen, "Examination of Association." If one asserts that phenomena
consist of separate yet interacting elements, then one is left with the problem
of how these elements combine, or associate, to produce the phenomena. There is
no way for atomistic and fully independent things to associate, for a truly
independent thing is non-contingent, incapable of being influenced, and thus not
subject to association. Further, if things are distinguishable, then their
identity can be defined in isolation. Yet the concept of difference requires
dependence. "Different things are dependent upon different things," Nagarjuna
says. FOOTNOTE: karika XIV.5 To say that things are different is to say that
they are separate. But, "without a second different thing, one different thing
can not exist as a different thing." FOOTNOTE: karika XIV.7, trans. Streng
(italics mine) Since any attempt to differentiate elements or phenomena reduces
to absurdity, there can be no such thing as association of these elements.
"Neither the associating nor the associated nor even the agent of association is
evident." FOOTNOTE: karika XIV.8 The English language affords an analogy here.
The etymology of both ``distinguish'' and ``distinction'' is the Latin
distinguere, ``to separate.'' As reality is ultimately whole, by whatever
definition, separations have only phenomenal validity. The consequence of this
is that there can be no way to declare a phenomenon to be composed of separate
but combined elements.
One of the aspects of the Buddha's teachings about which the Buddha was most
adamant is also one that proved to be the most unpalatable both to subsequent
Buddhists and to non-Buddhists alike. This is the assertion that there is no
real soul to be found in the universe. The Buddha was very explicit regarding
the doctrine of soullessness:
"Whether Buddhas arise, O priests, or whether Buddhas do not arise, it remains
a fact and the fixed and necessary constitution of being, that all its
elements are lacking in an ego (atman). FOOTNOTE: Following Freud, there is a
tendency to differentiate between the "ego" and the "soul," the ego being the
personality and the soul being the animating principle. Relating these varying
shades of meaning to the Buddha's skandha-theory would be fascinating, but
beyond the scope of this paper. The terms "ego," "self," "soul," and "atman"
will be used interchangeably here. (Whether ``self-nature'' is also a synonym
is precisely the point Nagarjuna discusses.) This fact a Buddha discovers and
masters... and announces, teaches, publishes, proclaims, discloses, minutely
explains and makes clear, that all the elements of being are lacking in an
ego." FOOTNOTE: Anguttara-nikaya- sutta, quoted in Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
and Charles H. Moore, eds., A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957), 274
Notwithstanding, the tendency to believe in the soul seems to have been almost
ineradicable, for it arose again and again in a variety of forms. The Theravada,
for example, saw every element as being a real entity with a self-nature,
svabhava. FOOTNOTE: Lamotte, 602 While not exactly a form of atman, self-nature
was nonetheless not so very different. Even more radical, certain of the
Abhidharma commentaries explicitly defined an element in terms of its
self-nature, declaring that it is precisely this permanent factor which gives an
element its distinguishing identity. FOOTNOTE: Warder, 323
Self-nature was the great bugaboo of metaphysical speculation, Nagarjuna felt,
for it was the assertion of self- nature that made incomprehensible the
relations between substance and attribute, subject and object, identity and
difference. Thus, the "Examination of Self-nature," though short, is of supreme
importance. While svabhava and atman are not exactly the same thing, as theories
they faced the same problems. Self-nature, for Nagarjuna, had to be seen as a
permanent and substantial identity for, if it were only temporarily the identity
of a thing, then it would not truly be that thing's identity. However, this
self-nature would have to be uncreated, neither caused nor dependent upon causal
conditions (pratyayas). "How could there be a self- nature that is made?" he
asks. FOOTNOTE: karika XV.2 That is, if it were not uncreated then it would be
artificial, and an artificial substance is inconsistent with the very definition
of substance. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1992, 165 If there is no self- nature, then
neither can there be its dialectical component, other-nature (parabhava),
Nagarjuna continues, and thus conceptions based on difference and relation would
be nullified.
Another significant corollary of svabhava is that it negates the very
possibility of existence itself. This can be illuminated by etymology. Sva -
bhava literally means "self - existence," and para - bhava literally means
"other - existence." Without sva - bhava and para - bhava, Nagarjuna says,
whence can there be existence itself, bhava? The reason for this is that
existence, bhava, "is established only when there is svabhava or parabhava."
FOOTNOTE: karika XV.4 Further, "when the existent is not established, the
non-existent is also not established," for the non-existent is nothing more than
the change of the existent. FOOTNOTE: karika XV. 5
The issue that Nagarjuna is addressing so doggedly is not simply metaphysical
eristics. The consequences for Buddhism are profound, for "those who perceive
self-nature as well as other- nature, existence as well as non-existence, they
do not perceive the truth embodied in the Buddha's message." FOOTNOTE: karika
XV.6 The Buddha explicitly denied both extremes because, as a belief system,
each was injurious for the individual seeking a release from suffering. To say
that something exists or has self-nature "implies grasping after eternalism." To
say that something does not exist now but once did, or exists now but will not
always exist, "implies the philosophy of annihilationism." Therefore, "a
discerning person should not rely upon either existence or non-existence."
FOOTNOTE: karika XV.10-11 These two extremes are each deleterious to the moral
life: annihilationism because it undercuts responsibility, and eternalism
because a firm belief in the self leads to a preoccupation with pleasure.
FOOTNOTE: Lamotte, 50
Sections sixteen and seventeen--Bondage and its Cause
The overarching purpose of Indian philosophy is the attainment of freedom.
"Salvation" in Western thought tends to mean "the acquisition of holiness" which
is provided by God. FOOTNOTE: Cf. Ninian Smart, The Philosophy of Religion (New
York: Random House, 1970), 104 Salvation is the deliverance from evil and the
bestowal of eternal life. "Freedom" for the Indian mind, however, is a little
different. It is a release from delusion and suffering which, while perhaps
assisted through God's guidance, is nonetheless wholly self-attained. FOOTNOTE:
T.R.V. Murti, "The Individual in Indian Religious Thought," in Charles A. Moore,
ed., The Indian Mind (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1967), 328 That
which caused the individual to be bound to the phenomenal world is, ultimately,
ignorance. The lack of spiritual understanding (jnana) leads to volitional
action, or karma, and the "fruits" of such action. These two elements, the
action and its result, constitute the law of universal cause-and-effect. In
order to attain liberation from the unpleasant cycle of birth-and-death, the
Buddha taught, one must disassociate oneself from volitional action. This is
done, not by refraining from volitional action, which would not be possible, but
by refraining from believing that there is a real self which does real acts. The
insight that there is no self is the antidote for ignorance. This understanding
allows one to abandon the dispositions, graspings, and passions which caused one
to be bound to the karmic cycle of birth- and-death in the first place.
Nagarjuna now examines these two interrelated concepts, bondage and its cause,
karma.
All of the major Indian religious systems--- Hinduism, Buddhism, and
Jainism---accepted the reality of karma and its corollary, rebirth. FOOTNOTE:
Charles A. Moore, "The Comprehensive Indian Mind," in ibid., 13 All acts were
necessarily followed by their fruits. If the fruit of an act had not as yet
become manifest by the time of the individual's death, then that individual
would be forced to return to existence in another life, again and again, until
the fruits of all actions had materialized. FOOTNOTE: One must not be left with
the impression that the systems were in agreement on the nature and function of
karmic volition. There have been, quite literally, as many interpretations of
karma as there were schools of Indian philosophy. This is technically referred
to as transmigration. The obvious difficulty that the Buddhist faced was in
reconciling the fact of bondage and its conjunct, transmigration, with the
Buddha's teaching that there is no self. This is the problem that is Nagarjuna's
major concern in section sixteen, ``Examination of Bondage and Release.'' "It
may be assumed that a person transmigrates," he agrees. Yet, he has demonstrated
in the previous sections that there is no person-hood, no self, to be found in
any of the elements of existence. "Who then will transmigrate?" FOOTNOTE: karika
XVI.2
The dilemma is, once again, found to be caused by a "Personalist"
misunderstanding of the theory of the aggregates (skandhas). The dispositions,
as the primary embodiment of the forces of grasping and greedy passions, are
also the chief forces causing rebirth. The erroneous tendency was to posit a
substantial self-nature in these dispositions. The popular belief, Nagarjuna
explains, was that only a real entity with real soul can be bound to phenomenal
existence and transmigrate. This, however, is not possible; as explained above,
there can be no self- nature in the dispositions. If there were an entity with a
permanent nature, then it could not transmigrate. Transmigration, Kalupahana
points out, "implies moving from one position to another, disappearing in one
place and appearing in another." FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986, 54 The notion of
permanence holds that an entity is always present, and so there is no question
of its ceasing and arising. Neither can an entity without an enduring
self-nature transmigrate, for, if the entity is truly temporary, then it will
completely cease, and no discussion of its continuance, either from one moment
to the next or from one life to the next, is appropriate. This method of
analysis, Nagarjuna says, applies not just to one factor of the individual, but
to the sentient being as a whole. It cannot transmigrate whether it has or does
not have a self-nature, and therefore it can experience neither bondage nor
release from bondage. If one thinks in terms of self- nature, then the
inevitable conclusion is that "a sentient being, like [dispositions], is neither
bound nor released." FOOTNOTE: karika XVI.5
Nagarjuna does not explicitly state in this section what is the proper way to
view the individual, its state of bondage, and the nature of release. It is to
be understood, though, and it will become clearer later, that the way out of the
impasse is to forego thoughts of substantialism. The Buddha's theory of the
aggregates, as explained above, manages to explain both what constitutes the
belief in an individual and how that belief could come to be without ever saying
that there actually is a real individual. Bondage and freedom are to be
understood in the same way: the factors that constitute the individual arise
interdependently and continuity consists, not in direct causation, but in causal
influence. This chain of arising is not broken by the event of a physical death.
Death is little more than the change of one of the aggregates, material form;
the chain of the other aggregates, and hence the appearance of self-hood,
continues unaffected as long as ignorant belief in the self remains.
A reading of section seventeen, "Examination of the Fruit of Action," indicates
that the tendency of substantialist thinking extended to karma in the same way
that it did to the transmigrating self. If the self transmigrates, the above
argument held, then it must have a perduring essence. Likewise, if the fruits of
an act necessarily follow the act, then the act must itself, in some way, also
perdure. Even to say that the act disappears and only its influence remains is
still to say that there is something remaining, asserted the opponent. Such a
reification of karma ultimately contradicts anatman, the Buddha's declaration
that nothing has a substantial existence. Yet it was of paramount importance to
Buddhism to affirm that there is karma and that its effects are inescapable, for
a denial of this would destroy the justification for morality. The Buddha's own
morality stemmed from his insight into anatman, soullessness, which by
definition results in selflessness. This selflessness awakened him to the plight
of the suffering world, leading him to teach "for the happiness of the many, out
of compassion for the world." FOOTNOTE: Rahula, 46 One who does not have this
insight into soullessness may need an incentive to act compassionately, an
incentive which the doctrine of karma provides. There was thus a need to affirm,
in some way, the reality of karma.
The Buddha stressed the inescapability of karma by saying that its results "do
not perish even after hundreds of millions of aeons. Reaching the harmony of
conditions pratyayas) and the appropriate time, they produce consequences for
human beings." FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986, 250 Nagarjuna explained this with an
analogy that is cryptic at best. "Like an imperishable promissory note," he
said, "so is debt as well as action. It is fourfold in terms of realms and
indeterminate in terms of primal nature." FOOTNOTE: karika XVII.14 The meaning
of this seems to be that karma does not have a substantial nature, just as
borrowed money is not real. Karma does effect change, and borrowed money can be
used to buy things. However, borrowed money is not really one's own, and at a
certain time it and/or whatever was purchased with it must be returned.
Similarly, the fruits of an action must materialize, following which both the
act and its fruit disappear. Although the process of karma is evident, the fact
that an effect and its cause arise only in mutual dependence means that neither
is truly real. They are "indeterminate in terms of primal nature." That karma is
"fourfold in terms of realms" means that all spheres of existence are ruled by
its effects: "there is no place on earth where a person can be released from his
evil actions," said the Buddha. FOOTNOTE: Dhammapada, quoted in Kalupahana 1986,
54 (paraphrased)
Nagarjuna concludes the section by stressing once again that neither the agent
nor his or her act is real. An action cannot be created either from conditions
(pratyayas) or from non-conditions for the reasons discussed in section one: if
created from causes, then it would depend on those causes and ultimately not be
separate from them. If created by non-conditions (pratyayas), then it would have
appeared indeterminately and the universe would be characterized by caprice.
Since the action is thereby produced neither by a causal agent nor by no agent,
then the agent who would otherwise be defined in terms of that action does not
exist. And, "if both action and agent are non-existent, where could there be the
fruit born of action? When there is no fruit, where can there be an
experiencer?" FOOTNOTE: karika XVII.30 It is necessary to uphold the moral path
by affirming the process of karma, but declaring there to be a permanent nature
residing therein is equally undesirable. Such a theory, Nagarjuna demonstrated,
is logically indefensible. Nagarjuna reconciles these difficulties by closing
this section with an analogy. Imagine that a person, through the use of magical
powers, creates a golem, an artificial human, and that this creature in turn
creates its own golem. "In the same way, an agent is like a created form and his
action is like his creation. It is like the created form created by another who
is created." FOOTNOTE: karika XVII.31-32 Dependent on each other, and within the
sphere of relative existence, agents and their action are equally real and must
be treated accordingly. From the once-removed standpoint of the enlightened
being, neither is real. Bondage and karma are self-perpetuating, and the way to
become free is to relinquish the belief in the permanent soul and thereby uproot
both.
Section eighteen--Self-hood and its Consequences
Nagarjuna apparently felt that he had not yet explained fully the way in which
belief in a permanent individual leads to bondage. (The reader may feel the
same.) He therefore addresses this issue more directly in section eighteen,
"Examination of Self." This section, though short and though ostensibly an
examination of this one particular topic, is actually one of the densest and
weightiest in the entire work. Nagarjuna here mentions in passing certain issues
of such far-reaching import that they elucidate the entire scope and purpose of
this thought. Specifically, after discussing the connection between
self-theories and bondage, he mentions the manner in which the sphere of thought
and its conceptualizing activity evoke the entirety of reality, then he alludes
to the nature of this reality (tathata) and the characteristics of final truth.
The significance of these issues as relevant to the immediate topic of the
section will be explained, but a fuller discussion of their broad import will
have to wait.
The untenability of the concept of a permanent soul, atman, has already been
addressed, but Nagarjuna now sums up once again and in a slightly different way
the reasons for rejecting this belief. The self is neither identical with nor
different from its constituent aggregates. If it were identical, then it would,
like they, partake of arising and ceasing and thus not be permanent. If it were
different from the aggregates, then it could not have the same characteristics
of them; e.g. it could not have the potential for perception or the quality of
consciousness. A consequence of the insubstantiality of the self Nagarjuna has
not previously mentioned is the impossibility of it having possessions. "In the
absence of the self, how can there be something that belongs to the self?" Since
the self can have neither characteristics nor possessions, "one abstains from
creating the notions of "mine" and "I." FOOTNOTE: karika XVIII.2 The import of
this is that it is "grasping" based on this possessiveness which binds one to
repeated existence. Contact with the perceived world, if it is believed to have
a real existence, leads to a desire for pleasant sensations and an aversion from
unpleasant ones. Both are forms of grasping. If, on the other hand, the world is
believed to be founded on nonexistence, then, the Buddha taught, yet another
form of grasping results: one fears the supposed nihility of nonexistence and
clings even more strongly to the cycle of repeated births. All of these forms of
greedy clinging are rooted in the belief that there is a permanent soul which
can possess things: possession leads to obsession. The teaching of soullessness
counteracts these self-created fetters, for, by definition, the theory of
no-self negates self-ish-ness. "When views pertaining to 'mine' and 'I'... have
waned, then grasping comes to cease. With the waning of that [grasping], there
is waning of birth." FOOTNOTE: karika XVIII.4 A variety of unwholesome actions
and conceptions result from a firm belief in the self, including grasping and
repulsion, passionate attractions and aversions, selfishness and pride, hedonism
and excessive asceticism. These are all referred to as defilements, and it is
these which occasion rebirth. When soullessness is realized, explains Nagarjuna,
the defilements wane and freedom is attained.
Having demonstrated the soteriological importance of abandoning belief in the
soul, Nagarjuna now rushes to forestall the antipodal error, namely an emphasis
on the lack of soul. To interpret the Buddha as teaching the non- existence of
the self is as bad as the tendency to reify self-ish-ness in the first place,
for nihilism and pessimism would result. Thus, while "the Buddhas have made
known the conception of self and taught the doctrine of no-self," Nagarjuna
says, "they have not spoken of something as the self or as the non-self."
FOOTNOTE: karika XVIII.6 That is, Buddhism denies both atman and anatman, but it
does not say that there is some "thing" which can be described as either having
or lacking atman. The remaining verses of this section seem to be cautionary
statements the intent of which is to prevent one from clinging to anatman as a
theory. The teaching of soullessness is a dialectical device used to counteract
the tendency to believe in the soul, nothing more. If one were to assert that
the identity of the universe is anatman, then the Buddha would have to
counteract this by saying that that, too, is erroneous. The theory of no-soul is
not a real characteristic of existent things. It is no more than a way to
obviate the reifying theories, dispositions, and graspings which cause suffering
and lead to rebirth.
Nagarjuna follows this examination with four verses which deal with the nature
of truth, essentially declaring it to be undefinable. FOOTNOTE: (karika
XVIII.8-11) These verses do not immediately seem to have any relevance to the
issue at hand, namely the nature of the self. Kalupahana interprets them in a
questionable way. "Up to this point [Nagarjuna] was discussing an embodied self,
a self associated with a psychophysical personality," says Kalupahana. The
verses that follow, therefore, "are intended to explain the Buddha's view
regarding the nature of a person when he attains [liberation]." FOOTNOTE:
Kalupahana 1986, 57 This interpretation is problematic. The word "self" is not
used even once in the entire second half of the section, and the only hint that
Nagarjuna could possibly be referring to the posthumous reality is that in one
verse he uses the word tathya, "such" or "thus." This is a word with many
significations. One of the uses of tathya is to refer to the nature of the
individual who has achieved nirvana, the Tathagata. He or she does not have the
illusion of partaking of any existential qualities and thus can only be referred
to as "thus." This is apparently what Kalupahana had in mind: it is the use of
tathya in this verse that leads him to interpret the entire second half of the
section as a discussion of posthumous reality. FOOTNOTE: ibid., 58 These verses
describe truth, of whatever kind, as encompassing four possibilities: something
is such (tathya), is not such, is both such and not such, and is neither such
and not such. "Such is the Buddha's admonition." FOOTNOTE: karika XVIII.8
Nagarjuna follows this verse with two verses that describe truth as having
neither a single meaning or a variety of meanings, and a repeated admonition
that dependently-arisen things are neither identical nor different, neither
annihilated nor eternal. FOOTNOTE: karika XVIII.9-11 An alternate and perhaps
more defensible interpretation of the remainder of this section is that
Nagarjuna is emphasizing his initial point. The self is neither real nor
non-real and the Buddha's purpose in teaching anatman was wholly and simply
pragmatic. The doctrine of soullessness is not to be understood as an
independent and real truth, Nagarjuna is saying here, for "everything is such,
not such, both such and not such, and neither such and not such." FOOTNOTE:
karika XVIII.8
Sections nineteen through twenty-one--Associative Composition of and Occurrence
of Phenomena in Time
Nagarjuna next offers a brief look at three qualities of the apparent world.
These three are time, the harmony existing between the elements constituting a
phenomenon, and the occurrence and dissolution of such composite phenomena. His
primary intention here is to demonstrate that, since the composite factors are,
as proven above, devoid of self-nature, so must the things composed of them be
devoid of real existence. Reductionism and atomism cannot account for the real
production of a real world, he says. A brief aside is necessary to introduce and
explain the background of this particular debate.
The Buddha, as explained above, said that the world can be seen in one way as
being composed of elements (dharmas), spheres of sense and sense objects
(ayatanas), and the psychophysical aggregates (skandhas). The Abhidharma refined
these analyses by enumerating, classifying, and relating these various
constituent factors, all in the hope of achieving a world-description that
managed to be comprehensive without recourse to soul theories. All physical and
psychological phenomena were explained as being composed of discrete and
separate elements, the mutual arising and continuity of which gives the illusion
that there exist lasting identities, such as personhood. A felicitous analogy is
that of the motion picture. A film is composed of static and separate
photographs which individually have no capability of conveying motion or change.
However, when these photographs flash, one by one, in contiguous succession, an
illusion appears. The viewer sees a lasting and unbroken continuity. A film
thereby creates an illusion of an uninterrupted process, the appearance of a
real identity that is nowhere to be found in the individual elements comprising
the apparent process. Such, held the Abhidharma theories, is the nature of
reality. All things, events, and processes consist of nothing more than
discrete, irreducible atomistic elements. These are referred to as "moments"
ksana). The Buddha did not disagree with such reductionism, for he taught it.
However, he in no way said that these moments are themselves real. Nagarjuna
demonstrates in the next section, "Examination of Time," that it is in such
reification of atomism that problems arise. Time must, to be perceived, be
divided into past, present, and future. If there were not this division, then
one would have no referents by which to perceive time. However, one cannot say
that these three divisions exist as such. For example, the present and the
future depend on the past for their determination. Yet, if they exist contingent
upon the past, "then the present and the future would be in the past time."
FOOTNOTE: karika XIX.1 If the thing called "present" and the thing called
"future" did not exist at the same time as the thing called "past," then they
could not relate to it. For example, the future could only come after some
thing, it cannot just be "after" in an abstract sense. If the past no longer
exists, though, then where is the thing the future is coming "after?" The things
would have to exist contemporaneously to relate, for there can be no relation
between two things if one of them does not yet exist or no longer exists. It is
obvious, however, that the present and the future do not exist in the past, for
this would oppose their very definitions. But, Nagarjuna continues, "if the
present and the future were not to exist [in the past], how could the present
and the future be contingent upon it?" FOOTNOTE: karika XIX.2 Combining these
two statements, one is left with the following argument: 1) The present and the
future must exist in the past for their relation and, thus, their reality to be
upheld. 2) The present and the future do not exist in the past. 3) Therefore,
the present and the future do not exist. 4) Consequently, all of the divisions
of temporality are illusory.
One may object that there is another way to view temporality that does not
depend on such irreducible momentariness. Time could be said to exist as a
concomitant of processes, not discrete events. FOOTNOTE: Murti 1960, 201 This
would obviate such an extreme slicing of temporality into separate moments.
However, time is not evident either as a static moment or as a dynamic process.
"A non-static time is not observed. A static time is not observed." FOOTNOTE:
karika XIX.5 Ultimately, processes are no more real than their component parts,
but this is not what Nagarjuna chooses to emphasize here. FOOTNOTE: It has been
stated that Buddhism shifted the emphasis from Being to Becoming, from the
static moment to the dynamic process. (cf. pp. 47 and 83) This is true from a
philosophical (samvrti) standpoint. From the standpoint of ultimate truth
(paramartha), though, both are concepts that have no final validity. What he
calls attention to here is that neither static nor dynamic time is observed.
Nagarjuna does not explain why neither is possible, but there is one probable
explanation. The act of perception is not instantaneous---it, too, is dependent
upon temporality. The awareness of an object or event is always separated, even
if by the most infinitesimal amount, from the perception of the thing, which
perception is in turn separated from the thing itself. This is so because, the
Buddha taught, the perceiver and that which he or she perceives do not form a
unified gestalt. The Buddha's theory of the five aggregates which comprise the
person describes the process by which awareness of the world takes place. There
is a physical (or sensory or conceptual) object, this object is sensed, this
sensation is then classified and made cognizable through the separate process of
perception, this perception is colored by dispositions, and finally
consciousness forms a thought of the object. The thing of which the perceiver is
aware is thus always in the immediate past. (If nothing else, it takes a span of
time for light to travel from the visible object to the eye.) Hence, time cannot
be observed, but only extrapolated.
The nature of temporality is the primary focus of this section, but Nagarjuna
mentions, in passing, the applicability of the logical method used here to all
concepts of relation. "Following the same method, ...related concepts such as
the highest, the lowest, and the middle, and also identity, etc. should be
characterized." FOOTNOTE: karika XIX.4 (The wording of "identity, etc." is
necessary for preservation of meter in the verse. What is meant is the
distinguishing of identity, difference, both, or neither.) The meaning here is
that in all relations of quality involving distinct elements, one cannot
attribute the quality to any element individually. For example, a person's
"tallness" cannot be part of his or her identity. He or she is only tall in
relation to one who is shorter.
The tendency to distinguish the elements that constitute reality and to define
them in isolation led to another difficulty, namely the necessity to posit
another type of thing called "harmony." This Nagarjuna addresses in section
twenty, ``Examination of Harmony.'' The word translated here as "harmony,"
samagri, also carries the meaning of totality, especially as in the complete
collection or assemblage of materials used together to make an object. FOOTNOTE:
cf. Monier- Williams, 1204 An example is the visual perception of an object. In
such a perception, the physical object, the sensation and perception of it, and
the eye all come together to produce an awareness of visible form. The Buddha
taught that an event like this is based on the dependent arising of all the
elements which arise together and thereby produce visual perception. "Harmony"
is here a description for their mutual dependence. The Abhidharma reification of
the elements, however, required that one describe the coming together of such
discrete elements as a separate thing, a unique whole not found in the parts.
This view made harmony an attribute, not just a description; the metaphysical
description of elements as discrete requires that the harmony between them
become a separate entity itself. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986, 61 The problem of
causality then arises anew.
The four theories of causation are summarized again, this time in terms of the
atomistic "moments" described above. The theory that one moment produces another
moment which is subsequent and directly contiguous is a form of self-causation.
The theory that one moment produces another moment which is subsequent but not
directly contiguous is other-causation. The theory that a moment is produced by
neither a preceding contiguous nor non-contiguous moment is neither-causation,
or chaos. The three of these were discussed and rejected in Nagarjuna's first
section. The fourth theory is that a moment is produced by a combination of
self- and other- causation. In terms of the present discussion, that combination
is the "harmony" between causes and causal conditions pratyayas). Nagarjuna,
using the same methodological approach he used in the previous discussion of
causality, declares that the effect is not to be found in this harmony any more
than in the individual causes and conditions (pratyayas) producing the harmony.
If one asserts that effects arise from such "harmonious" combinations of causes
and conditions (pratyayas), then the notion of harmony is just being substituted
for the effect-ive cause, which was refuted. The conclusion, too, is then
identical: "the effect is not made by the harmony, nor is it not made by a [sic]
harmony." FOOTNOTE: karika XX.24
The description of events as comprised of momentary units and things as
comprised of atomistic elements leads to a discrepancy with the Buddha's theory
of becoming, bhava, which Nagarjuna addresses in this next section, "Examination
of Occurrence and Dissolution." FOOTNOTE: Bhava, "becoming," is not to be
confused with bhava, "existence." Cf. Monier-Williams, 748f. and 754. If the
elements are discrete, then, Nagarjuna shows, it is not possible to explain how
they can arise and cease in mutual dependence.
To review, the Buddha's original concept of dependent arising describes reality
as consisting of the same elements later classified by the Abhidharma, but makes
it clear that these elements do not exist independently; they come into being
only through a process of mutual contingence. This mutual interdependence of
phenomena shifted the emphasis from being to becoming. That is, whereas the
Hindu philosophies found the essence of the universe in a substantial ("standing
under") ground of "true being," the Buddha recognized no substantial essence of
the universe---he saw all in terms of process, flux. The characteristic of
reality is neither Being nor non-Being, but only Becoming. Change is evident,
but there is not some thing that changes. The process itself is the only thing
that can be seen as having any degree of certainty or reality. FOOTNOTE:
Hiriyanna, 142 This process of dependently arising phenomena is beginningless.
If it had a beginning, then there would be one thing which came first, which
thing would then be the originating cause of the entire subsequent chain. It is
not that the beginning is hidden in immemorial time, nor that it is inaccessible
due to having been set in motion by a transcendent power. Rather, a beginning is
simply inconceivable. Likewise, neither can there be said to be an end to the
process.
The tendency to find substantial identities in the elements led to a slightly
different interpretation of the Buddha's theory of dependent arising. Whereas
the Buddha had spoken of a "stream of becoming," i.e. a seamless flow, the
Realists now spoke of a "series of becoming," i.e. a relation of independent
serial entities. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986, 62 Phenomena were seen as being
comprised of these serial elements and so, as described above, theories of
association, or "harmony," had to be formulated to account for apparent
identities. Nagarjuna refutes these notions of serial becoming first by focusing
on the impossibility of such associative harmonies to arise and cease. There can
be no way to relate the "occurrence," or arising, of a phenomenon with its
"dissolution," or cessation. "Dissolution does not exist either with or without
occurrence. Occurrence does not exist either with or without dissolution."
FOOTNOTE: karika XXI.1 If occurrence and dissolution existed together, then a
thing would be disappearing at the same time that it was appearing. If
occurrence existed without dissolution, then things would partake of a
one-directional eternity---they would arise, but never cease. If dissolution
existed without occurrence, then there would be the death of a thing which was
never born. Neither can one attempt to avoid the dilemma by saying that
dissolution is "potential" in a thing which is arising, but is not yet "actual."
This would ascribe to a thing two contrary natures, that of occurrence and that
of dissolution. No hypothetical proportion of "potentiality" versus "actuality"
of these two natures in a thing, would, ultimately, disguise this internal
disjunction. Another possibility Nagarjuna mentions is the attempt to circumvent
the distinctions of occurrence and dissolution by describing gradual change.
That is, instead of saying that an existent thing suddenly disappears, one can
say that it just fades out of existence. But this will not work, either, for
there still must be one discrete moment before which a thing was still fading
and after which it is completely gone. "Dissolution of that which is waning does
not exist, nor is there dissolution of the not waning." FOOTNOTE: karika XXI.7 A
final objection Nagarjuna addresses is the empirical one. "It may occur to you
that both occurrence and dissolution are seen," he says. That is, arguments
regarding the logical tenability of arising and ceasing are immaterial, for both
are unanimously observed to exist. "However," he declares, "both occurrence and
dissolution are seen only through confusion." FOOTNOTE: karika XXI.11 The
ignorant one may make such a claim, but the enlightened one knows better.
Nagarjuna concludes this section with a paradox. He has just demonstrated that
arising and ceasing do not have real existence, and, therefore, "the stream of
becoming is not proper in the context of the three periods of time." Nor can
there be some other way of explaining the existential flux, for "how can there
be a stream of becoming that does not exist during the three periods of time?"
FOOTNOTE: karika XXI.21 It seems that he is not accepting any theory of
becoming. However, as a devout Buddhist apologist, Nagarjuna certainly would not
have denied a single aspect of the Buddha's teachings. The only solution to this
dilemma is that he was not offering a blanket refutation of the stream of
becoming, but only a refutation of the stream as viewed in a certain way. He
does not explicitly state exactly which theory he is denying and which he will
accept, but the most likely explanation is that he is rejecting the
substantialist agenda. It is an error to posit an independent nature in the
discrete elements which comprise the serial flow. As dependently-arisen, no
things are really spatially or temporally distinct. If no substantial identity
is posited in the elements, then the issue of which produces which and when
exactly each is produced and dissolved ceases to be problematic.
All of the sections of the Mulamadhyamakakarika up to this point have examined
the specific elements, processes, and relations comprising reality. These are
all side issues, so to speak. The Path of Buddhism is little concerned with what
exact ontological status to grant to fire and fuel, for example. However,
misunderstandings about the nature of these factors of reality can lead to
problems of a more serious nature, and so all of the factors had to be examined
individually before larger issues could be addressed. The remainder of the
karika deals with precisely these larger issues. Nagarjuna first discusses the
nature of the one who has become enlightened and realized nirvana, and then
looks at the confusions and afflictions which hinder the attainment of
enlightenment. The Noble Eightfold Path is examined next. The Path is the
paramount teaching of the Buddha, for it is this Path, and this path only, which
can lead to an escape from duhkha. A proper following of the Eightfold Path will
lead to nirvana, the subject of the next section. Nagarjuna then examines what
is the most affirmative teaching of Buddhism: the chain of dependent arising.
This theory describes, clearly and positively, the ontological origin and nature
of reality as well as the philosophical basis on which enlightenment can be
achieved. In the final section, in a last preventative effort, Nagarjuna
describes the specific errors leading to bondage and misunderstanding for the
purpose of forestalling these errors.
Section twenty-two--The Meaning and Ontological Status of the Enlightened One
Siddhartha Gautama used a variety of epithets to refer to himself, including
Sakyamuni, "Sage of the Sakya Clan," Buddha, "The Awakened One," and Tathagata,
"The Thus-Gone One." The latter of these led to a host of misunderstandings, for
the term seemed to imply that there is an agent, the "One," who "Goes"
somewhere. That is, the enlightened person often was believed to be reborn in a
transcendent realm. One later Chinese school of Buddhism went so far as to
describe a "Pure Land," a concrete heavenly paradise where beings of high
spiritual attainment sojourn before taking the final step towards complete
nirvana. FOOTNOTE: Kohn, 174. To be fair, all attempts were made to explain that
such spiritual abodes were not really existent. Whether popular belief
understood this, though, is questionable. The original meaning of "Tathagata" is
no longer known for certain, FOOTNOTE: For example, it is not wholly clear
whether it is a compound of tatha + gata, "Thus Gone," or tatha + agata, "Thus
Come." Cf. Conze 1975, 36, and Nagao 1991, 205. but that to which the Buddha was
referring in using the term was clearly explained. Nagarjuna clarifies it in
section twenty-two, "Examination of the Tathagata." Tathagata is merely a
designation for that being who has released graspings and dispositions, is
thereby freed from karma and, following the next death, will completely
disappear and never experience another birth. The defiling dispositions which
created the illusion of person-hood out of the aggregates have been "appeased,"
or released. The aggregates still exist by dint of the inertia of previous
karma, and so the enlightened being still appears to exist. Since there are no
longer graspings at work, though, the apparent being will disappear when the
last inertial karma has been spent.
The Buddha made quite clear the fact that the Tathagata has not "gone
somewhere." In answer to his disciple Vaccha's persistent questions regarding
the nature of the Tathagata after death, the Buddha offered an analogy:
"What think you, Vaccha? Suppose a fire were to burn in front of you, would
you be aware that the fire was burning in front of you?"
"[Yes.]"
"...Vaccha, if the fire burning in front of you were to become extinct, would
you be aware that the fire in front of you had become extinct?"
"[Yes.]"
"But, Vaccha, if someone were to ask you, 'In what direction has that fire
gone,---east, or west, or north, or south?' what would you say?"
"The question would not fit the case, Gautama." FOOTNOTE: Majjhima- nikaya,
quoted in Radhakrishnan and Moore, 290
The point is that a fire depends on certain elements for its existence, such as
wood, heat, and oxygen. When these elements are no longer present, the fire does
not leave, as such---it just ceases to exist. Similarly, a person is dependent
on the aggregates, ignorance, and grasping. When ignorance and grasping cease to
be operative, and when the inertia of the last of the aggregates, i.e. the body,
is spent, then the person ceases to exist. The person is "thus-gone," but there
is no transcendent realm in which he or she is reborn. That is, the person has
"gone," but he or she has not gone some where.
This teaching, while clear, was not easy to comprehend. The Buddha warned his
disciples numerous times that his message was "recondite, subtle, and profound."
It is therefore easy to see why Nagarjuna devoted a section to this concept. Not
only had it always been a difficult one to understand, but, further, the recent
Realist and Substantialist trends had precipitated even more confusions. One
tendency was to hold that the Tathagata was composed of some substance not found
in ordinary unenlightened humans. This propensity to believe that the person's
nature underwent some essential transformation upon the achievement of
enlightenment was evidenced even in the Buddha's time. The theory was that the
soul which is unenlightened partakes of the quality of bondage, and, when this
soul becomes free, then its essence shifts to now partake of the quality of
freedom. FOOTNOTE: This notion was likely a product of the influence of Jainism,
which believed that the defiling karma is an actual substance that adheres to
the soul (jiva). Nagarjuna explains clearly that the nature of the Buddha is
identical to that of any other person, and it has neither the "quality" of
bondage nor the "quality" of freedom. There is no self to be found in either the
bound or the freed person; both are composed of nothing but the soulless
aggregates, and there is no real self which can be thus qualified. "The
Tathagata is neither the aggregates nor different from them. The aggregates are
not in him; nor is he in the aggregates. He is not possessed of the aggregates."
This definition of the Tathagata is no different than that of any and all
persons. Thus, "in such a context, who is a Tathagata?" FOOTNOTE: karika XXII.1
The existence of a self in the Buddha is denied for the same reasons that it is
denied in any person. If the Buddha is independent of the aggregates, then he
will not evidence their characteristics, e.g. he will not have a body,
sensations, or consciousness. If the Buddha depends on the aggregates, then "he
does not exist in terms of self-nature." Further, if his essence were to change
upon enlightenment, then he would now have a different, or "other- nature." But,
if he does not exist in terms of self-nature, then "how can he exist in terms of
other-nature?" FOOTNOTE: karika XXII.2
As all that exists is ruled by the process of dependent arising, one cannot say
that the Tathagata has an independent and transcendent existential status. Even
though the Buddha has ceased to grasp on to the aggregates, "he should still
depend upon them in the present. As such he will be dependent... There exists no
Tathagata independent of the aggregates." FOOTNOTE: karika XXII.5-6 This is not
to say that the Buddha has a self which exists even in the present. Having
abandoned grasping and soul-theorizing, it is only the external appearance of
him which exists. It is grasping which causes the aggregates to continue coming
together in life after life, grasping for self-assertion, for
sense-fulfillments, and for continued existence. Since the Buddha has become
enlightened by virtue of having released his tendency to grasp, he no longer
believes that there is a self comprising him in the present, and so he knows
that he will not exist after death, either. It is only, Nagarjuna says, the
misguided drive to attribute reality to the objects of grasping, the grasping
itself, and the one who grasps that embroils the ignorant person in the tangle
of existence-theorizing. It is only this misguided person, "firmly insisting
that a Tathagata 'exists' or 'does not exist,'" who ascribes a present or
posthumous existence to the Buddha. FOOTNOTE: karika XXII.13 That is, even
though the Buddha no longer falsely believes that he exists, it is still
possible for those who do imagine reality to attribute an existence to him.
Nagarjuna explains that these people are seeing nothing more than a figment of
their imaginations. "Those who generate obsessions with great regard to the
Buddha..., all of them, impaired by obsessions, do not perceive the Tathagata."
FOOTNOTE: karika XXII.15
Sections twenty-three and twenty-four--Error and Truth: the Perversions and the
Four Noble Truths
Nagarjuna has thus far examined all of the elements of existence and negated
substantialist understandings of all, and has discussed the nature of the
enlightened one who sees the true nature of things. Before presenting the
positive teachings of the Buddha's doctrine, Nagarjuna found it necessary to
devote section twenty-three, ``Examination of Perversions,'' to an explanation
of the origins of confusions and misunderstandings. The subject of this section,
viparyasa, is best translated as "perversion." The meaning of "perversion" here
is not so much the common one of moral or sexual debasement, but rather the
etymological meaning of "turning through" (per + vertere) and hence "error" or
"delusion." FOOTNOTE: cf. Monier-Williams, 974, in which the first meanings of
viparyasa given are "overturning" and "transposition."
The Buddha said that all conditioned things are characterized by three "marks:"
impermanence, soullessness, and suffering. These are not absolute definitions of
reality, but rather descriptions of the nature of reality as perceived by the
enlightened person. The epistemic ignorance of the unenlightened person lies in
his or her falsely knowing the world as permanent, containing a soul, or
non-suffering. Besides these three corruptions of the three marks, the Buddha
mentioned one other type of perversion, which perversion is a value judgment
independent of the three marks. This is the human propensity to characterize
things as wholesome or unwholesome, pleasant or unpleasant. Since Nagarjuna has
already examined the three marks in previous sections, here he first takes up
the latter perversion, the subjective value judgments. The defilements such as
passionate attraction and aversion (lust and hatred), Nagarjuna says, "have
thought as their source," and it is on the basis of these defilements that value
judgments such as pleasant and unpleasant come to be. FOOTNOTE: karika XXIII.1
All persons, whether Buddhas or unenlightened persons, continue to perceive and
have sensations, both pleasant and unpleasant. The difference is that the
sensations of the Buddhas are not filtered through defilements, and so they do
not believe that there is a real objective ground supporting the subjective
experiences of pleasant and unpleasant.
Nagarjuna spends the first half of this section demonstrating the unreality of
the foundations of perversions, thereby showing that it is possible to overcome
them. He first offers a rationale for abandoning belief in one of the
foundations of perversion, namely the defiling tendencies of passions and
grasping. Discriminatory judgments such as pleasant and unpleasant are based on
the defilements for, were there no passionate attraction and aversion, there
would be no need for one to judge things as pleasant or unpleasant. All
sensations would be accepted with equanimity and detached acceptance. "The
existence or non-existence of the self is not established in any way," Nagarjuna
reminds the reader, and "without that, how can the existence or the
non-existence of the defilements be established?" FOOTNOTE: karikaXXIII.3 One
may object that the defilements must exist, for they are experienced. Nagarjuna
counters this argument by explaining that the defilements exist in the same way
that the person does: both the defilements and the one defiled may be
experienced in ignorance, but neither is substantive--- neither is to be found
anywhere in the agglomeration of aggregates which comprise the apparent person.
Thus, as demonstrated in the examination of the self in section eighteen, there
is no reality in either the defilements or the one defiled. Conversely, the
defilements could be said to be dependent on the perversions, for, were there no
discrimination of pleasant or unpleasant, there could be no reason for aversion
or attraction. Yet this will not work either, for "the perversions regarding the
pleasant and the unpleasant are not evident from the standpoint of self-nature."
This being so, on what could the defilements of passionate aversion and
attraction be based? FOOTNOTE: karika XXIII.6 Finally, one could cling to the
belief in pleasant and unpleasant based on the reality of the sensations giving
rise to these categories. Nagarjuna here delivers the coup de grace to the
belief in the reality of such discriminations. Visual form, sound, taste, touch,
smell, and concepts (i.e. mental sensations) are the "sixfold foundations" of
defilements and discriminatory judgments. But, as demonstrated above, FOOTNOTE:
cf. sections IV, "Examination of Aggregates" and XVIII, "Examination of Self."
all six sensory foundations "are comparable to [a mythical city] and resemble
mirages and dreams. How can the pleasant and the unpleasant come to be in people
who are fabrications of illusion or who are comparable to mirror images?"
FOOTNOTE: karika XXIII.8-9 That is, the pleasant, the unpleasant, and the one
who discriminates between them are all unreal. As such, Nagarjuna asks, whence
the justification for passionate feelings? In the same way that discriminating
sensation into pleasant and unpleasant gives rise to adverse graspings, so does
it hinder enlightenment to pervert the other marks of existence, i.e. confusing
the impermanent for the permanent, the soulless as having an ego, and the
suffering as non-suffering.
A Buddhist would have an obvious motivation in aggressively denying the reality
of the senses, the discrimination of sensations into pleasant and unpleasant,
and the passionate attractions and aversions which arise on the basis of such
discriminations. It is only when these tendencies and perversions are understood
as being groundless that they can be appeased and the detachment of nirvana
attained. If these unpropitious aspects of existence were real, if they had
self- nature, then they could never be appeased, Nagarjuna says. Likewise, an
emphasis on the unreality of the one who discriminates facilitates release from
perversions. "Perversions do not occur to one who is already subject to
perversion," nor do they "occur to one who is not subjected to perversions," nor
do they "occur to one who is being subjected to perversions." The untenability
of relating a subject and its attribute in any of the three phases of time was
explained in section two in the examination of the moverand the moved. This
being so, Nagarjuna delivers the exhortation to "reflect on your own! To whom
will the perversions occur?" FOOTNOTE: karika XXIII.17-18 The above tack aside,
Nagarjuna had an additional reason for explaining perversions and confusions
here: his next three sections deal with "right views," i.e. the Buddha's
teachings of the Noble Truths, the nature of nirvana, and the process of
dependent arising. A person will be able to comprehend these only if he or she
first understands the false knowledge and perversions which hinder such
comprehension.
The Buddha expressed the core of his teaching in the four Noble Truths. These
are 1) suffering exists, 2) suffering has a cause, namely craving and grasping,
3) suffering, having been caused, can be ended, and 4) the Eightfold Path is the
way to end it. These are all truths, but they do not represent an objective and
absolute Truth. Truths for the Buddha were pragmatic. An Absolutist philosophy,
such as Plato's theory of the Forms, defines a concept's truth in terms of how
well that concept corresponds to the transcendent and independent standard, the
Absolute Truth. A pragmatic philosophy, on the other hand, does not recognize
such an independent standard by which relative truths can be measured.
Pragmatism holds that knowledge exists only as a tool to be used, and the test
of a concept's truthfulness is its practical consequences. FOOTNOTE: Frank
Thilly, A History of Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), 602
That the Buddha's attitude towards truth is one of pragmatismcan be seen in the
fact that, were all four Noble Truths absolute, they would contradict. For
example, the first announces the fact of suffering, but the third declares that
suffering can be eradicated. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1992, 168 This is perhaps why
the Buddha referred to them as "noble" (arya) truths: their importance is in
their value and worthiness, not in their absolute validity. The implication of
this is that they have a use and a purpose. This schemata of truth is the
subject of section twenty-four, "Examination of the Noble Truths."
It is certain that Nagarjuna upheld the validity of the Buddha's Noble Truths,
for he stressed the value of the Buddha's teachings at every turn. However, it
would be easy, after reading the Mulamadhyamakakarika thus far, to get the
impression that Nagarjuna was denying all and asserting nothing. Specifically,
he has thus far declared all existent things, grasping, the grasper, and even
the Buddha himself to be devoid of self-nature and "empty," sunya. FOOTNOTE:
karika XIII.3, XXII.10,14 respectively Such comprehensive negations would, it
would seem, deny the validity of all teachings, including the Buddha's, and
sabotage the Eightfold Path leading to nirvana. Nagarjuna presents this counter
argument in the first six verses this section. If all is empty, the opponent
could charge, all causation would be invalidated. This would lead to a denial of
the Noble Truths. There are four attainments, or fruits, corresponding to the
four truths, namely understanding the nature of suffering (duhkha),
relinquishing the passions which cause suffering, realizing the goal of nirvana,
and cultivating the proper Path towards the goal. But, the opponent continues,
if the Noble Truths are empty then likewise there could not be these
attainments, there would be none who achieve enlightenment and break free from
the cycle of birth-and- death, and finally, there would not even be a Buddha.
"Speaking in this manner about emptiness," the opponent concludes, "you
contradict the three jewels [of the Buddha, his teachings, and the community of
Buddhists], as well as the reality of the fruits, both good and bad, and all
such worldly conventions." FOOTNOTE: karika XXIV.1-6
Nagarjuna's answer to this cogent objection is simple: "we say that you do not
comprehend the purpose of emptiness. As such, you are tormented by emptiness and
the meaning of emptiness." FOOTNOTE: karika XXIV.7 The opponent's objections
would hold true if Nagarjuna was saying that all the elements of reality are
empty of reality and validity. However, what he has actually said is slightly
different---he said that the teaching of emptiness, sunyata, has a purpose. It
is not an absolute statement, but a pragmatic one. To explain this, he
introduces here the notion of two levels of truth. "The teaching of the doctrine
by the Buddhas is based upon two truths: truth relating to worldly convention
and truth in terms of ultimate fruit." FOOTNOTE: karika XXIV.8 The conventional
truth, samvrti, is that which is used in the everyday world. Even though all is
a realm of mere appearance, one must still use concepts to communicate with
others and to function in the world. For example, even though the enlightened
one understands that there is no "mover"who "moves," he or she still utilizes
the conceptions of movement to discuss going to the store. Likewise, even though
the Buddha stressed the unreality of the person and the complete lack of egoity
in the world, he still, when communicating, used terms like "myself" and "you."
The other form of truth is paramartha, which can be translated as "supreme
truth" or "ultimate fruit." As the term artha, "fruit" or "goal" implies, this
level still does not represent an ultimate, absolute Truth. It is a truth that
does not rely on relative meanings, but rather is provisional. Goal-oriented,
the supreme truth is conducive to attaining the fruits.
The four Noble Truths, i.e. the fact of suffering, its cause, its cure, and the
Eightfold Path leading to its removal are all expressed in terms of conventional
truth. Nirvana is the higher truth, the "greatest fruit," paramartha. These two
levels of truth often contradict. For example, the first limb of the Eightfold
Path is "right views." One must subscribe to the proper conceptual worldview to
follow the Buddhist path. However, the higher truth of paramartha denies that
there is an ultimate "right view." In the state of nirvana, all is seen to be
empty, and nothing is right or wrong, better or worse. What is crucial to point
out is that samvrti and paramartha are both called "truths." There is no line
drawn here between truth and falsehood, for that would give rise to
absolutism---something can only be false if there is one single, independent
standard against which to measure it. Thus, instead of the true/false dichotomy
integral to Absolutisms, the Buddha spoke in terms of truth versus "confusion,"
i.e. using knowledge pragmatically and beneficially versus being bound by it.
FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986, 46
The use of conventional language and relative truths is necessary for teaching.
"Without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit is not taught. Without
understanding the ultimate fruit, freedom is not attained." FOOTNOTE: karika
XXIV.10 The truths expressed by samvrti are necessary to point the way to the
ultimate goal. Language and concepts must be utilized. Once the goal is in
sight, these relative truths must be abandoned. It is at this stage that one
perceives all things to be devoid of soul and empty of reality, and one realizes
that the ultimate truth is itself not really a "truth." What is vital is always
to keep in mind which level of truth one is working with. If one mistakenly
applies the conception of emptiness to the relative realm, for example, then one
could see things as meaningless. This would cause one to be left in a state of
distress and lose faith in the Buddha and his teaching. "A wrongly perceived
emptiness ruins a person of meager intelligence," warns Nagarjuna. "It is like a
snake that is wrongly grasped." FOOTNOTE: karika XXIV.11 If anyone "generates
any obsessions or confusions with regard to emptiness, the accompanying error is
not ours," he disclaims. Such a confusion is akin to that of a person who,
mounting his horse, promptly forgets where his horse is! FOOTNOTE: karika
XXIV.13,15
It is just such a mistaken attribution of ultimate truths to the relative realm
that led the hypothetical opponent above to conclude that Nagarjuna was denying
the validity of the Buddha's message. The opponent had simply assumed that
Nagarjuna's notion that all things are empty invalidates all teachings, as well.
Nagarjuna now turns the table on the opponent. On the contrary, he says, it is
the denial of emptiness and the assertion of self- nature that negates the Noble
Truths. He spends the remaining two-thirds of the section demonstrating that
theories of self-nature and individual identity contradict all the Buddha's
teachings and preclude the very possibility of enlightenment. If existent things
are not devoid of a self-nature, then, for the reasons explained above, they
must be eternal and unchanging. If so, then they are both uncaused and incapable
of cessation. This will nullify the notions of an agent and his or her acts,
which will then render him or her incapable of appeasing the defiling
dispositions and escaping from the cycle of suffering. The Eightfold Path will
then be purposeless and its goal unattainable. Thus, Nagarjuna concludes,
notions of self- nature and a denial of emptiness will make the entirety of the
Buddha's teachings completely pointless.
A key to understanding the two truths is dependent arising. It is the insight
that all existent things have come to be only through a process of mutual
interaction and causation that provides the understanding of emptiness. "We
state that whatever is dependent arising, that is emptiness," says Nagarjuna.
FOOTNOTE: karika XXIV.18 All things that have come to be dependent on others
are, by definition, relative. That is, they only have identity in relation to
other things, as "tallness" has identity only in relation to "shortness." Since
they are arisen things they are not unreal. On the other hand, since they are
relative things they are not absolutely real. Neither are they both real and
unreal, for that would constitute an internal contradiction. However, neither
can they be said to be neither real nor unreal: as arisen, they are real, but as
dependent, they are unreal. The only remaining way to speak of arisen things is
by saying that they are in the middle between the extremes. All discourse and
conceptualization about dependently-arisen things is thus said to be the "middle
path." This is the key to the whole issue of truth and reality covered in this
section. "Whoever perceives dependent arising also perceives suffering, its
arising, its ceasing, and the path," says Nagarjuna in closing. FOOTNOTE: karika
XXIV.40 That is, whoever perceives dependent arising understands the ontology of
existent things and perceives the Buddha's four Noble Truths.
Section twenty-five--The Ultimate Goal: Enlightenment
Having explained the Madhyamika stance on the reality of the Noble Truths,
Nagarjuna now can examine the goal of them and of the entire Buddhist path,
nirvana. There may be no single concept in Buddhism which has elicited more
confusion and debate than nirvana. Nirvana is often translated as "freedom," but
it actually means "extinction." A literal translation of "nir - vana" is "blown
out," as in the extinguishing of a fire. Nirvana is not a state of transcendent
eternal bliss, like that of some forms of Yoga or of the Hindu Advaita Vedanta,
nor sanctified salvation, like that of the Christianity, nor final posthumous
nonexistence, like that of some Materialist philosophies. It is, simply, the
cessation of those factors which cause bondage, namely cravings, dispositions,
and karma.
An example of the extinction of nirvana is afforded by the Buddha's analogy of
the fire given above. When the fire is extinguished, it does not go anywhere,
east, west, north, or south. It simply ceases to be. Similarly, the one who has
appeased, or eliminated, the snares binding one to the cycle of birth-and-death
can be said to have attained freedom, for he or she is now free of the binding
influences. But, this does not mean that the freed one goes on to heavenly realm
or a state of sanctified bliss. This person does not disappear only to reappear
elsewhere. The freed one simply is no longer. It is not that the enlightened
person ceases to exist, for he or she never existed in the first place. It was
only an illusion of real existence that caused the one now free to have been
bound to existence in the first place, and it is an equally ignorant illusion of
those viewing the freed one to think that he or she exists now. That is, nothing
goes out of existence; it never existed in the first place. FOOTNOTE: It has
been mentioned repeatedly that a principal cause of bondage is the process
through which a person ignorantly perceives reality in unreal things, feels
passionate attractions or aversions to those perceived things, and then grasps
onto them. If it is unclear how it can be that strong emotions can be aroused by
a mere illusion, an analogy from mythology may be illuminating: Ovid recounted
the story of a young Greek sculptor named Pygmalion and Galatea who, fearing and
hating women, vowed to pour all of his creative energy into his art alone. He
carved one statue of a woman, which he named Galatea, which proved to be so
perfect and beautiful that he fell in love with it. Venus took pity on his
frustrated desires and brought Galatea to life, and the two were married. This
story suggests that human passions do not discriminate between real and unreal
objects.
In section twenty-five, "Examination of Nirvana," Nagarjuna eliminates various
misconceptions about this state of freedom. It is not a form of existence, nor
is it non-existence. It is not a "thing" which, like all things, is dependent on
all other things for its manifestation. Nor is it an independent thing. The fact
that nirvana is spoken of being "realized," "attained," or "achieved" is not to
be understood as implying that freedom is a thing which can be known or
possessed. These verbs are just convenient ways samvrti) of speaking about an
inexpressible concept. Nagarjuna's concern, as a Buddhist, was both to defend
the Buddha's philosophy and to help his fellow Buddhists escape the cycle of
suffering. This exposition of nirvana, then, is to be taken neither as a
contribution to a philosophical debate nor as a theory to be defended. It is a
pragmatic concept which can be used as a tool for escaping from suffering. To be
useful as such, it must be understood in the proper way. Hence this section,
whose purpose is a clarification of the concept and the improper understandings
of it.
He opens the section with the opponent's objection that, if all is really empty,
then there is no arising of things and so there is nothing to be extinguished
(nir - vana). Nagarjuna replies, as before, that "if all this is non- empty,
there exists neither arising nor ceasing." If there is svabhava, a self-nature
in things, then it is that which will prevent freedom. FOOTNOTE: karika XXV.2
Having rejected self- nature by saying that all is empty, he is now faced with a
problem. If there are no things, then what is freedom, and how can one speak of
it or strive for it? The Buddha offered various definitions of nirvana, one of
which Nagarjuna now makes use of. "Unrelinquished, not reached, unannihilated,
non-eternal, non-ceased and non-arisen---this is called freedom." FOOTNOTE:
karika XXV.3 One substantialist notion of freedom was that the bound person
partakes of the quality of bondage. Freedom, then, would be the relinquishing of
this nature and the adoption of a new and wholly disparate mode of
existence---the freed state. This does not apply. There is not a person who
partakes of qualities, and freedom is not a concrete goal that can be striven
for. An eternalist soteriology would hold that the state of freedom transcends
temporality, and the one who achieves freedom also becomes eternal. Nirvana is
not such, for it is non- eternal. Neither, however, is it a temporal state of
salvation, for it is "unannihilated." It cannot have any relation to
temporality, which is measured by arising and ceasing, for it is "non-ceased and
non-arisen." Freedom is thus not obtainable, not a transcendent reality, and
not, like the Vedanta atman, a preexisting immanent substratum.
Further, nirvana has absolutely no relation to the concepts of either existence
or non-existence. If it were a form of existence, then, like all existent
things, it would partake of birth and death, arising and ceasing. It would be
relative and thus conditioned, for there are no existent things that are
unconditioned. If conditioned, it could not be independent. These would
necessitate that nirvana, like all conditioned and dependent things, be
characterized by impermanence and suffering, which would make for a poor
enlightenment, indeed. Neither can freedom be said to be non-existence, for,
"wherein there is no existence, therein non-existence is not evident." FOOTNOTE:
karika XXV.7 The two are relative concepts. Moreover, if freedom were said to be
non-existence, it would, as one half of a dual conception, still not be
independent. Nagarjuna echoed the Buddha's clear assertion that nirvana is
neither transcendent existence nor posthumous annihilation. In discussing the
nature of the enlightened one in an earlier section, he clearly stated that "the
thought that the Buddha exists or does not exist after death is not
appropriate." FOOTNOTE: karika XXII.14
Notwithstanding such difficulties, nirvana must be seen as non-contingent and
independent. If it were not, then it would not be free from the contingency and
dependence of the suffering world. The solution, the Buddha said, is to
relinquish the notions of becoming and being in all forms. Therefore, "it is
proper to assume that freedom is neither existence nor non-existence." FOOTNOTE:
karika XXV.10 (na bhavo nabhavo nirvanam) That is, if one completely ceases to
think in terms of being, then neither arising nor ceasing, origination nor
annihilation will be posited. There is another possible interpretation of the
Buddha's exhortation to relinquish notions of being. One could say that, instead
of seeing freedom as neither existence nor non-existence, one could see it as
both, as a transcendence of the two categories or, in Hegelian terms, a
synthesis of thesis and antithesis. This would declare freedom to be some sort
of mystical consciousness which is both existence and non-existence by virtue of
being a transcendence of the dualities. This will not work, either, Nagarjuna
now shows, for nirvana can contain no aspect of either half of the duality. If
it were both existence and non- existence, then, rather than being independent,
it would be dependent on both and thus doubly contingent. Further, since
existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive opposites, "their
simultaneous existence in one place is not possible, as in the case of light and
darkness." FOOTNOTE: karika XXV.14
That which precipitated the debate was the Buddha's teaching that freedom is
attainable, and the following speculations of his followers about what sort of
existence the Buddha enjoyed after death, i.e. after his full attainment of
nirvana. FOOTNOTE: There are two forms of nirvana: the one achieved during life
is a state of freedom but, since the freed one still has a karmically-bound
body, it is not complete nirvana. Complete freedom, "total extinction"
(parinirvana), only occurs at death when the body, too, is extinguished. As
Nagarjuna has just shown, no theories of the Buddha's existential status seem to
be possible. Thus, "it is not assumed that the Blessed One [i.e. the Buddha]
exists after death. Neither is it assumed that he does not exist, or both, or
neither." FOOTNOTE: karika XXV.17 An immediate question following this statement
is "then what happened to him? He obviously existed at one point, and now he
doesn't, so where did he go?" Nagarjuna's answer is startling: "It is not
assumed that even a living Blessed One exists. Neither is it assumed that he
does not exist, or both, or neither." FOOTNOTE: karika XXV.18 The answer, then,
is that nothing happened to the Buddha. His existential status did not change
when he attained nirvana, for he could not even be said to have existed before
it.
If the Buddha's nature before his nirvana was the same as his nature after
enlightenment, then the only thing that changed was his subjective
understanding. His actual nature did not change. An even more startling
conclusion follows from this: if his nature did not change, then the world of
suffering, samsara, must not be different from the world experienced by the
freed person. This is exactly what Nagarjuna concludes. "The life-process has no
thing that distinguishes it from freedom. Freedom has no thing that
distinguishes it from the life- process." FOOTNOTE: karika XXV.19 There is no
transcendent reality, no unique state of freedom experienced by the enlightened
one. The worlds experienced by the one bound by suffering and the one freed from
suffering are not different worlds. Nirvana is nothing more than a shift in
understanding the world and a new way of reacting to it. However, Nagarjuna is
quick to say, this does not mean that the cycle of life-and- death and freedom
are the same. "Whatever is of the extremity of freedom and the extremity of the
life-process, between them not even a subtle something is evident." FOOTNOTE:
karika XXV.20 If they were simply declared to be identical, then there would be
neither the experience of suffering nor the experience of release from it.
Although the cycle of birth-and-death and nirvana are not different, then, they
are nonetheless experienced differently and are not simply one and the same.
The cause of this whole sphere of confusions and misunderstandings about the
nature of freedom is the human tendency to speculate and theorize. Were there
not this tendency, then one would never perceive transitory phenomena as
enduring in the first place, which would prevent one from developing passionate
attractions and aversions regarding phenomena. Without such passions, the
dispositions, graspings and cravings would not develop, and thus suffering would
not come to be. Without these passions, one would not create the concepts of
eternal life, identity or difference, or infinity of the universe, concepts
which the Buddha repeatedly refused to discuss. The notion of emptiness is an
antidote to this chain which has its birth in confused understanding and its
result in suffering. For, "when all things are empty, why [speculate on] the
finite, the infinite, both the finite and the infinite and neither the finite
nor the infinite? Why speculate on the identical, the different, the eternal,
the non-eternal, both, or neither?" FOOTNOTE: karika XXV.22-23 When one
completely and utterly ceases to grasp onto theories and perceptions,
speculation comes to an end, and dispositions are "blown out." This is nirvana.
Section twenty-six--Dependent arising, the Buddha's Positive Ontology
Section twenty-six, "Examination of the Twelve Causal Factors," is the
penultimate examination of the karika. It is a highly anomalous section. First,
there is hardly a single original statement in it, the entire section being no
more than a presentation of the twelve links of the chain of dependent arising
as taught by the Buddha. Second, there are none of the cryptic and negatory
statements so characteristic of the previous four hundred verses. This has led
some commentators to assume that it and the last section, "Examination of
Views," are merely summations of Theravada, "Older School," doctrine. This
opinion holds that the first twenty-five sections were the exposition of
Madhyamika thought, and these last two Nagarjuna added as an appendix of sorts.
Another hypothesis proposed is that these last two sections are actually
spurious. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986, 77 Nagarjuna completed his treatise with
the examination of nirvana, this hypothesis holds, and the last sections were
added by someone who wished to make Nagarjuna appear to be a Theravadin.
There does not seem to be any justification for either of these views. Regarding
the last two sections as non-Madhyamika may help one uphold certain theories
about the nature of Madhyamika. The Prasangika school, for example, asserts that
Nagarjuna was denying all concepts and advancing none of his own. Since section
twenty-six decidedly presents a positive theory, it would be convenient for the
Prasangika orientation to regard it as spurious. There is, however, no apparent
reason to interpret this section in that manner. If it is rejected because it is
positive and thus seems anomalous, then the dedicatory verses, as well, could be
rejected, and then so could any verse which was difficult to interpret. These
last sections will therefore be accepted as Nagarjuna's legitimate and intended
conclusion to his treatise.
Nagarjuna presents the Buddha's twelve links in the chain of dependent arising
in the same order and manner in which the Buddha presented them. The only
innovation is that he inserts two verses from another sutra to clarify one point
and concludes the section with three verses which summarize the way to reverse
the cycle. The Buddha's chain of dependent arising was already discussed in
chapter two, and will be explained fully in chapter five. This section is short,
though, and the subject very important, so it will not hurt to follow
Nagarjuna's verses and present it again.
The causal chain begins with ignorance. The true nature of reality is
impermanence, soullessness, and suffering. One who does not perceive this fact
will believe that things are real, that there are enduring identities and egos,
and that it is possible to find satisfaction in these things. One forms
dispositions, such as attraction and aversion, on the basis of such misbeliefs.
One then initiates volitional action, e.g. approaching that which one desires
and avoiding that which is undesirable. Based on such dispositions,
consciousness infuses the new life-form. That is, consciousness does not create
the attractions and aversions, but rather they are primal and give rise to
consciousness. It may seem odd to say that consciousness does not arise until
this point, for most religious systems regard consciousness as eternal,
all-pervasive, and ultimate. Buddhism, however, holds it to be
dependently-arisen. Consciousness is but one of the five aggregates constituting
a person. Until there is an awareness of subject/object duality, there can be
nothing of which to be conscious. Therefore, consciousness neither can arise nor
is needed until there is an awareness of a subject interacting with a separate
world. The dispositionally- conditioned attractions and aversions provide the
earliest basis of and need for interaction. Following this infusion of
consciousness, "name and form," i.e. the psychophysical personality, come to be.
This is where the new life can be said to be a "person" proper. The awareness of
name-and-form both creates the individual identity and also causes the awareness
of the objective world. Before the rise of name-and-form, it would be possible
to see attractions and aversions as occurring and acting as simple natural
forces. Now, however, name-and-form cause awareness both of internal subject and
external object, both of "me" and "it." This awareness conditions the six
spheres of sense-faculty, i.e. the five physical sense- faculties plus mental
sensations, which are called thoughts. These sense-faculties are not actual
feelings, but just the potential means by which feeling can occur. The duality
of subject and object plus the potential for sensation afforded by the
sense-faculties gives rise to contact itself and the actual feeling which
ensues.
Nagarjuna here inserts a few lines from one of the early canonical texts to help
explain the nature of contact. Using the example of vision, he says that contact
proceeds from "the harmonious occurrence of the three factors: material form,
consciousness, and eye. Feeling proceeds from such contact." FOOTNOTE: karika
XXVI.5 Dependent upon feeling is craving. When one has sensation, then one
develops likings for certain feelings and aversions for others. This leads to
grasping, which takes the two forms of passionate desire to partake of pleasant
sensations and avoid unpleasant ones. With the development of grasping, the one
who grasps now becomes bound to the cycle of birth-and-death. Nagarjuna here
points out a converse progression. "If [the grasper] were to be a non-grasper,
he would be released, and there would be no further becoming." FOOTNOTE: karika
XXVI.7 This, Nagarjuna points out, is a weak link in the chain. This is where
the cycle of suffering can be broken and freedom won. One may not have control
over the earlier links of the chain, such as primal ignorance or past karma, but
one assuredly has the ability, here and now, to refrain from grasping. With
detached equanimity, bondage would be broken. If one does grasp, then the five
aggregates constituting the psychophysical personality will be bound by
dispositionally-conditioned karma and will continue to arise again and again.
This will lead to unending rebirths, which in turn will lead to unending deaths.
This is the final link of the chain. "Such is the occurrence of this entire mass
of suffering." FOOTNOTE: karika XXVI.9
In summary, Nagarjuna reminds the reader that "the ignorant [person] forms
dispositions that constitute the source of the life process," and hence all
suffering. The key is to remove ignorance, which can be done by cultivating
knowledge and wisdom. The wise person will not initiate the cycle of suffering,
"because of his perception of truth." FOOTNOTE: karika XXVI.10 The truth in
question is dependent arising and its concomitant, emptiness. When all things
are seen as being empty, one can form no dispositions about them and will cause
neither passionate attractions nor aversions to come into play. This will
prevent grasping. There is thus a certain circularity in the chain of dependent
arising and the way to break free from the chain. Nagarjuna said above, in verse
seven of this section, that the weak link is grasping. If one ceases to grasp,
then dispositions will wane and endless rebirths will cease. In another way,
however, breaking free from grasping is the result of the appeasement of
dispositions. That is, one must refrain from grasping to release the
dispositions, and one must release the dispositions to refrain from grasping.
There is also a sort of catch-22 evident in the first two links of the chain:
"When ignorance has ceased, there is no occurrence of dispositions." However,
the cessation of that ignorance takes place only as a result of the release of
dispositions. FOOTNOTE: karika XXVI.11 The two halves of each of these
equations, grasping + dispositions and ignorance + dispositions, arise together.
They must also be released together. This may seem paradoxical, but the Buddhist
declares that it is possible to do. The Eightfold Path is the way to do this.
When one structures one's life on the principle of moderation through right
actions, right thoughts, and right discipline, then ignorance will be undercut.
"In this way, this entire mass of suffering ceases completely." FOOTNOTE: karika
XXVI.12
The chain of dependent arising is not a linear one, but a circular one. The
above catch-22 and the seeming paradox of releasing graspings through wisdom yet
gaining wisdom through releasing grasping is thus clarified. Ignorance is, it is
true, presented as being the first link. This does not mean, though, that
ignorance is in any way a cause of the succeeding eleven links. The chain can be
seen as a series of conditions (pratyayas) influencing one another in
succession, but this is just a way of explaining it. All links of the chain
arise dependently. When there is the first link, ignorance, then the twelfth
link, suffering and death, necessarily will follow. When there is the twelfth
link, death will lead to rebirth, and the first link will follow. Both the
origin and the means of escape from the entire chain are to be found in this
mutually-conditioned and interdependent arising.
Section twenty-seven--Conclusion: Right and Wrong Views
Nagarjuna has now completed his examination of the Buddha's philosophy. He has
discussed all manner of improper theories and has concluded with a short but
comprehensive recapitulation of the Buddha's central guiding teaching: the
nature of the cycle of arising and suffering and the way to eliminate this cycle
of binding influence through a cultivation of wisdom. He now closes the treatise
with one last warning against unnecessary theorizing.
Section twenty-seven, "Examination of Views," can be elucidated by a brief
excursus of one element of the Buddha's doctrine. The first two limbs of the
Eightfold Path are Right Thought and Right Understanding. There are definite and
specific ways of thinking which must be cultivated if one is to escape
suffering, and these are the Buddha's teachings. However, the Buddha also
stressed that certain types of speculation are deleterious, as exemplified by
the metaphor of the man shot with an arrow. These are the metaphysical questions
regarding the ultimate natures of things, which questions he would offer no
comment on. They are referred to as the Avyakrta, the "Unanswerables," or the
"questions which tend not to edification." An episode from an early sutra will
best explain these "Unanswerables" and the Buddha's attitude towards them. The
following episode is summarized and paraphrased.
A certain monk approached the Buddha and spoke as follows:
"Sir, it just occurred to me, as I was in meditation, that you have left
unelucidated, and set aside, and rejected certain theories---that the world is
eternal, that the world is not eternal, that the world is finite, that the
world is infinite, that the soul and the body are identical, that the soul is
one thing and the body another, that the saint exists after death, that the
saint does not exist after death, or both, or neither. If you know the
answersto these questions, then tell me. If not, then admit that you do not
know. If you do not give me an answer, then I will cease to be a Buddhist."
"O monk, did I ever say to you, 'Come, lead the religious life under me, and I
will answer these questions?'"
"No."
"In the same way as the man shot with the arrow, O monk, the man who refuses
to live the religious life until I have answered these questions, that man
would die before I have answered them. The religious life does not depend on
the dogma that the world is eternal... not eternal... The religious life does
not depend on the dogma that the world is finite... infinite. The religious
life does not depend on the dogma that the soul and the body are identical...
are different. The religious life does not depend on the dogma that the saint
exists after death... does not... both... neither. Bear in mind always what it
is that I have elucidated, and what it is that I have not elucidated. I have
only taught those things which have to do with the fundamentals of religion,
facilitate quiescence and cessation of passions, and lead to nirvana."
FOOTNOTE: The complete episode can be found in Warren, 117-122
These "unanswerables," which are found in many places in the early texts, treat
the four basic questions of the temporal duration of the universe, the spatial
extension of it, the future life of the Tathagata, and the relation between the
body and the soul. The questions represent the most basic and deepest
insecurities held by unenlightened persons, and all stem ultimately from a
belief in the self and a fear of its dissolution. They are enumerated variously
as ten or fourteen, FOOTNOTE: Murti is apparently incorrect in saying that "they
are invariably enumerated as fourteen." Cf. Murti 1960, 36 and Warren, 117-122
but this variance is due to no more than how many "either," "or," "both," or
"neither" alternatives are given for each of the four. Besides the Buddha's
refusal to provide specific solutions to these problems, as recounted above,
there were also times when, after having been asked such questions, he would
simply not speak.
Discussion of the unanswerablesand the famous "silence of the Buddha" has been a
popular topic in modern scholarship, and four main theories have been proposed
to explain his refusal to provide answers. These must be presented briefly now,
for Nagarjuna's treatment of the unanswerables does not seem to fit neatly any
of the four. First, it has been said that the Buddha was silent because he was
interested only in practical matters. The speculative metaphysics were, simply,
less important than living the proper life, and thus were set aside. A second
interpretation is that the Buddha frankly did not know the answers, and was
preeminently an agnostic. This was the initial suspicion of the monk in the
above parable. Third, an opposite interpretation of agnosticism is that the
Buddha did know the answers, but was incapable of explaining them. This
interpretation is partially supported by the number of times the Buddha
emphasized the subtlety and abstruseness of the doctrine. Following his
enlightenment he seriously considered not even attempting to teach his new-
found truths, only because he despaired of anyone understanding. FOOTNOTE:
``[The enlightenment] won by me is deep, difficult to see, difficult to
understand,'' the Buddha thought on the night of his awakening. ``...For human
beings this would be a matter difficult to see... If I were to teach [it] and
others were not to understand me, that would be a weariness to me, that would be
a vexation to me.'' (quoted in Kalupahana 1986, 336) However, to say that the
difficulty of teaching motivated the Buddha's reticence to speak is not to do
him justice. Surely such an enlightened being would be able to wield language to
make it do his bidding. Further, it is stated clearly in the discourses that the
Buddha did have the ability to tailor his use of language to fit his audiences.
A fourth approach is to say that the problem lies in the mental processes which
give rise to such questions. What is important is, not an answer or the lack of
an answer to these questions, but rather completely removing oneself from such a
sphere of ratiocination by the appeasement of reifying thoughts. FOOTNOTE: For a
more complete discussion of this, see Gadjin M. Nagao, "The Silence of the
Buddha and its Madhyamic Interpretation," in Nagao 1991, 35-50
These four might or might not be correct, and they might not even be
incompatible, but neither are they Nagarjuna's direct approach. Nagarjuna,
simply, says that the answers to these questions are wrong. There may be
theoretical reasons for rejecting the unanswerable questions, and there
certainly are pragmatic reasons for not becoming entangled in such speculation.
However, Nagarjuna's primary reason for rejecting them in his final section is
none of these. He simply rejects them because they do not hold up to logical
scrutiny.
Nagarjuna opens with a discussion of views about eternalism. All views of the
survival of the self are based on the belief that the self existed in the past
and/or that the self will exist in the future. However, it would not be
appropriate to say that the self existed in the past, for this would require
that the self who existed in the past is identical with the self who exists now,
in the present. This has already been refuted in section eleven. However, the
Buddha also said that it is incorrect to say that the self is not eternal. If
the Buddha had denied continuity of existence, then, as discussed above,
morality would be undercut, for "the fruit of action performed by one will be
experienced by another." FOOTNOTE: karika XXVII.11 This was discussed in section
seventeen. Further, a self that existed in the present but not in the past would
be uncaused, which would be an erroneous conclusion. Since neither of the above
alternatives is appropriate, it would certainly not be appropriate to combine
them and say that one both existed and did not exist in the past. Further, since
there are no other alternatives besides existence or not existence, and since a
middle ground between the two would be unintelligible, it is not appropriate to
say that one neither existed nor did not exist in the past. Views regarding a
future existence are to be treated in the same way. That which leads to the
asking of the above unanswerable questions is the tendency to seek for some
"thing," some real entity which can be characterized in terms of existence or
non- existence. But, "if it is thought that there is nothing eternal, what is it
that will be non-eternal, both eternal and non-eternal, and also what is
separated from these two [i.e. 'neither']?" FOOTNOTE: karika XXVII.20
Nagarjuna next addresses the issue of the relation between the soul and the body
by focusing on grasping, for it is grasping which causes the belief in
self-hood. There is certainly an appearance of continuous selfhood. This
illusion arises from the agglomeration of the aggregates, but it is only
dispositions and grasping that cause one to see a self in the aggregates. "When
it is assumed that there is no self separated from grasping, grasping itself
would be the self. Yet, this is tantamount to saying that there is no self."
FOOTNOTE: karika XXVII.5 But, he cautions, this does not mean that there is a
self different from grasping. The self, then, "is neither different from
grasping nor identical with it." FOOTNOTE: karika XXVII.8 What has been refuted
here is any natural existential status of the self, not the self as it has come
to be in those who grasp. "A self does not exist. Yet, it is not the case that a
person who does not grasp does not exist. This much is certain." FOOTNOTE:
karika XXVII.8 That is, when there is grasping, there is a belief in selfhood,
and a self comes to be. Nagarjuna's point is that this self is not ultimately
real.
One may object that perhaps there are forms of "subtle existence" which do not
face the above problems. The Buddha did allow for the possibility of higher
realms of existence, such as realms of Gods or spirits. This was a natural
corollary of the doctrine of rebirth, for one living the Eightfold Path may
improve his or her station but not achieve the final enlightenment which would
obviate further existences. This person would then have to be reborn, but would
be reborn in a better world. However, these divine spheres of reality, while
better, were still not eternal and ultimately no more satisfactory than the
human sphere. Nagarjuna devotes three verses to clarifying the fact that divine
existences share the same limitations as human existence.
The thoughts of the soul's eternity or lack thereof were negated above, and now
Nagarjuna negates thoughts of the universe's temporal eternity or lack thereof
and its spatial infinity or lack thereof. The popular metaphor of candle flames
is here used to illustrate the nature of the universe's existence. If the flame
of one candle is used to ignite the wick of another candle, and then that
newly-ignited candle is used to ignite a third one, then there is the appearance
of a flame passing from one candle on to the next. It cannot be said that there
is one identical flame passing on, for it is burning on different wicks, using
different fuel sources, and in different times. Yet neither can there said to be
three different flames, for there is an obvious continuity from one to the next.
In the same way are the elements of which the universe is composed. The universe
cannot be said to end, because continuity is observed in the series of
dependently-arising elements. Nor can it be said to endure, because each entity
in each moment is composed of different elements. Finally, the spatial extension
of the universe cannot be theorized about in any way. "It is not possible to
assert either the finite or the infinite," Nagarjuna concludes. FOOTNOTE: karika
XXVII.28
Nagarjuna has thus far dealt with three of the four unanswerable subjects: the
duration of the self, the relation of the self and the body, and the temporal
duration and spatial extension of the universe. What was left out of this
section was a discussion of the fourth unanswerable, the posthumous existence or
nonexistence of the Tathagata. It may be noted that each of the above topics was
dealt with in earlier sections. It is not entirely clear why he brought them up
again in the final section, but two options come to mind. First, while the first
three topics appear repeatedly in the previous twenty-six sections, they were
usually mentioned in passing. There was as yet not a unified treatment of each
one on its own. This would also explain why a discussion of the fourth
unanswerable was left out of this section: Nagarjuna did devote an entire
section to the nature of the Tathagata, and it did not need to be treated again.
Second, it is likely that Nagarjuna felt that the tendency to speculate on these
matters was so deeply ingrained in most people and the speculations so misguided
that it was worthwhile to refute them in summary one last time. This view is
supported by the statement with which Nagarjuna closes the Mulamadhyamakakarika:
"I reverently bow to Gautama [the Buddha] who, out of compassion, has taught the
true doctrine in order to relinquish all views." FOOTNOTE: karika XXVII.30
According to Nagarjuna, then, the Buddha's teachings were wholly for the sake of
precluding metaphysical speculations and providing guidelines as to what types
of views are appropriate.
Thus ends Nagarjuna's major and most influential work. One may perhaps wish that
it ended on a clearer note: the final two sections and, especially, the final
verse seem to raise far more confusion than they settle. Perhaps, though, this
is not a bad thing. The obscurity of the karika provides for good thesis topics
for those students needing them.

The Philosophy of Madhyamika

In the previous chapter an attempt was made to present and explain the main
themes of each section of Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika. It is hoped that
this was accomplished with clarity, and that the reader now has a cursory grasp
of the karika, its themes, and its method of argumentation.
The reasons for and implications of focusing solely on the karika to present
Madhyamika thought should be repeated here. This work represents the core of the
entire school. Though Nagarjuna wrote somewhere between thirteen and one hundred
other texts, and though his commentators were numerous and disparate, and though
the possible interpretations of the meaning and intent of Madhyamika thought are
quite varied, nonetheless one can point to this work as being both the sole
cornerstone of the school's philosophy and the vital influence which literally
provided the school with its very life-breath. Choosing this work alone may
present a limited understanding of the mind and intent of Nagarjuna (e.g. it
will shed no light on the question of whether Nagarjuna was a Theravadin or a
Mahayanist) and it certainly will not illuminate the subsequent developments of
Madhyamika thought in all its variety. What a focus on this work alone will
provide is the purest and cleanest possible presentation of the fundamentals of
the school. FOOTNOTE: The Buddhist tradition agrees that this is the place of
this treatise, for the work became known as ``The Fundamentals of the Middle
[Way].''
A disclaimer must be forwarded in advance: it must be cautioned that any
exposition of Nagarjuna's thought ultimately must be somewhat tentative. The
terse form of the treatise's verses, their often cryptic quality, and the
subtlety of the thought of both the Buddha and Nagarjuna all conspire to prevent
any final certainties about what exactly Nagarjuna's philosophy was. Moreover,
it is not always clear which of Nagarjuna's verses were meant to be an
opponent's position which he then refuted, and which represented Nagarjuna's own
position. Translators and interpreters of the karika, ancient and modern,
frequently disagree on whether any specific verse is meant to be the right view
being defended or the wrong view being negated. The above difficulties have not
prevented books from being written which claim to offer definitive
interpretations of Nagarjuna and Madhyamika---on the contrary, it seems that
most commentaries and studies have claimed to be conclusive. Such allegations of
certainty must be suspected even if only because the studies in question often
have arrived at quite diverse interpretations. This necessary caveat aside, a
discussion of the main elements and significances of Madhyamika thought as
expressed in the karika will now be offered.
The primary themes of Madhyamika thought as detailed in the karika are three:
the refutation of self-nature (svabhava), the examination of dependent arising
pratitya samutpada), and the teaching of emptiness sunyata). These three are
implicitly examined throughout the entire treatise, but were never isolated and
scrutinized on their own. There was, it is true, a separate section devoted to
each of self-nature and dependent arising, but these sections scarcely exhausted
the topics nor even attempted to explain their full significance. The reason
these three were not made explicit in Nagarjuna's treatise is that they were not
simply three subjects among many which he wanted to investigate. Rather, they
are the very substrata on which Madhyamika is based.
Self-nature runs throughout the karika as the insidious nemesis of Buddhist
philosophy. A refutation of it was the initial inspiration for this treatise,
for all false philosophical positions are based on its often subtle influence.
Dependent arising is the chief causal principle and is as well the shaping
factor of the severe use of dialectics for which Madhyamika is so famous. It was
a unique interpretation of dependent arising by Nagarjuna that provided the
means by which to refute self-nature. Interpreting causation in such a way as to
preclude self- nature led Nagarjuna to emphasize emptiness, the concept for
which he is most famous. If no entities, events, or personalities have
self-nature, then they are "empty." Emptiness is the closest that the otherwise
apophatic Madhyamika comes to advancing a doctrinal tenet. It is the only
possible description of the ontological status of the world, and it is as well
the sword which the Madhyamika uses to slash through all false views and counter
all opposition. (Dependent arising is not a cataphatic assertion: it is a
description, an abstract theory.) Now that a broad outline of the karika and its
surface themes has been presented, these three all-pervading and heretofore
largely tacit topics may be examined. Their significance will be shown to be
profound and subtle and their ramifications vast.


top

Thinking in Buddhism: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamikakarikas (part 5) by Jonah Winters'

The Philosophy of Madhyamika

In the previous chapter an attempt was made to present and explain the main
themes of each section of Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika. It is hoped that
this was accomplished with clarity, and that the reader now has a cursory grasp
of the karika, its themes, and its method of argumentation.
The reasons for and implications of focusing solely on the karika to present
Madhyamika thought should be repeated here. This work represents the core of the
entire school. Though Nagarjuna wrote somewhere between thirteen and one hundred
other texts, and though his commentators were numerous and disparate, and though
the possible interpretations of the meaning and intent of Madhyamika thought are
quite varied, nonetheless one can point to this work as being both the sole
cornerstone of the school's philosophy and the vital influence which literally
provided the school with its very life-breath. Choosing this work alone may
present a limited understanding of the mind and intent of Nagarjuna (e.g. it
will shed no light on the question of whether Nagarjuna was a Theravadin or a
Mahayanist) and it certainly will not illuminate the subsequent developments of
Madhyamika thought in all its variety. What a focus on this work alone will
provide is the purest and cleanest possible presentation of the fundamentals of
the school. FOOTNOTE: The Buddhist tradition agrees that this is the place of
this treatise, for the work became known as ``The Fundamentals of the Middle
[Way].''
A disclaimer must be forwarded in advance: it must be cautioned that any
exposition of Nagarjuna's thought ultimately must be somewhat tentative. The
terse form of the treatise's verses, their often cryptic quality, and the
subtlety of the thought of both the Buddha and Nagarjuna all conspire to prevent
any final certainties about what exactly Nagarjuna's philosophy was. Moreover,
it is not always clear which of Nagarjuna's verses were meant to be an
opponent's position which he then refuted, and which represented Nagarjuna's own
position. Translators and interpreters of the karika, ancient and modern,
frequently disagree on whether any specific verse is meant to be the right view
being defended or the wrong view being negated. The above difficulties have not
prevented books from being written which claim to offer definitive
interpretations of Nagarjuna and Madhyamika---on the contrary, it seems that
most commentaries and studies have claimed to be conclusive. Such allegations of
certainty must be suspected even if only because the studies in question often
have arrived at quite diverse interpretations. This necessary caveat aside, a
discussion of the main elements and significances of Madhyamika thought as
expressed in the karika will now be offered.
The primary themes of Madhyamika thought as detailed in the karika are three:
the refutation of self-nature (svabhava), the examination of dependent arising
pratitya samutpada), and the teaching of emptiness sunyata). These three are
implicitly examined throughout the entire treatise, but were never isolated and
scrutinized on their own. There was, it is true, a separate section devoted to
each of self-nature and dependent arising, but these sections scarcely exhausted
the topics nor even attempted to explain their full significance. The reason
these three were not made explicit in Nagarjuna's treatise is that they were not
simply three subjects among many which he wanted to investigate. Rather, they
are the very substrata on which Madhyamika is based.
Self-nature runs throughout the karika as the insidious nemesis of Buddhist
philosophy. A refutation of it was the initial inspiration for this treatise,
for all false philosophical positions are based on its often subtle influence.
Dependent arising is the chief causal principle and is as well the shaping
factor of the severe use of dialectics for which Madhyamika is so famous. It was
a unique interpretation of dependent arising by Nagarjuna that provided the
means by which to refute self-nature. Interpreting causation in such a way as to
preclude self- nature led Nagarjuna to emphasize emptiness, the concept for
which he is most famous. If no entities, events, or personalities have
self-nature, then they are "empty." Emptiness is the closest that the otherwise
apophatic Madhyamika comes to advancing a doctrinal tenet. It is the only
possible description of the ontological status of the world, and it is as well
the sword which the Madhyamika uses to slash through all false views and counter
all opposition. (Dependent arising is not a cataphatic assertion: it is a
description, an abstract theory.) Now that a broad outline of the karika and its
surface themes has been presented, these three all-pervading and heretofore
largely tacit topics may be examined. Their significance will be shown to be
profound and subtle and their ramifications vast.

Nagarjuna's Motivation and Mission
The Dedicatory Verses

Nagarjuna appears to have been motivated by two factors. First, certain
interpretations of the Buddha's teachings had been proposed with which he
disagreed. A careful reading of the karika points to the notion of self-nature
as being his primary focus. This was not simply a metaphysical doctrine which
Nagarjuna disagreed with. The notion of self-nature with all its ramifications
would have far-reaching repercussions on the Buddha's philosophy, calling into
question the applicability of the Eightfold Path, the veracity of the four Noble
Truths, and the attainability of nirvana. The second motivation both caused and
explains the first---Nagarjuna was a devout Buddhist. It was paramount to him to
defend the Buddha's teaching against all misinterpretations, to clarify the
teachings for his fellow Buddhists, and to spread the teaching to those outside
the community. FOOTNOTE: The rather antinomian character of much of later
Buddhism tends to disguise these two aspects of early Buddhism which many
Buddhists today, especially in America, would find unappealing: One, the
Buddha's teaching was basically fundamentalist in requiring "right views" before
any thing else. The only right view is the Saddharma, the Buddha's "True Law."
Granted, the right view is a "moderate" view, but this does not negate its
dogmatism. Two, Buddhism was one of the most missionary- and conversion-oriented
religions in world history, second only to Christianity. (On the latter, cf.
Kulke and Rothermund, 64-67) Nagarjuna's devotional attitude and his dedicatory
verses of the karika will be discussed first, and a detailed treatment of
self-nature will follow.
It cannot be stressed too much that Nagarjuna was, first and foremost, a
Buddhist. This devotional attitude does not necessarily shed light on the
philosophy of Madhyamika, but it was the dominant reason for Nagarjuna to write
the treatise. The karika opens with a two-verse dedication to the Buddha, it
contains almost twenty direct invocations of the Buddha variously extolled as
the Supreme Ascetic, the Victorious One, the Perfectly Enlightened One, and the
Blessed One, and it closes with Nagarjuna saying "I reverently bow to Gautama
who, out of compassion, has taught the true doctrine." FOOTNOTE: karika XXVII.30

This aspect of Nagarjuna seems to be overlooked curiously often by modern
scholars. His work tends to be treated as a philosophical system based on
ratiocination and expounded solely for the purpose of clearing up
misunderstandings. This is true, but it is not the whole picture. Nagarjuna's
frequent homages to the Buddha display his devotional attitude, and the volume
of hymns and devotional literature attributed to him demonstrate that the
Buddhist tradition did not see him in such a purely philosophical light. He was
also seen as an apologist motivated by faith and greatly concerned with the
dissemination of the Buddha's word.
Nagarjuna's religious piety and his trenchant philosophy are in no way
contradictory. This harmony between his faith and his intellect is expressed by
the two dedicatory verses with which he opens the karika:
"I salute him, the fully-enlightened, the best of speakers, who preached the
non-ceasing and the non-arising, the non- annihilation and the non-permanence,
the non-identity and the non- difference, the non-appearance and the
non-disappearance, the dependent arising, the appeasement of obsessions and
the auspicious." FOOTNOTE: karika, introductory verses
This introduction demonstrates, not only that Nagarjuna's faith and intellect
are not contradictory, but that they are complementary. The soteriological path
of the Buddha both explains and engenders the rational dialectical philosophy of
Nagarjuna.
These laconic verses may at first sight seem to express little more than a
simple rejection of extremes. In actuality, their significance is great, for
they summarize, in a mere eighteen words (in Sanskrit), the entirety of the
Madhyamika philosophical approach. All of the philosophical aspects contained in
these verses have been or will be discussed at length elsewhere in this thesis.
Notwithstanding, since Nagarjuna saw fit to state them in a preview to his work,
so shall they be briefly explained here.
First, the Buddha is extolled as the fully enlightened (sambuddhah). This,
obviously, immediately tells the reader what religious system is going to be
explained in the following treatise, but it also encapsulates the soteriological
goal, "full enlightenment." The Buddha is then credited with preaching the "non-
ceasing" and the "non-arising" and, later, "dependent arising." These three
terms state a sort of table of contents, but their significance is far greater.
They detail, in a mere three words, the full Madhyamika interpretation of
dependent arising. Early Buddhist schools saw dependent arising as the mutual
conditioning of interrelated elements and events. These elements and events were
seen as being mutually conditioned but still real in themselves. The Madhyamika
school gave a wholly new twist to dependent arising, stating that, if mutually
conditioned, elements and events can not be real. Things are thus not explained
by ceasing and arising, but are characterized as non-ceasing and non-arising.
Seen this way, one could almost call Nagarjuna's theory "non-dependent
non-arising." The fact that the normal casual order is reversed in this pair
further foreshadows the subversionary method so peculiar to Madhyamika. Two more
pairs flesh out Nagarjuna's interpretation of dependent arising: "non-
annihilation and non-permanence" and "non-appearance and non- disappearance." As
things arise dependently, they cannot have any real temporal location. They
cannot be annihilated, for they were never really originated. Nor can they be
permanent, for this would require that they have self-nature, an assertion that
does not withstand logical analysis. The perceiving and conceptual reifying
faculties of the individual are illuminated by the non-appearance and
non-disappearance of things. This pair shows that the existence of things is
illusory, and hence any perceptions of them are evanescent and imputations of
existence to them are false. Any conceptions that are held must be based on
thoughts of identity and difference. E.g., "I" am different from this "desk"
which is front of me; only thus can there be a subject relating to it as a
different object. Further, I know that there is a "me," for I have
identity---the me who existed last night is identical to the me who exists
today. Since the Buddha taught "non-identity and non-difference," all such
thoughts are wrong. Finally, these introductory verses point out the means of
salvation, which are "the appeasement of obsessions and the auspicious." By
abandoning clinging to obsessions, that is, one finds the auspicious, the good
(siva). One finds enlightenment. The fact that Nagarjuna did not state his
dedication to the Buddha and then follow it separately with the above summary of
Madhyamika thought shows that his devotional attitude and his philosophical
agenda are wholly intertwined.

Self-Nature Theories

The concept of self-nature, svabhava, has been repeatedly discussed in passing
in the above three chapters. It has not yet been examined in isolation because
Nagarjuna did not present a single, comprehensive presentation of it in the
karika. He did devote section fifteen to an "Examination of Self-nature," but
this presentation of it was not exhaustive. In it he only discussed three
aspects of self- nature theories: the character of svabhava as necessarily
non-made and independent (karika XV.1-3), the fact that svabhava cannot be
related to thoughts of existence or non-existence (XV.4-5, 8-11), and the
incompatibility of svabhava with the Buddha's teachings (XV.6-7).
The full significance of self-nature is hinted at by the fact that the karika
can be seen as being structured around a discussion of self-nature. The first
fourteen sections of the treatise dealt mostly with refutations of certain
Realist interpretations of the elements and factors comprising objective,
external reality. For example, examinations in the first half of the work were
of causes and conditions pratyayas), elements, action, and the conglomerating
relations and forces. The placement of this important section near the middle of
the treatise, instead of at the beginning, hints that a clarification and
refutation of self- nature concludes this examination of the elements and
factors of reality. The sections of the treatise following this seem to deal
more with an examination of the individual and his or her internal subjective
reality. For example, examinations following it are of bondage and release, self
and time, enlightenment and hindrances thereto, and right and wrong views. It
was necessary for Nagarjuna to have refuted notions of self- nature before he
could examine these latter issues.

Non-Buddhist Notions of Self-nature and the Soul

The three aspects of self-nature theories discussed in section fifteen seemingly
were chosen because they were of the most direct relevance in the theories
Nagarjuna was refuting and the teachings he was upholding in the treatise. What
he did not discuss, then, and for obvious reasons, was a more sympathetic
account of self- nature, i.e. the reasons it was formulated as a concept in the
first place, what the theory meant, and what problems it solved. The concept had
a long history of usage and a variety of meanings throughout that history. There
were definite reasons for some schools of thought, Buddhist and otherwise, to
posit self-nature. Further, there are more significances of the concept which
Nagarjuna did not as explicitly touch upon; these significances were only
implicit in his refutation of the concept. A brief discussion of the history of
the concept, reasons for its assertion, and its significance needs to be taken
up now. This is not an irrelevant aside, but is important for two reasons.
First, a fuller understanding of self- nature theories will shed greater light
on Nagarjuna's enterprise. Second, it will demonstrate the ground for his
philosophy. The two most important concepts of Nagarjuna's philosophy, dependent
arising and emptiness, will only make sense against the backdrop of the theories
he was criticizing.
One cannot point to a conclusive beginning of self-nature theories. Surely, they
were first posited whenever individuals reflected on the fact that there is a
causal regularity between events and an apparent continuity of identity in
individuals and things. By the time of the early classical period in India, two
distinct camps of self-nature theories had become clear: those of orthodox
Hinduism, and those of the three heterodoxical systems of Materialism, Jainism,
and Buddhism.
The central fact agreed upon by almost all of Hinduism is the reality of an
eternal, immutable, immanent soul, the atman. This led Hinduism to assert the
reality of self-nature in one form or another. For example, Aghamarsana, one of
the earliest Hindu philosophers, considered "warmth" to be the first creative
principle. From this primal warmth originated, respectively, law, truth,
darkness, water, time, and finally the physical universe. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana
1975, 6 The Sankhya-Yoga system later postulated a general material principle
(prakrti) which was the primal cause of the universe and from which all else
evolved. Theistic interpretations of the above posited a primum mobilum which
initiated the causal process, and nontheistic interpretations declared that the
primal matter contained an inherent energy which obviated the need for a primum
mobilum. FOOTNOTE: ibid., 7 Either way, though, it was clear that the
omnipresence and the eternality of the soul declared that nothing really new
could come into existence; all change was, in some form or another, based on
self-nature. FOOTNOTE: The Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of asatkaryvada is not an
exception to this, for the effect, while empirically a new creation, is
nonetheless potential in and hence inherent in the cause. Cf. Hiriyanna, 239
The "Materialist" philosophies of the early classical period were even more
clear about the reality and function of self-nature, for they denied the
existence both of controlling, inner soul and of a transcendent primum mobilum.
"Without doubt," says Kalupahana, "it was the Materialists who first put forward
a systematic theory of inherent nature svabhava)." FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1975, 28
Since the regularity of causation could be attributed neither to a God nor to an
inner soul, only inherent self- nature could be invoked to account for it. This
self-nature became elevated to the status of fixed, universal law: self-nature
is the only determinant of and force behind causation. Since self-nature took
the place of both the soul and God for the Materialists, they were often grouped
under the broad heading of Svabhava-vada, the "School of Self- nature."
FOOTNOTE: cf. Hiriyanna, 103- 106 Generally speaking, they held that only matter
is real. Any forms of life or consciousness are byproducts of material forces,
the theory of hylozoism. These material elements have an inherent nature which
manifests itself in a fixed pattern of causation. Since sentience is
epiphenomenal and self-nature invariable, free will is necessarily an illusion.
The main difference between Hindu svabhava and Materialist svabhava boils down
to morality. First, the Hindu was more transcendental. The eternal
all-pervasiveness of atman required that nothing really new come into
existence---causal change was always ultimately superficial. The Hindu tradition
emphasized the spiritual quality of ultimate reality, a corollary of which was
that morality is real. One's action determined one's fate, and so it was
paramount to make causality and self-nature two halves of the same coin. The
Bhagavad- Gita summarizes well the connections between self- nature and morality
in Hinduism. Its final chapter states clearly that each person has a self-nature
which determines his or her duties in life. Each of the four castes is said to
have its own intrinsic nature, svabhava, which prescribes specific duties
incumbent upon each person. One can only obtain freedom by properly living out
and manifesting one's svabhava. FOOTNOTE: Cf. Bhagavad-Gita, XVIII.40-48 The
Materialist recognizes no such transcendent self-nature, for self- nature is a
blind physical force found in the material elements only. Religion then boils
down only to morality, and morality in turn reduces to simple hedonism. One text
defines heaven as nothing more than "eating delicious food, keeping company of
young women, using fine clothes," etc. FOOTNOTE: Sarvasiddhantasamgraha 9, in
Radhakrishnan and Moore, 235 Certain Materialists did at least elevate morality
to include cultural cultivation, discipline, and education, but this was for no
other reason but to develop a greater capacity to enjoy the world's delights.
FOOTNOTE: Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta, An Introduction to
Indian Philosophy (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1960), 69 Morality is
further obviated by the complete absence of free will in certain of these
Materialist systems. The text quoted above declares that even one's potential
for pleasure is determined by the lifeless self-nature: "A person is happy or
miserable through [the laws of] nature: there is no other cause." FOOTNOTE:
Sarvasiddhantasamgraha 4, in Radhakrishnan and Moore, 235
Jainism, whose founder was a contemporary of the Buddha, adopted a middle ground
between the above two opposing theories. The Hindus held a modalistic
philosophy; they saw the universe as nothing but modes of the living atman. The
Materialists saw the universe as nothing but manifestations of non-living
matter. The Jains attempted to reconcile the two by postulating a living being
with a soul acting in a universe comprised of non-living matter, space and fate
(karma). Both permanence (spirit) and change (matter) are equally real. This led
to what seems to be the rather confusing doctrine that "things are partly
determined and partly undetermined," that both determinism and free will are
real and operative. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1975, 50 As might be expected from
this, they attempted to both accept and deny self-nature. This was accomplished
by asserting that, on one hand, individual human exertion was capable of
effecting change. On the other hand, past extrinsic karma caused the individual
to become associated with a deterministic type of self-nature.

The Buddha's Theory of Soullessness

The Buddhist theory of self-nature, both in its original formulation and its
later developments, is unlike any of the above three. There are few references
to self- nature to be found in the early Buddhist writings. This is not because
the Buddha was unaware of or was ignoring the issue, but because he saw self-
nature as included in the larger issue of selfhood (atman) as a whole. About
this, he had very clear teachings. Any ideas of self are false and imaginary
beliefs which have no objective ground. Further, the illusory beliefs in
self-hood are the direct cause of selfishness, craving, and greed. "In short,"
says Buddhist scholar Walpola Rahula, "to this false view can be traced all the
evil in the world." FOOTNOTE: Rahula, 51 However, and this is crucial, the
Buddha also taught that one must not conceive of the self as non-existent. He
clearly stated that there is no self, but he did not intend for this to be
interpreted as a negation of something that once existed.
An anecdote will explain this apparent ambivalence between denying and asserting
the soul. The Buddha was once asked by his disciple Vacchagottagotta whether or
not there was a self. The Buddha declined to answer, and the disciple left. He
later explained his refusal to respond:
"If I had answered 'There is a self,' [that would not have been] in accordance
with my knowledge that all things are without self... If I had answered 'There
is no self,' then that would have been a greater confusion to the already
confused Vacchagottagotta. For he would have thought: 'Formerly indeed I had a
self, but now I haven't got one.'" FOOTNOTE: quoted in ibid., 62-3. The
Buddha's dilemma is the same as that presented by the famous, albeit
distasteful, joke from Western philosophy: ``Have you stopped beating your
wife yet?'' As soon as one attempts to answer the question, one is forced to
give misleading information. The only escape is to refrain from answering.
The Buddha was thus careful not to be too adamant about either answer. Saying
that there is a self would lead people to interpret him as being eternalist,
i.e. asserting the eternal atman of Hinduism. The moral result of eternalism is
selfishness and, ultimately, excessive desires. Saying that there is no self
would lead people to interpret him as being annihilationist, i.e. denying any
sort of self-hood in the same way that the Materialists denied it. The moral
result of annihilationism is a state of distress over losing that which one
believes one now has and, further, annihilationism would undermine moral
accountability. Neither could the Buddha say that there both is and is not a
soul, for that would echo the Jaina theory. Morally, he probably saw the Jaina
fatalistic determinism as another threat to accountability; if one's nature and
actions are determined as inexorably by previous karma as the Jains held, then
the efficacy of individual initiative is greatly lessened.
A few hundred years after the Buddha's death some schools undertook the task of
systematizing his ontology in the face of his teaching of anatman, soullessness.
The result was the Abhidharma, a classificatory analysis of human experience
into physical elements, sense- faculties, and the aggregates comprising the
individual. In this process of analysis, two old pre-Buddhist theories crept
back in: self-nature svabhava) and other-nature (parabhava). It was in response
to these insidious heresies that Nagarjuna formulated his refutation of the two.
Theories of self-nature found their host in the Realist (Sarvastivada) school.
Theories of other- nature found a host in the "Sutra School" (Sautrantika), so
called because they saw themselves as being the most faithful to the original
writings, the sutras. The Realists reduced all phenomena to ultimate atomistic
entities. The systematization of these atoms and the relations between them was
complete enough to account for all phenomenal things, events, and individuals
without any recourse to theories of a transcendent self, such as atman. However,
since these atoms were irreducible and discrete, both temporally and spatially,
there remained a difficulty of accounting for the influencing effect of one
momentary atom on another. Further, the perceived continuity of existence was
not fully explained. To resolve these difficulties, the Realists asserted that
each atom has its own self- nature. However, since these atoms are the ultimate
building blocks of reality, and since each has self- nature, they cannot be
associated with arising and ceasing. As such, they must exist in all three
phases of time, past, present, and future. It is not clear how exactly the atoms
can be momentary but their self-nature eternal. It seems that the phenomenal
manifestation of an atom is but momentary, while the potential existence of an
atom and its eternal character, its self-nature, are trans-temporal. FOOTNOTE:
Cf. Kohn, 188 Such a self-nature may not have been explicitly contrary to the
Buddha's teachings, but it seemed to other schools of Buddhism to come
dangerously close to the Hindu atman-theories which the Buddha was assuredly and
clearly negating. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986, 32
In response to these theories which seemed to border on heresy, a group of monks
split off of the Realists around 150 C.E. FOOTNOTE: Kohn, 189 This, the "Sutra
School," intended to reject the heresies of the Realists and return to the
original Buddhism as found in the earliest scriptures. They denied the eternal
self-nature of the otherwise momentary atoms by going to the other extreme of
denying the atoms any temporal duration. They did not merely confine the atom to
existence in the present alone, but literally reduced its duration to zero. A
result of this nontemporal instantaneity was that the atoms could have no
spatial extension, either. FOOTNOTE: Lamotte, 603 The atoms were seen as arising
and perishing in the same instant. Since the atoms partook of neither time nor
space, their causal efficiency was negated. Causation was not denied, for
regular continuity of phenomena was observed to exist. However, the
all-but-nonexistent atoms had no such power to influence or cause. There was
thus seen to be a difference between cause and effect, and the Sutra School was
forced to recognize other-nature, parabhava. FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986, 23 The
"other" in their other-nature was the series of atoms of which any one atom was
a part. The atoms succeed one another in a contiguous, uninterrupted sequence.
While no atom on its own lasts long enough to have causal efficacy, the series
of atoms does last long enough to influence other atomic series. FOOTNOTE:
Lamotte, 607 It is the self-nature of one series, which series is "other" than
each atom within it, that interacts with and conditions pratyayas) other series.
FOOTNOTE: The Sautrantika philosophy of instantaneity led to another, even more
heretical doctrine, which, being unrelated to the topic at hand, was not
mentioned above. Briefly, the Sautrantikas were another school of Personalists.
If an atom is infinitesimally short-lived, then it cannot be perceived directly.
The act of perception would have to be once-removed from the object of
perception. Yet perception exists. To account for this, consciousness was seen
as underlying and supporting all phenomena. This consciousness creates from
succession the illusion of continuity. This illusion is self-conscious, and a
subtle self comes to be.

Nagarjuna's Response

Nagarjuna's position seems to be that the above two schools were led to posit a
form of self-nature because they took the Abhidharma agenda of analysis too far.
By so enthusiastically making lists of all the elements and factors by which the
Buddha explained reality and drawing correspondences and relations between these
factors they failed to realize that, though the Buddha explained his philosophy
using such conceptions as psychophysical aggregates, material elements, and
sense perceptions, he was not reifying these factors. Such elements and factors
provided for a complete description of reality, but they were not intended to be
taken as real. They are all dependently-arisen, not autonomous. Further, the
doctrine of momentariness, as explained above, led the Realists to posit the
existence of self-nature in all three phases of time and led the Sutra School to
deny any temporal duration to the elements. But this notion of momentariness is
not to be found in the Buddha's teachings, either. Nagarjuna's position is that,
had these schools understood dependent arising in the right way, they would not
have been led to hold such beliefs.
Nagarjuna's attitude towards self-nature is wholly explained by one fact: the
theory of dependent arising necessarily upholds the Buddha's doctrine of
soullessness (anatman), which soullessness can never be compatible with
self-nature theories. The self-nature of a thing is its "identity," that which
makes it unique, autonomous, and differentiable from any and every other thing.
The meaning of identity can be illuminated by examples from the English
language. If someone points to me and asks "Who is that?" and they are told
"That is Jonah Siegel," then I have been "identified." I have been distinguished
solely on the basis of my "identity." Further, this identity requires temporal
identical-ness. For the person who is now reading this to have an identity, that
person must at this moment be identical to the person who got out of bed this
morning, and both must be identical to that person who was born one year or
fifty years earlier. Identity theories therefore require that there be an
enduring and unchanging substance residing within the entity, event, or
individual being identified. If a substance either changed or did not endure,
then it would not be identical from one moment to the next, and thus would not
have identity, and thus could not be self-nature.
Nagarjuna saw that self-nature, by necessity, must have two qualities: it must
be unchanging and it must be enduring. The Buddha's theory of dependent arising,
however, is incompatible with such identity on both accounts. First, as
explained above, self-nature must be unchanging and identical from one moment to
the next. However, it would then never be associated with change, and
cause-and-effect would be meaningless. "Because of the perception of change, the
absence of self- nature is [recognized]," says Nagarjuna. FOOTNOTE: karika
XIII.3 The example he used previously to deny change of identity was that a
person cannot be said to age. Who is it that ages, the young person? No, for
youthfulness and agedness cannot exist in the same identity. Is it the old
person who ages? No, for an old person is already aged, and thus cannot again
partake of the process of aging. FOOTNOTE: Cf. karika XIII.4 Is the person
distinct from the discrete process of aging, which process is a mere temporal
attribute of the enduring subject? No, for then subject and attribute would be
separate and individually autonomous. Aging would exist as an abstraction apart
from any thing that ages, and the subject would exist but have no association
with either youthfulness nor agedness, and would thus be equally abstract. Thus,
if a thing has self-nature as a sort of substance, then that thing can never
participate in change or, by extension, causality. A tempting alternative would
be to posit a distinction between a thing's identity and its substantial
self-nature. This is wrong for two reasons. One, such a distinction is
meaningless. Self-nature is identity, and vice-versa. Two, if a thing's identity
and its self- nature were distinguished, then it would have to be said to have
"other-nature." This is metaphysical nonsense, and Nagarjuna repeatedly makes it
clear that, without self- nature, there can be no such thing as other-nature.
The second quality of self-nature is that it must be eternally enduring, for its
autonomy would require that it not be causally conditioned. "The occurrence of
self- nature through causes and conditions (pratyayas) is not proper," declared
Nagarjuna. FOOTNOTE: karika XV.1 If self-nature arose due to a cause or through
the influence of conditions (pratyayas), then it would be artificial, it would
be made. But "how could self-nature be made?" FOOTNOTE: karika XV.2 If made, it
would be at least partially dependent and self-nature, by definition, is
independent. If made, its identity would be potentially or explicitly in its
cause, its maker. One may object that it is still theoretically possible to
declare self-nature to be eternal and unmade, and thus a real and autonomous
identity. A Buddhist would say that there are two philosophical problems with
such eternalism. (There is a moral one, too: see below.) One, no such unmade
identity is evident. The Buddha saw that the nature of all conditioned things is
transitory and he announced this transitoriness. Asserting eternalism
contradicts the Buddha's enlightened observation. Two, such an eternal identity
would be pure metaphysical speculation. If eternal, it would be uncaused and
unconditioned, and wholly autonomous. As such, it could have absolutely no
influencing effects on the rest of the universe, and so it could never be known.
The theoretical denial of self-nature is further upheld by an empirical fact:
self-nature is never observed to exist, and so its assertion must be pure
metaphysical speculation. The very third verse in the treatise states "the
self-nature of existents is not evident." FOOTNOTE: karika I.3 The Buddha, with
all of his perspicacity and philosophical acuity, who was "adept in existence as
well as in non-existence," FOOTNOTE: karika XV.7 said that he found there to be
no substantial identity in things. Even Nagarjuna, who did not claim to have the
same enlightened wisdom as the Buddha, observed the empirical evidence that
self- nature is simply not found to exist. It is na vidyate, "not seen." Those
who do claim to perceive immutable and eternal identity are simply myopic,
filtering their perceptions through defilements, grasping, and dispositions.
"Those who perceive self-nature as well as other-nature, existence as well as
non- existence, they do not perceive the truth embodied in the Buddha's
message." FOOTNOTE: karika XV.6 As mentioned, a supranatural transcendent
identity could be posited theoretically but, as explained above, this theory
could never leave the realm of pure speculation, and so is pointless.
The final reason that Nagarjuna refuted self-nature theories is the moral one.
The potential of things to change and to be changed is prerequisite for personal
growth, change, and escaping from suffering. If one's substantial identity were
immutable, then change would obviously be simply superficial. For one to escape
suffering by changing and appeasing the defilements, self- nature must
necessarily be mutable. FOOTNOTE: The common Vedantic solution to this is that,
since one's substantial nature (atman) is immutable and eternal, the defilements
are but adventitious and temporal. Change is not change of substance, but change
of the accidentals; bondage is removable because it is extrinsic. A Madhyamika
response to this likely would be that, if truly extrinsic, the adventitious
elements could never really affect or bind the substance. More drastic, a person
is only confined to the cycle of birth-and-death if he or she has dispositions
like passionate attraction and aversion and if he or she grasps onto these
passions or grasps onto existence itself. If things had self-nature, then these
dispositions and graspings would themselves have self-nature. Since self- nature
is unchanging, then the dispositions and grasping themselves would be permanent,
unappeasable, and eternally binding. One could never break free from them, and
enlightenment could never be found. FOOTNOTE: Cf. karika XXII.9 Finally,
self-nature would be incompatible with causation, an individual's ability to
effect real change would be impossible, all moral action would be nullified, and
the Buddha's path would become meaningless. "If you perceive the existence of
the existents in terms of self-nature, then you will... contradict [the notions
of] effect, cause, agent, performance of action, activity, arising, ceasing, as
well as fruit [i.e. the results of moral action]," Nagarjuna concludes.
FOOTNOTE: karika XXIV.16-17

Dependent Arising, the Foundation of Madhyamika
Dependent Arising as a Central Notion in Buddhism

The Buddha's theory of dependent arising has an immediately obvious
signific-ance---it is the only positive ontological theory expounded by the
Buddha. The formulations of the four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path are of
course positive teachings, but they are not really philosophical dogmas. They
are descriptions of the condition of humankind, the ultimate goal of humankind,
and teachings about how to achieve that goal. Only dependent arising describes
the ontic status of the universe (dependence), its mode of creation
(dispositions conditioned by ignorance), its future fate (the appeasement of
dispositions which reverses the cycle of arising), the ontic nature of the
individual (impersonal aggregates conditioned by ignorance), and the future fate
of the individual (extinction through enlightenment). Scholar Gunapala
Malalasekera has expressed the status of these various formulations well in
saying that "Just as the Four Noble Truths... form the heart of the Buddha's
teaching, so does the doctrine of dependent arising constitute its backbone."
FOOTNOTE: Gunapala Piyasena Malalasekera, "Aspects of Reality taught by
Theravada Buddhism," in Moore, 78
Dependent arising was likewise of supreme importance for Nagarjuna. As explained
above, Nagarjuna opened his treatise with a dedication that placed dependent
arising at the center of his appreciation of the Buddha and as central for
Madhyamika thought. Indeed, renowned scholar of Buddhism Gadjin Nagao has gone
so far as to say that Nagarjuna "regarded Sakyamuni as the great master
precisely because of his elucidation of dependent arising." FOOTNOTE: Gadjin M.
Nagao, The Foundational Standpoint of Madhyamika Philosophy (New York: State
University of New York Press, 1989), 5 (italics mine) As with the above
discussion of self- nature, a prefatory presentation of the doctrine and its
development is necessary. Dependent arising is not a theory that the Buddha
developed, but one that he saw. As he sat under the Bodhi tree on the night of
his full awakening he discovered the fact of the mutual contingency of all
existent things. This awareness led him to the "threefold knowledge" that marked
his station as one who had achieved full enlightenment sambuddhah). First, he
saw, through his new- found knowledge of dependent arising, the origin of
suffering in ignorance and the end of suffering in wisdom. Second, fixing "his
mind upon the chain of causation, in direct and reverse order," FOOTNOTE:
Mahavagga, quoted in Radhakrishnan 1929, 410 he obtained the knowledge of all of
his previous existences. This provided him with the recollection of his previous
actions and their karmic consequences, enabling him to see that he had lived out
all of his accrued karma and that this would be his last existence. Third,
having so clearly perceived the origin of the cycle, he knew with certainty that
he had fully erased the binding ignorance, and would surely never return to
existence. He knew himself to be "Thus Gone;" he was a Tathagata. FOOTNOTE:
Lamotte, 16-17
A key to the Buddha's teaching is that he was not the only one privileged to see
dependent arising. Anyone who follows the path he recommended can realize its
nature and workings. More than this, individual freedom requires that one verify
these truths for him- or herself. The importance of and possibility of
perceiving dependent arising is exemplified by the story of the conversion of
Sariputta and Moggallana related in chapter one, above: all that was needed for
each of them to realize nirvana was to be told "all things that arise will
cease." The duty of the Buddhist monk who is aware of the Buddha's formulation
of dependent arising is to examine each of the links for him- or herself,
discover how they are conditioned, how they arose, and how they can be ceased.
FOOTNOTE: Warder, 133 This is the key to the Buddhist path. The import of this
duty is far greater than merely verifying one aspect of the Buddha's teachings.
Rather, one who follows this will understand the entirety of the Buddha's
teachings, his "dharma," and, more, one who follows this is guaranteed to see
the Buddha himself. He once said "those who see dependent arising will see the
dharma; those who see the dharma will see dependent arising," and another time
he said "those who see the dharma will see me; those who see me will see the
dharma." FOOTNOTE: Majjhima-nikaya and Samyutta- nikaya, respectively, quoted in
Nagao, 1991, 104
The Meaning of Dependent arising
There are two main formulations of dependent arising, one general and the other
specific. In its most abstract form, the theory holds that "That being, this
comes to be; from the arising of that, this arises; that being absent, this is
not; from the cessation of that, this ceases." FOOTNOTE: Samyutta-nikaya, quoted
in Harvey, 54 The more specific formulation details the process by which links
in the chain arise, one after the other, and which links directly influence
which others. The most common of these specific formulations is the twelve-link
one described in chapter two, but there are minor variations on this. The crux
of all formulations of the theory is the mutual interdependence of all things.
Every element is both conditioned and is a conditioner, so every element is both
an effect and a cause. There is no transcendent law of cause-and-effect ruling
the process, for there is only a relative "before" and "after," only a relative
causal sequence. On the one hand no element is individually autonomous, and on
the other hand neither is there a higher force ruling the process. Since no
thing exists on its own, no thing is real in itself. A thing is dependent on
another, then, not just for its identification, as "tallness" is dependent on
"shortness," but for its very existence, as the piece of clothing is dependent
upon the threads which constitute it.
Thus far, the doctrine of dependent arising may seem clear and obvious. If so,
it is only because one does not yet understand it in all of its implications.
The Buddha's attendant, ananda, once said to his master, "It is surprising, sir,
it is wonderful, sir, how profound this dependent arising is and how profound is
its illumination. Yet it seems to me as if very simple." "Say not so, ananda,
say not so," admonished the Buddha in reply. FOOTNOTE: Mahanidana Sutra, quoted
in Warder, 108 The theory is abstruse and its ramifications vast.
In the eyes of Buddhism, the doctrine of dependent arising solves all
metaphysical philosophical problems. Etiology is solved because there is, not an
absolute beginning, but an temporally indeterminate welling up of
mutually-conditioned factors. Since no factor is temporally prior, as such, the
discussions of genesis manage to avoid positing an absolute beginning without
recourse either to a metaphysical entity like a transcendent God or to causal
priority ad infinitum. Eschatology is solved because, since the ultimate end of
existence is merely the appeasement of arising through appeasement of ignorant
dispositions, there is no need to predict apocalypses or nihilistic destruction
of existence. Things arose, but there was no ultimate cause, and things will
cease, but there is no ultimate fate. Soteriology is likewise solved; one need
not face either a final Judgment Day nor mere annihilation, but rather one will
just face the self-caused abandonment of equally self-caused afflicted
existence. When ignorance ceases, birth ceases, and death ceases. Karma,
metempsychosis, and the nature of the soul are also all solved without recourse
to abstract soul-theories. Karma is neither an adventitious elemental
defilement, like it is for the Jains, nor a subtle and transcendental
deterministic fate, like for certain schools of Hinduism. Karma is simply the
correlation between cause and effect. Karma is determined by one's actions and
dispositions, and when one appeases one's dispositions then, when eventually the
lingering effects of prior causes have come to fruition, existence will be no
more. The simple conditioning of one link by another link enables the Buddhist
karma to be determined without being deterministic, and subtle without being
transcendental. Reincarnation is similarly solved with no recourse to
atman-theories. Death is conditioned by birth, which is in turn conditioned by
ignorance. This contiguous contingency obviates the need to posit a substantial
and transcendently-enduring soul. The perceived existence and continuity of the
individual is likewise explained without recourse to atman: since the aggregates
of the individual arise together, and these aggregates account for the entire
nature of the individual, there is no need to posit an extraneous metaphysical
entity like the self. The debate of free will versus determinism is also solved.
There can be no "free" will, for no element of existence is independent. All
things are dependent upon other things, and so is the will. This does not mean
that the universe is bound by inexorable determinism: the Buddha declared
himself to be an upholder of "free action," FOOTNOTE: Malalasekera in Moore, 80
for it is one's will in the form of volitional dispositions which both caused
existence in the first place and will ultimately bring about appeasement and
freedom. FOOTNOTE: That both free will and determinism are operative in
Buddhism's dependent arising is not to be confused with the compatibility of the
two in Jainism. In the former, neither is ultimately real, but in the latter,
both are real. Two more theories repugnant to the Buddha, the extremes of
eternalism and annihilationism, are obviated by dependent arising. Nothing is
eternal, for, when a thing's conditioning factors cease, then it will cease.
Neither is anything destined to face destruction in non-existence for, as
contingent upon other things, it was never independently real in the first
place. Finally, dependent arising solves ontology. Things are empirically real,
for they were arisen. However, they are not ultimately real, for there is no
substance, t\`o on, on which they are founded. There is Becoming, but no Being.
Since things are not ultimately real, the affliction of suffering can be
vanquished; if suffering were ultimately real, then it could never be abolished.
The Abhidharma schools were the first to offer an interpretation of the doctrine
of dependent arising, but interpretation probably was not their intent. They
understood the doctrine to mean the temporal succession of momentary and
discrete elements (dharmas) which were in themselves real. FOOTNOTE: Santina, 6
They did not see dependent arising to mean that the elements were only
relatively real, but rather they saw it as describing the interactions between
already-existing elements. The point of the doctrine dependent arising, they
felt, was solely to negate soul-theories, not to negate the elements themselves.
Dependence was thus seen as referring to the conditioning relations between the
elements, which relations were meticulously analyzed and systematized. It was
these relations that became seen as the dynamic force of becoming.
The Perfection of Wisdom (Prajnaparamita) writings criticized the Abhidharma
theory of relations as being, not an explanation of dependent arising, but an
interpretation of it, and an interpretation with which they disagreed. The
systematic hierarchy of relations was seen as being no less metaphysical than
the speculative theories of causality which the Buddha was trying to avoid.
FOOTNOTE: Cf. Kalupahana 1975, 154-155 A further problem was that, while it was
not explicitly wrong to describe the universe as made up of discrete elements,
it was misleading. To isolate an element temporally was to take a first step
towards conceptually reifying that element. The approach adopted by the
Perfection of Wisdom school was to elevate the theory of dependent arising from
the empirical to the conceptual by formulating a two- truth theory, a theory
later embraced by Nagarjuna. This approach declared that the Abhidharma schools
saw reality from the standpoint of lower, conventional truth, and so they saw
all as being composed of real elements which are mutually dependent in terms of
causal efficacy. The Perfection of Wisdom, on the other hand, believed
themselves to have access to perfect prajna, "wisdom" (hence the name of this
school, Prajnaparamita). From the standpoint of higher, ultimate truth afforded
by such wisdom, elements were seen as being, not just causally conditioned, but
even ontologically conditioned. That is, the elements did not merely constitute
conglomerate things which, as an assemblage, had no inherent identity and real
existence; moreover, rather, the elements themselves had no inherent identity or
real existence.
The result of this interpretation of dependent arising is that the elements are
"empty;" as dependent arisen, they are not real and are without self-nature.
Furthermore, concepts, too, are unreal. FOOTNOTE: Santina, 12 All concepts are
based on dualities as "tallness" is dependent on "shortness." The ultimate
implication of this interpretation is a shift from emphasis on logical
reasoning, as evidenced in the Abhidharma, to non-dual intuition, or prajna.
This non-dual intuition prefigured Nagarjuna's use of comprehensive four-fold
negations and the later mysticism of Zen. FOOTNOTE: On the latter, cf. Shunryu
Suzuki, "No Dualism," in Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind (New York: Weatherhill,
1983), 41-43 In the writings of both the Perfection of Wisdom school and
Nagarjuna, all propositions regarding a subject are negated (e.g. something is,
is not, both is and is not, neither is nor is not), but no alternative
proposition is offered. The only way to grasp the subject is through non-dual,
non-conceptual intuition.

Madhyamika Interpretations and Re-interpretations

The Perfection of Wisdom school of thought was to have so great an influence on
Nagarjuna that he was even credited with having founded the school. FOOTNOTE:
Cf. chapter three Indeed, his interpretation of dependent arising is identical
with that of the Perfection of Wisdom. However, while in the former this
interpretation of dependent arising was pervasive but implicit, Nagarjuna
fleshed it out and gave systematization to its implications. In doing so, the
notion of dependent arising became radically different and more profound than it
had been in its earlier incarnations. It has been argued that Nagarjuna
instigated a "Copernican revolution" in both Buddhism and Indian philosophy as a
whole by expanding the meaning of dependent arising from being mere elemental
relations to defining a full dialectical method. FOOTNOTE: Cf. Murti, 1960,
123-4 and 274. This may or may not be the case---it is in no way clear that
Nagarjuna was revolutionizing the philosophy of the Buddha as the Buddha meant
it---but it is certainly true that Nagarjuna's interpretation of dependent
arising was wholly unlike that of the Buddhism which preceded him.
Briefly, Nagarjuna's interpretation of dependent arising of elements focused on
the nature of each element on its own. He found that nothing can be
conceptualized in isolation, but neither can it be conceptualized in
association. Two things, if dependently arisen, can be neither identical nor
different. Yet, the concept of relation requires that they be both identical and
different. FOOTNOTE: ibid., 138 They must be identified as separate, for, if not
separate, one cannot speak of their relating. A thing cannot interact with
itself; plurality is required. Conversely, they must be identified as not being
different, for, to relate, they must have a connection. If truly separated, then
they can never interact. Water, for example, cannot interact with burning, and
fire cannot interact with freezing. "In identity," Nagarjuna points out, "there
is no co- existence. That which is associated does not arise together." That is,
if identical, the "co-" of "co-existence" is meaningless. Dependent arising
requires two distinct elements for there to be relation and hence arising. Yet,
on the other hand, "in discreteness, how can there be co- existence?" FOOTNOTE:
karika VI.4 That is, if separate, the "co-" doesn't apply, either, and the
relation that is required for arising is again precluded. The only conclusion is
that "whatever arises depending on whatever, that is not identical nor different
from it." FOOTNOTE: karika XVIII.10
One cannot avoid the above difficulty by positing a type of causality that is
other than dependent arising, such as eternalism or simple phenomenalism. Things
cannot be eternally existing and hence unarisen for, if they had an eternal
identity, then they would be devoid of change, devoid of action, devoid of all
phenomenality, and hence meaningless in their metaphysicality. Neither can there
be a type of causality in which things are temporally new phenomenal creations
for, if the effect is discrete from its cause, then ultimately it is not
connected to the cause and hence is uncaused. Dependent arising, which explains
causation without recourse either to eternalism or to simple phenomenalism, is
the only coherent theory. As Nagarjuna says in relation to agent and action, a
cause proceeds depending upon its effect and the effect proceeds depending on
the cause. "We do not perceive any other way of establishing [them]," he says.
FOOTNOTE: karika VIII.12
The main complication in thinking of things as independent is self- nature,
svabhava. Any thing that is dependently arisen, Nagarjuna said, must be without
self-nature, incapable of being isolated and, ultimately, not even real. Maria
Ruth Hibbets, a recent thesis student of Madhyamika, has clarified the
incompatibility of self- nature and relativity with a most apt analogy. Seeking
to discover the essential meaning of a word, i.e. its one true and unique
meaning, one looks up the word in a dictionary. Here one finds a series of
relations, e.g. X is like Y, unlike Z, etc. Still wanting to pinpoint the word's
identity, one looks up the secondary relational words Y and Z, where entirely
new sets of relations are given. One could continue ad nauseam and never find
the word's essence, its svabhava. It is only defined in relation to other words,
all of which are likewise without self- nature. FOOTNOTE: Maria Ruth Hibbets,
"An Investigation into the Negative Dialectics of Nagarjuna and Candrakirti"
(Bachelor's thesis, Reed College, 1991), 20 The constituents of existence are
both brought into manifestation and defined in the same way---they have neither
essential nor empirical independence, but can only arise and be defined in
relation to other constituents. Had the earlier Buddhists not analyzed reality
into discrete momentary elements, Nagarjuna likely would not have responded by
so drastically disproving the reality of elements in themselves. It was in the
light of these self-nature theories that he responded with this teaching of
relativity. If all things are dependently arisen, then they are not arisen
independently, on their own. If not arisen on their own, then they cannot be
said to exist on their own. This is identical to the Buddha's formulation of
dependent arising as explained above: their conceptual distinction is relative
as "tallness" depends on "shortness," and, further, their very ontological
existence depends on relative arising, as fire cannot exist without fuel and
fuel cannot exist without fire. The only reason for Nagarjuna to repeat the
Buddha's doctrine, then, was to negate the misconception of self-nature that had
arisen since the Buddha's time.
The shift in emphasis from mere elemental relativity to both ontological and
conceptual relativity is exemplified by the exegesis of the term
pratitya-samutpada, dependent arising, by two Buddhist philosophers. The
Abhidharma notion of momentary elements required that the universe at each
moment be quantitatively and qualitatively a new creation. With this
understanding, a proponent of the Realist school, Srilabha, interpreted the term
with the following etymology:
"Pratitya denotes the sense of momentary destruction and it qualifies the term
samutpada as a derivative adjective. 'Prati + iti + yat,' which means 'fit to
disappear in every succeeding moment.' [sic] The suffix yat connotes
'fitness,' iti means 'perishing,' 'destruction,' 'annihilation,' 'cessation.'
The prefix prati is used, according to [the Abhidharmas], in the sense of
repetition. They mean by 'pratitya-samutpada,' 'origination by repetitive
destruction.'" FOOTNOTE: Ramendranath Ghose, The Dialectics of Nagarjuna
(Allahabad, India: Vohra Publishers and Distributors, 1987), 183, quoted in
ibid., 34
The insight afforded by this exegesis is that the Abhidharma saw dependent
arising as just the interplay of relations between real elements, which elements
enjoy ephemeral but real manifestation. Candrakirti, a later commentator on
Nagarjuna, disagrees with the interpretation of those "who hold that the term
means the arising of things which vanish in the moment. This is bad etymology,"
he says. FOOTNOTE: Prasannapada in Sprung, 34. A note may be added here. It may
not be clear why the Abhidharma theory of elements requires that an element be
destroyed after its momentary "flash" of existence. The reason is two-fold.
First, they held that a cause must cease utterly before its effect could
manifest, or cause and effect would overlap. This would allow there to be at
least one moment in which an element is still being caused while its effect has
already materialized. Two, a change in time must be a change in identity; if a
thing lasted two moments with the same identity, then it would endure, and, by
extension, could be eternal. To counter this "bad etymology," Candrakirti offers
his own:
"The root i means motion; the preposition prati means the arrival or
attainment. But the addition of a preposition alters the meaning of the
root... So, in this case, the word pratitya, as gerund, means 'attained' in
the sense of dependent or relative. Again, the verbal root pad [to go]
preceded by the preposition samut [out of] means to arise or to become
manifest. The full meaning of the term pratitya-samutpada is therefore the
arising, or becoming manifest of things in relation to or dependent on causal
conditions pratyayas)." FOOTNOTE: Prasannapada, 33
The above two exegeses may not seem contradictory and, indeed, the only obvious
difference is that Srilabha's etymology mentions both arising and ceasing, while
Candrakirti's focuses only on arising. The important differences are those
between the underlying assumptions, which assumptions can be gleaned from the
quotes. The Abhidharma interpretation of dependent arising is little more than
the interaction of distinct parts to form new wholes. The Madhyamika
interpretation, as hinted at by Candrakirti, is more radical. It is not just
that composite things which are made up of momentary parts are arisen depending
on the parts and have new identities in each time- moment. More, the parts
themselves have no real existence outside of the mutual interaction which causes
them to become manifest. The momentariness of the Realist conception requires
that each element arise, endure for a moment, and then cease. This is not
possible, says Nagarjuna's Madhyamika. "When the triad consisting of arising,
[enduring, and ceasing] are discrete, they are not adequate to function as
characteristics of the conditioned." FOOTNOTE: karika VII.2 These three
characteristics cannot be real, explains Nagarjuna in the following verses, for
then each one would itself have to partake of arising, enduring, and ceasing.
That is, if "arising" is a hypostatized process, then "arising" itself will have
to arise, endure, and cease before the next hypostatized process, "enduring,"
can come to be manifest, and so forth. Nagarjuna will not accept this, for the
result is infinite regress. On the other hand, these three processes must be
characteristics of existent things. If not, it would be possible for a thing to
arise but not endure or cease, for a thing to endure but not arise or cease, or
for a thing to cease but not arise or endure.
There is another problem regarding the arising, enduring, or ceasing of existent
things. What is it that arises, the existent thing? No, for an existent thing
already exists, and cannot arise again. Does the non-existent thing arise? No,
for, if non-existent, it is not a "thing," and there is no possible nominal
subject of the verbal predicate. "As such," Nagarjuna concludes, "neither the
arising of an existent nor the arising of a non-existent is proper." Likewise
the both existent and non-existent and the neither existent nor non-existent are
improper. FOOTNOTE: karika VII.20 In the same way, mutatis mutandis, Nagarjuna
refuses to accept the enduring or the ceasing of existent or non-existent
things. He has no choice but to conclude that dependent arising has no function,
no reality. "With the non- establishment of arising, duration, and destruction,
the conditioned does not exist. With the non-establishment of the conditioned,
how could there be the unconditioned?" Dependent arising can have no relation
either to existence or to non-existence. Arising, duration, and cessation are
"an illusion, a dream." FOOTNOTE: karika VII.33-34
Following such a radical and comprehensive denial of dependent arising and its
three characteristics, arising, enduring and ceasing, it would seem that
Nagarjuna has completely annihilated the Buddha's central doctrine. However,
there is one verse which demonstrates that this is not the proper explanation of
Nagarjuna's agenda: "Whatever that comes to be dependently, that is inherently
peaceful. Therefore, that which is presently arising as well as arising itself
are peaceful." FOOTNOTE: karika VII.16 The only way to reconcile this cataphatic
statement with Nagarjuna's relentless denial of dependent arising presented
above is to question the subject of the dilemma, namely conceptions of existence
itself. What he is denying, then, are the very notions of existence or non-
existence. FOOTNOTE: David Snellgrove, Indo-Tibetan Buddhism (Boston: Shambhala,
1987), 82-83 Reality must be devoid of conceptual dichotomies. Nagarjuna made
this clear in demonstrating that fire and fuel or lust and the lustful one
cannot be thought of as independently real, and now declares that even existence
and non-existence are but illusory conceptions with no empirical basis. "A thing
that is existent or non-existent is not produced." Further, if existence is
unreal, then so is non-existence, for "existence and non-existence are, indeed,
dependent upon one another." FOOTNOTE: karika I.7 and XXV.12, respectively
All that can be said to be real is the "inherently peaceful." This was, in fact,
enunciated by Nagarjuna in the opening dedicatory verses, where dependent
arising was linked with "the appeasement of obsessions and the auspicious." This
is in fact nothing less than nirvana itself, the "blown-out," the appeasement of
defiling dispositions and graspings through the appeasement of passionate
desires. The conceptual reality left when dispositions and conceptions are
"blown out" corresponds exactly with the Buddha's original message: there is no
soul in the individual and no self-hood of the universe but those conceived in
ignorance. If one is to ask "Of whom is there old age and dying, and of what is
there dependent arising," both the Buddha and Nagarjuna would answer that the
question is wrongly formulated. FOOTNOTE: Warder, 119 Nagarjuna's interpretation
of dependent arising, then, holds that all that can be said to have any reality
is the process, not the fluctuating elements comprising the process. Wrong views
arise when one, through ignorance, believes there to be absolute objects,
absolute temporality, absolute spatiality. "Those who posit the substantiality
of the self as well as of discrete existents---these I do not consider to be
experts in the meaning of the [Buddha's] message." FOOTNOTE: karika X.16
A key to understanding Nagarjuna's distinction between reifying the elements
versus seeing only the process is the two truths. From the standpoint of
conventional truth, arising, enduring, and ceasing are seen. Where existents are
observed, one has no choice but to say that they are dependently-arisen through
these three characteristics. It is only from the standpoint of ultimate truth
that dependent arising is peaceful. From this standpoint, when the notions of
permanent being and identity are "blown out," all that is perceived is the flow
of becoming. This flow is inherently without static objects such as elements or
the individual self. This is fully compatible with and, indeed, explains the
philosophical core of Buddhism: impermanency and soullessness.

Emptiness, the Ultimate Cosmology
Pre-Madhyamika Use of the Concept

The Buddha perceived that all things are transitory, that nothing endures. This
was the logical basis for his declaration that nothing has an essence, that all
is anatman. The Theravada tradition interpreted this to mean that no persons
have a self beyond that constructed by the five fluctuating aggregates, but that
the individual elements constituting existence did have an essence; this is what
made the elements individual and irreducible. Mahayana offered a broader
definition of soullessness and declared that, not only are persons devoid of a
self, but that all of the elements comprising existence are also without
essence. They are empty, sunya, of self-nature. FOOTNOTE: An analogy from the
history of Western physics (Western) will clarify these two conflicting notions
of emptiness. Classical Newtonian physics saw everything as comprised of
irreducible atoms with a determinable location and momentum. Belief in the
determinism made possible by such a reified existence led French mathematician
Pierre de Laplace to declare that, could he theoretically know the location and
momentum of every monad in the universe, he could predict the exact future
history of the entire cosmos. Quantum physics revolutionized this view by
describing the qualities of the monadic elements of existence as being
inherently unknowable. Further, the utter smallness of the particles and the
sheer distances between them shows matter to be little more than empty space and
existence ultimately nothing more than interactions of abstract energy fields.
That the truest cosmological quality of things is emptiness, sunyata, came to be
regarded as the central notion of Buddhism. FOOTNOTE: Kohn, 203
The base formulation of emptiness comes from Nagarjuna, and it is the concept
for which he is most famous, so much so that the Madhyamika school was often
referred to as the Sunyata-vada, the "School of Emptiness." Notwithstanding, the
concept was not original with him. The term "sunyata" appears a few places in
the Pali Canon, but only a few. Here it tends to have the simple meaning of a
lack of something. In the "Lesser Discourse on Emptiness," the Buddha says that,
in a hall where there are monks gathered but in which there are no elephants or
cows, one can say that the hall is "empty" of elephants and cows. Likewise, when
a monk is meditating in a solitary forest, the forest is "empty" of villages and
villagers. "When something does not exist there, the latter [the place] is empty
with regard to the former," the Buddha defines. FOOTNOTE: Culasunnata-sutta,
quoted in Nagao 1991, 52 This meaning of a lack is extended to also mean a lack
of disturbances for the meditating mind. Emptiness is both an object for
contemplation and a method of quietism; one can "practice emptiness" both by
meditating on the emptiness of the self and by freeing oneself from
disturbances.
The philosophical formulation of emptiness in the Theravada tradition is usually
taken to be that expressed by the Abhidharma writings. The Realist school of the
Abhidharma held that the elements of existence must not be empty, or else they
would not be able to interact. It was just compounded objects, like the
individual, that are empty, in that they have no enduring soul. The Perfection
of Wisdom (Prajnaparamita) school disagreed, pointing out that the elements,
like the things they compound, must also be seen as empty. By applying emptiness
to all things, this school used the concept much more systematically and
frequently and expanded its meaning. The Abhidharma quest to define the true
nature of things was replaced by a stress on non-dual, intuitive apprehensions
of reality through wisdom, prajna. The highest achievement of wisdom, this
school held, was the realization that all things, not just compound ones, are
empty of an essence.
Taken far enough, the mystical Perfection of Wisdom insight into emptiness
produced a paradox. Not only are things empty, the school declared, but
emptiness is a thing rupa = sunyata). This meaning of this equation was not made
entirely clear until Nagarjuna offered an interpretation of it. The equation is
not to be taken too literally, but it seems just to express the notion that
emptiness should not be seen merely as a negation. This was hinted at in the
"Lesser Discourse on Emptiness," where the Buddha said that, "through abiding in
emptiness, [I] am now abiding in the fullness thereof." Further, the text
continued, it is comprehended that, when a place is empty of something like cows
or a village, there is "something [which] remains there that does exist as a
real existent." FOOTNOTE: Culasunnata-sutta, quoted in Nagao 1991, 52 (italics
mine) On the one hand, early Buddhism saw emptiness as a lack of being but, on
the other, something remains which cannot be negated. These statements will not
make sense in Buddhist terms unless reconciled with the Buddha's absolute
rejection of an ultimate ground of reality. The meaning of the paradox,
according to the Perfection of Wisdom writings, is that emptiness is both and
neither being and non-being, both and neither negation and affirmation.
Emptiness is not really a thing any more than a thing is really empty, for
reality cannot be pinned down in concepts. FOOTNOTE: Harvey, 99
This paradoxical, non-conceptual use of the notion of emptiness is reflected in
the fact that certain of the Perfection of Wisdom writings used the notion
without ever mentioning the term. The Diamond Sutra, for example, taught that
the notion of emptiness was to be used like a hard diamond to "cut away all
unnecessary conceptualization," FOOTNOTE: Vajracchedika, quoted in Kohn, 57
including the idea of emptiness itself. The discourse accomplished this by
presenting a series of paradoxes that demonstrated emptiness without using the
word. For example, the Buddha is made to say:
"As many beings as there are in the universe of beings, ...all these I must
lead to nirvana, into that realm of nirvana which leaves nothing behind. And
yet, although innumerable beings have thus been led to nirvana, no being at
all has been led to nirvana." FOOTNOTE: Vajracchedika 3, Edward Conze, trans.,
in Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, The Diamond Sutra (Poona, India: Ma Yoga Laxmi
Rajneesh Foundation, 1979), 3. (The similarity of such paradoxes with Zen
teachings may be noted. The Vajracchedika is, indeed, the locus classicus of
Zen. Cf. "Silent Meditation and Ch'an," in Kalupahana 1992, 228- 236)
A paradox like this will only make sense if the elements of it are not taken
either as real or nonreal, but as, in terms of Perfect Wisdom, "empty."
The actual use of the term "emptiness" (sunyata) was likely avoided in the
Diamond Sutra because, even though the paradoxes were half affirmative and half
negatory, the potential for misunderstanding and seeing only the negative side
of the equation was great. Equally dangerous was the possibility of clinging to
the notion of emptiness as yet another, albeit apophatic, theory. These were
dangers the Buddha was quite aware of. He said that, following his death, "the
monks will no longer wish to hear and learn [my teachings], deep, deep in
meaning, ...dealing with the void (sunyata), but will only lend their ear to
profane [teachings], made by poets, poetical, adorned with beautiful words and
syllables." FOOTNOTE: Samyutta- nikaya, quoted in Santina, 7 What was crucial,
the Buddha taught, was to use the teaching of emptiness as a provisional tool, a
way to cut through illusion and achieve insight. His teachings were to be seen
as a raft which gets one across a stream but which, upon reaching the other
side, should be discarded. The Perfection of Wisdom school used the method of
teaching with nonsensical paradoxes to show the final nature of things as empty
and then to prevent one from grasping onto the concept of emptiness itself.
Nagarjuna adopted the Perfection of Wisdom teaching that the highest form of
intuitive wisdom is insight into the emptiness of all things. His innovation was
to clarify this insight and apply it to all philosophical concepts in a more
systematic way than had his predecessors. The result of this was that the notion
of emptiness, though not new to Buddhist thought, suddenly became seen as a
revolutionary concept. It is common for mystical expression to speak negatively
of the Absolute, noumenal sphere; the mystical side of every religion in history
has witnessed this apophaticism in some degree. Nagarjuna's innovation was to
apply the via negativa to the phenomenal sphere, as well, and thereby to deny
the essential reality of even relative dualities.

Emptiness as a Via Negativa, a Way of Negation

It may be helpful to precede a presentation of Nagarjuna's philosophy of
emptiness with a discussion of his school's peculiar use of negation. As a
philosophy of emptiness, the functions of refutation and negation are central to
Madhyamika, and if the function of negation in the school is not understood,
radical misinterpretations are likely. Even as reputable a scholar as Austin
Waddell dismissed Madhyamika as "essentially a sophistic nihilism" which
advocated the "extinction of Life." FOOTNOTE: L. Austin Waddell, Tibetan
Buddhism (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1972), 11 The Madhyamika
philosophy of emptiness is much more than just a method of negation or a
declaration of negativity. However, since this is how both the West and
Nagarjuna's fellow Orientals have often viewed it, that must be addressed first.
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, who pertinaciously misunderstood Nagarjuna as an
absolutist, FOOTNOTE: "The whole show of Nagarjuna's logic is a screen for his
heart, which believed in an absolute reality." (Radhakrishnan 1929, 656) Based
on other, likely spurious, writings attributed to Nagarjuna, one could perhaps
make such a claim. However, in the works which modern scholarship believes to be
authentically Nagarjuna's, there is found no justification for Radhakrishnan's
claim. expressed well the standard rationalist opinion of negation: "All
negation depends on a hidden affirmation. Absolute negation is impossible. Total
skepticism is a figment, since such skepticism implies the validity of the
skeptic's judgment." FOOTNOTE: ibid., 662 Classical Hindu thinkers, too,
dismissed Nagarjuna's extreme use of the via negativa as self-condemned. The
negation of everything is inconceivable without implying a positive ground
thereby, they held, and so the ultimate truth cannot be negative; nothing can be
proved false if nothing is taken as true. FOOTNOTE: Hiriyanna, 221 The act of
negation itself proves the existence of the negator, one could say.
Shin-ichi Hisamatsu has delineated five general uses of negation which are to be
distinguished from Nagarjuna's. These are: 1) the negation of the existence of a
particular, e.g. "there is no desk," or "there is no such thing as self-nature;"
2) a negative predicate, e.g. "pleasure is not pain," or "self-nature is not an
existent;" 3) the abstract concept of "nothingness," as the opposite of being or
of a general existent "somethingness;" 4) a blank of consciousness which would
be equal to a state of dreamless sleep or, by conjecture, death, e.g. the
Upanisadic analogy that "when one is in deep sleep, composed, serene,
dreamless---that is the Self;" FOOTNOTE: Chandogya Upanisad, quoted in Ainslee
T. Embree, ed., Sources of Indian Tradition, volume one (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1988), 35 5) a hypothetical negation whereby something which
is usually considered to exist is denied, e.g. "self-nature is an illusion which
does not really exist." FOOTNOTE: adapted from Shin-ichi Hisamatsu, "The
Characteristics of Oriental Nothingness," in Streng, 162 It was claimed above
(see Introduction) that all religious philosophies save Madhyamika are, to some
degree, Absolutisms which posit a really existing substratum in the cosmos. This
substantialism is reflected both in the dismissal of the Madhyamika negative
method by many Western scholars and classical Hindu thinkers, as well as in the
above five uses of the concept of negation, for all directly assume the quality
of essential existence or, by positing non-existence, indirectly assume the
quality of existence. All non-Madhyamika uses of negation, in Murti's words,
affirm a real thing "existing in some form or in some place other than what and
where it was mistaken for." For example, to say "A is not B" is usually
tantamount to saying "A is C." FOOTNOTE: Murti 1960, 154
In contrast with such substantialist-oriented uses of negation is Nagarjuna's
concept of emptiness, sunyata. Emptiness is the description of things as having
no self- nature. Nagarjuna's emptiness was arrived at through a use of
dialectics such as those exemplified in the above five, but its meaning was
different. Emptiness is neither the denial of an existing thing or quality nor
merely the negation of a concept. It is a call to shift one's perceptions to
reconceive the nature of reality. The fifth option given above, negation as the
cancellation of an illusion, is the closest to Nagarjuna's use, save one
difference. The cancellation of an illusion is usually taken to mean that one is
piercing phenomenal reality to perceive true ontological reality. An oft-
repeated analogy is that of a person walking on a path at twilight who is
startled to see a snake lying curled up in the middle of the path; on closer
examination, the snake is seen to be nothing more than an abandoned piece of
rope. The illusion that has been dispelled was never real. The snake never
existed, and so the negation of it amounts to nothing more than a clearer
perception of what always was. For Nagarjuna's Madhyamika, in contrast, the
snake, or self-nature, is not such a simple illusion. Things do exist, even if
only as dependently-arisen phenomena. That they have self- nature is not so much
an illusion as it is the result of a misguided or improperly-trained faculty of
conceptualization. One holds to a theory of self-nature not because of primal
ignorance, like Advaita Vedanta's avidya, nor because of a clouded perception,
like that of the rope, but because one cognizes falsely. "When the sphere of
thought has ceased, that which is to be designated also has ceased," says
Nagarjuna, FOOTNOTE: karika XVIII.7 and when one ceases to adhere to a
metaphysical theory like self-nature, it disappears. Emptiness is not so much
the means to dispel an illusion as it is the correction of an error.
Nagarjuna's method of negation is by means of a logical use of the concept of
emptiness. This is hinted at by the first appearance of the term in the karika
which is in section four. Nagarjuna has just spent the first seven verses of
this section discussing the relation of the five psychophysical aggregates to
their causes, concluding that cause and effect are neither identical nor
different and that there is no self- nature in any of the aggregates. He
concludes the examination by saying that:
"when an analysis is made in terms of emptiness, whosoever were to address a
refutation, all that is left unrefuted by him will be equal to what is yet to
be proved.
"When an explanation in terms of emptiness is given, whosoever were to address
a censure, all that is left uncensured by him will be equal to what is yet to
be proved." FOOTNOTE: karika IV.8-9
(The crypticness of these verses is not the fault of the translation, for other
translations are equally or more unclear.) What Nagarjuna seems to be saying
here is that the concept of emptiness, when used as a method of negation, is
exhaustive. When an analysis is made in terms of emptiness, all bases have been
covered and no loopholes remain. Nagarjuna's negation of self-nature is
thorough, and the burden of proof for further analysis lies with the opponent.
When an explanation in terms of emptiness is given, there is no room for
criticism by the opponent. The Madhyamika description of all things as empty is
also exhaustive, and anyone offering a positive counter theory must provide an
equally-exhaustive metaphysic.
This far-ranging value of the concept of emptiness is expressed succinctly in a
later section. "Everything is pertinent for whom emptiness (sunyata) is proper,"
Nagarjuna says. Conversely, "everything is not pertinent for whom the empty
(sunyam) is not proper." FOOTNOTE: karika XXIV.14 This verse can be explained in
terms of the two truths. Conventional truth deals with, not theories, but with
the interaction of individual existents. These things, by virtue of having
arisen dependently, are "the empty." In conventional truth, emptiness is used as
an adjective to describe the arisen existents, "the empty." Only if these things
are seen as "empty" can everything be "pertinent," that is, can one formulate
coherent and valid thoughts about reality. FOOTNOTE: There may be confusion
about this verse due to the fact that the primary translation of the
Mulamadhyamakakarika prior to Kalupahana's, i.e. Streng's, contains an error
here. The third and fourth padas of this verse are translated by Streng as "If
emptiness does not 'work,' then all existence does not 'work'" (italics in
original). The error is the term "emptiness" instead of "the empty" here. That
the original word is "the empty" is proven by the fact that only "sunyam" fits
the meter. The term " sunyata" would make this line seventeen, not sixteen,
beats long. Ultimate truth relates more to abstractions that go beyond everyday
particulars. From this broader vantage point, the fact that all arisen things as
well as the process of arising are empty is encompassed by the abstract theory
of "emptiness." This theory is comprehensive, encompassing any and all other
concepts by virtue of showing how any description of reality must ultimately
itself be negated and thus be empty. Only if one includes the notion of
"emptiness" in one's worldview can one's theory be "pertinent." As a method of
negation, then, emptiness is, like the diamond, an incisive and effective tool.
It does not merely refute false concepts, but it refutes them so comprehensively
that the ball is in the opponent's court, so to speak. "All that is left
unrefuted by him will be equal to what is yet to be proved."
Another aspect of using emptiness as a method of logical refutation is that, as
a somewhat mystical concept based on intuitive wisdom (prajna), it does not
merely negate. Emptiness also affirms. Substantialist methods of negation
implicitly assert the opposite of what is negated, as in the above example where
saying "A is not B" means "A is C." Madhyamika negation, to continue this
example, would say that "A is not B, nor is A not not B." It is true that the
Buddha leads innumerable beings to nirvana, but it is also true that no being at
all has been led to nirvana. Such paradoxes are not meant to imply that ultimate
reality transcends conceptual thinking, such that the relation of A to B cannot
be conceived. Rather, since A and B are both empty of self-nature, and since
both the beings led to nirvana and nirvana itself are empty of self- nature,
equations are neither valid nor invalid. A cannot be B nor not B, for there is
no essence of A which can either be identical with or different from the essence
of B.
That the negatory aspect of emptiness is usually emphasized does not mean that
emptiness is negative; rather, since Nagarjuna felt there to be more affirmative
ontologies in need of refutation than annihilationist ones, he responded with
negation more often than affirmation. However, both the Buddha and Nagarjuna
make it quite clear that one should not stress negativity any more than one
should affirm positivism. As Edward Conze puts it, "The Buddhist sage... should
never really commit himself to either 'yes' or 'no' on anything." Since the
Buddhist path is a middle one which renounces all extremes, if the sage "once
says 'yes,' he must also say 'no.' And when he says 'no,' he must also say
'yes.'" FOOTNOTE: Conze 1975, 132 Emptiness is a middle view which, by denying
essences and identities, stands between the extremes of being and non-being,
between negation and affirmation. Since negation is no more real than
affirmation, even the concept of emptiness must in the end be denied reality.
After emptiness has shown the falsity of wrong views like self-nature, its job
is done, and negation itself must be negated. FOOTNOTE: As if to answer this
very question and tie it in with theory of two truths, Neils Bohr said ``There
are trivial truths and there are great truths. The opposite of a trivial truth
is plainly false. The opposite of a great truth is also true.'' (quoted in
Malaclypse the Younger, p. 9)

Emptiness is Perceived, not Invented

Emptiness is not a theory which Nagarjuna invented, nor even one which he
clarified---it is not a theory as such. Emptiness is just the description of the
way things are, i.e. impermanent and without essences or self-natures. It is
only the opposites of emptiness that are concepts. That is, metaphysical
theories like self-nature, permanency, the soul, or God are concepts that
require definition and defending by those who hold them. Emptiness requires no
defending. When obscurities are cleared away, one sees, through intuitive
wisdom, the nature of things as they always have been. This nature, before the
addition of defiling concepts, is, the Buddha described, like the clean water of
a clear pool, "self-luminous through and through." FOOTNOTE: (source not noted)
quoted in Conze 1975, 162 The Diamond Sutraexpressed this by having the Buddha
say that nothing has ever been taught by him. "If a man should say that the Law
[Dharma] has been taught by the Tathatagata, he would say what is not true."
FOOTNOTE: Vajracchedika, quoted in Zimmer, 522 Nagarjuna echoed this in saying
that "the Buddha did not teach... some thing to some one at some place."
FOOTNOTE: karika XV.24 What the Buddha and Nagarjuna did was to show that
concepts are false and distort the true nature of reality. They did not offer
thoughts of their own to replace false ones, but taught that all ideas,
including even the philosophy of Buddhism, must be appeased, or not grasped on
to. When notions like self-nature, the soul, or permanency are "blown out" (nir
- vana), the true nature of reality, emptiness, is seen.
The Visuddhimagga, the most important post-canonical work of the Older School,
FOOTNOTE: Kohn, 245 delineated seven stages of purification and the development
of insight. Each stage is one of greater perception of the soullessness of
reality culminating in, in the seventh and final stage, perception of the
"signless," the "wishless," and "emptiness," FOOTNOTE: Harvey, 256 which are
three qualitative descriptions of the unconditioned nature of reality. This
insight is the Perfect Wisdom of pre-Madhyamika Buddhism, which insight
Nagarjuna found to be the supreme expression of Buddhist knowledge. The heart of
this Perfect Wisdom is nothing more than a perception of emptiness. Both the
Perfection of Wisdom school and Nagarjuna agree that a proper understanding of
the Buddha's philosophy as reported by the original discourses inevitably leads
to seeing all things as empty. This was in contrast to the Abhidharma attitude
that a study of the scriptures can allow one to formulate a neat set of concepts
to define and describe the nature of reality. It must be admitted, though, that
Nagarjuna's idea that emptiness is seen, not invented, is only implicit in the
karika, for he never expressly describes the nature or the importance of this
insight. What he does make clear is that emptiness is empirically evident. That
emptiness is perceptible is only a manner of speaking, for it is explained that
emptiness is not a "thing" which can be defined and perceived. Rather, it is a
lack, as, for example, one can speak of the concept of darkness even though it
is nothing more than a lack of light. The term Nagarjuna uses most frequently is
pasyati, "perceives." FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986, 82 What is perceived is the
non- existence of self-nature in things, and an awareness of this non-existence
is referred to as the perception of emptiness.
One may ask, if the original nature of all things is unconditioned emptiness,
then why was it ever hidden in the first place? On one level, this question can
be answered by pointing to the first link of the chain of dependent arising,
ignorance. On the basis of ignorance, concepts and consciousness arise. Concepts
by their very nature and function create artificial divisions in the otherwise
undivided, seamless reality, and thus obscure its true nature. Existence and
essence, though seemingly ultimate concepts, are nonetheless themselves
artificial divisions which thus distort the "self-luminous pool of clear water."
The Madhyamika stress on emptiness is one way to demonstrate the unreality and
falseness of concepts. FOOTNOTE: Williams, 62 On another level, the question
cannot be answered. If one further inquires, "and what created ignorance?" the
Buddhist can only point out that, in the twelve-link circular chain of dependent
arising, ignorance is causally conditioned by previous karma and death. More
cogent, though, one should not even ask such a question; since ignorance is a
"lack" and not a "thing," it is not proper to ask how it was created. Beyond
these replies, further speculation is not fruitful.
Some schools of Buddhism, especially Zen, would offer the above explanation and
then stop. The mind cannot possess anything, a modern Zen teacher says, and if
one continues questioning, the teacher has nothing to say but "in Japan in the
spring we eat cucumbers." FOOTNOTE: Shunryu Suzuki, 138 Nagarjuna's philosophy
supports the same conclusions, but arrives at them by a quite different way. One
way to counteract the conceptualizing tendency is by offering alternative
concepts. Notions of self-nature and the soul are root causes of suffering. As a
means of "fighting fire with fire," Nagarjuna offers a systematic philosophy of
emptiness as a conceptual antidote to these notions.
Dependent Arising + No Self-nature = Emptiness
The Perfection of Wisdom school taught that emptiness is a fact of reality that
is indirectly perceived by virtue of non-empty things not being perceived.
Nagarjuna's innovation was to expand the meaning of emptiness by applying the
notion to the conceptual sphere as well as the experiential one. That is,
whereas earlier Buddhism saw all composite things as empty of soul, Nagarjuna
declared them to be empty of existence, as well.
The crux of the Madhyamika philosophy of emptiness is a reinterpretation of
dependent arising by a distinction between conventional and ultimate truths. The
Theravada definition of dependent arising was the interdependency of irreducible
atoms which, through mutual contingency, create a world of phenomenal things.
Things are empty of self- nature in that they are not self- subsisting, but were
brought into being only through the action of dependent arising. Nagarjuna said
that, from the point of view of conventional truth, this theory is applicable.
Perfect wisdom, though, allows one the insight that even the causal process
itself is empty, for there is no self-nature to be found anywhere, in any thing.
A greater understanding of dependent arising shows things to be more than just
causally interdependent; they are interdependent for their very definition and
essential self-nature, too. "In the absence of self-nature, there is no
other-nature," Nagarjuna declares numerous times, FOOTNOTE: karika I.3, XV.3,
XXII.2, XXII.4, XXII.9 the meaning of which is that, without dependency, things
cannot even have an individual identity and essence. FOOTNOTE: This idea that
things are relative for, not just their arising, but their very identity has led
some interpreters of Madhyamika to translate sunyata as, not "emptiness," but
"relativity" or "non-exclusiveness." (Cf. Stcherbatsky, 242, and Ramana, 42,
respectively) There are thus no things, but only the process by which things
came to be, and this process, too, is empty. The main reason for declaring
things to be without essence is empirical, as explained above. Self-nature
simply is not observed. More than this, though, logic leads to the same
conclusion. If the identity of dependent arising with emptiness were just an
expression of mystic intuition, the function of Madhyamika as a philosophy would
be precluded. The logical argument that leads to the theory of emptiness is
this: The nature of reality is dependently arisen; that is attested to by the
Buddha, by observation, and by logic. "A thing that is not dependently arisen is
not evident," Nagarjuna declares. FOOTNOTE: karika XXIV.19 If things are
dependently arisen, then they are phenomenal, not real, entities. Self-nature
must, by definition, be a really-existent and permanent essence. A permanent
essence never changes nor acts, so self-nature will never interact, hence things
that interact or are the product of interaction have no essence. "A non-empty
effect will not arise; a non-empty effect will not cease." FOOTNOTE: karika
XX.17 Dependently arisen things have no self-nature. Both their arising and
their very essential definition are the result of causal interdependence. They
are thus empty of existence, of self-nature, and of any other type of
hypothetical essence. "A thing that is non-empty is indeed not evident," he
concludes, FOOTNOTE: karika XXIV.19 but he does not stop there. If things are
empty of essence, then the whole process of dependent arising is also called
into question. If things are empty, then what even is the point of saying that
they arise and cease? "If something is empty, it follows that it is non-ceased
and non- arisen." FOOTNOTE: karika XX.18 There is no "it" which can partake of
arising or ceasing. Both arisen things and the process of dependent arising
itself are but "an illusion, a dream, a [mythical city]." FOOTNOTE: karika
VII.34
This relentless negation is the revolutionary aspect of Nagarjuna's Madhyamika.
He is not content just to refute the self-nature of composite things, nor even
of the individual elements comprising things, but goes so far as to refute the
reality of the entire process of interaction itself. With the negation of any
kind of self-nature, anywhere, all sense of real and unreal, of cause and
effect, of identity and difference is lost. The only way left to speak of things
is in terms of emptiness. The bold consistency with which this via negativa "has
been carried through every phase of thought and feeling, to the very limit,"
says Heinrich Zimmer, "keeps a wonderful, really sublime wind of detachment
blowing through" the entire philosophy. FOOTNOTE: Zimmer, 521
However, this negative method must not overshadow positive affirmation, or the
Madhyamika would surrender to its opponent's accusations that the philosophy of
emptiness is mere nihilism FOOTNOTE: Much of the misunderstanding of Nagarjuna's
philosophy as nihilism especially by Westerners, could have been avoided if the
etymology of sunya had been kept in mind. The word likely comes from a root
which means "to swell," the interpretation of which is probably that something
which appears swollen is hollow, empty, on the inside. Sunyata would then be not
a mere nothingness, but a certain potentiality, an internal openness within
apparently full entities. Cf. Conze 1975, 130f. Instead of saying simply that
dependent arising is empty or that only empty things dependently arise,
Madhyamika declares that the formula dependent arising = emptiness is an
affirmative equation. The Perfection of Wisdom formula that matter is emptiness
and emptiness is matter rupa = sunyata) had a similar purpose, but its meaning
was slightly different. There, the equation was made to demonstrate the
paradoxical non-dual nature of intuitive wisdom. For Nagarjuna, the formula
dependent arising = emptiness was meant to be taken literally. One must not lean
to either side of the equation; over-emphasizing dependent arising or being
would lead to a sort of positivism, and too much stress on emptiness or
non-being could engender nihilism This equation must be carefully explained. If
the declaration that dependent arising is identical with emptiness or that being
is identical with non-being is not properly understood, then it would seem to
be, in Nagao's words, "the raving of a madman." FOOTNOTE: Nagao 1989, 9
If things were not empty, then they could in no way arise, dependently or
otherwise. Conversely, if things arise, they could in no way have a self-
nature. Both being and non-being are real in one sense; there is being, for
things do arise, even if but phenomenally. That the chain of arising has, not
one, or two, but twelve links of existential causality demonstrates the
at-least-partial reality of being. However, as these things are not absolutely
real but have not always existed and will one day cease to exist, they are
non-being. This idea of non-being is not a nothingness, for it does not deny
that things do, in some way, exist. Rather, non-being is the denial of an
essential self-nature in things. From another angle, being and non-being are
unreal concepts which can only exist dependently. They are thus empty, devoid of
any independent definition. FOOTNOTE: Thus is the foundation and explanation of
the wonderful outlook of Zen, which manages to teach the utter purposelessness
and futility of all things and yet at the same time to find in that
meaninglessness of life the very motivation for joy, humor, love, and
compassion. Cf., for example, Alan Watts, "The Secret of Zen," in The Spirit of
Zen (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1960), 46-64 This equal status of each half of
the dependent arising/emptiness equation is reflected in the status of the two
truths. Ultimate truth is no more real than conventional truth, but is just a
different way of looking at the same thing. They are each truth, even though
their verdicts conflict, and neither level of truth could exist alone. Without
relying upon conventional truth, ultimate truth is not taught, Nagarjuna said,
FOOTNOTE: karika XXIV.10 and without the existence of a higher truth, there
could be no such thing as Perfect Wisdom and knowledge of emptiness.
Conventional truth is that things arise, endure, and cease, and are thus real.
Ultimate truth is that, as transitory phenomena, things are empty of
self-nature, and are thus unreal. Each one of these statements is true, and
neither should be asserted to the exclusion of the other, else either positivism
or nihilism would result.
A final reason that the formula dependent arising = emptiness must be clearly
understood is that it may seem, prima facie, to evidence a contradiction in
Madhyamika philosophy. The relation between things has been demonstrated to be
neither one of identity nor one of difference. A is not B, nor is A not not B.
Yet, Nagarjuna here appears to be declaring an identity relation. The resolution
of this discrepancy is that the equation is not one of simple identity. Neither
dependent arising nor emptiness has a nature which can relate to something else;
neither has any form of real existence. Thus, their relation, as well as their
own nature, is empty and indefinable. They are equal only in the fact that
neither has self- nature. The formula is a practical guide, not a dictum of
logic.
Though dependent arising and emptiness, cataphaticism and apophaticism, are said
to be equally valid and important, Nagarjuna understood that there is still a
tendency for spiritually insecure, unenlightened individuals to reify emptiness
and become distressed thereby. In a further attempt to prevent this, he offered
yet another reason why dependent arising must be seen as empty. An opponent,
misunderstanding the meaning and use of emptiness, may object that the concept
undercuts the entire Buddhist philosophy and path. If all is empty, the opponent
objects, there exists no dependent arising, and the four Noble Truths, the
teaching of the Buddha, the community of monks, and the Buddha himself are
invalidated. "Speaking in this manner about emptiness, you contradict the three
jewels [Buddha, his Law, and his community], as well as the reality of the
fruits, both good and bad, and all worldy conventions," charges the opponent.
FOOTNOTE: karika XXIV.6 On the contrary, responds Nagarjuna, it is the
opponent's theory of self- nature that contradicts all of these things. It is
the philosophy of emptiness that makes possible causality, the Buddha's teaching
and the Buddhist path, all change and growth, and nirvana itself. It is only the
fact that things do not have an immutable essence and identity that makes them
able to change, interact, and condition new events. Further, it is only the fact
that the defilements and suffering are empty of self-nature that makes them
susceptible to eradication. If there were self- nature in things, then
defilements would be eternal and suffering inescapable. Emptiness is thus not
only the description of dependently arisen things nor only the nature of the
process of dependent arising itself. Rather, emptiness is the very thing which
makes dependent arising and hence the entire phenomenal world possible. Thus,
whatever one's attitude towards the world, emptiness is a positive theory. If
one dislikes the world, it is emptiness which makes it possible to change the
world or escape from it. If one likes the world, it is emptiness which allowed
it to come into being. Later Mahayana philosophy used emptiness as a springboard
for its very positive doctrines of Love and Compassion, declaring that, only
after the world is negated and selflessness is seen, can one truly empathize
with the plight of one's fellow humans and desire earnestly to help them.
FOOTNOTE: Nagao 1991, 49. Cf. also 33-34
Emptiness is a Theory of No-Theory
One of the more disturbing results of the doctrine of emptiness is that it would
seem to deny the possibility of enlightenment. It is relatively easy to accept
the position that all existent, mundane, and hence unpleasant things are empty,
for one can still hope for a pleasant enlightenment or, in certain types of
Buddhism, afterlife. If, as Nagarjuna claims, all things, both worldly as well
as transcendent, are empty, then how can one retain hope and aspire to the
ultimate goal of freedom, nirvana? In response to one who expresses such
concerns, Nagarjuna says that "you do not comprehend the purpose of emptiness.
As such, you are tormented by emptiness and the meaning of emptiness." FOOTNOTE:
karika XXIV.7
There are two significances implied by this statement of Nagarjuna. One, there
is a meaning of emptiness besides the obvious one of lack of self- nature. Two,
the concept has a pragmaticvalue as well as a logical one. The former, the fact
that emptiness has a greater meaning, was already discussed. This meaning is
that, besides referring merely to the lack of essential reality in things,
emptiness also betokens the potential of things to interact and change, to arise
and cease. Reality is not "nothingness," but an indefinable mix of being and
nonbeing and both and neither. FOOTNOTE: The reader's patience is requested in
this improper and perhaps misleading continual use of the term "reality." No
alternatives were found. The latter, the pragmatic value of emptiness, is that
it prescribes a method by which unpleasantries can be appeased. Suffering is
caused by dispositions, desires, expectations, and graspings, all of which in
turn are caused by an improper understanding of the world and the way things
are. If one comprehends emptiness, one ceases to cling to desires, for the
things one would desire are shown to be empty and thus not desirable; one would
cease to grasp and cling, for the pleasant things which one would want to hold
on to are seen as unreal; one would cease to form false theories and concepts
about reality, for the theory of emptiness precludes the tendency to theorize;
one would not entertain false hopes for a concrete afterlife and a real
Savior-figure, for the Buddha and his teachings are both seen as provisional;
and, finally, one would have an incentive to appease suffering, for, being
empty, suffering is susceptible to change and, hence, can be vanquished.
The pragmatic function of emptiness is intimately tied to its non-theoretical
nature. Part of the nature of nirvana is the appeasement of the tendency to
theorize excessively and grasp onto theories. It is thus crucial to make as
clear as possible, before examining nirvana, the anti-theoretical character of
emptiness. From the standpoint of conventional truth, emptiness is the
declaration that dependently arisen things have no independent identity. They
are "the empty." From the standpoint of ultimate truth, emptiness is the
description of all things, events, processes, and life-forms as having no real
existence. All is "emptiness." Both "the empty" and "emptiness" are
descriptions, not attributes. A thing or event does not partake of emptiness,
but rather, since it assuredly does not partake of self-nature, it is described
as empty. "'Empty,' 'non-empty,' 'both,' or 'neither'---these should not be
declared," Nagarjuna explains. They "are expressed only for the purpose of
communication." FOOTNOTE: karika XXII.11 The true reality, the "suchness"
(tathata) of the cosmos, must be seamless. Conceptualizing it imposes artificial
divisions and distinctions on that which is undivided. Notions like existence or
nonexistence, self-nature or other- nature, emptiness or fullness, are wholly
improper. There are times, however, when one would wish to refer to this
"suchness." No manner of speaking or means of cognizing is proper, but, in light
of the inveterate tendency of humans to seek and grasp onto supposed positive
notions like "soul" and "existence," the most proper designation is a negative
one.
Nagarjuna therefore uses such a notion as a means of communication only. This is
referred to, in the Buddhist tradition, as "skillful means" (upaya), the ability
of a teacher to tailor his or her speech and philosophical system to the ears
and understanding of his or her audience. FOOTNOTE: Williams, 143 The teacher
communicates thoughts and formulates theories only insofar as they would be
helpful to the student. This was Nagarjuna's intent in expounding the idea of
emptiness; it is a useful way of speaking, for it is less misleading than ideas
like "God" or "permanency," but it still has no ultimate applicability.
Nagarjuna's use of emptiness as a "skillful means" has a specific function and
purpose. One of the chief causes of bondage is, not so much the faculty of
conceptualization, but rather the propensity to grasp onto the products of that
faculty. The rational nature, like the dispositions Nagarjuna discussed in
section seven of the karika, has a value. Concepts are an important and
necessary tool to be used in ordering one's world and acting within it. The
problem is that rational creatures, be they humans or Gods, tend to ascribe
excessive validity to these concepts. This is done for two reasons. One is
ignorance: the rational creature does not know or ignores the fact that his or
her mental nature is only a tool and has limited applicability. The other, and
perhaps foundational, reason that sentient creatures cling to the mental
processes is desire. Desiring pleasure, the mind reifies the apparently
pleasurable things in the hope of thereby possessing them and preventing them
from ceasing. Fearing death, the individual reifies the apparent existence of
life itself and thereby acts with excessive and unjustified selfishness.
FOOTNOTE: The Buddha did uphold the importance of self-preservation, not because
the self is real, but only out of compassion---compassion for oneself as well as
compassion for others. Self-preservation must be tempered by
"other-preservation." The Buddha taught that these two tendencies, desire and
the faith in the results of mentation, are, indirectly, the cause of bondage.
"Desire, know I thy root," he is reported to have said. "From conception thou
springest; No more shall I indulge in conception; I will have no desire any
more." FOOTNOTE: quoted in Candrakirti's Prasannapada, quoted in Murti 1960, 223
(samkalpa translated as "conception." Cf. Monier- Williams, 1126)
There are, as explained, two significances of the notion of emptiness. One is
simply that, when one is enlightened, one sees things as empty. It is not a
concept, but an observation. The other significance is the pragmaticone. As a
"skillful means," emptiness is an antidote to an excessive emphasis on
mentation. Having demonstrated that all things are empty, Nagarjuna explains
that it is pointless to hypostatize anything. "When all things are empty, why
[speculate on] the finite, the infinite, both..., and neither...? Why [speculate
on] the identical, the different, the eternal, the non-eternal, both, or
neither?" FOOTNOTE: karika XXV.22-23 Emptiness, as a concept, acts as an
antidote to this misuse of the rational faculty in two ways. One, if all things
are empty, then no speculation is worthwhile. Excessive belief in concepts is
misguided and, ultimately, debilitating, for it distracts one from the proper
path, which is tranquillity and appeasement of desires. The other use of the
concept of emptiness is a positive one. The neophyte who has not developed the
Perfect Wisdom which allows him or her to see all things as empty may need to
use concepts as a temporary guide. The mind, by its very nature, needs to think.
The trained mind can dwell in peaceful wisdom (prajna), but the untrained one
needs a system to direct its thoughts properly. The theory of emptiness can act
as an object for contemplation, an abstraction on which meditation can be
focused. Once the mind in training achieves perfect wisdom, then even the notion
of emptiness itself must be abandoned. In this context, the notion has pragmatic
value only; it is like, in Streng's words, "a phantom destroying another
phantom." FOOTNOTE: Streng, 92 Once the phantom of real existence has been
appeased, then the phantom of empty existence must also be released.
That Nagarjuna's philosophy is a middle path must be kept in mind to understand
properly the function of emptiness as a concept. Madhyamika is, obviously, not a
philosophy that declares there to be a real structure in the universe which can
be defined in rational formulas, so emptiness is clearly not a positive theory.
Neither is Madhyamika a nihilism, so Nagarjuna is not advocating the destruction
of concepts or the stifling of ratiocination. The middle path rather advocates
the appeasement of conceptualization. Thoughts have a certain function---they
are useful and necessary in relation to the mundane world---but they must not be
applied to ultimate truth; they must be appeased. The point of the idea of
emptiness, Nagarjuna says, is "the relinquishing of all views." FOOTNOTE: karika
XIII.8 This pragmatic function of emptiness for Nagarjuna is indicated by the
fact that he did not devote a section of his karika to it; if emptiness were a
description of Ultimate Reality, or if it were an absolute concept, then he
certainly would have explained it more fully. What he does devote a section to
(section XXIV, "On Truth") is an explanation that emptiness is, not a nihilism
or an Ultimate Reality, but only the principle of relativity and the best
description of conditioned things. FOOTNOTE: Sprung, in translating the
Prasannapada, wrote that the term sunyata should be read as "the absence of both
being and non-being in things." Sprung, 13 (italics mine)
Nagarjuna's philosophy of emptiness, no matter how clear and precise, still
could never prevent all misunderstanding. C. W. Huntington points out the
dangers of misconceiving it with the following example: Buddhist teachers often
remind their students that while mistaken beliefs concerning the mundane are
relatively easy to correct, like dousing a fire with water, if one reifies the
notion of emptiness, then it is as if the water intended to extinguish the blaze
has itself caught fire. FOOTNOTE: Huntington, 22 To reify the concept of
emptiness is a blatant error, for it is an idea whose function is to prevent
reification of concepts. "Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness [as a
theory] are said to be incorrigible," Nagarjuna wrote. FOOTNOTE: karika XIII.8
To hypostatize emptiness would be both ridiculous and an insult to the Buddha's
doctrine. It would be ridiculous because emptiness is not a thought but the
absence of thoughts, not a theory but a criticism of theorizing. Candrakirti
demonstrates the absurdity of reifying emptiness by saying that it would be like
one person saying to another "I have no wares to sell you," and the other person
responding "give me what you call those 'no wares.'" FOOTNOTE: Prasannapada, in
Sprung, 150 Since emptiness is not a thing, it cannot be thought of in positive
terms. It is nothing more than a lack of theories, not a theory itself.
FOOTNOTE: In the Vigrahavyavartani, verse 29, Nagarjuna writes: "If I were to
advance any proposition whatsoever, from that I would incur error. On the
contrary, I advance no proposition. Therefore, I incur no error." (pratijna
translated as "proposition." Cf. Monier-Williams 664)
Emptiness Is Freedom Itself
The relationship between the anti-theoretical function of emptiness and freedom,
nirvana, is quite close. Thoughts are useful, but the results of these thoughts,
namely concepts, are not ultimately real. Similarly, desires and dispositions
have a specific function, for they assist the individual in acting in and
interacting with his or her world, but if too much emphasis is placed on any of
these, i.e. thoughts, desires, or dispositions, then one will hold a false view
of the world. This will lead to desiring and grasping onto things which do not
exist, which, finally, will bind one to the phenomenal cycle of birth-and-death.
Enlightenment is achieved when the true nature of things as transitory and as
having no real self-nature is seen, understood, and accepted. Nirvana is nothing
more than the "blowing out" of false thoughts and their concomitant desires.
This may seem to be a surprisingly simplistic account of the way to achieve
enlightenment. Nagarjuna would say that, yes, it may seem simplistic. And it is.
There is no transcendent realm that must be discovered, no ultimate knowledge
that must be obtained, no psychic or spiritual powers that must be won. To
become free, one need do no more than release, or appease, the things onto which
one is grasping and see reality as it truly is, as it always has been. Nagarjuna
discussed four stages in explaining the cause of bondage and the way to release:
1) "Those who are of little intelligence, who perceive the existence as well as
the non-existence of [things], do not perceive the appeasement of the object,
the auspicious." FOOTNOTE: karika V.8 Nagarjuna has here referred to appeasing
"things" because this quote is the conclusion to section five, the examination
of the material elements. The formula is identical, though, with the appeasement
of dispositions and thoughts, of things as well as sentient creatures. As long
as one obstinately clings to thoughts of existence and non- existence, one will
never see the way things truly are, which does not fall into either category.
Until one sees things and individuals as empty, one can never release the
binding forces.
2) "From the appeasement of the modes of self and self-hood, one abstains from
creating the notions of 'mine' and 'I'.'" FOOTNOTE: karika XVIII.2 One of the
words for ego is ahamkara, which means, literally, "I-making." (The word ``ego''
in Greek means nothing more than ``I.'') Self-hood is not a really-existing
thing, for the nature of reality does not allow for permanency and
individuality. An individual is "in-dividual:" it is the monad which cannot be
further reduced into constituent elements. Such a monad must, by definition,
have self- nature, or it would be neither definable in independence nor be
enduring. Since such a monad could not exist, there can be no such thing as an
in-dividual.
3) "When views pertaining to 'mine' and 'I' ...have waned, then grasping comes
to cease. With the waning of [grasping], there is waning of birth." FOOTNOTE:
karika XVIII.4 It is the false belief in a real ego that underlies and creates
all problems. The self does exist in a conventional way, for the five aggregates
have come together to form a temporary composite. However, to believe that this
self is ultimately real or will endure will cause one to grasp onto pleasant
things and avoid unpleasant ones, both of which will bind one to the cycle of
repeated deaths. To escape rebirth, one need only appease the views pertaining
to "mine" and "I."
4) "On the waning of defilements of action, there is release. Defilements of
action belong to one who discriminates, and these in turn result from obsession.
Obsession, in its turn, ceases within the context of emptiness." FOOTNOTE:
karika XVIII.5 When one ceases to desire for and grasp onto things and concepts,
nirvana follows. Why the five aggregates came together to produce the illusion
of self-hood in the first place is not entirely clear, and a comprehensive
answer to that question can never be known. What is clear is that, having come
together, the notion of self-hood arises. This self is real, in a limited way.
Without the benefit of wisdom, however, this self-hood reflects on its existence
and believes itself to be real and permanent, and it begins to seek pleasure and
avoid pain. One of the primary ways it continues to fool itself is through the
use of concepts. It reifies notions like mine, existence, and possession. The
teaching of emptiness allows it to see the impossibility of real possession, the
lack of an essential nature within itself, and the empty relativity of all
dependently arisen things. The notion of emptiness allows it to extinguish its
false notions. The self is not completely extinguished, for the limited
existence that it does have is true. What is extinguished is defiling passion,
any expectation of permanency, and excessive "selfishness."
To summarize, the four stages are as follows: 1) ignorance causes one to reify
things and the self; 2) appeasing the thought of self-hood puts an end to the
process of "I-making;" 3) when the ego is appeased, grasping is released, and
rebirth ends; 4) with the waning of grasping and dispositions and the cessation
of transmigration, freedom is won. These four steps delineate both how belief in
the self comes to be, i.e. through ignorant perceptions of existence and
non-existence, and how freedom can be realized, i.e. through a proper perception
of emptiness. It would be a mistake to see this process as a linear one. In the
form Nagarjuna presents it, ignorance causes bondage and wisdom releases one
from it. This is only one way to understand the process, for wisdom does not
necessarily follow the release of dispositions; looked at from the other
direction, it is wisdom which allows one to release the dispositions in the
first place. The whole process must be seen as one whose elements dependently
arise.
Perfect wisdom, the insight of emptiness, provides one with a certain sort of
power---not power to make, but power to refrain from making. FOOTNOTE: Streng,
159 It is ignorance that causes one to construct dispositions and passionate
desires, and so, indirectly, it is ignorance which has the power of bringing the
entire phenomenal world into manifest existence. Wisdom provides one with the
power to appease this process and release the world. Lest this sound like an
inversion of good and evil, it must be pointed out that the power of ignorance
is not a real power, for the world it brings into existence is but a phantom.
Similarly, the function of wisdom as extinguishing the world is not a negative
one, for wisdom merely causes the phenomenal world to revert to its truest
state.
The function of the conceptualizing faculty has a broader impact than merely
creating false views about self-hood. The faculty of thought is that which
applies distinctions to the perceived cosmos, which differentiates between
subject and object, noun and verb, past and future, motion and rest, and any
such dualities. Nagarjuna says that "when the sphere of thought has ceased, that
which is to be designated also has ceased." FOOTNOTE: karika XVIII.7 It is thus
the sphere of thought which, in a way similar to the Idealism of Berkeley or
Bradley, creates the observed world and, in a way similar to the Sapir-Whorf
linguistic hypothesis, defines the elements of that world. Nagarjuna says that
the truest description of reality, i.e. the world as it is without the
hypostatized notions of the ignorant mind, is "independently realized, peaceful,
unobsessed by obsessions, without discriminations and a variety of meanings."
FOOTNOTE: karika XVIII.9 The character of reality is not differentiated; all
divisions are artificial and imposed by the mind. Without the passionate
clinging of the unenlightened mind, the best possible description of this
reality is that it is at peace and restful. There is process and flux, for
elements continue to arise and cease dependently. Without the imposition of the
insecure mind, though, this process is undisturbed by obsessions. Moreover, were
the insecure mind not to attribute essences to the process and its products,
there would not even be a need to refer to them as "empty."
When one's dispositions and obsessions are extinguished, one sees this nature of
reality as it is, i.e. empty, undifferentiated, and undisturbed. Since self-hood
is no longer reified, the tranquillity of the world becomes the tranquillity of
the individual, and nirvana can be described in very positive terms indeed. An
early scripture says that the individual who has appeased ideas, false views,
and passions "enters the glorious city of Nirvana, stainless and undefiled,
secure and calm and happy, and his mind is emancipated as a perfected being."
FOOTNOTE: Milindapanha, quoted in Embree, 114 Nirvana is not happy etc. by its
nature; since it is not a thing, no adjectives can be applied to it. Rather,
since the status of the unenlightened person is suffering, the release of
suffering is, subjectively, pleasant. Similarly, nirvana is not calm by its
nature; since the flux of elements is a non-real and empty one, it can be
described as peaceful. Though nirvana is said to be empty, this apparently
negative term is actually the foundation for the most positive of descriptions.
No matter how much one may stress that nirvana is not a thing but is a lack of
thing- ness, there is much likelihood that unenlightened people would think of
it as a concrete goal or a tangible heaven. Seeing nirvana in this way would be
yet another false concept and form of grasping, and would erect yet another
obstacle to freedom. To preclude this possibility, Nagarjuna enunciated what
could perhaps be the most controversial verse in the karika: "The life-process
(samsara) has no thing that distinguishes it from freedom (nirvana). Freedom has
no thing that distinguishes it from the life- process." FOOTNOTE: karika XXV.19
The term used to refer to the life- process, samsara, can be translated as
"wandering" or "transmigration." It is a term for the cycle of birth-and-death
in its imprisoning, pre-enlightenment aspect. To say that the world of suffering
is identical with the highest and most honored of goals of Buddhism would seem
to be flagrant blasphemy.
There are two main significances of Nagarjuna's equating the life-process with
freedom, one theoretical and one practical. First, it is only blasphemy from the
standpoint of essentialism. If there is a self- nature in either, then the two
would assuredly be different. Bondage, as a real thing, would have to be broken
free from, and enlightenment, as a true state, would have to be achieved.
However, the refutation of self-nature applies to these notions as well; both
are empty. Nirvana and the phenomenal world do not exist, as such. They only are
separate due to their being differentiated and named by the hypostatizing mind.
FOOTNOTE: Streng, 45 The tendency to see them as concrete things actually would
deny a person the possibility of ever releasing one and obtaining the other. If
the life-process had a self- nature, and if one were bound within that
life-process, then one could never leave. Similarly, if nirvana were a real
attribute of which the unenlightened individual were not yet partaking, and if
it had an essence, then it could never be achieved. It is only because both
nirvana and the life-process are empty that they can be said to be identical.
Again, Nagarjuna's attitude towards identity and difference must be kept in mind
to prevent a misunderstanding of this equation. In saying that they are
identical, he is not saying that they have an identity-relation, for neither has
an essence which can relate. Rather, as empty, they can each be said to lack
self-nature, and are identical in that neither is real. This relation is made
clear in the discussion of the nature of the Buddha in section twenty-two.
"Whatever is the self-nature of the Tathagata, that is also the self- nature of
the universe," Nagarjuna says. The two are equal because and only because "the
Tathagata is devoid of self-nature. This universe is also devoid of
self-nature." FOOTNOTE: karika XXII.16
The pragmatic value of equating nirvana and the cycle of birth-and-death is that
it demonstrates the attainability of enlightenment. Freedom and bondage are not
identifiable things with separate and distinct spheres of influence. To borrow a
simplistic view of theism, if the world comprised one plane and freedom another,
transcendent one, then the feasibility of escaping one and attaining the other
would be highly suspect. Nagarjuna's declaration that freedom is the world and
the world is freedom demonstrates that enlightenment is readily at hand. One
need do no more than shift one's perceptions to find it. The unpleasant world is
one constructed through ignorance and grasping dispositions. The pleasant (or
not-unpleasant) world is found simply by understanding the meaning of emptiness
and ceasing to reify the phenomenal one. Seen from the conventional or
unenlightened vantage point, the cosmos is a cycle of birth-and-death
characterized by suffering. Seen from the vantage point of wisdom or of ultimate
truth, the cosmos is an ever-flowing, ever-changing empty process. FOOTNOTE: Cf.
Nagao 1991, 177-179
The notion of emptiness may, at first, seem negative and limiting. It seems to
deny the cosmos the option of having existence, of being real. When comprehended
properly, though, the paradox of emptiness is seen as the most liberating of all
possible teachings. In teaching that the self is empty and that the universe is
empty, it demonstrates that both are one and the same, and that their
distinction was based on nothing more than obscured understanding. The
limitations caused by the notion of self-hood are destroyed. The true nature of
the enlightened one is seen to be the true nature of the universe, for both are
empty. In enlightenment, one becomes the universe.



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Thinking in Buddhism: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamikakarikas (part 6) by Jonah Winters

Conclusion

As with any subject, much more could be said about Madhyamika, and often has
been. Candrakirti's commentary, for example, runs to many hundreds of pages.
This thesis, too, far exceeds the normal length of bachelor's theses. In light
of Nagarjuna's teaching that excessive theorizing is one of the main causes of
suffering and bondage, it may seem that lengthy commentary is self- negating.
This objection would be quite valid, were the intent of these research projects
to express truth and the nature of reality. However, as exemplified in the
Introduction, were that the intent of these works, they likely would have said
no more than "this flax weighs three pounds."
The purpose of the philosophy of Madhyamika, with its stress on emptiness, is
not to discard all theorizing. Rather, the point is to demonstrate that theories
are not ultimately valid. Ascribing excessive validity to the products of
thought will cause one to grasp onto them and lose sight of the true nature of
things, which is empty. The truest conceptual expression of reality will always
be a paradox. "A saint (bodhisattva) is a saint because there is no saint," says
the Perfection of Wisdom school, "and that is why there is a saint!" FOOTNOTE:
quoted in Nagao 1989, vii Concepts are applicable in the conventional sphere
only. This is the place of commentary and research: such projects can clarify
the nature of the phenomenal world and discuss the relative validity of various
theories within that plane. Neither the Buddha nor Nagarjuna would have said
that the rational faculty has no function, for, though no theory is absolutely
true, some theories are certainly better than others. When one wishes to speak
of the ultimate sphere, thoughts can point the way towards a proper
understanding of it and teach one how to achieve the Perfect Wisdom which can
perceive it, but theories themselves cannot express its nature.
As a conventional truth, the Madhyamika philosophy propounds a system of
ordering one's thought, and then it shows where such thought must end. This
system includes the theory of dependent arising, the four Noble Truths, the
constitution of the psychophysical personality, and the Noble Eightfold Path;
the theory of emptiness points out the limit of the mental faculty. Nagarjuna
demonstrates that all of his ideas are pragmatic only in one of the most famous
verses of his treatise:
"We state that whatever is dependent arising, that is emptiness. That is
dependent upon convention. That itself is the middle path." FOOTNOTE: karika
XXIV.18
This verse succinctly ties together his entire philosophy, shows where it comes
to an end, and defines the point of it all.
Nagarjuna's thought can be summed up in the first two terms of the verse:
dependent arising and emptiness. From these all other elements of his philosophy
are derived. Dependent arising explains all aspects of the relative world, for
it details the process of causation and, hence, the ontology of the world.
Emptiness is the only possible description of ultimate truth, for it
demonstrates relativity and provides a sort of anti-theory on which the rational
faculty can focus. Neither of these, though, should be relied on as valid in
themselves, for they are both "dependent upon convention." FOOTNOTE: The
original of this latter phrase, sa prajnaptir upadaya, is a famously difficult
one to translate. For example, Nagao renders it "a designation based upon (some
material)," Ramana as "derived name," and Sprung as "a guiding, not a cognitive,
notion, presupposing the everyday." Kalupahana's translation was used here
because, while not necessarily more accurate than any others, it is clearer and
more succinct. Any theory, even one as all-encompassing as emptiness, is still a
theory based on convention. Were there no dependently arisen things, there would
be no theory of dependent arising. Further, even though these things are empty,
they are at least phenomenally real; if they were not, there would be no theory
of emptiness, for there would be nothing on which to base it. The whole of
Nagarjuna's philosophy is dependent upon convention, for it all presupposes the
perception of everyday things and their phenomenal reality. It is vital that one
following his philosophy understand that it, every bit as much as the things it
describes, is relative. Dependent arising and emptiness are relative to each
other, and both are relative to the perceived world. They thus constitute a
middle path. One must remember that dependent arising would be no more proper a
description of ultimate truth than emptiness, and vice-versa, else either
materialism or nihilism would result. Likewise, one must find a middle ground
between theorizing and refraining from doing so. The philosophy of Madhyamika is
of vital importance, for it explains reality and points the way to an escape
from it. Were one to accept no philosophy, the mental faculties would be
ungrounded and directionless. On the other hand, one must remember the proper
place of philosophies as based on convention only; they have no final validity.
This, Nagarjuna says, is the middle path of the Buddha.
Perhaps the most important thing demonstrated by the equation Nagarjuna presents
in the above verse is that the Madhyamika philosophy is, in its essence, very
simple. "Independently realized, peaceful, unobsessed by obsessions, without
discriminations and a variety of meaning: such is the characteristic of truth,"
he says. FOOTNOTE: karika XVIII.9 The one clear perception underlying Madhyamika
is the interconnectedness and complete dependence of all things. Becoming and
being, past and future, reality and emptiness, subject and object, arising and
ceasing are all real things, but only in relation to each other. None exist
absolutely. Unfortunately, this insight, while utterly simple and clear, is not
so easily explained. The function of language and concepts is to make
distinctions and impose artificial boundaries. The very word "define" has in its
roots the connotation of creating boundaries (de + finis). The Buddha and
Nagarjuna had no choice but to explain their insight into the nature of reality
in philosophical terms, formulas, and theories. Nagarjuna's brilliance lay in
his ability to explain it so clearly, and then to build such effective
safeguards against excessive philosophizing into his system.
Ultimately, the one thing that is of importance is the Buddha's three-faceted
teaching of transitoriness, soullessness, and suffering, the goal of which
teaching being freedom. Only in light of this can Buddhism and Nagarjuna's
enterprise be understood correctly. Rejecting all conceptual extremes and
advocating a middle path is not an exercise in philosophy, but an aid to help
people escape suffering and become free. The Visuddhimagga expresses poetically
but succinctly the reality that remains when the Buddha's teachings are truly
understood:
"Misery only doth exist, none miserable,
No doer is there; naught save the deed is found.
Nirvana is, but not the man who seeks it.
The Path exists, but not the traveler on it." FOOTNOTE: Visuddhimagga, quoted
in Warren, 146

Epilogue

This research project was not merely an academic exercise. I would like to
address briefly what I consider to be the importance of Madhyamika to our modern
world, Occidental or otherwise. To my knowledge, there has never been in
recorded history a philosophical system so exhaustively apophatic as Nagarjuna's
that was not also a nihilism. Even Zen, the champion of paradox, is not really
either apophatic or a system. I have defended the value of Madhyamika within the
Buddhist tradition as being a defense of and an explanation of the twin
doctrines of soullessness and transitoriness, the purpose of which being an aid
to escape suffering. Outside the Buddhist tradition the importance of Madhyamika
is slightly different, for it is not likely that the Western undercurrents of
essentialism could easily be unseated---nor would I want to. One value of this
philosophy for the West lies in its potential to undercut the habits of
"I-making" and grasping, both grasping onto the things of the world and grasping
onto the products of rationality. Another value is the contribution Madhyamika
could make to Western philosophy and theology.
Many of the structures of the modern world are based, in some way or other, on
distrust of individual authority. For example, that which has become American
democracy is rooted in a party system. The hope is that, if two or more parties
compete for election and for legislation, then compromises will emerge in the
long run, and no individual will have too much power. The method on which
science is based is founded on a similar safeguard. One can never prove, but
only disprove. Third, the quest for objectivity underlying all academia
certainly betrays this distrust. There is a strong emphasis on removing all
personal reference from research and attempting to make it uninfluenced by any
personal emotions or prejudices. These safeguards are necessary components of
the structures we have. However, it is not certain that these structures are the
only option.
The Buddha's teachings demonstrate that, in a way, emphasis on the self is the
root of all evil. It is an excessive "self-ishness" that causes one to desire
passionately, to assert forcefully one's opinions and thoughts, to want to be
right, to desire to possess. "Self-ishness" is that which, in whatever
situation, causes one to seek one's own well-being and ignore the thoughts and
needs of others. The Buddha's path, especially as enunciated so radically by
Nagarjuna, subverts this "I-making." I do not know what the result would be if
the doctrine of soullessness were introduced into our systems of politics,
science, and academia, but my suspicion is that the results would be beneficial.
The other importance of Nagarjuna's agenda for me is the impact it could have on
our rational structures of philosophy and theology. There are many discerning
thinkers in these fields whose philosophies are in no way simplistic, but there
are far too few. A study of Madhyamika philosophy has not forced me to abandon
my belief in concepts like God, the soul, and the afterlife. What it has done is
shown me, if I am to retain those beliefs, of what they may and may not consist.
Nagarjuna's teaching of emptiness can vastly deepen and enrich one's religious
and philosophical notions. Further, his teachings can demonstrate to what extent
those notions are self-created and, thus, which notions may be true, which
false, and which merely helpful guides that must ultimately be abandoned.
The philosophies of the Buddha and Nagarjuna offer trenchant explanations of the
constitution of reality, the function of the human mind, and the purpose to
which an individual's life and, in some cases, academic career should be
devoted. A study of Madhyamika, if approached with a receptive attitude, will
complement any philosophy, no matter how antithetical.

The bibliography

Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta. An Introduction to Indian
Philosophy. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1960.
Edward Conze. Buddhism: Its Essence and Development. New York: Harper and Row,
1975.
Edward Conze, ed. and trans. Buddhist Scriptures. London: Penguin Books, 1959.
Edward Conze, ed. and trans. The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1975.
Michael Coulson. Sanskrit. Chicago: NTC Publishing Group, 1992.
Ainslee~T. Embree, ed. Sources of Indian Tradition, volume one. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1988.
Etienne Lamotte, trans. Sara Webb-Boin. History of Indian Buddhism.
Louvain-La-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1988.
Ramendranath Ghose. The Dialectics of Nagarjuna. Allahabad, India: Vohra
Publishers and Distributors, 1987.
John Grimes, ed. A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy. Madras: University
of Madras, 1988.
Herbert Guenther. Buddhism: Tibetan schools. Encyclopedia of Religion, 1987.
Edith Hamilton. Mythology. New York: The New American Library, 1942.
Peter Harvey. An Introduction to Buddhism. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990.
Maria~Ruth Hibbets. An Investigation into the Negative Dialectics of Nagarjuna
and Candrakirti. Bachelor's Thesis, Reed College, 1991.
M.~Hiriyanna. Outlines of Indian Philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
1967.
Nolan~Pliny Jacobsen. Understanding Buddhism. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1986.
William James. The Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: The Modern
Library, 1929.
David~J. Kalupahana. Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. Honolulu:
The University of Hawaii Press, 1975.
David~J. Kalupahana. Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis. Honolulu: The
University of Hawaii Press, 1976.
David~J. Kalupahana. Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way: the
Mulamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna. New York: State University of New York Press,
1986.
David~J. Kalupahana. A History of Buddhist Philosophy. Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 1992.
Michael~H. Kohn, trans. The Shambhala Dictionary of Buddhism and Zen. Boston:
Shambhala, 1991.
Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund. A History of India. London: Routledge,
1990.
Karen Lang, trans. aryadeva's Catuhsataka. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986.
Chr. Lindtner. Nagarjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of
Nagarjuna. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987.
Donald~S. Lopez. A Study of Svatantrika. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications,
1987.
Sir~Monier Monier-Williams. A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1993.
T.R.V. Murti. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. London: George Allen & Unwin
Ltd., 1960.
Gadjin~M. Nagao. The Foundational Standpoint of Madhyamika Philosophy. New York:
State University of New York Press, 1989.
Gadjin~M. Nagao. Madhyamika and Yogacara. New York: State University of New York
Press, 1991.
Geoffrey Parrinder, ed. World Religions. New York: Facts on File Publications,
1983.
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. Indian Philosophy, volume I. London: George Allen and
Unwin Ltd., 1929.
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles Moore. A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.
Walpola~Sri Rahula. What the Buddha Taught. New York: Grove Press, 1959.
Regington Rajapakse ``Buddhism as Religion and Philosophy''. Religion. 1986.
Bhagwan~Shree Rajneesh, trans. Edward Conze. The Diamond Sutra. Poona, India: Ma
Yoga Laxmi Rajneesh Foundation, 1979.
K.~Venkata Ramana. Nagarjuna's Philosophy. Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle
Company, 1966.
Paul Reps. Zen Flesh, Zen Bones. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, (no
impress date).
T.W. Rhys-Davids, ed. and trans. Buddhist Suttas. New York: Dover Publications,
Inc., 1969.
Richard~H. Robinson. Early Madhyamika in India and China. Madison, Wisconsin:
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967.
Peter~Della Santina. Madhyamaka Schools in India. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1986.
Ninian Smart. The Philosophy of Religion. New York: Random House, 1970.
Huston Smith. The World's Religions. San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1991.
David Snellgrove. Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. Boston: Shambhala, 1987.
Mervyn Sprung. Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: The Essential Chapters of the
Prasannapada of Candrakirti. Boulder: Prajna Press, 1979.
Theodore Stcherbatsky. The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana. London: Mouton & Co,
1965.
Frederick Streng. Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning. Nashville: Abingdon
Press, 1967.
D.T. Suzuki. Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism. New York: Schocken Books, 1967.
Shunryu Suzuki. Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind. New York: Weatherhill, 1983.
Malaclypse the Younger. Principia Discordia. Port Townsend, WA: Loompanics
Unlimited, (no impress date).
Frank Thilly. A History of Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951.
L.~Austin Waddell. Tibetan Buddhism. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1972.
A.~K. Warder. Indian Buddhism. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980.
Henry~Clarke Warren, ed. and trans. Buddhism in Translations. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1987.
Paul Williams. Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. London: Routledge,
1989.
Kajiyama Yuichi. Madhyamika. The Encyclopedia of Religion, 1987.
Heinrich Zimmer. Philosophies of India. New York: Meridian Books, 1957.



publications
Jonah Winters' personal page


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 The Doctrine of Anatta
 by U Han Htay

Research Officer
Vol. III, No. 2, 1983


To the ordinary level of knowledge and thinking the Anatta dhamma may
appear as a metaphysical concept, but it is the only practical realistic
truth in life. This can be correctly realised by means of satipatthana
practice on the existing phenomena. We all experience such as emotion,
cognition, feeling, thinking, etc. They are all sankhara dhammas, that is,
the processes of rise and fall, in short, by looking through the nama and
rupa we discern, in a deeper insight dimensions, the voidness of soul in
us. With the progress of Vipassana insight the three characteristics of
existence are fully known: impermanence, suffering, and absence of
individuality or ego. At first we may learn these profound spiritual
truths by means of hearing and thinking. At perceptual level, these truths
may seem dreary or pessimistic. But at insight level the highest truths
are revealed to deliver us from the clutches of pride, lust and delusion.
Ignorance of these existential, spiritual truths or life’s
characteristics is seen to be the greatest obstacle in the path to lift
man from his common average level. This kind of delusion also retards
psychological and moral development in man. Conflicts arise because of
wrong beliefs such as the belief in an ego.
Now what is Anatta? This technical Buddhist term means all "beings"
are composed of transient natures or changing forces, too quick to see
with the ordinary eyes, so much so that they are void of substances or
soul. The Buddha advises us, in our search for highest truths, to note the
present changing materialities and mentalities (nama and rupa).
Universally all puthujjanas, the uninstructed human beings, take these
ultimate realities to be permanent entities and they think souls,
entities, individualities and selves really exist in the ultimate sense.
Thus the wrong belief, the Sakkayaditthi belief in personality or eternal
soul, is the hardest and greatest obstacle to achieve mental and spiritual
peace.
True happiness means liberation from all kinds of false illusions and
beliefs. Liberation from false beliefs is a basic step in wholesome
living. Purity is attained. The Buddha therefore emphatically teaches that
if there is impermanence there is also egolessness. Thus the Anatta truth
arises from the nature of life, Anicca dhamma, the impermanence of all
phenomena.
It will be realised that the unique Anatta teaching of the Buddha, as
clearly stated in the Khandhavagga Samyutta, is based on the truths of
rupa, vedana, sanna, sankhara and vinnana. These five groups of existence,
life’s basic factors, clearly show the hidden truths such as the facts of
unnsatifactoriness, unsubstantiality, rapid changefulness, void of self,
etc. By knowing our five khandhas— materiality, feeling, perception,
mental formations and consciousness— we know the truth of Anatta. One
realizes the reality of Anatta by introspecting one’s daily experiences
here and now. We take note of the changing phenomena intensively through
our six sense-doors. We meditate deeply on the nature of pathavi, apo,
tejo and vayo, the four basic elements of life. Consequently we come to
know the truth of Anatta and find supreme peace. The benefits we gain are
many; such as humility, humbleness, compassion, contentment, clarity of
vision, right belief and right conduct. Thus the truth of Anatta is beyond
ontological and theological concepts. It is a profound truth, but we can
learn it from our nama and rupa (mind and matter) which constitute life.
Voidness (sunnata) is another name for Anatta. We find in Pali
Buddhism the empirical Voidness of our existence which is realised by
mindfulness. The original Theravada Buddhism, on the other hand, teaches
only three kinds of sunnata: (1) voidness of the idea of beings and
persons, puggala sunnata, (2) voidness of soul, atta sunnata, and (3)
voidness of nama and rupa which is Nibbana. These three kinds of truth
must be realised practically with the aid of Vipassana which brings the
Four Noble Truths in all their aspects.
Sometimes, the meaning of Anatta may be difficult to understand even
at theoretical level. But Anatta is always present as dhamma in our daily
life, Seeing, hearing, thinking, moving, etc, are Anatta. It is the
practical voidness for practical persons. Many people make fun on the
truth of emptiness by asking how empty is the emptiness. This type of
question can only lead to theology or ontology. We must take down to the
actualities of life in view, In fact for the Vipassana meditators, the
term "emptiness" assumes great significance. As followers of the Eightfold
Noble Path we must know that the world is empty of self and permanence. So
the Buddha, in the light of highest insights, teaches the actuality of
life known as sunnata. All our khandha worlds, ayatana worlds, dhatu
worlds are sunnata.
By realizing the sublime truths our attitudes and motivations become
more pure and more refined. Our attitudes change for the better. Our minds
become steady and concentrated. Now we are not under the control of
(maya), illusion. We realistically face the hard, deep truths of life. Yet
our minds become clear and noble. A full ethical life is lived by all
persons who gain this right understanding on the meaning of life. The
emptiness of life does not convey the meaning of hopelessness, uselessness
or futility. In life we appreciate and use such noble dhammas as viriya
(effort), piti (joy), dhammavicaya (investigation), as taught in the seven
enlightenment factors. A noble person enjoying the Nibbanic peace within,
remains calm and clear amid all kinds of distracting turmoils and changing
processes of life. He, by finding the peace of Anatta truth, knows how and
when to act rightly. Righteousness becomes a keynote in his life.
Even by thinking of the fact of Anatta while we see or hear dhamma,
either good or bad, we extract peace and purity from the turmoils of our
daily life. Ups and downs of life are seen in a new perspective. They are
now utilized for the achievement of Anatta insight which at once promotes
Nibbanic peace in our hearts, indeed Anatta insight clarifies all mental
confusions, it destroys all illusions that create fool’s paradise.
Whenever we experience "bad’’ things in the ‘world around us, we
should instantly form right attitude together with right understanding. We
should not run away from life. Neither should we indulge in momentary
pleasures which generate false belief in permanent self. Since, from the
ultimate standpoint of understanding, there is no self we should enjoy
five sensual pleasures with the help of right knowledge. Otherwise
delusions will increase in as much as pleasures of the senses are regarded
as ‘lasting", "likeable" or "agreeable". These wrong attitudes are against
the truth of Anatta. Anatta teaches us that even our sensual pleasures are
without agreeable substances, permanent entities and selves. With this
right knowledge we should take pleasures and displeasures correctly. Life
then will become meaningful and full of dhammas to see with our wisdom
eye. Anatta, in brief, shows us that there are no "I" and "you" who like
or dislike "things" and "persons". All are dhamma. The dhamma’ of lust
(lobha-raga) only enjoys. The dhamma of hatred (dosa-patigha) only hates.
Attachment and irritation can now be seen as "dhammas" only. So we gain
dhamma-eye to see all things are "dhamma". Hence all wise people, knowing
dhamma, do not suffer from the influences of lust and anger. They know
Anatta!


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Culasunnata_Sutta by The Buddha


The Sutta (121)
1. Thus I heard: On one occasion the Blessed One was living at Savatthi in the
Eastern Park, the Palace of Migara's Mother.
2. Then when it was evening, the venerable Ananda rose from retreat, and he went
to the Blessed One, and after paying homage to him, he sat down at one side.
When he had done so, he said to the Blessed One:
3. 'Venerable sir, once the Blessed One was living in the Sakyan country. There
is a town of the Sakyans called Nagaraka; there I heard and learnt this from the
Blessed One's own lips: "Now I abide much in the voiding, Ananda." Venerable
sir, was this well heard by me, well apprehended, well attended to and well
remembered?' 'Certainly, Ananda, that was well heard by you, well apprehended,
well attended to and well remembered. As formerly, so now too, I abide much in
the void abiding.
4. 'Ananda, just as the Palace of Migara's Mother is void of elephants, cattle,
horses and mares, void of gold and silver, void of the forgathering of women and
men, and there is (present) only this non-voidness, that is to say, the single
state (of non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) the community of
bhikkhus; so too, without giving attention to perception of village, without
giving attention to perception of man, a bhikkhu gives attention to the single
state (of non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) perception of forest. His
mind enters into that perception of forest and acquires confidence, steadiness
and decision. He understands thus: "Disturbances that would be present dependent
on perception of village are not present here, disturbances that would be
present on perception of man are not present here, and only this measure of
disturbance is present, that is to say, the single state (of non-voidness)
dependent on (the presence of) perception of forest." He understands: "This
field of perception is void of perception of village." He understands: "This
field of perception is void of perception of man.", (and he understands): "There
is (present) only this non-voidness, that is to say, the single state (of
non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) perception of forest." So he sees
it as void of what is not there, but of what remains there he understands:
"There is that still present there." Now this has been for him an alighting upon
voidness that accords with what actually is, without perversion of meaning and
is pure.
5. 'Again, Ananda, without giving attention to perception of man, without giving
attention to perception of forest, a bhikkhu gives attention to the single state
(of non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) perception of earth. His mind
enters into that perception of earth and acquires confidence, steadiness and
decision. Just as though a bull's hide were freed from folds by stretching it
with a hundred pegs, so too, without giving attention to all the ridges and
hollows, the river ravines, the tracts of stumps and thorns, the rocky
inequalities, on this earth, a bhikkhu gives attention to the single state (of
non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) perception of earth. His mind
enters into the perception of earth and acquires confidence, steadiness and
decision. He understands thus: "Disturbances that would have been present
dependent on perception of man are not present here, disturbances that would be
present dependent on perception of forest are not present here, and only this
measure of disturbance is present, that is to say, the single state (of
non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) perception of earth." He
understands: "This field of perception is void of perception of man." He
understands: "This field of perception is void of perception of forest.", (and
he understands): "There is (present) only this non-voidness, that is to say, the
single state (of non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) perception of
earth." So he sees it as void of what is not there, but of what remains there he
understands: "There is that still present there." Now this too has been for him
an alighting upon voidness, that accords with what actually is, without
perversion of meaning, and is pure.
6. 'Again, Ananda, without giving attention to perception of forest, without
giving attention to perception of earth, a bhikkhu gives attention to the single
state (of non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) perception of the base
consisting of infinite space. His mind enters into that perception of the base
consisting of infinite space and acquires confidence, steadiness and decision.
He understands thus: "Disturbances that would be present dependent on perception
of forest are not present here, disturbances that would be present on perception
of earth are not present here, and only this measure of disturbance is present,
that is to say, the single state (of non-voidness) dependent on (the presence
of) perception of the base consisting of infinite space." He understands: "This
field of perception is void of perception of forest." He understands: "This
field of perception is void of perception of earth." , (and he understands:)
"There is (present) only this non-voidness, that is to say, the single state (of
non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) perception of the base consisting
of infinite space." So he sees it as void of what is not there, but of what
remains there he understands: "There is that still present there." Now this too
has been for him an alighting upon voidness that accords with what actually is,
without perversion of meaning and is pure.
7. 'Again, Ananda, without giving attention to perception of earth, without
giving attention to perception of the base consisting of infinite space, a
bhikkhu gives attention to the single state (of non-voidness) dependent on (the
presence of) perception of the base consisting of infinite consciousness. His
mind enters into the perception of the base consisting of infinite consciousness
and acquires confidence, steadiness and decision. He understands thus:
"Disturbances that would be present dependent on perception of earth are not
present here, disturbances that would be present dependent on perception of the
base consisting of infinite space are not present here, and only this measure of
disturbance is present, that is to say, the single state (of non-voidness)
dependent on (the presence of) perception of the base consisting of infinite
consciousness." He understands: "This field of perception is void of perception
of earth." He understands: "This field of perception is void of perception of
the base consisting of infinite space", (and he understands): "There is
(present) only this non-voidness, that is to say, the single state (of
non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) perception of the base consisting
of infinite consciousness." So he sees it as void of what is not there, but of
what remains there he understands: "There is that still present there." Now this
too has been for him an alighting upon voidness that accords with what actually
is, without perversion of meaning, and is pure.
8. 'Again, Ananda, without giving attention to perception of the base consisting
of infinite space, without giving attention to perception of the base consisting
of infinite consciousness, a bhikkhu gives attention to the single state (of
non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) perception of the base consisting
of nothingness. His mind enters into the perception of the base consisting of
nothingness and he acquires confidence, steadiness and decision. He understands
thus: "Disturbances that would be present dependent on perception of the base of
infinite space are not present here, disturbances that would be present
dependent on perception of the base of infinite consciousness are not present
here, and only this measure of disturbance is present, that is to say, the
single state (of non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) perception of the
base consisting of nothingness." He understands: "This field of perception is
void of perception of the base consisting of infinite space.", and he
understands: "This field of perception is void of perception of the base
consisting of infinite consciousness.", (and he understands): "There is
(present) only this non-voidness, that is to say, the single state (of
non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) perception of the base consisting
of nothingness." So he sees it as void of what is not there, but of what remains
there he understands: "There is that still present there." Now this too has been
for him an alighting upon voidness that accords with what is, without perversion
of meaning and is pure.
9. 'Again, Ananda, without giving attention to perception of the base consisting
of infinite consciousness, without giving attention to perception of the base
consisting of nothingness, a bhikkhu gives attention to the single state (of
non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) perception of the base consisting
of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. His mind enters into the perception of
the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception and acquires
confidence, steadiness and decision. He understands thus: "Disturbances that
would be present dependent on the perception of the base consisting of infinite
consciousness are not present here, disturbances that would present dependent on
the perception of the base consisting of nothingness are not present here, and
only this measure of disturbance is present, that is to say, the single state
(of non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) perception of the base
consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception." He understands: "This
field of perception is void of perception of the base consisting of infinite
consciousness." He understands: "This field of perception is void of perception
of the base consisting of nothingness.", (and he understands): "There is
(present) only this non-voidness, that is to say, the single state (of
non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) perception of the base consisting
of neither-perception-nor-non-perception." So he sees it as void of what is not
there, but of what remains there he understands: "There is that still present
there." Now this too has been for him an alighting upon voidness, that accords
with what actually is, without perversion of meaning and is pure.
10. 'Again, Ananda, without giving attention to perception of the base
consisting of nothingness, without giving attention to perception of the base
consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, a bhikkhu gives attention
to the single state (of non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) the
signless concentration of mind. His mind enters into the signless concentration
of mind and acquires confidence, steadiness and decision. He understands thus:
"Disturbances that would be present dependent on the perception of the base
consisting of nothingness are not present here, disturbances that would be
present dependent on the perception of the base consisting of
neither-perception-nor-non-perception are not present here, and only this
measure of disturbance is present, that is to say, that (disturbance) which has
life as its condition dependent on the presence of this body with its six
bases." He understands: "This field of perception is void of perception of the
base consisting of nothingness." He understands: "This field of perception is
void of perception of the base consisting of
neither-perception-nor-non-perception.", (and he understands): "There is
(present) only this non-voidness, that is to say, that (non-voidness) with life
as its condition dependent on this body with its six bases." So he sees it as
void of what is not there, but of what remains there he understands: "There is
that still present there." Now this too has been for him an alighting upon
voidness, that accords with what actually is, without perversion of meaning and
is pure.
11. 'Again, Ananda, without giving attention to perception of the base
consisting of nothingness, without giving attention to perception of the base
consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, a bhikkhu gives attention
to the single state (of non-voidness) dependent on (the presence of) the
signless concentration of mind. His mind enters into the signless concentration
of mind and acquires confidence, steadiness and decision. He understands thus:
"This signless concentration of mind is conditioned and mentally produced." He
understands: "Whatever is conditioned and mentally produced is impermanent and
liable to cessation." When he knows and sees thus, his mind is liberated from
the taint of sensual desire, from the taint of being, from the taint of
ignorance. When liberated there comes the knowledge "It is liberated". He
understands: "Birth is exhausted, the life divine has been lived out, what was
to be done is done, there is no more of this to come." He understands thus:
"Disturbances that would be present dependent on the taint of sensual desire are
not present here, disturbances that would be present dependent on the taint of
being are not present here, disturbances that would be present dependent on the
taint of ignorance are not present here, and only this measure of disturbance is
present, that is to say, that (non-voidness) with life as its condition
dependent on (the presence of) this body with its six bases." He understands:
"This field of perception is void of the taint of sensual desire." He
understands: "This field of perception is void of the taint of being." He
understands: "This field of perception is void of the taint of ignorance.", (and
he understands): "There is (present) only this non-voidness, that is to say,
that (non-voidness) with life as its condition dependent on (the presence of)
this body with its six bases." So he sees it as void of what is not there, but
of what remains there he understands: "There is that still present there." Now
this has been for him an alighting upon voidness that accords with what actually
is, without perversion of meaning, is pure and is unsurpassed by any other.
12. 'Whatever monks or divines in the past have entered upon and abode in a
voidness that was purified and unsurpassed by any other, they have all of them
entered upon and abode in this voidness that is pure and unsurpassed by any
other.
_____'Whatever monks and divines in the future will enter upon and abide in a
voidness that will be purified and unsurpassed by any other, they will all of
them enter upon and abide in this voidness that is pure and unsurpassed by any
other.
_____'Whatever monks and divines in the present enter upon and abide in a
voidness that is purified and unsurpassed by any other, they all of them will
enter upon and abide in this voidness that is pure and unsurpassed by any other.
_____'Therefore, Ananda, you should train thus: "We will enter upon and abide in
the voidness that is pure and unsurpassed by any other."'
______That is what the Blessed One said. The venerable Ananda was satisfied, and
he delighted in the Blessed One's words.


From: "A Treasury of the Buddha's Words" (Discourses from the Middle
Collection);
...translated by Ven. Nyanamoli Thera;
...edited and arranged by Phra Khantipalo, Wat Bovoranives Vihara, Bangkok,
Thailand
©(C) Mahamakut Rajavidyalaya Press; 287 Phra Sumeru Road; Bangkok 2, Thailand;
1977


cf. Visuddhimagga, Chapter 10; (The Path Of Purification, (Aruppa-Niddesa));
Buddhaghosa; an @ A.D.350 Commentary
cf. Dharmanet;other Bhuddist works on the Web

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 The Diamond Sutra
(Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita Sutra)
Translated from Kumarajiva's Chinese [T235] by Charles Patton



Read an alternate translation
Translator's Note
This original translation has been composed for the express purpose that
this text may be made freely available to any and all who should desire
to obtain it. With this in mind, the author of this document has granted
permission for this translation to be distributed freely, the only
conditions being: a) that the content of this document not be altered
and b) that all such distributions are gifts requiring nothing in
recompense. So long as these conditions are followed, the author
wholeheartedly encourages this document to be spread far and wide, in
whatever form is convenient, so that myriad beings might come to read
it, and grow wiser.



1.
Thus have I heard: One time the Buddha was staying at the garden retreat
of Anathapindada, in the Jeta Grove near Sravasti, with a great bhiksu
congregation of 1,250 people. At that time, the World Honored One at
mealtime donned robes and took his almsbowl into the great city of
Sravasti to beg for alms. In the midst of that city, he begged
successively and then returned to his personal dwelling to eat his meal.
Having put away his robes and bowl, and washed his feet, he prepared his
seat and sat.
2.
At that time, the venerable Subhuti was amidst the great congregation.
He then rose from his seat, adjusted his robes to one shoulder, and with
his right knee touched the ground. With palms joined in reverence, he
addressed the Buddha: "Extraordinary, World Honored One, is the
tathagata's skillful mindfulness of the bodhisattvas, and his skillful
entrustment to the bodhisattvas. World Honored One, in what should good
sons and good daughters initiating the annutara-samyak-sambodhicitta
dwell? How should they regulate their thoughts?"
The Buddha replied: "Excellent, excellent! Subhuti, as you have said,
the tathagata is skillfully mindful of the bodhisattvas, and skillful in
entrusting to the bodhisattvas. If you now listen closely, I shall
explain for you in what good sons and good daughters launching the
anuttara-samyak-sambodhi mind should thus abide, and how thus they
should regulate their thoughts."
"Yes, World Honored One. Gladly, I shall listen."
3.
The Buddha told Subhuti: "Bodhisattva-mahasattvas should thus regulate
their thoughts: 'Where there is every single sort of being -- whether
womb-born, whether egg-born, whether water-born, or born of
transformation; whether possessing form or whether without form; whether
possessing thought or whether without thought; whether neither
possessing thought nor without thought -- I will cause all to enter the
non-residual nirvana, liberating them. Thus liberating the immeasurably
boundless beings, in reality there are no beings attaining that
liberation.' What is the reason? Subhuti, if a bodhisattva has the view
of a self, the view of a person, the view of beings, or the view of a
soul; then he is not a bodhisattva.
4.
"Furthermore, Subhuti, a bodhisattva in the Dharma should in no place
dwell while acting in charity. That is to say, not dwelling in the forms
of charity: not dwelling in the sounds, odors, tastes, sensations, or
dharmas of charity. Subhuti, a bodhisattva should thus be charitable,
not dwelling in appearances. What is the reason? If a bodhisattva does
not dwell in the appearances of charity, his blessed virtue cannot be
calculated.
"Subhuti, what do you think? To the East, the empty space can be
calculated, no?"
"No, World Honored One."
"Subhuti, to the South, West, North, the four directions between, above
and below, the empty space can be calculated, no?"
"No, World Honored One."
"Subhuti, the blessed virtue of a bodhisattva not dwelling in the
appearances of charity is also, again, thus: it cannot be calculated.
Subhuti, bodhisattvas should only thus in this teaching dwell."
5.
"Subhuti, what do you think? One can by means of the bodily signs see
the tathagata, no?"
"No, World Honored One. One cannot by means of the bodily signs attain
sight of the tathagata. What is the reason? The tathagata has explained
that the bodily signs are not bodily signs [of the tathagata]."
The Buddha told Subhuti: "The mortal possession of signs is in every
case vacant and delusive. If one sees that the signs are not signs, then
one sees the tathagata."
6.
Subhuti said to the Buddha: "World Honored One, it is doubtful that
there are beings who, hearing thus the spoken words in this composition,
will give birth to genuine belief, no?"
The Buddha told Subhuti: "Do not compose such a statement. In the last
five hundred years after the tathagata's extinction, there will be the
taking up of precepts and cultivation of the blessed. From these
paragraphs and phrases, it is possible to give birth to the believing
mind because they are true. It should be known that these people [of
that age] would not be with one buddha, two buddhas, three, four, or
five buddhas when sowing their good roots. They will have completed,
with immeasurable tens of millions of buddhas, the sowing of good roots.
Hearing these paragraphs and phrases, even for a single recitation,
shall give birth to pure belief. Subhuti, the tathagata fully knows and
fully sees this of every being attaining thusly the immeasurably blessed
virtue. What is the reason? These beings will not return to the views of
a self, a person, beings, or a soul. They would be without the views of
dharmas and also without the views of non-dharmas. What is the reason?
If these beings' minds were to apprehend appearances, it would then
create the clinging to a self, a person, beings, and a soul. If they
were to take up the appearances of dharmas, it would then create the
clinging to a self, a person, beings, and a soul. What is the reason? If
they were to take up the appearances of non-dharmas, it would then
create the clinging to a self, a person, beings, and a soul. For this
reason, one should not apprehend dharmas, nor should one apprehend
non-dharmas. This meaning is the reason the Tathagata always says, 'You
monks! Know that my expounded Dharma is like the bamboo raft. The
honored Dharma must be relinquished, how much more so what is not the
Dharma?'
7.
"Subhuti, what do you think? Has the tathagata attained the
annuttara-samyak-sambodhi? Has the Tathagata a teaching of the Dharma?"
Subhuti replied: "As I have comprehended the Buddha's express meaning,
there is no established dharma called 'annuttara-samyak-sambodhi'. Also,
there is no established dharma which the tathagata can expound. What is
the reason? Of the dharmas expounded by the tathagata, none can be
grasped or explained, being neither dharmas nor non-dharmas. What is the
reason for that? Of every one of the Sages, all via the unconditioned
dharma make discriminations."
8.
"Subhuti, what do you think? If a person filled the billion worlds with
the seven treasures for the purpose of charity, this person's attainment
of blessed deeds would become plentiful, no?"
Subhuti replied: "Incredibly plentiful, World Honored One. What is the
reason? This blessed deed then would not, again, be of a blessed nature.
This is the reason the Tathagata has said that the blessed deeds would
become plentiful."
"If again, there is a person who receives and keeps what is in this
sermon, even just four lines of verse, and to another person expounds
it, that person's blessedness would overcome the other's. What is the
reason? Subhuti, every one of the buddhas who reach the buddhas'
annuttara-samyak-sambodhi Dharma are all from this sermon produced.
Subhuti, what is called the 'Buddha's Dharma,' then, is not the Buddha's
Dharma.
9.
"Subhuti, what do you think? The stream entrant (srota-apanna) is able
to compose this thought -- 'I have attained the stream entrant's fruit'
-- no?"
Subhuti replied: "No, World Honored One. What is the reason? 'Stream
entrant' is the name for entering the stream [of the holy life], for
entering nowhere; not entering forms, sounds, odors, tastes, sensations,
or dharmas. This is called 'stream entrant'."
"Subhuti, what do you think? The Once More to be Reborn (sakrdagama) is
able to compose this thought -- 'I have attained the Once More to be
Reborn's fruit' -- no?"
Subhuti replied: "No, World Honored One. What is the reason? 'Once More
to be Reborn' is the name for one more arrival [in this mortal world],
and really is without future arrival. This is called 'Once More to be
Reborn'."
"Subhuti, what do you think? The Non-Returner (anagamin) is able to
compose this thought -- 'I have attained the Non-Returner's fruit' --
no?"
Subhuti replied: "No, World Honored One. What is the reason?
'Non-Returner' is the name for no more rebirth, and really has no
non-rebirth. This is why it is called 'Non-Returner'."
"Subhuti, what do you think? The Arhat can compose this thought -- 'I
have attained the Arhat's path' -- no?"
Subhuti replied: "No, World Honored One. What is the reason? Really,
there is no existent dharma called 'Arhat'. World Honored One, if an
arhat were to compose this thought -- 'I have attained the Arhat's
reward' -- then it would be because of clinging to a self, a person,
sentient beings, and a soul. The Buddha has said that I have attained,
without debate, a samadhi which among others is the best. It is the best
because of the departure from the desire for Arhatship. I do not compose
this thought -- 'I have departed from the desire for Arhatship'. World
Honored One, of myself, if I composed this thought -- 'I have attain the
arhat's path' --the World Honored One would then not have said that
Subhuti is this happy woodland practitioner (ie, ascetic), because
Subhuti really practices nowhere. And so he is called 'Subhuti, the
happy woodland practitioner."
10.
The Buddha addressed Subhuti: "What do you think? When the Tathagata was
formerly staying with the Buddha Dipamkara, in the Dharma he had
attainment, no?"
"No, World Honored One. When the tathagata was staying with the Buddha
Dipamkara, in the Dharma he really had no attainment."
"Subhuti, what do you think? The bodhisattva adorns the buddhaland, no?"

"No, World Honored One. What is the reason? The adornment of the
buddhalands is not adornment. This is called 'adornment'."
"This is why, Subhuti, that bodhisattva-mahasattvas should thusly give
rise to the purified mind. They should not dwell in forms when giving
rise to that mind; they should not dwell in sounds, odors, tastes,
sensations, or dharmas when giving rise to that mind. They should dwell
nowhere while giving rise to their thoughts.
Subhuti, supppose there is a person whose body is like Mount Sumeru.
What do you think? This body would be made great, no?"
Subhuti replied: "Incredibly great, World Honored One. What is the
reason? The Buddha has said that a non-body is called a great body."
11.
"Subhuti, suppose there were Ganges Rivers equal in numbers to that of
all the sand grains in the Ganges River. What do you think? The sand
grains of all those Ganges Rivers would be many, no?"
"Incredibly many, World Honored One. Merely all of those Ganges Rivers
would be so many as to be countless. How much more so would be their
sand grains?"
"Subhuti, I now will truthfully tell you: if there are good sons and
good daughters who fill the billion worlds with the seven treasures with
the purpose of charity, themselves numbering like the sands of those
Ganges Rivers, they would attain many blessings, no?"
Subhuti replied: "Incredibly many, World Honored One."
The Buddha addressed Subhuti: "If a good son or good daughter from
within this sermon should receive and uphold just four lines of verse,
and for another person explain it, the blessed virtue of this person
would surpass the former's blessed virtue.
12.
"Furthermore, Subhuti, where what is said in this sermon is followed,
even if just four lines of verse, it should be known that this place in
every single world -- be it they of gods, men, or asuras -- all within
should give offerings of support as though it were a Buddhist pagoda or
temple. How much more so if there is someone who is able to receive,
keep, read, and recite it in its entirety? Subhuti, it should be known
that this person will completely accomplish the supreme, best, most
extraordinary Dharma. If this canonical sermon resides in his abode,
then it would be like the place of a buddha, if it is honored by the
disciples."
13.
At that time, Subhuti said to the Buddha: "World Honored One, what shall
be the name of this sermon? How are we to receive and uphold it?"
The Buddha addressed Subhuti: "This sermon's name is the Diamond
Perfection of Wisdom (Vajra Prajna-paramita). By way of the words of
this title, you should receive and uphold it. For what reason? Subhuti,
the Buddha says that it is the perfection of wisdom, so it is not the
perfection of wisdom.
"Subhuti, what do you think? The Tathagata has a teaching of the Dharma,
no?"
Subhuti said to the Buddha: "World Honored One, the Tathagata has no
teaching."
"Subhuti, what do you think? The atoms of the billion worlds are many,
no?"
Subhuti replied: "Incredibly many, World Honored One."
"Subhuti, atoms, the Tathagata has said, are not atoms: these are called
'atoms'. The Tathagata has explained that the worlds are not worlds:
these are called 'worlds'. Subhuti, what do you think? One can by way of
the thirty-two signs see the Tathagata, no?"
"No, World Honored One. One cannot by way of the thirty-two signs attain
sight of the Tathagata. What is the reason? The Tathagata has explained
that the thirty-two signs then are not signs: these are called the
'thirty-two signs'."
"Subhuti, suppose there are good sons and good daughters who with their
lives equal to the sands of the Ganges River give in charity; and
suppose again there is a person who from within this sermon, even if
only receiving and keeping four lines of verse and for another person
expounds it: his merit would be incredibly more."
14.
At that time Subhuti, hearing the pronouncement of this sermon, deeply
understood its meaning suddenly. He wept and lamented, and then
addressed the Buddha, saying: "It is extraordinary, World Honored One,
that the Buddha expounds thusly such an incredibly profound canonical
sermon. Since formerly coming to obtaining the wisdom-eye, I have never
before heard such a sermon. World Honored One, if again there is a
person who hears this sermon with a believing mind that is pure, then
they will give rise to the sign of reality. It should be known that this
person will have entirely accomplished the best, most extraordinary
merit. World Honored One, this sign of reality then is a non-sign. This
is why the Tathagata has said that it is called the 'real sign'. World
Honored One, having heard thusly this canonical sermon, and sincerely
understood it, receiving and upholding it is no longer difficult. If
there shall come into the world after five hundred years, beings who
hear this sermon with sincere understanding, receiving and upholding it,
then they would be made most extraordinary. What is the reason? These
people would be without the views of a self, a person, beings, or a
soul. Why is that? The view of self then is this non-sign. The views of
a person, beings, and a soul then are this non-sign. What is the reason?
Departing, from all signs, they then are called Buddhas."
The Buddha told Subhuti, "Yes, yes. If again there is a person who hears
this sermon, and is not astonished, alarmed, or fearful; it should be
known that this person would be made most extraordinary. What is the
reason? Subhuti, the Tathagata has explained that the first perfection
is then not the first perfection: This is called the first perfection.
Subhuti, the perfection of perseverance (kshanti), the Tathagata has
said, is not the perfection of perseverance. What is the reason?
Subhuti, as I had formerly had my body sliced to pieces by King Kalinga,
I in that time was without the views of a self, a person, beings, or a
soul. What is the reason? When I in that former time had been limb from
limb cut apart, if there had been the views of a self, a person, beings,
or a soul; there would have arisen in me anger and indignation. Subhuti,
further, I recall that in the past five hundred incarnations I had been
an ascetic practicing perseverance. In that incarnation, I was without
the view of a self, without the view of a person, without the view of
beings, and without the view of a soul. Subhuti, bodhisattvas should
depart from all signs while initiating the
annutara-samyak-sambodhicitta. They should not dwell in forms when
giving rise to that thought. They should not dwell in sounds, odors,
tastes, sensations, or dharmas when giving rise to that thought. They
should dwell nowhere when giving rise to that thought. If in thought
they were to have a dwelling, then it would be to become non-dwelling.
For this reason, the Buddha has said that the bodhisattva's thought
should not dwell in forms regarding charity. Subhuti, the bodhisattvas
creating blessings for every sentient being should thus be charitable.
The Tathagata has said that all signs then is the non-sign. Further, he
has said that all sentient beings, then are not sentient beings.
Subhuti, the Tathagata's discourses are true, real, thus, not false, and
not contradictory. Subhuti, the Dharma that the Tathagata has attained
is neither true nor false. Subhuti, if a bodhisattva's thought dwells in
dharmas while practicing charity, it would be like a person entering
darkness, and therefore being unable to see anything. If a bodhisattva's
thought does not dwell in dharmas while practicing charity, it would be
like a person who, seeing by the sunlight that illumines, sees all the
various forms. Subhuti, if it should come into the world that there are
good sons and good daughters who are able to receive, keep, read, and
recite what is in this sermon, then they will become Tathagatas. Via the
Buddha's sagely wisdom which fully knows and fully sees these people, I
can say that that all shall attain the complete accomplishment of the
immeasurably boundless merit.
15.
"Subhuti, suppose there are good sons and good daughters who, in the
morning, in numbers equaling that of the sand grains of the Ganges, give
themselves in charity; who, in the afternoon, in numbers equaling that
of the sand grains of the Ganges, give themselves in charity; who, in
the evening, in numbers equaling that of the sand grains of the Ganges,
give themselves in charity; thusly for immeasurable billions of kalpas
gave themselves in charity. Suppose, again, that there is a person who
hears this canonical sermon with a believing mind that is not contrary:
his blessedness would overcome that of the others. How much more so
copying, receiving, upholding, reading, and recited it in its entirety,
and then giving comprehensive explanations of it to other people?
Subhuti, essentially speaking, this sermon has a meaning which cannot be
comprehended, and the boundless merit [of receiving, upholding, et al]
cannot be measured. The Tathagata for the sake of setting forth the
great vehicle speaks it; for the sake of setting forth the supreme
vehicle speaks it. If there is a person who is able to receive, uphold,
read, and recite this sermon and widely explain it to others, The
Tathagata fully knows and fully sees that such people will all attain
entirely the accomplishment of the merit which cannot be measured,
cannot be express, has no bounds, and is inconcievable. Thusly such
people therefore carry on the Tathagata's annuttara-samyak-sambodhi.
What is the reason? Subhuti, if there is satisfaction found in lesser
dharmas, that is attachment to the view of a self, the view of a person,
the view of sentient beings, and the view of a soul. Therefore, there
could not be compliance with, receiving, upholding, reciting, or
explaining for another what is in this sermon. Subhuti, wherever it
resides in whatever place, if therein is this sermon, every one of the
worlds, be they of gods, humans, or asuras, should give offerings for
its support. It should be known that this place then is a pagoda. All
should venerate it by circling it clockwise, scattering flowers and
incense about its premises.
16.
"Furthermore, Subhuti, good sons and good daughters receiving,
upholding, reading, and reciting this sermon; if they should be insulted
or despised, they would have in prior lives committed evil acts and
accordingly fallen into the path of suffering. Because of that, they in
the present life are insulted or despised by others. When the prior
life's evil acts then have been dissolved and extinguished, they shall
attain the annuttara-samyak-sambodhi. Subhuti, I recall in the past
measureless asankya kalpa, before having been with the Buddha Dipamkara,
I had met eighty-four trillion nayutas of Buddhas, had to their entirety
given offerings of support, and had carried on their work without
needless error. Suppose, again, there is someone who, in the later
superficial age, is capable of receiving, upholding, reading, and
reciting this sermon, attaining that merit. The merit of my giving
offerings of support to all of those buddhas would not compare to a
hundredth of the latter's merit. Even a billionth of the latter's merit
would be an insufficient estimation. Subhuti, if good sons and good
daughters, in the later superficial age, who have received, upheld,
read, and recited this sermon; if I were to fully enunciate the extent
of their attainment of merit, some of the people's minds in the audience
would be confounded, becoming doubtful and disbelieving. Subhuti, it
should be known that this sermon's meaning is inconceivable. The fruit
of its reward is also inconceivable.
17.
At that time, Subhuti said to the Buddha: "World Honored One, in what
should good sons and good daughters initiating the
annuttara-samyak-sambodhicitta dwell, how should they regulate their
thoughts?"
The Buddha told Subhuti: "Goods sons and good daughters initiating the
annuttara-samyak-sambodhicitta will give rise to the thought: 'I shall
liberate all sentient beings. Having liberated all of the sentients
beings, there are really no existent beings who are liberated.' What is
the reason? Subhuti, if a bodhisattva has the view of a self, the view
of a person, the view of sentient beings, or view of a soul; then that
is not a bodhisattva. Why is that? Subhuti, really there is no existent
annuttara-samyak-sambodhicitta. Subhuti, what do you think? When the
Tathagata was with Dipamkara Buddha, he had attained the
annuttara-samyak-sambodhi, no?"
"No, World Honored One. As I have understood the Buddha's express
meaning, the Buddha, when with Dipamkara Buddha, did not have any
attainment of the annuttara-samyak-sambodhi."
The Buddha replied: "Yes, yes. Subhuti, really there is no existent
dharma that the Tathagata has attained in the annuttara-samyak-sambodhi.
Subhuti, suppose there is a dharma that the Tathagata has attained in
the annuttara-samyak-sambodhi. Dipamkara Buddha, then, would not have
given me the prediction 'You, in a life to come, shall appear as a
Buddha named Shakyamuni'. That is because in reality there is no
existent dharma in the attainment of annuttara-samyak-sambodhi. For this
reason Dipamkara Buddha bestowed onto me prediction, composing the
words: 'You in a life to come shall appear as a buddha named
Shakyamuni.' What is the reason? For one who is a Tathagata, then, the
dharmas are of like meaning. Suppose there is a person who says the
Tathagata has attained the annuttara-samyak-sambodhi. Subhuti, really
there is no existent dharma in the Buddha's attaining the
annuttara-samyak-sambodhi. Subhuti, the Tathagata's attainment of the
annuttara-samyak-sambodhi is the middle, being without truth or
falsehood. For this reason, the Tathagata says that all of the dharmas
are all the buddhadharma. Subhuti, that which is called 'all of the
dharmas,' then, is not all of the dharmas. This is the reason it is
called 'all of the dharmas.' Subhuti, for example take the person whose
body is ancient and great."
Subhuti replied: "World Honored One, the Tathagata has said that the
person who has a body which is ancient and great, then, does not have a
great body. It is called a great body."
"Subhuti, a bodhisattva is also thus. If one should compose the words 'I
shall liberate the immeasurable beings' then this is not to be called a
bodhisattva. What is the reason? Subhuti, really there is no existent
dharma whose name is 'bodhisattva'. For this reason, the Buddha has said
that every one of the dharmas lack a self, lack a person, lack sentient
beings, and lack a soul. Subhuti, if a bodhisattva were to compose these
words: 'I shall adorn the buddhaland'; this is not to be called a
bodhisattva. What is the reason? The Tathagata has said that the
adornment of the buddhaland, then, are not adornment: it is called
'adornment'. Subhuti, if a bodhisattva penetrates and traverses
selflessly the Dharma, the Tathagata has said that he is truthfully
called a bodhisattva."
18.
"Subhuti, what do you think? The Tathagata possesses the flesh-eye, no?"

"Yes, World Honored One. The Tathagata possesses the flesh-eye."
"Subhuti, what do you think? The Tathagata possesses the heavenly-eye,
no?"
"Yes, World Honored One. The Tathagata possesses the heavenly-eye."
"Subhuti, what do you think? The Tathagata possesses the wisdom-eye,
no?"
"Yes, World Honored One. The Tathagata possesses the wisdom-eye."
"Subhuti, what do you think? The Tathagata possesses the Dharma-eye,
no?"
"Yes, World Honored One. The Tathagata possesses the Dharma-eye."
"Subhuti, what do you think? The Tathagata possesses the Buddha-eye,
no?"
"Yes, World Honored One. The Tathagata possesses the Buddha-eye."
"Subhuti, what do you think? The sand grains in the Ganges River -- the
Buddha has spoken of these sands, no?"
"Yes, World Honored One. The Tathagata has spoken of these sands."
"Subhuti, what do you think? As there are sand grains in a single Ganges
River, suppose there are Ganges Rivers equal in number to those sands,
possessing Buddha realms numbering [in each] like those sand grains.
These realms would be made rather many, no?"
"Incredibly many, World Honored One."
The Buddha said to Subhuti, "In those lands there are sentient beings
with various kinds of minds, which the Tathagata fully knows. What is
the reason? The Tathagata has said that minds all are not minds, and so
are called minds. What is the reason for that? Subhuti, past thoughts
are unobtainable, present thoughts are unobtainable, and future thoughts
are unobtainable."
19.
"Subhuti, what do you think? Suppose there is a person who filled the
billion worlds with the seven treasures for the purpose of charity. This
person, because of these causes and conditions, would obtain many
blessings, no?"
"Yes, World Honored One. This person, via these causes and conditions,
would obtain incredibly many blessings."
"Subhuti, if that blessed deed were real, the Tathagata would not have
said that this person would obtain many blessings. Since the blessed
deed is not, the Tathagata says that the person would obtain many
blessings."
20.
"Subhuti, what do you think? The Buddha can by means of the perfect form
of his body be recognized, no?"
"No, World Honored One. The Tathagata should not by means of the perfect
form of his body be recognized. What is the reason? The Tathagata has
said that the perfect form of his body is not a perfect form of body. It
is called a perfect form of body."
"Subhuti, what do you think? The Tathagata can by means of the perfect
signs be recognized, no?"
"No, World Honored One. The Tathagata should not by means of the perfect
signs be recognized. What is the reason? The Tathagata has said that the
signs which are perfect are not signs which are perfect. They are called
signs which are perfect."
21.
"Subhuti, do not say that the Tathagata composes this thought: 'I shall
have an explanation of the Dharma.' Do not compose that thought. What is
the reason? If a person says that the Tathagata has an explanation of
the Dharma, then they have slandered the Buddha, because they are unable
to understand the reason for my speaking. Subhuti, the spoken Dharma
lacks a Dharma which can be spoken. It is called a spoken Dharma."
At that time, the Venerable Subhuti said to the Buddha: "World Honored
One, it is doubtful that there will be sentient beings in generations
yet to come who, hearing of this Dharma, will give birth to the
believing mind, no?"
The Buddha replied: "Subhuti, those are not sentient beings, nor are
they not sentient beings. What is the reason? Subhuti, the sentient
beings who are sentient beings, the Tathagata has said, are not sentient
beings. They are called sentient beings."
22.
Subhuti said to the Buddha: "World Honored One, the Buddha's attainment
of the annuttara-samyak-sambodhi is because of nowhere attaining
anything?"
The Buddha replied: "Yes, yes. Subhuti, in my annuttara-samyak-sambodhi,
verily, there is not the slightest dharma that can be attained. This is
called the annuttara-samyak-sambodhi."
23.
"Furthermore, Subhuti, the Dharma is level, lacking high or low. This is
called the annuttara-samyak-sambodhi. By means of being without self,
without person, without sentient beings, and without a soul, cultivation
of all the good Dharmas, then, is attaining the
annuttara-samyak-sambodhi. Subhuti, what is said to be the good Dharmas,
the Tathagata has explained to be non-Dharmas. They are called good
Dharmas.
24.
"Subhuti, suppose that, like the Mount Sumerus of the billion realms, a
person has accumulated mounds of the seven treasures of such size and
numbers as those Mount Sumerus for the purpose of charity. If a person,
via this perfection of wisdom sutra, even just four lines of verse,
receives, upholds, reads, and recites, and for another explains it: the
former's blessed deed would not reach a hundredth of the latter's. A
billionth part of the latter's, even, would be an insufficient
estimation of it.
25.
"Subhuti, what do you think? Do you say that the tathagata composes this
thought: 'I shall save the sentient beings'? Subhuti, do not compose
that thought. What is the reason? Really, there are no sentient beings
the Tathagata saves. If there were beings the Tathagata saved, the
Tathagata then would have a self, a personage, beings, and a soul.
Subhuti, the Tathagata has explained that an existent self is then not a
self. Mortal men regard their persons as being a self. Subhuti, mortal
men, the Tathagata has explained, then, are not mortal men. They are
called 'mortal men'."
26.
"Subhuti, what do you think? One can by means of the thirty-two signs
examine the Tathagata, no?"
Subhuti replied: "Yes, yes. By means of the the thirty-two signs, one
examines the Tathagata."
The Buddha said: "Subhuti, if by means of the thirty-two signs one
examines the Tathagata, a [Dharma]-wheel turning holy king, then, is
this Tathagata."
Subhuti said to the Buddha: "World Honored One, the Tathagata, as I
understand the Buddha's express meaning, should not be examined by means
of the thirty-two signs."
At that time, the World Honored One proclaimed this gatha, saying:
If via form (one) looks for the Tathagata
Or via the sound of the voice beseeches me,
This person walks a corrupt path
And is unable to recognize the Tathagata.

27.
"Subhuti, suppose you were to compose this thought: 'Because it is not
by means of the perfect signs that the Tathagata has attained the
annuttara-samyak-sambodhi'. Subhuti, do not compose that thought:
'Because it is not by means of the perfect signs that the Tathagata has
attained the annuttara-samyak-sambodhi'. Subhuti, if you compose this
thought: 'Initiating the annuttara-samyak-sambodhi is the spoken Dharma
of nihilism'. Do not form that thought. What is the reason? Initiating
the annuttara-samyak-sambodhi cannot be said to be the dharma of a
nihilistic view.
28.
"Subhuti, suppose a bodhisattva filled worlds numbering like the sands
of the Ganges River with the seven treasures, and accumulated it for the
purpose of charity. Suppose, again, there is a person who knows every
dharma is selfless and attains the complete perseverance of them. This
bodhisattva would overcome the former bodhisattva's attainment of merit.
Subhuti, the reason is because bodhisattvas do not receive blessed
virtue."
Subhuti addressed the Buddha, saying: "World Honored One, how is it
bodhisattvas do not receive blessed virtue?"
"Subhuti, the bodhisattva's composition of blessed deeds should not be
greedily clung to. This is why is it is said 'not receiving blessed
virtue'.
29.
"Subhuti, if there is a person who says the Tathagata comes, goes, sits,
or lies down; this person would not understand my express meaning. What
is the reason? The Tathagata is without a place from whence to come, and
also is without a place to which to go. That is the reason he is called
a tathagata."
30.
"Subhuti, suppose good sons and good daughters were to grind the billion
realms to dust grains. What do you think? These grains would become
many, no?"
"Incredibly many, World Honored One. What is the reason? If these myriad
grains were really existent, the Buddha would not then speak of these
myriad grains of dust. What is the reason for that? The Buddha has said
the grains are then not grains of dust. These are called grains of dust.
World Honored One, the Tathagata has said that the billion realms are
then not realms: these are called realms. What is the reason? If the
worlds were really existent, then these would appear as a single
conglomeration. The Tathagata has said that the appearance of a single
conglomeration is not the appearance of a single conglomeration. This is
called a single conglomeration."
"Subhuti, the appearance of a single conglomeration, then, is
inexpressible. Only mortal men greedily cling to the doings of their own
persons.
31.
"Subhuti, suppose someone says the Buddha has spoken of a view of self,
a view of a person, the view of sentient beings, or the view of a soul.
Subhuti, what do you think? This person understands my express meaning,
no?"
"No, World Honored One. This person would not understand the Tathagata's
express meaning. What is the reason? The World Honored One has said the
view of a self, the view of a person, the view of beings, and the view
of a soul; then, are not the views of a self, a person, beings, or of a
soul."
"Subhuti, in the annuttara-samyak-sambodhi, all dharmas thusly should be
known, thus be viewed, and thus be sincerely understood as the unborn
appearances of dharmas. Subhuti, the words 'dharma appearances,' the
Tathagata has said, then, are not dharma appearances. This is called
dharma appearances.
32.
"Subhuti, suppose there is a person who fills immeasurable asankyas of
worlds with the seven treasures and accumulates it for the purpose of
charity. And suppose there are good sons and good daughters who initiate
the bodhicitta, keeping from within this sutra even just four lines of
verse; receiving, upholding, reading, reciting, and for others giving
extensive explanations of it. Their blessed virtue would overcome the
other's. How would they make for other people extensive explanations?
Without grasping the appearances of the absolute, without agitation.
What is the reason?
All of the existent, conditioned dharmas
Are like dreams, illusions, bubbles, shadows;
Like dew and also like lightning:
Thus should they be contemplated."
The Buddha having finnished propounding this sutra, the Venerable
Subhuti, the bhiksus, bhiksunis, upasakas, and upasikas, and everyone in
the worlds of gods, humans, and asuras having heard the Buddha's
exposition were all greatly elated. Sincerely, they received and handed
down the practice of the Diamond Perfection of Wisdom Sutra.





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Fragments from The Philosophy of Emptiness
 

The Philosophy of Emptiness (Abe)
The Heart and Soul of Awakening (Batchelor)
The Ethics of Fundamental Consciousness (Blackstone)
What the Heart Sutra tells us (Brazier)
The Santiago Theory of Cognition (Capra)
The Madhyamika School (Ch'en)
Emptiness of Intrinsic Nature (Cleary)
The Perfection of Wisdom (Conze)
Identity in Hua-yen Buddhism (Cook)
Emptiness or the Void (Copleston)
The Origins of the Madhyamaka Philosophy (Della Santina)
Madhyamaka Schools in India (Della Santina)
Perfect Wisdom (Dumoulin)
Nothingness cannot be affirmed or negated (Fatone)
The Theory of Double Truth (Fung)
The Conventional Reality of Phenomena (Garfield)
The Buddhism of the Nikayas (Gethin)
For Prasangika Nothing Exists Objectively (Hopkins)
The Nirvanic Realm, Here and Now (Inada)
Nirvana truly realized is Samsara properly understood (Iyer)
Order for Free (Kauffman)
Existential Thinking is Subjective (Kierkegaard)
Nagarjuna and the Madhyamika school (Ling)
The Idea of Emptiness in the Prajñaparamita-sutras (Liu)
Madhyamaka is advayavada (Loy)
The Distinction between Problem and Mystery (Marcel)
The Distinction between Advaya and Advaita (Murti)
Dharmakaya (Narasu)
Pure Experience (Nishida)
Circuminsessional Interpenetration (Nishitani)
Nagarjuna and Madhyamika Buddhism (Potter)
Gaudapada and Buddhism (Radhakrishnan)
The Mundane and the Ultimate Nature (Ramanan)
Language in Nagarjuna's System (Robinson)
The Highest Wisdom (Scheepers)
Shunyavada (Sharma)
Prajñaparamita Literature (Singh)
Nirvana and the Empirical World are Identical (Smart)
The Order of Things (Spinoza)
Appearances and Absolute Reality (Smolin)
Dependent Origination as Shunyata (Sprung)
The Religious Significance of 'Emptiness' (Streng)
The First Principle and the Second Principle (Shunryu Suzuki)
Pratitya-Samutpada (Tachikawa)
Emptiness is a Mode of Perception (Thanissaro)
The Middle Path between Dualism and Materialism (Wallace)
Tsongkhapa's View of Reality (Wallace)
The Buddha's Conception of the Universe (Warder)
Nirvana is the Acceptance of the Present Moment (Watts)
The Term Shunyata (Zimmer)
Web Search







The Philosophy of Emptiness (adapted from Zen and Western Thought, by Prof.
Masao Abe, edited by Prof. William R. LaFleur, 1985, Honolulu 1989)

In early
Buddhism the theory of dependent origination and the philosophy of emptiness
were still naively undifferentiated. It was Abhidharma Buddhism which awakened
to a kind of philosophy of emptiness and set it up in the heart of Buddhism. But
the method of its process of realization was to get rid of concepts of
substantiality by analysing phenomenal things into diverse elements and thus
advocating that everything is empty. Accordingly, Abhidharma Buddhism's
philosophy of emptiness was based solely on analytic observation - hence it was
later called the 'analytic view of emptiness'. It did not have a total
realization of emptiness of the phenomenal things. Thus the overcoming of the
concept of substantial nature or 'being' was still not thoroughly carried
through. Abhidharma fails to overcome the substantiality of the analysed
elements.
Beginning with the Prajñaparamita-sutra, Mahayana Buddhist thinkers transcended
Abhidharma Buddhism's analytic view of emptiness, erecting the standpoint which
was later called the 'view of substantial emptiness'. This was a position which
did not clarify the emptiness of phenomena by analysing them into elements.
Rather, it insisted that all phenomena were themselves empty in principle, and
insisted on the nature of the emptiness of existence itself. The
Prajñaparamita-sutra emphasizes 'not being, and not not being'. It clarified not
only the negation of being, but also the position of the double negation - the
negation of non-being as the denial of being - or the negation of the negation.
It thereby disclosed 'Emptiness' as free from both being and non-being, i.e. it
revealed prajña-wisdom.
But it was Nagarjuna who gave this standpoint of Emptiness found in the
Prajñaparamita-sutra a thorough philosophical foundation by drawing out the
implications of the mystical intuition seen therein and developing them into a
complete philosophical realization. Nagarjuna criticized the proponents of
substantial essence of his day who held that things really exist corresponding
to concepts. He said that they had lapsed into an illusory view which
misconceived the real state of the phenomenal world. He insisted that with the
transcendence of the illusory view of concepts, true Reality appears as animitta
(no-form, or non-determinate entity). But Nagarjuna rejected as illusory, not
only the 'eternalist' view, which took phenomena to be real just as they are,
but also the opposite 'nihilistic' view that emptiness and