Cognitive Skepticism of
Nagarjuna
The Seismic Order by Jean Baudrilliard
A simple Buddhist Glossary
Buddhist Philosophies in a Historical Perspective
Philosophy of Anarchism by George Woodcock
Skeptics: ancient and modern
The ancient Skeptics
On Prajna
The doctrine of Non-Duality in the Vimalakirti Nirdesa Sutra
Nietzchean Anarchy
Tao Te Ching
The Core of the
Teachings of krishnamurti
Resources on Philosophy
MultiFaithNet Introducing the
Buddhist Community
Chan
Psychedelics and
Religious Experience alanwatts
Self and Otheralanwatts
The Nature Of
Consciousnessalanwatts
Lecture On Zen
Summit Pt 1oracle gathering
Summit Pt 2 oracle gathering
Summit Pt 3 oracle gathering
Taoism by Alan Watts
Time To Eternity alanwatts
The
`No-Self' Nature of PeopleCharlie Singer
The Window of Right
View to Life by Lama Choedak.
The Nature Of Consciousness
Cognitive
Scepticism Of Nagarjuna
Theory of Knowledge
Cognitive Scepticism Of Nagarjuna
D. K. Mohanta
Assam University
aulib@dte.vsnl.net.in
ABSTRACT: This paper aims at a critical exposition of some arguments by
Nagarjuna against the cognitivist claims of the Nyaya philosophers, and
a possible cognitivist critique of the skeptical arguments of Nagarjuna.
My argument is presented in two broad sections. The first deals mainly
with an exposition of Nagarjuna's charges against the concept of
pramana, while the second is devoted to critical evaluation of the
Nagarjunian charges. I conclude with the impression that there is hardly
any common ground on which a Nyaya cognitivist and a Nagarjunian skeptic
can meet. For this reason, the Nagarjunian cognitive skepticism seems to
be theoretically 'irrefutable' but 'psychologically incorrigible.'
Preamble
By cognitive scepticism here we mean a philosophical attitude which
suspends the possibility of making conclusive statements concerning
non-erring cognition or prama as it is called in Indian Philosophy for
want of sufficiently warranted instrumental and casual grounds (or
pramanas as it is called in Indian Philosophy). A cognitive sceptic, dose
not go for 'theory - making'. Amidst the opposing claims he finds no
better ground for his choice for one claim than its contra-claim. In
philosophical circle, he questions or raises doubt about the validity of
the 'knowledge claims' made by others. If we bear in mind this general
characterization when we read Nagarjuna's philosophical treatises like
Vigraha-vyavartani and Mulamadhyamaka Karika, we would be convinced that
there is no logical or psychological obstruction or hardship to make an
extension of the applicability of the term 'cognitive sceptic' to
Nagarjuna. In his philosophical works Nagarjuna subjects the
'knowledge-claims' made by the Naiyayikas and others to severe dialectical
criticism and shows that these claims are not supported by sufficient
justification.
The philosophical opponent of the sceptic to coin a word from Matilal, may
be called 'cognitivists'. (2) In Indian Philosophy they are
mostly
Naiyayikas who claim that with the help of justificatory grounds as casual
instruments (pramanas) we can have the cognition of the objects of the
knowledge (prameyas). In Akaspada Goutama's 'Nyayasutra' knowledge is
considered as something that leads to attainment of the highest good (
tattvajnanannihsreyasadhigamah ). In Nyaya system of philosophy knowledge
is taken as something which always points beyond itself. All the furniture
of the world are classified under several sets of objects of knowledge (
prameyas ). A piece of cognition is valid if it can give us an indubitably
true awareness of an object of knowledge. Nagarjuna devoted 20 verses from
31st 51st in Vigrahavyavartani in order to refute the Nyaya concept of
pramana. Nagarjuna's main concern here is not to say that what we know
about the world is false; rather he maintains that the knowledge claims
made by the cognitivists ( Naiyayikas and others ) are not supported by
adequate logical grounds. The paper is divided into two broad sections
.The first section deals mainly with the exposition of Nagarjunian charges
against the concept pramana while the second is devoted to critical
evaluation of the Nagarjunian charges. The paper ends with some general
remarks. The main contention of Nagarjunian scepticism is to set a limit
to cognitive claim of the Naiyayikas. In other words, it is rather a
critique to the soteriological claims on the basis of empirical foundation
of cognitivists' theory of knowledge. It is a scepticism about the
justification of knowing or pramana.
1 : No Criterion Argument
The pramanavadins (cognitivists) claim that it is possible to have
indubitablely true presentational cognition or (prama) on the basis of
pramanas. A pramana is usually defined as the instrumental cause of an
indubitable and unerring piece of presentational knowledge. All
cognitivists in Indian Philosophy would agree that the acceptance of
pramanas is something exclusively indispensable for any philosophical
investigation, because if some 'rules of game' (as Wittgenstien in his
'Philosophical Investigations ' compares a philosophical enquiry as a form
of linguistic game) are not accepted at the very outset a player would not
be entitled to take a part in the game. In other words, he would be
putting himself out of the court before the game begins. (3) A
Nyaya
cognitivist Vatsyayana further argues that in philosophical debate, one is
supposed to defend or reject certain thesis. Even for the rejection one
would require this or that pramana. In other words, even the very denial
of a certain pramana is possible only on the acceptance of certain other
pramana and this precisely establishes the validity of pramana as such.
And if once it is admitted that the validity of pramana as a variety of
knowable (prakara), one is logically compelled to recognise three other
varities of knowables (prakara)-the agent of knowledge (pramata), object
of knowledge (prameya) and knowledge par excellence (pramiti). (4)
It is
here a Nagarjunian philosopher would object that your very programme is
defective. (5) If you say that prameyas or knowables are
justified because
of pramanas (ground) and pramanas are not questionable, then you are
acting as a dogmatic in philosophising. If you accept the reality of
pramanas without any justification, your very acceptance is an exercise of
dogmatism. All the accounts of the cognitivists may be broadly classified
under two heads: (a) the pramanas are self-validating (svatah prasiddhih)
that is to say they are intrinsically valid. (b) their validity is
established on the basis of some other pramanas (paratah prasiddhih). Both
these possible alternatives have been examined by Nagarjuna. The charge of
no criterion centres the question: How is a congitivist going to validate
his standard or criterion (pramana) itself ? It is said that pramana is
valid on its own ground in terms of itself, that is no more than just
begging the question and is a case of dogmatic enterprise. If it is said
that pramana is validated in terms of another, that would immediately
leave room for the charge of infinite regress. Now either way, according
to a Nagarjunian sceptic, a cognitivist can not have adequate means to
support the established status or truth-criterionship of pramanas which
lies at the foundation of cognitivist's truth-claims. Let us elaborate the
arguments.
1.1 Charge of Inner-inconsistency and Dogmatism Explained
The point Nagarjuna elaborates is this that dogmatism and inconsistency of
arguments would be automatic outcome if we admit pramanas as
self-validating. Nagarjuna further argues that if we admit that pramanas
are required for the justificatory grounds as well as intrumental cause
for establishing the knowables (prameyas) but the pramanas themselves
belong to a self-validating class, then we also accept that pramanas are
placed in a 'privilezed sacrosanct class'-that is to say, a clear-cut
dichotomy is introduced between pramanas and prameyas. But a philosopher
must explain, the justificatory grounds for such preferential treatment;
he should not merely state the dichotomy but must explain the reason
behind such dichotomy. This is what exactly Nagarjuna demands. 'If without
assigning any reason pramanas are claimed to be self-validating then a
sense of arbitrariness would be introduced and this acceptance of this
without any justificatory certification is a clear case of dogmatic
enterprise.' This is also a case of internal inconsistency and disaccord
in congnitivists' arguments.
1.2 The Charge of Infinite Regress Revisited
Now if in order to aviod the charge of non-accordance and dogmatism, the
cognitivist adopts the second alternative that is a pramana may derive its
validity or authority from another pramana of the same type or different
type this would, according to Nagarjuna, instead of giving any
justification for the acceptance of pramana simply invite the blemish of
infinite regress (anavasthadosa). (6) For example, of the first
alternative we may say that a perception say P1 is established through
another perception say P2 and for the second, a perception say P, is
established through an inference say F. But in either case of the theory
of extrinsic validity, the blemish of 'infinite regress' would be
inevitable. (7) These are the techniques about which the
congnitivists
themselves highly speak of, that is, if something is to be acceptable,
there must be inner logical consistency between the justification and the
claim and a justification must not be vitiated by the blemishes of
circularity and infinite regress. The sceptic here is just reminding the
cognitivists that claiming pramanas as self certified, you are committing
logical inconsistency and claiming them as established by others you are
either inviting the blemish of circularity or the blemish of infinite
regress.
1.3 Analogical Arguments Refuted
However, Goutama in the Nyayasutra also employs the analogy of a lamp
(pradipa) to meet possible charge of infinite regress. (8) He
says that as
a lamp reveals objects as well as itself, so the pramana (supportive
grounds) reveal prameyas (knowables) as well as themselves. It is here
Nagarjuna tries to point out faults and in 'Vigrahavyavartani' he devotes
six verses in order to show that the analogy of light or fire is quite
incapable of serving as a 'sapaksa' in the cognitivists' arguments. (9)
In
'Vigrahavyavartani' verse 35, Nagarjuna argues that if pramanas were like
light or fire which reveals itself as well as the presence of other
subjects simultaneously then there would be no logical as well as
practical difficulty in claiming that fire would also burn itself as it
can burn other things. (10) But this is a contradiction in
thinking as
well as in the actual happenings. In view of this, the cognitivists'
assumption that fire reveals itself as well as other objects' becomes
doubtful and remains unestablished. It is further contended that if 'fire
reveals itself as well as other object is true, then the proposition that
'darkness conceals the existence of itself as well as other things' would
also be true. (11) It is an admitted fact that although
darkness conceals
the presence of other things, it does not conceals the presence of itself.
(Na caitad drstam tatra yaduktam / Svaparatmanau
prakasayatyagnirititanna). (12) What is evident here is that
in contrast
with the cognitivists 'light analogy, Nagarjuna constructs just contrary
analogical argument to disprove the cognitivists' claim.
1.4 Blemishes of Interdependence and Circularity Detected
Nagarjuna further argues that if for the sake of argument we admit that
pramanas are self-established, then it would imply that they are
established even independent of prameyas (knowables). (13)
But if a kind
of pramana were established without reference to prameyas, then this
particular type of pramana ceases to be worthy of the name pramana. If it
is argued that pramanas are independent of prameyas, then these pramanas
become pramanas of nothing. As pramana has always a relational character
with prameya in cognitive situation, the thesis that 'pramanas are
independently established' becomes refuted. If it is said that pramanas
are established through prameyas and prameyas through pramanas, then a
Nagarjunian sceptic would at once point out that neither of them have a
self-nature (svabhava) of their own and therefore, should be treated as
sunya (vacous). (14) Again, it would be a case of proving
what is already
proved (siddha-sadhana), because the tacit assumption is this, that
prameyas are already established. (15) If prameyas were
regarded as
already established, the necessity of pramana itself for the establishment
of prameyas becomes superfluous. If it is said that the validity of
pramanas are prameyas dependent and the validity or establishment of
prameya is pramana dependent then it amounts to committing the blemishes
of interdependence and circularity. Nagarjuna laughs at the cognitivis
because his view almost amounts to say that "the son is produced by the
father and that father is produced by that son. But in this case who is
that gives birth and who is that is born". (16) Therefore the
criterion of
mutual dependence rather shows that both pramanas and prameyas are devoid
of any essence of their own (sunya). Since there is neither established
pramana nor established prameya the so called 'knowledge-claim' of the
cognitivists becomes unwarranted. (17) All views (drsti)
about the world,
for Nagarjuna, becomes systematically misleading and therefore, they are
to be rejected.
2 : A Cognitivist Critique of the Nagarjunian Critique of Pramana
Considered
It has been seen that a cognitivist claims that it is possible on our part
to know something with certitude and we can justify our claims by adequate
supportive grounds. A Nagarjunian sceptic only gives caution to these and
shows flaws of antinomies in cognitivists' reasonings. Let us now see how
far the sceptical charges be answered from the cognitivistic viewpoint.
Vatsyayana would meet the sceptical charge of infinite regress by saying
that it is not necessary that before functioning as an instrument a thing
must be known first. For example, we become visually aware of something in
front of us by our eyes, the sense of sight but we cannot see the senses
itself. We do not question or doubt about the reality of eyes. This shows
that in practical experience, the establishement of pramana does not arise
and there is no scope for infinite regress, because their truth can be
apprehended directly or immediately . A piece of cognition is said to be
valid if practice based on the assumption of its truth leads to the
attainment of desired end. What Udayana puts with regard to infinite doubt
in another context seems to be relevant here. He is of opinion that
"infinite series of doubt in principle is not possible. It could never be
carried out, since the activity of doubting is possible only against the
background of some area of certainty." (18) Vatsyayana further
contends
that there is no rigid distinction between prameya and pramana both of
these have the same source - the root 'ma' (means 'to measure') and both
of them are meaningful only in certain cognive contexts. If we try to
understand the significance of different 'case-inflections' in sanskrit
language, it would be clear that these karakas stand for 'different
role-playing' in the linguistic contruction. (19) When
something is called
a pramana, we mean that it has the instrumental role in generating
cognition and in case of prameya, it has the role of accusative case in a
cognitive situation. With this background we think a Nyaya cognitivist may
say that when something is playing the role of a pramana, psychologically
we do not feel the necessity for pramana's validity or establishment.
But here, I think, a Nagarjunian sceptic may argue against the
cognitivists' pursuation by saying that he does not see any good ground
for introducing psychological proof when one is engaged in purely logical
debate. Psychological proof can not be taken to be an adequate gurantee
for objective truth-claims. And it is also true that a cognitive sceptic's
suspension of judgement regarding what is real as mental act need not
distrub his private life. He only exercises his reasoned suspension of
judgement about reality when there is a suitable occasion for it.
The Naiyayika cognitivist may level another fresh charge aginst Nagarjunan
sceptic by saying that it is impossible to carry out the infinite doubt
regarding the validity of pramanas, because when one denies a thesis say
P, as defective, he must have a thesis, it might be a counter-thesis, say
'not-P', that is not defective. Without involving oneself in theoretical
inconsistency, one can not deny the validity of pramanas as such.
Uddyotkara in the 'Nyaya-vartika' carried this charge in a much more
straightforward way and brings the charge of self-stultification against a
cognitive sceptic. (20) The charge is this : If you deny
everything, then
you can not deny the fact that 'you are denying'. If you do not deny the
fact that 'you are denying' then you are not denying everything.
What seems to me convincing here is that a cognitive sceptic like
Nagarjuna would not mind for these charges. A close study of Nagarjuna's
arguments would reveal that he would be pleasant in seeing that by this
charge, the cognitivist misunderstands him again and are trying to grasp
what the sceptic intends to convey. That is to say, what cannot be stated,
one must not state it or advocate a theory about it. It is another
significant aspect of Buddha's mysterious silence regarding metaphysical
issues, the Madhyamika unfolds. In defence of Nagarjuna, one might argue
that by sceptical arguments Nagarjuna examines all the possible views
about the establishment of pramanas and finds that to any 'pro-argument'
for a doctrine, there can be 'contra-argument' and thus he dose not have
any other choice but to stop advancing another thesis regarding prama,
prameya and pramana. He has engaged himself in epistemological debate
because it is on the basis of such epistemology, different metaphysical
theories can come into being. A cognitivist like Goutama, considers valid
cognition of reals (tattva) as that which leads to the highest good
(nihsreyasah). Nagarjunian scepticism may be considered as a caution that
points to the inadequacy of such soteriological claim on the basis of
their epistemological stand.
As regards the cognitivists' charge of self-stultification, a cognitive
sceptic like Nagarjuna would react that this comes out from a
misunderstanding of the exact significance of his refutation. It is to use
a term from classical Indian epistemology, a 'prasajya pratisedhah', that
is to say, a rejection of the possibility without (even a least)
implificatory significance to assert another or counter possibility. It is
different from 'paryyudasapratisedhah'. In paryyudasa-pratisedhah' the
assertion of the counter thesis motivates the very act of rejection of any
thesis. (21) This consideration is enough to show that the
cognitivists'
charge of theoretical incoherence in sceptcial rejection is not tenable.
From this it appears that theoretically scepticism is irrefutable. A
cognitive
sceptic like Nagarjuna would only try to unfold the drama of the logical
consequences of the cognitivists' epistemological framework. To be more
specific, Nagarjuna tries to undermine the foundations of speculative
metaphysics. The language Nagarjuna uses is 'meta-language' and by this
type of linguistic expression about statements that make 'objective
truth-claims', he can answer the charge of self-stultification against
him. As a result when all statements of 'object-level' are shown to be
unwarranted, that does not affect the truth-status of the meta-level
statement of Nagarjuna. The remedy suggested by Nagarjuna is the awareness
of 'sunyata', the rejection of language empirical determinations as an
adequate instrument for any veridical description of the real. Nagarjuna's
dialectics merely "shows" the structure of reality but does not "say" or
"assert" anything about reality. Had he been aquainted in the linguistic
phrasology of Wittgenstein, he might probably have expresed it in the same
vein "whereof one can not speak, thereof one must be silent.' (22)
3. Concluding Remarks
From what has been discussed in fore-going paragraphs, a crucial question
may be raised at this point. How can such a (logically irrefutable)
sceptical position be consistently carried out in practice ? Can it make
'adequate sense' in 'belief-behaviour'. Does it (the sceptical position)
not overthrow the foundation of all practical activity ? Can we live
without the guidance of some inherent position what we accept ? A
cognitive sceptic of Nagarjuian type might react to such questions by
saying that it would be an exercise of dogmatism if something with
reference to actual state of practics is introduced as the ultimate resort
when somebody is engaged in purely theoretical discourse with his
philosophical opponents. (23)
It is however, true that a Nyaya cognitivgist's pre-suppositions for
pluralistic metaphysics and its description through epistemological
frame-work seem to initiate the sceptical approach in Indian Philosophy in
order to dismantle the main fabric of many dogmatic assertions. An
important question may arise here : Can there be any commonly sharable
point on which a Nyaya cognitivist and a Nagarjunian sceptic can meet ?
Our humble answer to this question would be in the negative. When a
Nagarjunian sceptic is asking for the pramana's pramana he is demanding
for the absolute causal proof as the ground for claiming truth (in the
absolute sense) regarding the object of knowledge. A cognitive sceptic
uses the term 'indubitability' strictly in the logical sense 'which imputs
the intrinsic doubtfulness of all contingent statements.' (24)
He
criticises the concepts required to justify any knowledge-claim. But a
Nyaya cognitivist does not make cognitive claim in its absolutistic sense;
he would rather say that he seeks pramana whenever he feels necessity for
this in actual state of practice. For him, it is somehow 'nonsensical' to
seek reason after reason, that is, to go on seeking where there is no
'psychological requirement' for this in actual state of practice. Again,
for a Nyaya cognitivist, the concepts like pramana (causal means of
knowing), prameya (knowable) etc. are not absolute but relative to the
context of their specific 'role playing'. (25) A pramana is
considered as
the causal and instrumental ground for yielding knowledge (prama) which is
of the nature of an effect, in certain context about a certain knowable
(prameya); it does not mean that in certain other contexts it can not act
as a knowable (prameya). In view of this Nagarjuna's demand for explaining
the cause of placing pramana in a 'sacrosanct class' seems; to be
unwarranted. The same term seems to be used by the cognitivist and the
sceptic in two different senses; the former uses it in the 'relative
sense' whereas the later uses it in the 'absolute sense. For a Nyaya
cognitivist, all logical queries are to be preceded by some psychological
factors like 'dubiousness' about the exact character of the knowable and
this state of doubt is to be eradicated by the application of a pramana
(s) that can causally justify the truth of a specific cognitive episode as
devoid of doubt. And an evidential justification in the sense of causal
ways and means of knowing is considered as 'justification' as long as it
is coherent with the practicability. But a Nagarjunian sceptic whose sole
interest lies in 'refutation exclusively' does not care for this and
devotes so much to clear the way to travel that he almost forgets the
destination. Facing the difficulty in meeting the psychological ground for
the endless logical enquiry, a Nagarjunian sceptic and the Nyaya
cognitivist use 'reason' in different senses; for the former, it is 'pure
theoretical reason' ; for the latter it is 'practice-oriented' reason that
springs from 'our form of life' (26) It also appears that
Nagarjuna's
sceptical approach is an attempt to show the limitation of the
applicability of 'practice -oriented' reason to assert the nature of
reality with absolute certitude. Though a sceptic like Nagarjuna may say
that in 'theoretically oriented' debate it is irrelevant to introduce the
element of pragmatic efficacy; a Nyaya cognitivist may remind his sceptic
friend here that without accepting the validity of some common principles
even no 'theoretically oriented' debate can begin at all. But in turn, a
Nagarjunian sceptic would say that he is ready to accept the validity of
the so-called principles only as an 'adhoc' arrangement which is to be
rejected ultimately. But since there seems to be no commonly sharable
platform for both a cognitive sceptic and a Nyaya cognitivist, does it
suggest that the sceptic does leave the arena of knowledge emptyhanded?
Our answer to this, would be in the negative. In fact, Nagarjuna's
sceptical charges in Indian philosophy directly or indirectly; I believe,
have been cautions to the tendency of 'closed-door thinking' on the part
of some cognitivist and placed them on the alert. Aksapada Goutama claims
knowledge as that which leads to the attainment of the highest good
(nihsreyasah). Nagarjuna's sceptical arguments egarly point out that such
soteriological assertions on the basis of empirical foundation of
epistomological 'superstructure' are unwarrented. As a result of this
probably in latter commentaries and subcommentaries on Nyaya philosophy we
see that meticulous care have been taken to re-structure the definition of
prama, pramana etc. (27) Opening the way of 'free enquiry' and
shaking the
ground for dogmatic faith cognitive scepticism of Nagarjuna type has
directly or indirectly given momentum to clear 'hindrance to genuine'
cognition. (28) The force of sceptical arguments makes many
Indian
philosophers purturbed as to whether it is possible to speak of truth and
knowledge with emprical foundation. This seems to be a great disservice to
the later development of epistemological subtleties in Indian Philosophy.
29
Notes
(1) Scepticism is, indeed a wide term which may mean two board
types of
epistemogical attitude. In the wider sense it would mean an
epistemological attitude that suspends all calaims for the possibility of
knowledge and in this sense a sceptic carries doubt and "seeks nothing
beyond uncertainty". But there is a special type of epistmological
attitude/grounds through which we can dispute the validity of so-called
"knowledge-claim" in all its aspects. The word "knowledge'' has been used
throughout this paper in order to mean (what is called prama in sanskrit
in Indian epistomology) true and sure piece of presentational cognition
and 'knowledge' in this sense is always known by certain causual ways and
means of knowing (usually called in sanskrit pramana).
(2) Philosophers who claim the possibility of knowledge (pramana)
on the
basis of one or some casual instruments of knowing (pramana) are called
pramanavadins, the nearest word for which in western philosophy may be
'cognitivists'. All cognitivists agree that whatever be the case of a
knowable, it must be yielded by certain pramanas. But Indian philosophical
heritage is also gifted with some philosophers who do not admit the
reality of pramana itself and consequently question all claims in favour
of the possibility of knowledge on the basis of pramana. Nagarjuna,
Jayarasi and Sriharsa are three important philosophers who do not accept
the validity of any pramana and if the reality of pramana itself is
questioned or refuted the claim to possibility of knowledge stands
rufuted. For details see. B. K. Matilal, Perception (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1986) P. 64.
(3) Ludig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Trans.
GEM Asncombe,
Oxford Blackwell 1958 Sect. 65) P. 31
(4) Vatsyayana in his commentary on Goutama's Nyaya-sutra
1.1.1. thus
says, "pramananata' rthapratipattu pravrttisamarthyadorthavatpramanam
..... Arthavati ca pramane pramataprameyampramitityarthavanti bhavanti
...... Catusrsucaivabvidhasu tattvamparisamapyate". It is to be noted here
that all these four naming as pramana, premeya etc. are due to the
particular 'prakara'. In other wards, something is a pramana in a
particular unit of knowledge and it may play the role of prameya in some
other unit of knowledge. But the Nagarjunian sceptic accepts pramana as
something in the rigid sense of its function, that is to say always it
acts as causal ways and means of knowing irrespective of variation in
contexts of use.
(5) It is to be noted in this connection that in Indian
philosophical
heritage from early days various knowledge claims were made regarding
ethical and religious matters. There were also thinkers like Sanjaya who
questioned vehemently about the metaphysical assertions or claims. To meet
such challenges in different phases of time various cognitivistic account
or pramana theories have come into existance. Gradually the very tradition
of questioning the truth-claims with regard to metaphysical and moral
matters led to the development of sceptical arguments against the
possibility of any 'knowledge-claim'. The Nyaya cognitivistis on the
otherhand, developed a cognitivistic attitude and claimed that 'what is
existent is knowable, even nameable' But in order to know it, the
existance of a pramana or various pramanas must be a priorily admitted.
They may be compared with axioms for a logical system and their validity
is not questionable within this cognitivistic system. For details about
Sanjayas method of philosophy, one may see my paper titled;
Amaraviksepavada; The Philosophical Method of Sanjaya, Silchar, Journal of
Assam University vol. 4, no 1, 1999.
(6) The sanskrit word 'anavastha' literally means 'lack of a
firm
foundation. Nagarjuna brings this charge against paratah / paraparatah
pramanyavada in the following words : "Anyair yadi pramanaih pramana
sidhir bhavettadanavastha / Nadeh siddhitatrasti naiva madhyasyanantasya
/-Vigrahavyavartani" (hence forth VV) No. 32.
(7) Nagarjuna notes all these possible instances in his vrtti
(verse 51)
(8) It is interesting to note in the passing that
Jayantabhatta in
Nyayamanjari likeother cognitivists also holds that knowledge (prama) is a
piece of true and indubitable awareness. But the concept of indubitability
has both psychological and logical senses of use. For the Nyaya, the
psychological sense of use is satisfied by the element of 'pragmatic
success' (arthakriyakaritva) and the logical sense of use is satisfied by
introducing the casual justificatory grounds (pramanas). In the first
sense the term; 'indubitable' is taken to mean that one is subjectively
convinced that 'p' whereas in the second sense it imputs to contingent
propositions', 'inherent dubitableness'. A Nagarjunian sceptic seems to
capitalise mostly on the second sense and thus brings the charge of
infinite regress. Vatsyayana, however tries to meet the sceptical
challenge of infinite regress to psychological pursuation. He argues that
when we prove A by B and B by C, it dose not invite the blemish of
infinite regress, because at certain level, say at C, the further question
of validity (regarding C) becomes irrelevant. Where there is no query,
there can not be any necessity of searching for a further justificatory
ground.
(9) Sapaksa : Niscitasadhyavana paksena saha vartamanah sapaksa
-yathaparvate dhumena vanhi sadhane mahanasah' - Nyayakosah Ed. By M. M.
Bhimacharya Jhalakikar, revised by M. M. Vasudeva Sastri Abhankar,
(Oriental Institute, Puna, 1929) P. 952.
(10) Yadi ca svaparatmanau tvadvavanena prakasyatyagnih /
paramiva
nanvatmanam svam paridhakasyatyapi hutasah // vv. No. 35.
(11) Yadi ca svaparatmanau tvadvavanena prakasyatyagnih /
pracchadayisyati
tamah svaparatmanau hutasaiva // vv. No. 36.
(12) Pradipah svaparatmanau samorkasyayate yad / tomo' pi
svaparatmanau
chadayisyatyasamsayam // Maddhyamika - karika-Ch.vii 12; also see in the
commentry on Vigrahavyavartani verse No. 36.
(13) Anapeksya hi prameyanarthan yadi te pramanasidhiriti /
nabhavanti
kasyacidevamimanitanipramanam // v. v. No. 41
(14) Madhyamika-karika : 1.5 (Ed. P. L. Vaidya, Mithila
Institute,
Darbhanga 1960)
(15) Atha tu pramansiddhirbhavatyapekasyaiva te prameyani /
Vyatyaya evam
sati te dhruvam pramana prameyanam te pramanasiddhya premeya siddhih
prameya siddhyaca / bhavati pramana siddhirnastyu bhayasyapi te siddhih//
v. v. verse 45-6
(16) Pitra yadyutpadyah putriyadi tenaciva putrena / Utpadyah
sa yadi pita
vada tatrotpadyati kah kam ? Kasca pita kah putrastara tvam bruhi
tavubhayapi ca/ Pitrputralaksanadharau yato bhavati no samdehah // v. v.
verses 49-50
(17) Naiva svatah prasiddhirna parasparatah parapramanar va /
Na bhavati
na-ca prameyairna capyakasmat pramananam II v. v. No 51. Comparable :Na
svatah na paratah no dvabhuyam napyahetutah / Utpannajatu vidyante bhavah
kvacana kecan // Madhyamika karika 1. 1.
(18) Drstyadrstorna sandeho bhavabhava viniccayat /
Adrstivadhine heto
pratyakasamapi durlabam Nyayakusumanjali Ch. 3, Verse 6, (Ed. P. Updhyaya
& D. Shastri, Varanasi, Chowkhamba, 1957).
(19) See : Vatsyayana's commentary on Nyaya-sutra-2. 1.9. (Na
pradipa
prakasa siddhivat tat siddheh) By the sanskrit word 'na' the Naiyayika
refutes the possibility of sceptical charge and then the compares the
casual means (pramana) with light. Though light is exclusively required
for the illumination of other objects, light itself is sufficient for
illumination. According to Vatsyayana the sceptical arguments shows that
pramanas can not be accepted as proof for prameyas unless we admit
pramanas as either apriori or simultaneous to prameyas and on examination
none of the alternatives can be accepted. But this charge is not directly
mentioned in Vigrahavyavartani nor does Vatsyayana mention any name as the
propounder of this objection. However, we may subsume it under
'Visesahetusca vaktavyam'.
(20) Nyaya-vartika- 2.1.12. (Ed. V. P. Dvibedin, Varanasi,
Chowkhamba,
1915) P. 189.
(21) Prasajya pratisedhah is similar to J. R. Searle's
illocautionary
nagation which is meant to negate 'illocutionary force' (See, Speech Acts
: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1969, PP 32-3) Sabdakalpadruma (Vol. 3, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series,
1967, P. 298 & 264 explanation goes thus : Apradhanyam vidheryatra
pratisedhe pradhanata / prasajya pratisedho 'savkriyaya saha yatra nan //
Pradhanyam hi vidheryatra pratisedhe' pradhanata / paryyudasa sa vijneyo
yatrottarapadena nan //.
(22) L. Wittgenstein : Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus ( Kegal
Paul,
London, 1947) P. 189.
(23) According to J. W. N. Watkins, the pragmatic consideration
or
difficulty cannot be an adequate rebuttal for a sceptic engaged in
cognitively (theoritically oriented) questioning. Question of 'praxis
orientation' is also irrelevant here, because it is noncognitive. For
details see : Science and Scepticism (Hutchinson, London, 1984) P. 36. One
may also see in this context : R. N. Ozick : Philosophical Explanations
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981) P. 197
(24) Quinton distinguishes five uses of 'indubitableness' in
philosophical
enterprise. See : A. M. Quintion : The Nature of Things (London, 1975) PP.
144-9
(25) See : Vatsyayana's commentary on 'Nyaya-Sutra 2.1.19
(26) See : T. K. Sarkar : Knowledge, Truth and Justification
(Calcutta,
Allied Pub. & Jadavpur University, 1992) P. 203
(27) It is to be noted here that we see some refinement in
using
philosophical concepts in the later writing of the same Nyaya School. When
in the Navyanyaya (Neo-school of Nyaya) the term knowledge (prama) is
prefixed by the term asandigdha (non-dubious) it does not mean 'knowledge
must be certain', rather it implies that a genuine piece of knowledge
(prama) will never be vitiated by the presence of 'dubiety' about the
absence of knowledgehood (pramatva) and this is precisely meant by the
saying 'apramanya jnananaskandita'. However, the Nyaya cognitivists in
later days have tried to develop a casual theory of knowledge with many
technicalities where a pramana is operative as intrumental case of
generating knowledge (prama) and there is no room for getting knowledge
(as something 'non-dubious and truth hitting mental episode') from a
faulty pramana or pseudo-pramana.
(28) For details see: Rashvihari Das : Philosophical Essays
(Ed. R. Das,
University of Calcutta, Calcutta 1994) PP. 1.8.21.
(29) To support our contention let us quote from S. N. Dasgupta,
a noted
historian of Indian Philosophy. Dasgupta states : "Unlike the older Nyaya,
later Nyaya writers like Gangesa, Raghunatha and others were mainly
occupied in investing suitable qualificatory adjuncts and phrases by which
they could define their categories in such a way that the undersirable
applications and uses of their definitions, pointed out by the criticism
of their opponents could be avioded" - A history of Indian Philosphy, Vol
- 2 (Cambridge 1951) P. 146
BAUDRILLARD
Baudrillard uses the metaphor "earthquake"
to describe a "form of catastrophy" which
according to him is typical of our times.
The play of destruction and resurrection
("volcanic eruption") will be replaced by the
blasting apart of almost inseparable things, the
cracked surface shifting, changing, drifting apart.
Baudrillard: "This all serves to acquaint us
with the horizontal age of sensations without
consequences, where the last act is staged
almost like a parody by Nature itself."
Jean Baudrillard
THE SEISMIC ORDER
The seismic order is the future. It constitutes the congenital order of
catastrophy in the age of simulation (I don't know why) - an unfathomable
and bottomless form of the crevice the rupture and the crack, the order of
bursting and brittle objects; the order by which immense masses of earth
and entire regions slide over the other, producing violent surface
tremors. We are no longer taken aback by the destructive lava: a
fire-spitting mouth covering the earth and bringing with it punishment and
purification.
Here, it is not the Flood that is being referred to, but rather a primal
catastrophy as the beginning of the world: to be exact the great,
legendary and mythical orders which are forever monopolizing our
attention. The explosion which culminated as an order (principle) in the
frenzy following the nuclear catastrophy, appears to have more to do with
the present (conversely it also backed up the myth of the Big Bang als
being the origin of the universe). The earthquake, the seismic order has,
one could say, a more modern and more topical nature confirming yet again
that catastrophies adapt themselves to their relevant cultural order.
Cities also distinguish themselves through a certain order of catastrophy
relative to them, constituting in each case the keen fascination of the
city in question. For New York it is King-Kong, black-out and the vertical
bombardment. Towering inferno. Los Angeles represents a horizontal break
and the gliding away of California into the Pacific. Earthquake.
Today we are confronted with an order which is even closer to mind: it
belongs to the system of fissions and immediate diffusion; comparable to a
system of waves, a spasmodic order and direct (polar) reversal. The sky no
longer falls on our heads, but the ground is now slipping away from under
our feet.
Buddhism Glossary
A | B | C | D
| E | F | G | H
| I | J | K | L
| M | N | O | P
| Q | R | S | T
|
U | V | W | X
| Y| Z
A
Amitabha Buddha*
The name of the bodhisattva who established the Pure Land form of Buddhism.
The power he gained from his merit as a bodhisattva enabled him to establish
the Pure Land and now allows him to help others enter the Pure Land. The laity
in particular can now enter the Pure Land with Amitabha's help, they do not
have to get there on their own power. All they need do is to chant and believe
the Amida Butsu.
Amida Butsu *
In Japanese, the term by which devotees call on Amitabha Buddha. They usually
say "Praise to the Buddha Amitabha," i.e., "Namu Amida Butsa," which can be
shortened to "Nembutsu."
anatman/anatta *
The Buddhist notion that there is no eternal soul, unlike in Hinduism.
Instead, each living person is an association of five skandas, which fly apart
at death. Linguistically, "atta" is Pali for "atman" while "an" is the
negative. The term literally means "no soul."
arhat/arhant/arahat/arahant *
A term used primarily in Theravada Buddhism to signify a person who has
fulfilled its ultimate goal, the attainment of nirvana. Upon death, the arhat
will become extinguished. The arhat, as an individual, has attained full
enlightenment, peace and freedom. This should be contrasted to Mahayana
Buddhism, in which the ultimate goal is to become a bodhisattva--someone who
uses the power they gain from enlightenment to help others.
Asura *
This term is often translated as "ogre" or "titan." They are one of the six
states of existence that are in samsara. Different types of Buddhism view them
differently. Asura is usually seen as positive, resulting from good karma like
human beings and gods. In this interpretation, they dwell in the lower
heavens. Other views treat the asuras as resulting from bad karma and hence
they are seen as the enemies of the gods. Some types of Buddhism ignore this
category altogether and have only five states of existence.
Avalokiteshvara*
Popularly known as the Bodhisattva of Compassion. He has reincarnated in this
world numerous times (in both male and female forms) and therefore plays many
roles depending on which strand of Buddhism one follows. First, in Mahayana
Buddhism, he is considered to be the manifestation of Amitabha Buddha, the
founder of the Pure Land school of Buddhism, and is often represented at
Amitabha's right hand. As such he is available to help all in dire need.
Second, in China, she appears as Kuan Yin, the Goddess of Compassion. In folk
belief, she keeps people safe from natural catastrophe. Third, in Tibet, he
appears in several forms. The most important of these are as Chenrezig (the
male partner of the couple who gave birth to the Tibetan people), Tara, and as
the Dalai Lama.
Awakening
A Zen term for enlightenment.
B
bhikkhu, bikkhuni *
A Buddhist monk, a Buddhist nun.
bodhi*
See Enlightenment.
Bodhisattva*
In Mahayana Buddhism, a person who has achieved enlightenment, but has who has
chosen to remain in this world to help those who are suffering, instead of
going on to nirvana. This is the highest ideal. Kuan Yin is an important
Chinese bodhisattva; her full name means "Hearing World's Cries Bodhisattva."
Amitabha Buddha is an important Bohisattva in the Mahayana form of Buddhism
called Pure Land. The idea of the bodhisattva should be contrasted to the
arhat of Theravada Buddhism.
Buddha *
(1) The Buddha is Siddartha who was the founder of Buddhism. He was the first
to attain enlightenment, and then taught others how to attain it. His first
name is Siddartha, his family name was Gautama. He was a member of the Shakya
clan, and hence is called Shakyamuni, "the wise one of the Shakyas." He is
also known as Tathagata, "the Enlightened One." (2) Mahayana Buddhism holds
that there are five Buddhas who have/will manifest themselves in the earthly
realm. The fifth Buddha, who will come in the future, is known as Maitreya.
(3) In Mahayana, a buddha is someone who has attained enlightenment.
Buddha-fields *
The Buddha-fields are the infinite number of paradises which are populated by
uncountable Buddhas and bodhisattvas. The Buddha-fields are beyond the realm
of samsara. Those within them have reached enlightenment, but have not yet
attained nirvana. This is where Amitabha has his Pure Land.
C
Chan Buddhism
The Chinese name for Zen Buddhism.
Chenrezig *
The Tibetan form of Avalokiteshvara, the Bodhisattva of Compassion. Chenrezig
is viewed as the founding father of the Tibetan people, and has had several
manifestations among them. The most famous are King Songtsen Gampo who brought
Buddhism to Tibet in the seventh century, and the Dalai Lama. His female
aspect is Tara. The mantra associated with him (om mane padme hum) was the
first to enter Tibet.
D
Dalai Lama*
The bodhisattva who is the reincarnation of Avalokiteshvara, a.k.a. Chenrezig,
the bodhisattva of Compassion. He is a single being who has been reincarnated
14 times as the Dalai Lama. See also lama. The Dalai Lama has always been a
combination the chief spiritual leader and the chief political leader of
Tibet. The present Dalai Lama lives in exile in Nepal; he remains spiritual
leader of his people, even under their oppression by the Chinese government.
For further information, click here.
Dharma/ Dhamma*
The teachings of the Buddha.
dhyana
Another way of spelling jhana.
dorje
See Thunderbolt.
dukkha *
The Buddhist understanding of the nature of life, especially human life. It is
suffering, pain, misery, and death. To see how dukkha is explained within
Theravada Buddhism, click here.
E
Eightfold Path*
The Noble Eightfold path consists of the eight steps by which a person can
achieve Nirvana. This is the path by which one ceases to desire and thereby
ceases to suffer (see dukkha). This path leads to a form of meditation which,
similar to Raja Yoga in Hinduism, enables a person to reach enlightenment. The
eight stages are:
1) Right Views.
2) Right Intent.
3) Right Speech.
4) Right Conduct.
5) Right livelihood.
6) Right effort.
7) Right mindfulness.
8) Right concentration.
To see how the Eightfold Path is described within Theravada Buddhism, click
here.
Emptiness*
Emptiness is usually the description of Enlightenment. To the western mind,
this description is often difficult to comprehend, leading to the idea that it
is "nothing," and therefore quite unattractive. Two points will help correct
this view. First, "emptiness" can be understood as the Buddhist way of saying
that Ultimate Reality is incapable of being described, much the way that many
Christian theologians view the Christian God as beyond our human attempts to
describe. Second, the "emptiness" should not be thought of an another place.
Instead, it is identical to the world or universe humans experience in this
life. In this way, it is much like the Hindu notion that this world is simply
maya (illusion), which prevents humans from seeing the true unity of the
cosmos (which in Hinduism means the identity of Atman and Brahman). Thus
emptiness and the phenomena of this world are the same, or as the Heart Sutra
says, "Form is emptiness, emptiness is form."
Enlightenment*
This is the usual English translation of the Sanskrit word "bodhi," which
literally means "awakening." It is achieved by following the Eight-fold path,
and therefore constitutes freedom from all desires. Enlightenment gives the
person who achieves it the wisdom of perceiving the ultimate reality, which
entails the power and the ability to work to change that reality in certain
ways--especially to help people in need. For example, Amitabha created the
western land--the Pure Land--as a heaven for his followers. Enlightenment is
often described as emptiness. This is the final step before nirvana. Gaining
Enlightenment can be likened to breaking through a wall. At first, only a
small hole may be created, through which one can briefly see a small part of
the other side. Ultimately, the whole wall may be destroyed and all will be
visible.
F
Factors of Conditioned Rising
There are twelve factors of conditioned arising: death, birth, craving,
ignorance, consciousness, becoming, contact, sensation, the six senses,
grasping, the power of formation, and mind and body.
Five Precepts *
The minimum set of moral rules for Buddhism, practiced by both the lay people
and the monks of the sangha. They forbid (1) theft, (2) improper sexual
practices (adultery for lay people, sexual activity of any kind for monks),
(3) killing, (4) lying and deceiving, and (5) drinking alcoholic drinks. To
see how the Five Precepts are laid out within Theravada Buddhism, click here.
Four Noble Truths *
The most basic statement of Buddhist belief:
(1) All is suffering (dukkha).
(2) Suffering is caused by desire.
(3) If one can eliminate desire, they can eliminate suffering.
(4) The Noble Eight-fold Path can eliminate desire.
To see how the Four Noble Truths are explained within Theravada Buddhism,
click here.
G
Gautama *
The Buddha's family name, or last name. His first name was Siddhartha.
Guru *
A teacher or guide for a novice. This is an important activity in Vajrayana
Buddhism.
H
Heart Sutra *
One of the central sutras in Mahayana Buddhism. It is particularly important
in Zen because of its teaching about emptiness. The key idea of this teaching
is: "Form is no other than emptiness, emptiness is no other than form." For an
on-line translation of the Heart Sutra, click here.
Hinayana
The term literally means "the Little Way." It is a derogatory term put onto
Theravada Buddhism by those who follow Mahayana, which means "the Great Way
(or vehicle, or raft)."
Hungry Ghost *
These ghosts are a state of existence, a type of rebirth. This state stems
from negative karma. The ghosts live between the earth and hell. They are
called hungry because they have large stomachs and tiny mouths. This is one of
the six states of existence.
I
Impermanence
(Sanskrit: anitya, Pali: anicca) This term refers to the Buddhist notion that
all things of samsara are impermanent. Once created, they decay and pass away.
Although this is particularly true for human illness and death, the idea
refers to the nature of all things. It is one of the reasons for suffering and
is considered one of the three marks of existence.
J
Jhana/dhyana
A jhanais one of the highest levels of awareness that can be reached by the
practice of samadhi. There are four jhanas, which together essentially are
enlightenment. This is where the monk attains supernormal powers, sees his
past lives, and gains wisdom of the true character of reality.
K
Karma/Kamma *
For Buddhism, as in Hinduism, this is the moral law of cause and effect.
People build up karma (both good and bad) as a result of their actions. This
then determines the state of existence to which one is reborn after birth. In
Buddhism, the different levels can include hells, humans or animals in this
world, or one of several heavens.
koan *
A riddle-like puzzle used for teaching in Zen Buddhism. It cannot be solved by
reason, but instead forces the student to solve it through a flash of insight.
A well-known example is the question, "What is the sound of one hand
clapping?" For a collection of koans, click here.
Kuan Yin *
The Chinese manifestation of Avalokiteshvara, the Bodhisattva of Compassion.
Although originally depicted as male, he gradually became represented as
female. She appears to all who need her help, especially those threatened by
water, demons, sword or fire. Childless women often turn to her for help.
L
Laity*
An English word used to refer to the general members of a religion (in
Buddhism, Christianity, etc.) as opposed to religious specialists such as
monks or priests. In Buddhism, the opposite of laity is the sangha.
Lama*
In Vajrayana, the term for teacher or guru. He is usually the head of a
monastery or perhaps several monasteries. Some important lamas are considered
to be bodhisattvas, such as the Dalai Lama.
Lotus Sutra
The Lotus Sutra is probably the most important text of Mahayana Buddhism. It
describes a lecture the Buddha gave and the ideas and thoughts. He discusses
all the things that differentiate Mahayana Buddhism from Theravada, such as
the idea of a bodhisattva, in particular the bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara, the
merit of the people who venerate the Lotus Sutra, and the key to nirvana and
Buddhahood.
M
Mahakala
This is the wrathful form of Avalokiteshvara, the Bodhisattva of Compassion.
He protects from dangers and bad influences that might hinder a monk's
approach to enlightenment. Mahakala is seen as the protector of the Dalai
Lamas.
Mahayana Buddhism *
Mahayana means "The Great Raft" or "The Great Vehicle." It is the largest and
most influential of the three main forms of Buddhism (the other two being
Theravada and Vajrayana ). It is practiced in China, Japan and Korea.
Vajrayana derived from it and shares many similarities with it. Mahayana
emphasizes the idea of the bodhisattva over that of the arhat. The goal of an
individual is therefore not to pass out of this world into nirvana, but to
attain enlightenment--with the wisdom, understanding and power that goes with
it--and then to show compassion by returning to this world to help those in
need. Amitabha Buddha did this to establish Pure Land Buddhism. In comparison
to Theravada, Mahayana Buddhism emphasizes the help that gods and bodhisattvas
can give to people to help them escape samsara. It has elaborate descriptions
of how this works and emphasizes prayers and rituals that enable people to
seek this help. Zen is another branch of Mahayana Buddhism.
Maitreya *
The buddha who is expected to come in the future, known to all schools of
Buddhism. He is worshipped as a being who guides those who confess their
wrongs, and teachers who become discouraged. He is sometimes depicted as the
"Laughing Buddha" with his hands stretched over his head, a smile on his face,
and a large, bare stomach. He represents all-encompassing love.
mandala *
In general, an art form based on the closed circle, which is the symbol on
eternal continuity. In Trantric Buddhism (Vajrayana), it is a painting or
tapestry based on concentric circles. Within the circles, the Buddha usually
appears with other deities, bodhisattvas, and other symbolic imagery. For the
monk, a mandala serves as a focus of meditation, and a symbolic representation
of the reality of the identity of samsara and nirvana. In popular religion,
the mandala is often the focus of worship--or, to put it another way, the
Buddhas and deities depicted in a mandala become the object(s) of worship. For
further information about mandalas, click here.
Manjushri
The Bodhisattva of Wisdom (prajna), one of the two key Mahayana concepts; the
other is compassion (represented by Avalokiteshvara). His two main symbols are
the sword of knowledge and a book of the Prajna-Paramita Sutra. His wisdom
casts away the darkness of ignorance.
mantra *
A sound that is used as a focus for mediation or worship. Similar to Hinduism.
Marks of Existence *
There are three marks of existence: suffering (dukka), impermanence (anitya),
and "no-soul" (anatman). For a fuller discussion of these in Theravada
Buddhism, go here
Merit *
Merit is essentially "good Karma." It can be gained in a number of ways. Many
of these involve interaction between the sangha and the laity. For example,
when a lay person gives a monk food, they gain merit. Acting in a moral
manner, teaching the proper belief, preaching, and chanting also gain an
individual merit. Worship of the Buddha can also bring merit. The notion of
merit plays the largest role in Theravada Buddhism.
Moon days *
Every lunar month has four moon days. The most important are the New Moon
(which begins the month) and the Full Moon (which is the middle of the month).
On these days the sangha gathers to read the rules of monk behavior and each
monk examines himself to see if they have violated any of the rules. The other
two moon days are halfway in between these two. Thus, there is therefore a
moon day every seven days. Members of the laity often gather at the monastery
on these days for religious activity.
mudra *
Symbolic hand gestures used in ritual or dance. The Buddha is often depicted
with his hands in the meditation mudra or in the mudra symbolizing teaching.
In Vajrayana, the gestures enlarge to involve the entire body, and they enable
the gesturer to interact with Tantric deities.
N
Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna was the first Buddhist thinker who attempted to systematize Buddhist
belief. He wrote extensive commentaries on the the Prajna-Paramita Sutra. He
probably lived during the second century ce. Although he founded a Mahayana
school, the Madhyamikas, his systematization was much more important, being
used by many Mahayana schools and as one of the intellectual bases of
Vajrayana Buddhism.
Nembutsu
In Japanese, the term by which devotees call on Amitabha Buddha. They usually
say "Praise to the Buddha Amitabha," i.e., "Namu Amida Butsa," which can be
shortened to "Nembutsu."
nirvana/nibbana *
It is the cessation of suffering, the liberation from karma, and therefore the
passing over into another existence. The best way to think about nirvana is
that it is the final goal of Buddhism, and that Enlightenment is the step
immediately before it. Thus one becomes aware of the nature of Ultimate
Reality in Enlightenment, and then one becomes unified with that reality in
nirvana. Thus the Buddha, when he died, passed into Nirvana, having previously
attained Enlightenment during his life and sharing it with humanity. A
bodhisattva is one who has attained Enlightenment, but rather than passing
over into nirvana, chose to come back to this world to use their power to help
other people.
O
Ogre
A translation of the word asura.
P
Pali and Pali Canon
Pali is a dialect of Sanskrit and is thought to be the language the Buddha
spoke; it is also the language of Therevada Buddhism. The Pali Canon (of
Therevada) is the sacred. Buddhist exts written in this dialect, the
Tripitaka.
paramita
These are the six virtues, or "perfections," that the bodhisattva perfects
during his development. They are: generosity, discipline, patience, energy,
meditation (jhana) and wisdom (prajna). The fifth paramita is meditation, or
jhana. It refers to the attainment of the four levels of jhana in which
non-duality is experienced. The sixth paramita is that of supreme wisdom
(prajna).
prajna
This term, meaning wisdom, is the supreme wisdom considered by Mahayana
Buddhism to be outside human experience and incapable of being conveyed in
this-world categories. The key experience of prajna is insight into Emptiness,
the true nature of the cosmos. This is usually attained during enlightenment.
Prajna-Paramita Sutra
This term refers to a collection of 40 Mahayana sutras which all deal with
prajna and its attainment. This was the focus of Nagarjuna's writing and
commentaries. The best known of the 40 is the Heart Sutra.
preta
The Sanskrit word usually translated as hungry ghost, one of the six states of
existence.
puja *
A act of worship or devotion to a buddha or a bodhisattva.
Pure Land Buddhism *
The form of Buddhism focuses on the Buddha Amitabha and the "Pure Land" he
created. Appearing in China in the fourth century c.e. and later in Japan,
Korea and other nations, this form of Buddhism has the largest following of
all the different types of Buddhism. Pure Land is aimed at the average person
in its recognition that most people cannot achieve enlightenment and so are
doomed forever to stay in samsara. So Amitabha set up a "Pure Land" in the
"west"--a paradise--to which people can go when they die. To gain entrance,
people simply have to call on the power of Amitabha. This is done by uttering
a phrase such as "Namu Amidha Butsu," (the Nembutsu) which is Japanese for
"Praise to Amitabha Buddha."
Q
R
Rain Retreat *
In the earliest centuries of Buddhism, monks were itinerant, wandering for
nine months of the year. When the monsoons began, in July, they gathered
together for teaching, instruction, meditation and encouragement. Theravada
Buddhism, which is in the area of the monsoons, still keeps the rain retreats,
even though its monks have long ago ceased to wander.
Rinpoche
This is an honorific term applied to lamas in Vajrayana (Tibetan) Buddhism. It
literally means "greatly precious" and is given to masters who are highly
valued for their spiritual knowledge. A Rinpoche is often believed to be the
reincarnation of a lama, guru, or even a bodhisattva or a buddha. For
introductions to some Rinpoches, go here.
S
Sakya, Sakymuni
The Sakya is the clan into which the Buddha was born. "Sakyamuni" means "wise
one of the Sakya," which was a title given to the Buddha.
Samadhi *
A form of meditation widely practiced in Theravada Buddhism in which the mind
is concentrated on a single object and gradually calmed until only the object
is known. The ultimate goal of this meditation is to enter the state of
samadhi which is when the distinction between the object and the meditator
disappears, which is the realization of non-dualism. This state is a
prerequisite to entering the four levels of jhana and enlightenment.
samgha
See sangha.
samsara *
The continual cycle of death and rebirth. This death and rebirth is of course
into this world of suffering and this is viewed in a negative manner.
sangha/samgha *
A general term that refers to the monks (Bhikkhus) as a whole.
Sanskrit
The spoken language of ancient India, which belongs to the class of the
Indo-European languages. It is used both in Hinduism and in some forms of
Buddhism..
Sanzen *
This is the twice-daily meeting between the student and the master in Zen
Buddhism to discuss the student's progress in meditation. The main purpose is
to determine whether the student has solved their koan. If not, the incorrect
answer is rejected, and the master must then spur the student on to find a
correct solution.
Satori
Zen Buddhism's term for enlightenment.
Siddhartha *
The Buddha's given name, or first name. His surname was Gautama.
Sila/shila
This term means precept or rule. It usually is used in reference to the Five
or Ten Precepts which form the basic guidelines for the sangha's behavior.
skandhas *
The five elements of a human which come together at birth and separate at
death: body, feelings/senses, perceptions, habits and inclinations, and
consciousness. This is linked to the notion of "no-soul."
States of Existence *
There are six states of existence (gati). The highest three are the gods, the
asuras, and human beings; they result from good karma. The lowest three are
animals, hungry ghosts, and demons (hell-dwellers); they result from bad
karma. Some forms of Buddhism view the asuras as stemming from bad karma and
other ignore them completely, having only five states of existence.
stupa *
A shrine in which relics of the Buddha are kept. The center is a raised temple
which is usually surrounded by a series of terraces.
Suffering *
See dukkha.
sutra/sutta *
(1) As in Hinduism, a term meaning sacred text. (2) The Sutra Pitaka is one of
the three divisions of the tripitaka. It contains the words and teachings of
Buddha himself. (3) The Sutras are the foundational texts for Mahayana
Buddhism, which differentiate Mahayana from Theravada Buddhism. Two important
Sutras are the Heart Sutra and the Lotus Sutra.
T
Tantrayana
See Vajrayana.
Tantrism *
Tantrism and tantric ideas begin with notions in line with all forms of
Buddhism, namely, the idea that Ultimate Reality is a singular Unity. It is
not the apparent multiplicity of the present world around us (maya). Tantrism,
which is a key component of Vajrayana, then goes beyond these notions to their
representation in the symbol of the sexual union between male and female (see
yab-yum). This union is a symbol of the identity of the multiple nature of
this world (maya), which is represented by the male, with the unity and wisdom
of cosmos, represented by the female. In some schools, the symbol of
intercourse is reenacted as part of meditation.
Tara *
A female manifestation in Tibet of Avalokiteshvara, the Bodhisattva of
Compassion, whose Tibetan form is Chenrezig. She can appear in 21 different
forms, which differ in attributes and are known by their color. She appears in
both peaceful and wrathful manifestations. The most commonly appearing forms
are Green Tara and White Tara. She is often revered as a yidam, guiding
Vajrayana monks towards enlightenment. Included in her earthly manifestations
are the two consorts of King Songtsen Gampo who brought Buddhism to Tibet in
the seventh century, who is himself considered an manifestation of Chenrezig.
Tathagata
A term for the Buddha (Siddartha) which means "The Enlightened One."
Ten Precepts *
This is the code of monastic discipline for the monks. It consists of the Five
Precepts (no stealing, sexual activity, killing, lying, or alcohol) which
apply to all Buddhists, and five further restrictions designed specifically
for members of the sangha. These are:
(6) Not to take food from noon to the next morning.
(7) Not to adorn the body with anything other than the monk's robe.
(8) Not to participate in or watch public entertainments.
(9) Not to use high or comfortable beds.
(10) Not to use money.
To see how the Ten Precepts are laid out within Theravada Buddhism, click
here.
Theravada Buddhism *
Literally, "the path of the Elders." Of the three major branches of Buddhism,
this was the earliest to crystallize into form. In contrast to Mahayana and
Vajrayana, Theravada emphasizes the individual over the group, holding that it
is the individual who must reach nirvana on their own. Its central virtue is
thus wisdom, which is to be achieved by the arhat who attains enlightenment in
this life and nirvana upon death. It discourages speculation about the nature
of the cosmos, enlightenment, and nirvana, instead focusing on meditation to
achieve enlightenment. The main social group is therefore the sangha, the
gathered monks and nuns who support and teach each other as each one strives
to achieve enlightenment.
The Three Vows, also known as The Three Refuges or The Three Jewels *
1) I take refuge in the Buddha.
2) I take refuge in the Dharma.
3) I take refuge in the Sangha.
Thunderbolt *
The English word often used to translate the Sanskrit word "vajra" (Tibetan,
"dorje"), which is key symbol for Vajrayana Buddhism. It means literally
"Diamond Thunderbolt." It symbolizes the indestructible character of
emptiness, the true nature of all things. Tibetan Buddhists use a crafted
metal image of a thunderbolt in their rituals. For a picture of Vajrasattva
holding thunderbolts in his hands, click here.
Titan
A translation of the term asura.
tripitaka, also tipitaka. *
The three main sacred scriptures of Buddhism. A "pitaka" is a basket and so
the term refers to the "three baskets." The first basket is the teachings of
the Buddha. The second is the discipline for the sangha. The third is that of
special teachings. For further information about the tripitaka, click here.
U
V
Vajrayana *
Since a "vajra" is a diamond, this term means "The Diamond Way." It refers to
the third form of Buddhism (after Theravada and Mahayana), which is practiced
largely in Tibet. It is also known as Tantric Buddhism. The main claim of
Vajrayana is that it enables a person to reach nirvana in a single lifetime.
It is able to do this by using all of a person's powers (including those of
the body) to achieve that goal.
Vipassana
This form of meditation is widely practiced in Theravada Buddhism. Its goal is
the realization of the three marks of existence: suffering, impermanence, and
"no-soul." It leads to the realization of the true character of Emptiness.
Vipassana and Samadhi are considered prerequisites for attaining nirvana by
Theravada Buddhism.
W
Wheel of Life *
(Sanskrit: Bava Chakra) In Tibetan Buddhism especially, the Wheel of Life is a
symbol consisting of three concentric circles held by Yama, the God of the
Underworld. It signifies samsara. The inner-most circle contains symbols of
the three sources of suffering: the pig (ignorance), the snake (hate), and the
cock (desire). The next circle is divided into six sections, each depicting
one of the six states of being. The outside ring is divided into twelve
sections, each representing a symbol of one of the twelve factors of
conditioned arising (death, birth, craving, ignorance, consciousness, etc.).
Wisdom *
This is the usual translation of prajna.
X
Y
yab-yum *
In Tibeten Buddhism, or Vajrayana Buddhism, this is the symbol of the male and
female sexual union--usually a union of a god or a bodhisattva and his
consort--which represents the completeness of the cosmos. The male represents
action, usually that of compassion, in this finite world, and the female
represents wisdom, the unity of the Infinite. The male is seen as passive and
the female as active.
yidam *
A bodhisattva or other "deity" assigned to a Vajrayana monk by his guru as his
personal guide and protector. Once established, this link will last the monk's
lifetime, and will help him work towards attaining enlightenment.
Z
Zazen *
In Zen Buddhism, the practice of extended periods of mediation, usually in a
group in a meeting hall. The monks sit quietly for long periods of time in the
cross-legged Lotus position. While different individuals will be meditating
with different goals, often meditation focuses on solving a koan. For more
information than you ever wanted to know about zazen, click here.
Zen Buddhism*
A branch of Mahayana Buddhism which was brought to China (where it was called
Chan) in 520 CE by Bodhidarma and arrived in Japan in the twelfth century. It
is probably the most common form of Buddhism in the West. Practitioners of Zen
must usually devote themselves to a life as a monk, for it requires extensive
periods of meditation. It concentrates on making clear that reality is beyond
words and language and beyond logic. To accomplish this, it makes use of the
koan, zazen, and sanzen. The word "zen" derives from the Sanskrit term for the
concept of jhana.
A |B | C | D
| E | F | G | H
| I | J | K | L
| M | N | O | P
| Q | R | S | T
| U
| V | W | X | Y
| Z
To send comments to the professor, please email PFlesher@uwyo.edu.
Copyright ©: 1996, 1997 Paul V. M. Flesher.
This glossary was written by Paul V. M. Flesher; it is not drawn from any
published work. It is for use with the course RELI 1000, Introduction to
Religion, taught at the University of Wyoming.
m<<&WP Floppy 1:Buddhism HTML:Bglossry.htm@Ä
Buddhist Philosophies
Historical Perspective
Buddhism was created by Siddhartha Gautama, the historical Buddha (the
"Enlightened One"), after his enlightenment. He had awakened to the truths of
the suffering (duhkha), the craving/hatred/ignorance which is the cause of the
suffering, the elimination of the causes of the suffering, and the eightfold
path to eliminate them.
12.1 India enjoyed a great civilization in every respect at the time of the
Buddha.
12.2 After the Buddha, the council of monks were called in several times over
centuries to recall and collect his teachings. Buddhist philosophies evolved
through the attempts to reconcile the different views of various sects.
12.3 Hinduism and Buddhism
HinduismBuddhism
Accept the authority of the Vedas No way
varnano varna
samsarasamsara
karma - it determines next varnakarma, but no varna
AtmanNo Atman
moksha - termination of samsara. This is attained when one realizes the
true nature of self (Atman).nirvana - termination of samsara. Since there
is no Atman, this is attained by completely extinguishing one’s desires.
12.4 Hinayana (Theravada) and Mahayana
Hinayana - a lesser vehicle for an arhant- saves oneself only. Mahayana - a
greater vehicle of a bodhisattva - wants to save all the suffering creatures.
There are three types of perfect beings (The Lotus of the Good Law): arhants
(hearers) and private buddhas are ideals of Hinayana; but, for Mahayana,
bodhisattvas.
12.41 Bodhisattva (‘Being of Wisdom’) - (1) Previous incarnations of the
historical Buddha --- self-sacrifices of a Bodhisattva, etc., (2) Enlightened
One who wants to save the suffering creatures.
12.42 Differences between Hinayana and Mahayana
Hinayana (Theravada)Mahayana
The BuddhaSiddharta GautamaThe eternal and omnipresent Buddha. Siddharta
was only one of the manifestations.
ScripturesThe historical Buddha’s teachings recalled and recited+ new
scriptures attributed to the historical Buddha
Communitymonastery+ the secular world
The Paththe Noble Eightfold Path of the practitioner+ the six surpassing
virtues (paramitas) to save all the suffering beings: generosity,
morality, patience, vigor, meditation, wisdom
Faiththe Buddha, his teachings, and the community+ a host of celestial
beings
Realityinterdependent arising+ Emptiness (Void)
cf. The Lotus of the Good Law - "I (the Buddha) desire to enable all living
beings to attain the same way with me."
Mahayana does not really reject Hinayana as something inferior; rather, the
former includes the latter as a part of its teachings and practices.
12.43 The Essential Tension
Why should the enlightened one take care of the suffering creatures? Was the
Buddha’s decision to teach and save the creatures consistent with his doctrine
of non-attachment? The fundamental tension and conflict existed even at the very
moment of Siddharta Gautama’s enlightenment. (cf. the story of Seong-Cheol)
12.5 Philosophical Problems: The basic Buddhist teachings of no-self,
impermanence, and nirvana gave rise to ‘interesting’ philosophical problems.
12.51 The problem of no-self: If there is no self, who or what is it that
transmigrates? If nothing remains the same and everything changes constantly,
how can the same person, that must change at every instant, suffer at one time,
and achieve nirvana later to terminate the cycle of birth and rebirth? If there
is no self, how can anyone be reborn at all? If existence is simply a bundle of
karma (or burning desires, or interrelated experience), what is it that gives
this bundle its unity and continuity? The denial of self makes moral
responsibility unintelligible.
12.52 The problem of impermanence: If everything changes constantly and nothing
persists, things lack being. There is nothing that really exists. If everything
lacks being, how can the Buddha’s existence be real? How is the chain of
causation possible unless real beings are admitted? What causes what, if nothing
really exists? Without the causal chain, the transition from the suffering to
nirvana is impossible.
12.53 The problem of knowledge: If the self and things are not real, how is
knowledge possible that is a certain relation between the self and things?
Without knowledge, how can we overcome the ignorance that causes the suffering?
12.6 Sarvastivada: The self and ordinary things are unreal because they are
constructions; but the ultimate units (dharmas) out of which they are
constructed are ultimately real, not dependent on anything else.
12.7 Madhyamaka (Doctrine of Middle Position): Nagarjuna
A mendicant monk with defective eyesight may imagine that he sees flies in his
begging bowl, and they have full reality for the percipient. Though the flies
are not real, the illusion of flies is. All beings labor under the constant
illusion of perceiving things where in fact there is only emptiness. This
Emptiness or Void is all that truly exists. But the phenomenal world is true
pragmatically, and therefore is qualified as reality for practical purposes. Yet
the whole chain of existence is only real in this sense, for it is composed of a
series of transitory events, and these, being impermanent, cannot have reality
in themselves.
Emptiness (Void): It is not something, but it is not nothing either (negative
definition used to refute rival theories) --- it is that which mysteriously/well
exists somewhere between existence and nonexistence. (cf. Everything is empty;
that everything is empty is empty; ... that that everything is empty is empty is
empty...)
In China, Madhyamaka came to turn into a very positive philosophical doctrine:
Emptiness - never changes - absolute truth - absolute being - nirvana - the Body
of Essence of the Buddha. The ultimate Emptiness is here and now, everywhere and
all-embracing. Void is the phenomenal world; and all beings are already
participants of the Emptiness that is nirvana; all beings are already Buddhas if
only they realize it: all beings have the Buddha-nature in them and can be
saved.
cf. A Vision of Nirvana Here and Now
cf. "Mountain is mountain, water is water" - acceptance of the beautiful nature
as it is in Chinese culture.
12.8 Yogacara (Consciousness-Only School): Vasubandhu
There are two kinds of consciousness: (1) the cognitive action itself, the
activity of consciousness itself; (2) the contents of consciousness, the
representation or ideation. (Yogacara is one of pure idealisms, though John
Koller disagrees.)
"All depends on the mind.": the fact of illusion - the case of flies in the
begging bowl, the experience of dreams, the conjuration of visions having equal
vividness and semblance of truth with the perception; but all these have no
objective reality. Perception is no proof of objective reality.
Suchness (Tathata) - One entity that exists independently of human thought. A
pure and integral being without characteristics: Practice meditation and yoga
cleaning up all the karmas, traces of impressions, in the store of
consciousness. Realize, by conjuring up visions, that our usual perceptions do
not have objective reality. The distinction of subject and object is only the
representation of consciousness. If you clean up all the karmas, even all the
traces of them, in the consciousness, you are identical with the pure
consciousness. pure consciousness - pure being - the true suchness - the
ultimate emptiness (Void)
12.9 Ch’an (Son or Zen) Buddhism in China, Korea, and Japan: Ch’an focuses on
the practices (e.g., meditation) facilitating enlightenment. Buddha-nature is
omnipresent, in everyone and in everything: so, anyone can get enlightened, and
anything can serve as an occasion for realizing enlightenment. Meditative
sitting has been emphasized to have all concerns, distractions, and dualities
fall away. Ch’an also introduced kung-an (koan) as a part of practice: koans are
paradoxical sayings that are to be taken seriously; but conceptualization cannot
help understand the truth of the saying, and the student is driven beyond the
conceptualizing (and differentiating) mind to a deeper, spontaneous, and
undivided awareness. Some school emphasized sudden enlightenment.
Some examples of koans: "There is a reflection of the moon on the surface of the
water. Is that the moon or water?", "Buddha is dogshit".
13 The Buddha’s Life and Teachings
The story of his birth... Prophesies... The unification war... His
enlightenment... Massacre of his tribe... 40 years’ teaching... Nirvana
13.1 The Four Signs
old age... sickness... death... the life of those who have gone forth
(cf. birth)
13.2 Finding a Middle Way
Neither hedonistic nor ascetic. Two extremes should be avoided.
(cf. Carvaka, Epicuros, Self-mortification)
13.3 The First Sermon: Setting in Motion the Wheel of Truth
The Noble Fourfold Truth
1. The world is the sea of suffering (duhkha).
2. Craving causes suffering.
3. Suffering can be eliminated by removing its cause (craving).
4. The removal of craving is possible by following the Middle way constituted by
the Noble Eightfold Path.
13.4 The Noble Eightfold Path
Right view, Right intention, Right speech, Right action, Right livelihood, Right
effort, Right mindfulness, Right concentration
13.5 The Last Words of the Buddha
"What I have taught and laid down... as Doctrine and Discipline this will be
your teacher when I am gone.
"Transient are conditioned things. Try to accomplish your aim with diligence."
14 The Chain of Causation (lit. Interdependent Arising, or Dependent
Origination)
Everything changes constantly, and nothing remains the same (the doctrine of
impermanence: anicca). The way our existence changes is expressed in the
Buddha’s teaching of dependent origination. The basic philosophical concept
underlying this teaching is the causal chain of existence.
cf. Heraclitus: "Can we step on the same river twice?"
cf. Anicca and Anatman(no self): How are they related? - a half of the story
cf. the philosophical importance of the notion of causality:
regularity, counterfactual approach, instrumentalism...
14.1 Twelvefold formulation of interdepedent arising
The world consists of a series of constant changes. What is going to happen is
dependent on what has happened; in this way, everything is related, and nothing
exists independently of other things. What we believe to be our self exists only
as the following twelve stages on dependent origination (Refer to the Wheel of
Becoming on BB p. 154):
1. Ignorance
2. Karma (action, volition)
3. Consciousness
4. Name and form (mind-body)
5. Six Senses (eye/seeing, ear/hearing, nose/smelling, tongue/tasting,
body/touching, mind/thinking)
6. Contact
7. Sensation (Feeling)
8. Desire (Craving)
9. Attachment (Grasping)
10. Existence (Becoming)
11. Birth
12. Old age and death
The Buddha’s teaching on how to cease suffering: Upon the cessation of ignorance
ceases karma; upon the cessation of karma ceases consciousness, ..., ceases old
age and death. These are an elaboration of the second and third of the Four
Noble Truths (how to extinguish craving, and hereby eliminate suffering).
14.2 Three Poisons (three interrelated forces that drive the whole wheel of
becoming): Craving (Grasping), Aversion (Hatred), and Ignorance
Get rid of these poisons, and stop the suffering!
14.3 Types of Existence: (Heavenly) Deities, Hell, (Fighting) Demons, Animals,
Humans, (Hungry and Thirsty) Ghosts.
These are the regions where different beings belong; but they are usually
compared to the kinds of people and the way they live in the human society.
14.4 The Doctrine of Anatman (no self): Chariot Analogy of Milindapanda (RB.
pp.222-225) - the conversations of the Greek king Milinda and the Buddhist
priest Nagasena.
The term "chariot" does not refer to the pole, the axle, the wheels, the
chariot-body, the banner-staff, the yoke, or any part of the chariot. It does
not refer to all of them united, either. Nor does it refer to something else
besides them. The word "chariot" is only a way of counting, term, appellation,
convenient designation, and name for pole, axle, wheels, chariot-body, and
banner-staff. In the absolute sense, there is no chariot.
Similarly, when we use the term "Nagasena", it does not refer to any of five
aggregates: form, sensation, perception, predisposition (motivation or will), or
consciousness. It does not refer to all of them united, either. Nor does it
refer to something else besides them. In the absolute sense, there is no
Nagasena (his self).
14.5 No-Self and Transmigration
Lighting Analogy: RB p. 228
14.6 No-Self and Karma
Fire Analogy: RB p. 229
16 Madhyamaka: The Middle Way Tradition
The core of Madhyamaka thought is the teaching of Emptiness (sunyata). Emptiness
is that which comes midway between two extreme views of existence: (1) Existence
is permanent, self-existing things with their own essences, and (2) Nothing
exists, and the appearance of this is merely an illusion. Koller: "... things
exist as processes, continuously arising and ceasing in dependence on each
other. It is this vision, taught by the Buddha as interdependent arising, and
taught by the Madhyamakas as emptiness, that is the heart of the Middle Way
tradition..."
16.1 Perfection of Wisdom (prajnaparamita) Tradition: Diamond Sutra and Heart
Sutra
Perfect wisdom is distinguished from both ordinary knowledge and wisdom (deep
knowledge) because both are rooted in conceptual activity. (1) In ordinary
knowledge --- Our congnition imposes the construction of experience. Our
percepts and concepts separate the objects we experience from other objects,
abstract them from their continuous stream of change. The separation of these
objects from ourselves as subjects having the experience creates a duality of
subject and object. (2) Wisdom (prajna) results from deep, penetrating insight
and careful reflection.
Perfect wisdom transcends the conceptual knowledge. As perfect (paramita), this
wisdom goes beyond the indirect awareness achieved through concepts and theories
to an immediate, direct realization of the fullness of experience.
A tension: the Perfection of Wisdom authors had to find a way of using
conventional truths (conceptual knowledge) found in the constructions of
ordinary knowledge to talk about the ultimate truth that transcends them. One
way of doing this is to use the three-stage of construction, deconstruction, and
reconstruction illustrated in the Diamond Sutra: "... heap of merit, no heap of
merit..."
16.11 Diamond Sutra (Vajracchedika): the diamond that cuts through the illusion
that the conceptual is the real. Concepts are incapable of capturing reality;
they only function as signs that point to reality.
"However many species of living beings there are..., we must lead all these
beings to the ultimate nirvana so that they can be liberated... And when this
infinite number of beings has become liberated, we do not, in truth, think that
a single being has been liberated." Why? --- "If, Subhuti, a bodhisattva holds
on to the idea that a self, a person, a living being, or a life span exists,
that person is not an authentic bodhisattva." The doctrines of no self,
impermanence, and interdependent arising teach that there is no independent,
separate existence such as a self, a person, etc.
"As far as I have understood the Lord Buddha’s teachings, there is no
independently existing object of mind called the highest, most fulfilled,
awakened mind, nor is there any independently existing teaching that the
Tathagata gives." "The teachings that the Tathagata has realized and spoken of
cannot be conceived of as separate, independent existences and therefore cannot
be described." They transcend the conceptual knowledge.
The meaning of the dialectic of the Diamond Sutra is that for something to be
what it is, it cannot be just what it is by itself; to be what it is it must
interexist with everything else
16.12 Heart Sutra
Refer to our RB!
16.2 Middle Way Philosophy of Nagarjuna: In his book Fundamental Verses on the
Middle Way, Nagarjuna (1) shows that explanations of the topics in Buddhism,
such as causality, the Buddha, samsara and nirvana, in terms of absolutes are
self-refuting, and (2) offers an explanation consistent with interdependent
arising.
Nagarjuna’s method used to refute absolutist views is showing their absurdity by
revealing internal inconsistencies. It proceeds with the reductio ad absurdum.
Nagarjuna wants to prove that S (the Buddha, causality, etc.) does not
self-exist. In order to lead to this claim, he supposes the negation of this,
that is, that S self-exists; he then shows that this supposition results in an
absurd consequence, and so concludes that the supposition is wrong. That way, he
proves that S does not self-exist.
cf.) the logical rule of reductio ad absurdum
Bill Gates is rich. To prove this, suppose that he is not rich. If he is not
rich, it is impossible that he has billions of dollars. But he has billions
of dollars. So, it is not the case that he is not rich (- the supposition is
negated). Therefore, Bill Gates is rich.
After refuting the mistaken absolutist views with this method, he proceeds to
explain the topics, relying on emptiness that is in accord with the teaching of
interdependent arising.
16.21 Causality
Nagarjuna shows (1) the impossibility of causality if it is interpreted as
something called a cause, having the power to produce another thing called the
effect, and (2) how it is possible to understand the arising and ceasing of
things by knowing the conditions of arising and ceasing, conditions which have
no inherent self-existence and which have no essential causal power.
Regarding (1), there are four possible ways that effects can be produced by
causes: (1) an effect produces itself; (2) an effect is produced by something
other than itself; (3) an effect both produces itself and is produced by
something other than itself; (4) an effect is produced without a cause.
Nagarjuna shows that none of these are possible if causality is viewed as the
production of an effect by a causal power that inheres in a self-existent cause.
Comments: (1) Causality is a relation between two things/events. (2) How could
an effect come from a totally different thing? (3) ‘(1) & (2)’ is false because
each conjunct is false. (4) We firmly believe that there are causal
relationships.
Nagarjuna’s positive view of causality is that things arise, exist, and cease in
dependence on conditions, but that none of these conditions are self-existent
causes. There are four kinds of conditions on which change (the arising and
ceasing of things) depend: (1) efficient conditions, (2) percept-object
conditions, (3) immediate conditions, and (4) dominant conditions. Notice that
no essences or causal powers are invoked here. Only if causes are seen as empty
of self-existence and causal power can they produce effects. But this emptiness
means that they are not causes in the usual sense, but simply conditions of
change. And this is fully in accord with the teaching of interdependent arising.
16.22 Self
Nagarjuna argues against the essentialist view of the self. The self, if it is a
self-existent, enduring entity, must either be identical with its five
aggregates or it must be different from them. If the self is identical with the
five components, the constantly changing aggregates will make the self change
constantly, which is absurd. If the self is different from them, then no change
in them can have any effect on the self, which is also absurd. Therefore, the
essentialist view of the self is not true.
16.23 The Buddha and Nirvana
The Buddhist views of the Buddha and nirvana are also conceptual constructs. All
conceptions are empty of ultimate reality (although they constitute signs that
point to reality --- cf. skillful means).
Even the Buddha is empty of self-existence. Our ordinary understanding of the
Buddha is conceptual; and the Buddha’s existence as we know it is empty of
independent, permanent existence. Grasping at the conceptual construct of the
Buddha will not reveal the reality of the Buddha. (The Buddha can be known
directly through mindfulness.)
Since emptiness means that nothing exists by itself independently of others,
everything exists as interdependently arisen. In other words, emptiness is
actually interdependent arising.
Nirvana is not an independently real entity. It is just ordinary existence in
this world, but without the duhkha that arises from ignorance. But suffering and
nirvana are not two. And "(Nagarjuna) [T]here is not the slightest difference
between samsara and nirvana." "(Koller) If samsara and nirvana were completely
different kinds of existence, then the Buddha’s attainment of nirvana would have
meant that he could not have continued to live in this world, teaching the
Middle Way for forty years."
17. Yogacara: Asanga and his brother Vasubandhu
As their name suggests (‘the practice of discipline’), the Yogacarins emphasize
on the practice of meditation to become a Bodhisattva. On its theoretical side,
Yogacara is known for its idealist view that only consciousness exists (it is
also called ‘Cittamatra’ meaning Consciousness Only).
Ignorance is the primary affliction that gives rise to the afflictions of
grasping and hatred, and these three poisons underlie all suffering (duhkha).
Enlightenment is possible by the removal of ignorance: so, Yogacara is
interested in understanding what ignorance is and how it arises, and what
enlightenment is and how we can achieve it. Since both ignorance and
enlightenment pertain to consciousness, Yogacara is naturally led to investigate
the nature and function of consciousness. Their two primary foci are the nature
of knowledge and the processes of consciousness that produce ignorance and
knowledge.
Yogacara accepts the Mahayana doctrine of emptiness. Everything is empty of
self-existence (or self-nature); and emptiness is the interdependent arising.
Yogacara also agrees with Madhyamaka on its claim that there is no difference
between nirvana and samsara except that a person’s ignorance has been
transformed into enlightenment. But Yogacara is not satisfied with this
explanation ‘except that...’. Madhymaka explains merely how a Bodhisattva should
understand emptiness (that is, in terms of interdependent arising); but that is
where they stop explanation. However, Yogacara tries to explain how ignorance
can be transformed into enlightenment by examining (1) what ignorance is and how
it arises, (2) what enlightenment (perfect wisdom) is and how it arises, and (3)
how ignorance and enlightenment are related. Thus Yogacara focuses on the
processes of consciousness that produce both ignorance and knowledge to show how
to achieve enlightenment.
One prominent contribution of Yogacara to Buddhist philosophy is that it gives
an account of the continuity of consciousness between different states of
consciousness (between ignorance and enlightenment). Without this continuity,
all Buddhist practice would be meaningless. Yogacara develops its theory of the
store consciousness (alaya vijnana) to explain how personal continuity is
possible and how it is compatible with the doctrine of emptiness.
17.1 Three Aspects (Natures) of Things
Asanga attempted to overcome the nihilistic understanding of the doctrine of
emptiness by distinguishing among the three natures of things. A thing can be
known as (1) something conceptually constructed, (2) something conditioned by
other things, or (3) something as it is in itself (tathata), free of conceptual
construction.
The analogy of mirage in which water is seen --- There is no real water. What is
perceived as water is just the flow of perceptions (the dependent aspect). This
flow of perceptions is taken to be real water (the conceptually constructed
aspect). But there is no water, although it is present in the flow of
perceptions (the perfected aspect).
17.11 Things known by conceptual construction: "Do not mistake the finger that
points to the moon for the moon itself!"
The mind imposes concepts on things as it attempts to know them. In ordinary
cognition, this conceptually constructed things appear to a cognizing subject as
a separate, self-existent object; but this is a mentally constructed and
illusory nature of things known, recognized by the wise to be empty of intrinsic
reality. The conceptual construction is only a sign that points to the thing,
not the thing itself.
17.12 There is a relative nature of things as they depend on each other and on
the mind. The object is conceptually constructed out of the flow of
interdependent mental phenomena that arises in the presence of the conditioned
thing that is perceived.
17.13 The perfected aspect of the known thing is realized in mindfulness when
all conceptual construction is left aside, when the meditational insight of yoga
practice has gone beyond all conceptual dualities. The flow of experience is
realized to be simply a flow, entirely empty of objects and subject. Conceptual
constructions can represent the thing that is known; but only the insight of
direct awareness in the full mindfulness can reveal it as it really is.
17.2 Knowledge of Reality
Asanga distinguishes among four kinds of knowledge:
1. what is universally accepted by ordinary beings;
2. what is universally accepted by reason, or logic;
3. that which is the sphere of cognitive activity completely purified of the
obscurations of defilement, and
4. that which is the sphere of cognitive activity completely purified of
obscurations to the knowable.
Asanga does not reject 1 or 2 as knowledge; it is just that these kinds of
knowledge are regarded as lower because they are less revealing of reality.
Higher knowledge requires self-purification and training in the methods of
insight.
cf. Knowledge, Wisdom, Smartness
17.21 Ordinary Knowledge: "the shared opinion of people based on habitual
association of names and things"
Ordinary knowledge is rooted in the assumption that names or verbal descriptions
correspond to the things they name or describe. However, knowing the name of
something and knowing what that something is are two different things. (cf. ‘Who
are you?’, ‘What are you?’...)
17.22 Scientific Knowledge: "well-analyzed knowledge wherein the thing being
investigated is established and proven by demonstration and proof," "This is the
knowledge of people governed by reason, skilled in logic, highly intelligent,
who are skillful investigators with great reasoning power."
This knowledge is regarded as inferior because it is based on discursive
thought. Discursive thought cuts the seamless flow of reality by concepts, and
then splice them together into a theory about reality. The things themselves
cannot be encountered with this thinking. In their suchness, things totally
interpenetrate with other things. Everything is present in any given thing, and
any given thing is present in everything else --- interdependent arising. This
is actually experienced in mindfulness.
17.23 Knowledge Free of Personal Defilements: knowledge free of ignorance,
grasping, and hatred
These three contaminates the ways in which a person acts and thinks. By defiling
a person’s consciousness and volitions, they give rise to all of the attitudes
and action that produce duhkha. Ignorance is of course the root of all these
defilements. The defilements obscure our understanding of the true nature of
reality; the knowledge free of these defilements provides the understanding of
no separate self, the noble fourfold truth, and so on.
17.24 Knowledge Free from Discursive Thought: the highest kind of knowledge that
Buddhas and bodhisattvas have of reality.
Through rigorous discursive thought, they know of the doctrine of no-self,
emptiness...; but they also know that discursive thought itself is merely
conceptual construction. They further know, through direct insight, the great
means of enlightenment, the actual reality of the things (that is, emptiness)
that are merely represented by the conceptual constructions of discursive
thought. In other words, the highest kind of knowledge reveals that the ways
things really are is neither existent nor nonexistent, but midway between
existence and nonexistence.
17.3 Nature and Function of Consciousness
There are two ways consciousness functions: (1) Ordinary dualistic consciousness
functions in terms of knowing subject and known objects. Since it moves between
its subject and its objects, it is referred to as discursive consciousness. This
consciousness knows a given thing by representing it as an object to the
subject; however, the object known is only a mental representation; and the
knowing subject is also a mental representation. (2) Non-dualistic consciousness
functions where knowledge is immediate and direct. The representations of
subject and object are not involved in this consciousness/ knowledge. In
(nondualistic) mindfulness this second way consciousness functions is
experienced directly. Words cannot describe it: for, to talk about it is
unavoidably to talk about it as an object known by a subject.
This distinction is also closely related to conceptualization/ differentiation.
17.31 Store Consciousness (alayavijnana)
Yogacarins refer to a fundamental consciousness called store consciousness to
explain the origins and continuity of ordinary consciousness. Intentional
(discursive) consciousness refers to its object (grasped) and subject(grasper);
by contrast, store consciousness is not discursive or intentional; it functions
beyond the dualities of subject and object.
17.32 Eight Kinds of Consciousness
The first six produce the awareness of the various objects of the senses and the
mind: sight, sound, smell, taste, feel, and thought. The seventh kind (called
defiled consciousness) recognizes the store consciousness but mistakes it for an
object which it wrongly views as a permanent, independent self. These seven
kinds are all intentional and dualistic.
The eighth kind is the store consciousness that underlies the other kinds and
functions of consciousness. When completely purified, this fundamental
consciousness becomes directly aware of itself (--- enlightenment) transcending
the differentiation of the subject and the object.
17.321 The store consciousness collects and stores the effects or seeds of
experience until they mature and give rise to new experiences. All experiences
arise from these seeds. The particular intentional consciousnesses are only
manifestations of the great ocean of store consciousness, out of which they
arise and to which they return.
17.322 How do ignorance and enlightenment arise? Ignorance arises because
intentional (discursive) consciousness mistakes the subject and the object of
knowledge for the reality they merely represent. The truth is that both
object-consciousness and self-consciousness are manifestations of store
consciousness. "This transformation of consciousness is a discrimination, and as
it is discriminated, it does not exist, and so everything is perception-only."
In mindfulness, duality is overcome as both the subject and the object of
experience are dissolved in the immediacy of the experience itself. The
enlightenment arises when the subject and the object are seen to be empty of the
reality in the fundamental consciousness of mindfulness.
17.323 The theory of store consciousness explains the continuity of the person:
(1) The store consciousness collects the fruits of past experience and then
reissues the new experiences. This explains the continuity between past,
present, and the future activities of consciousness. (2) An ignorant person
becomes enlightened if the defiled seeds are purified, through practice of
perfections, within the continuing store consciousness.
17.324 An explanation of karma, the retribution of effects of actions to the
doer is also possible because the effects of action are stored in the store
consciousness as seeds from which future experiences arise.
18 Zen
The origin of the wordless transmission of true teaching: "Long ago when the
Buddha was at Mount Gridhrakuta to give a talk, he held up a flower before the
assemblage. At this all remained silent. The Venerable Maha Kashyapa alone broke
into a smile. The Buddha said, ‘I have the all-pervading True Dharma,
incomparable Nirvana, exquisite teaching of formless form. It does not rely on
letters and is transmitted outside scripture. I now hand it to Maha Kashyapa.’"
The legendary Bodhidharma symbolizes the emphasis on sitting meditation, sudden
enlightenment, and the wisdom beyond words that give Zen its unique character
--- his 9 year long sitting meditation, gazing at a wall in a cave. The
experience of enlightenment, precisely because it goes beyond the dualities of
thought constructs, cannot be grasped or communicated intellectually; only
profound silence can express it.
18.1 Aims of Zen
Zen is a way of life that has a certain aims, prescribes various practices, and
rests upon an understanding of reality. As a way of life, Zen is training not in
doing something, but training in not doing. For example, zazen (sitting
meditation) is not thinking, but letting go of thinking.
Zen emphasizes the integrity and completeness of the present experience (here
and now) wherein there is no distinction between subject and object. Dogen says,
"Put your whole mind into the practice of the Way. Remember that you are alive
only today in this moment." The ultimate is not separate from the everyday; and
ordinary things, when rightly seen, are the supreme reality. Enlightenment does
not take us beyond the ordinary things of life, but allows us to experience them
in a new light, revealing their profundity. The real aim of Zen is to live
ordinary life fully, rather than to transcend it. -- Mahayana...
18.2 Practice
18.21 Zazen (sitting meditation)
Three Aims of Zazen: (1) Concentration. (2) Satori (the awakening of
enlightenment that sees directly into one’s own existence and the existence of
others) --- the enlightenment of satori may come like a flash, but it
presupposes intensive training for most people through, e.g., koan. cf.) Read
the poems of BB p. 217 --- To the enlightened mind, reality is dynamic and
whole, not passive and divided. (3) Living Enlightenment --- Enlightenment is
not just a momentary experience. It is to be lived; every action and every
moment should be an action and a moment lived in enlightenment. cf.) Read the
poems of BB P.218 --- In the state of nonseperation, self is experienced as
present in all things and all things are experienced as present in oneself.
18.22 Koan Practice --- Koans are paradoxical sayings that are to be taken
seriously; but conceptualization cannot help understand the truth of the saying,
and the student is driven beyond the conceptualizing mind to a deeper,
spontaneous, and undivided awareness.
All definitions of enlightenment are inadequate. Even negative descriptions,
which point out what it is not, presuppose the dichotomy between is and is not.
Without experiencing at least a degree of enlightenment, perhaps the only way to
get a sense of the experience is to talk with people who have achieved satori or
to read their biographies.
18.23 Teachings --- zazen, koan, and question-and-answer sessions.
Anarchism - Philosophy
by George Woodcock
A social philosophy that rejects authoritarian government and maintains
that voluntary institutions are best suited to express man's natural
social tendencies. Historically the word "anarchist," which derives from
the Greek an archos, meaning "no government," appears first to have been
used pejoratively to indicate one who denies all law and wishes to promote
chaos. It was used in this sense against the Levelers during the English
Civil War and during the French Revolution by most parties in criticizing
those who stood to the left of them along the political spectrum. The
first use of the word as an approbatory description of a positive
philosophy appears to have been by Pierre Joseph Proudhon when, in his
Qu'est-ce-que la propriete? (What Is Property?, Paris, 1840), he described
himself as an anarchist because he believed that political organization
based on authority should be replaced by social and economic organization
based on voluntary contractual agreement. Nevertheless, the two uses of
the word have survived together and have caused confusion in discussing
anarchism, which to some has appeared a doctrine of destruction and to
others a benevolent doctrine based on a faith in the innate goodness of
man. There has been further confusion through the association of anarchism
with nihilism and terrorism. In fact, anarchism, which is based on faith
in natural law and justice, stands at the opposite pole to nihilism, which
denies all moral laws. Similarly, there is no necessary connection between
anarchism, which is a social philosophy, and terrorism, which is a
political means occasionally used by individual anarchists but also by
actionists belonging to a wide variety of movements that have nothing in
common with anarchism.
Anarchism aims at the utmost possible freedom compatible with social life,
in the belief that voluntary cooperation by responsible individuals is not
merely more just and equitable but is also, in the long run, more
harmonious and ordered in its effects than authoritarian government.
Anarchist philosophy has taken many forms, none of which can be defined as
an orthodoxy, and its exponents have deliberately cultivated the idea that
it is an open and mutable doctrine. However, all its variants combine a
criticism of existing governmental societies, a vision of a future
libertarian society that might replace them, and a projected way of
attaining this society by means outside normal political practice.
Anarchism in general rejects the state. It denies the value of democratic
procedures because they are based on majority rule and on the delegation
of the responsibility that the individual should retain. It criticizes
Utopian philosophies because they aim at a static "ideal" society. It
inclines toward internationalism and federalism, and, while the views of
anarchists on questions of economic organization vary greatly, it may be
said that all of them reject what William Godwin called accumulated
property.
Attempts have been made by anarchist apologists to trace the origins of
their point of view in primitive nongovernmental societies. There has also
been a tendency to detect anarchist pioneers among a wide variety of
teachers and writers who, for various religious or philosophical reasons,
have criticized the institution of government, have rejected political
activity, or have placed a great value on individual freedom. In this way
such varied ancestors have been found as Lao-Tse, Zeno, Spartacus, Etienne
de La Boetie, Thomas Munzer, Rabelais, Fenelon, Diderot, and Swift;
anarchist trends have also been detected in many religious groups aiming
at a communalistic order, such as the Essenes, the early Christian
apostles, the Anabaptists, and the Doukhobors. However, while it is true
that some of the central libertarian ideas are to be found in varying
degrees among these men and movements, the first forms of anarchism as a
developed social philosophy appeared at the beginning of the modern era,
when the medieval order had disintegrated, the Reformation had reached its
radical, sectarian phase, and the rudimentary forms of modem political and
economic organization had begun to appear. In other words, the emergence
of the modem state and of capitalism is paralleled by the emergence of the
philosophy that, in various forms, has opposed them most fundamentally.
Although Proudhon was the first writer to call himself an anarchist, at
least two predecessors outlined systems that contain all the basic
elements of anarchism. The first was Gerrard Winstanley (1609-c. 1660), a
linen draper who led the small movement of the Diggers during the
Commonwealth. Winstanley and his followers protested in the name of a
radical Christianity against the economic distress that followed the Civil
War and against the inequality that the grandees of the New Model Army
seemed intent on preserving. In 1649-1650 the Diggers squatted on
stretches of common land in southern England and attempted to set up
communities based on work on the land and the sharing of goods. The
communities failed, but a series of pamphlets by Winstanley survived, of
which The New Law of Righteousness (1649) was the most important.
Advocating a rational Christianity, Winstanley equated Christ with "the
universal liberty" and declared the universally corrupting nature of
authority. He saw "an equal privilege to share in the blessing of liberty"
and detected an intimate link between the institution of property and the
lack of freedom. In the society he sketched, work would be done in common
and the products shared equally through a system of open storehouses,
without commerce.<