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 Cognitive Scepticism Of Nagarjuna
Theory of Knowledge
Cognitive Scepticism Of Nagarjuna
D. K. Mohanta
Assam University
aulib@dte.vsnl.net.in

ABSTRACT: This paper aims at a critical exposition of some arguments by
Nagarjuna against the cognitivist claims of the Nyaya philosophers, and
a possible cognitivist critique of the skeptical arguments of Nagarjuna.
My argument is presented in two broad sections. The first deals mainly
with an exposition of Nagarjuna's charges against the concept of
pramana, while the second is devoted to critical evaluation of the
Nagarjunian charges. I conclude with the impression that there is hardly
any common ground on which a Nyaya cognitivist and a Nagarjunian skeptic
can meet. For this reason, the Nagarjunian cognitive skepticism seems to
be theoretically 'irrefutable' but 'psychologically incorrigible.'


Preamble
By cognitive scepticism here we mean a philosophical attitude which
suspends the possibility of making conclusive statements concerning
non-erring cognition or prama as it is called in Indian Philosophy for
want of sufficiently warranted instrumental and casual grounds (or
pramanas as it is called in Indian Philosophy). A cognitive sceptic, dose
not go for 'theory - making'. Amidst the opposing claims he finds no
better ground for his choice for one claim than its contra-claim. In
philosophical circle, he questions or raises doubt about the validity of
the 'knowledge claims' made by others. If we bear in mind this general
characterization when we read Nagarjuna's philosophical treatises like
Vigraha-vyavartani and Mulamadhyamaka Karika, we would be convinced that
there is no logical or psychological obstruction or hardship to make an
extension of the applicability of the term 'cognitive sceptic' to
Nagarjuna. In his philosophical works Nagarjuna subjects the
'knowledge-claims' made by the Naiyayikas and others to severe dialectical
criticism and shows that these claims are not supported by sufficient
justification.
The philosophical opponent of the sceptic to coin a word from Matilal, may
be called 'cognitivists'. (2) In Indian Philosophy they are mostly
Naiyayikas who claim that with the help of justificatory grounds as casual
instruments (pramanas) we can have the cognition of the objects of the
knowledge (prameyas). In Akaspada Goutama's 'Nyayasutra' knowledge is
considered as something that leads to attainment of the highest good (
tattvajnanannihsreyasadhigamah ). In Nyaya system of philosophy knowledge
is taken as something which always points beyond itself. All the furniture
of the world are classified under several sets of objects of knowledge (
prameyas ). A piece of cognition is valid if it can give us an indubitably
true awareness of an object of knowledge. Nagarjuna devoted 20 verses from
31st 51st in Vigrahavyavartani in order to refute the Nyaya concept of
pramana. Nagarjuna's main concern here is not to say that what we know
about the world is false; rather he maintains that the knowledge claims
made by the cognitivists ( Naiyayikas and others ) are not supported by
adequate logical grounds. The paper is divided into two broad sections
.The first section deals mainly with the exposition of Nagarjunian charges
against the concept pramana while the second is devoted to critical
evaluation of the Nagarjunian charges. The paper ends with some general
remarks. The main contention of Nagarjunian scepticism is to set a limit
to cognitive claim of the Naiyayikas. In other words, it is rather a
critique to the soteriological claims on the basis of empirical foundation
of cognitivists' theory of knowledge. It is a scepticism about the
justification of knowing or pramana.
1 : No Criterion Argument
The pramanavadins (cognitivists) claim that it is possible to have
indubitablely true presentational cognition or (prama) on the basis of
pramanas. A pramana is usually defined as the instrumental cause of an
indubitable and unerring piece of presentational knowledge. All
cognitivists in Indian Philosophy would agree that the acceptance of
pramanas is something exclusively indispensable for any philosophical
investigation, because if some 'rules of game' (as Wittgenstien in his
'Philosophical Investigations ' compares a philosophical enquiry as a form
of linguistic game) are not accepted at the very outset a player would not
be entitled to take a part in the game. In other words, he would be
putting himself out of the court before the game begins. (3) A Nyaya
cognitivist Vatsyayana further argues that in philosophical debate, one is
supposed to defend or reject certain thesis. Even for the rejection one
would require this or that pramana. In other words, even the very denial
of a certain pramana is possible only on the acceptance of certain other
pramana and this precisely establishes the validity of pramana as such.
And if once it is admitted that the validity of pramana as a variety of
knowable (prakara), one is logically compelled to recognise three other
varities of knowables (prakara)-the agent of knowledge (pramata), object
of knowledge (prameya) and knowledge par excellence (pramiti). (4) It is
here a Nagarjunian philosopher would object that your very programme is
defective. (5) If you say that prameyas or knowables are justified because
of pramanas (ground) and pramanas are not questionable, then you are
acting as a dogmatic in philosophising. If you accept the reality of
pramanas without any justification, your very acceptance is an exercise of
dogmatism. All the accounts of the cognitivists may be broadly classified
under two heads: (a) the pramanas are self-validating (svatah prasiddhih)
that is to say they are intrinsically valid. (b) their validity is
established on the basis of some other pramanas (paratah prasiddhih). Both
these possible alternatives have been examined by Nagarjuna. The charge of
no criterion centres the question: How is a congitivist going to validate
his standard or criterion (pramana) itself ? It is said that pramana is
valid on its own ground in terms of itself, that is no more than just
begging the question and is a case of dogmatic enterprise. If it is said
that pramana is validated in terms of another, that would immediately
leave room for the charge of infinite regress. Now either way, according
to a Nagarjunian sceptic, a cognitivist can not have adequate means to
support the established status or truth-criterionship of pramanas which
lies at the foundation of cognitivist's truth-claims. Let us elaborate the
arguments.
1.1 Charge of Inner-inconsistency and Dogmatism Explained
The point Nagarjuna elaborates is this that dogmatism and inconsistency of
arguments would be automatic outcome if we admit pramanas as
self-validating. Nagarjuna further argues that if we admit that pramanas
are required for the justificatory grounds as well as intrumental cause
for establishing the knowables (prameyas) but the pramanas themselves
belong to a self-validating class, then we also accept that pramanas are
placed in a 'privilezed sacrosanct class'-that is to say, a clear-cut
dichotomy is introduced between pramanas and prameyas. But a philosopher
must explain, the justificatory grounds for such preferential treatment;
he should not merely state the dichotomy but must explain the reason
behind such dichotomy. This is what exactly Nagarjuna demands. 'If without
assigning any reason pramanas are claimed to be self-validating then a
sense of arbitrariness would be introduced and this acceptance of this
without any justificatory certification is a clear case of dogmatic
enterprise.' This is also a case of internal inconsistency and disaccord
in congnitivists' arguments.
1.2 The Charge of Infinite Regress Revisited
Now if in order to aviod the charge of non-accordance and dogmatism, the
cognitivist adopts the second alternative that is a pramana may derive its
validity or authority from another pramana of the same type or different
type this would, according to Nagarjuna, instead of giving any
justification for the acceptance of pramana simply invite the blemish of
infinite regress (anavasthadosa). (6) For example, of the first
alternative we may say that a perception say P1 is established through
another perception say P2 and for the second, a perception say P, is
established through an inference say F. But in either case of the theory
of extrinsic validity, the blemish of 'infinite regress' would be
inevitable. (7) These are the techniques about which the congnitivists
themselves highly speak of, that is, if something is to be acceptable,
there must be inner logical consistency between the justification and the
claim and a justification must not be vitiated by the blemishes of
circularity and infinite regress. The sceptic here is just reminding the
cognitivists that claiming pramanas as self certified, you are committing
logical inconsistency and claiming them as established by others you are
either inviting the blemish of circularity or the blemish of infinite
regress.
1.3 Analogical Arguments Refuted
However, Goutama in the Nyayasutra also employs the analogy of a lamp
(pradipa) to meet possible charge of infinite regress. (8) He says that as
a lamp reveals objects as well as itself, so the pramana (supportive
grounds) reveal prameyas (knowables) as well as themselves. It is here
Nagarjuna tries to point out faults and in 'Vigrahavyavartani' he devotes
six verses in order to show that the analogy of light or fire is quite
incapable of serving as a 'sapaksa' in the cognitivists' arguments. (9) In
'Vigrahavyavartani' verse 35, Nagarjuna argues that if pramanas were like
light or fire which reveals itself as well as the presence of other
subjects simultaneously then there would be no logical as well as
practical difficulty in claiming that fire would also burn itself as it
can burn other things. (10) But this is a contradiction in thinking as
well as in the actual happenings. In view of this, the cognitivists'
assumption that fire reveals itself as well as other objects' becomes
doubtful and remains unestablished. It is further contended that if 'fire
reveals itself as well as other object is true, then the proposition that
'darkness conceals the existence of itself as well as other things' would
also be true. (11) It is an admitted fact that although darkness conceals
the presence of other things, it does not conceals the presence of itself.
(Na caitad drstam tatra yaduktam / Svaparatmanau
prakasayatyagnirititanna). (12) What is evident here is that in contrast
with the cognitivists 'light analogy, Nagarjuna constructs just contrary
analogical argument to disprove the cognitivists' claim.
1.4 Blemishes of Interdependence and Circularity Detected
Nagarjuna further argues that if for the sake of argument we admit that
pramanas are self-established, then it would imply that they are
established even independent of prameyas (knowables). (13) But if a kind
of pramana were established without reference to prameyas, then this
particular type of pramana ceases to be worthy of the name pramana. If it
is argued that pramanas are independent of prameyas, then these pramanas
become pramanas of nothing. As pramana has always a relational character
with prameya in cognitive situation, the thesis that 'pramanas are
independently established' becomes refuted. If it is said that pramanas
are established through prameyas and prameyas through pramanas, then a
Nagarjunian sceptic would at once point out that neither of them have a
self-nature (svabhava) of their own and therefore, should be treated as
sunya (vacous). (14) Again, it would be a case of proving what is already
proved (siddha-sadhana), because the tacit assumption is this, that
prameyas are already established. (15) If prameyas were regarded as
already established, the necessity of pramana itself for the establishment
of prameyas becomes superfluous. If it is said that the validity of
pramanas are prameyas dependent and the validity or establishment of
prameya is pramana dependent then it amounts to committing the blemishes
of interdependence and circularity. Nagarjuna laughs at the cognitivis
because his view almost amounts to say that "the son is produced by the
father and that father is produced by that son. But in this case who is
that gives birth and who is that is born". (16) Therefore the criterion of
mutual dependence rather shows that both pramanas and prameyas are devoid
of any essence of their own (sunya). Since there is neither established
pramana nor established prameya the so called 'knowledge-claim' of the
cognitivists becomes unwarranted. (17) All views (drsti) about the world,
for Nagarjuna, becomes systematically misleading and therefore, they are
to be rejected.
2 : A Cognitivist Critique of the Nagarjunian Critique of Pramana
Considered
It has been seen that a cognitivist claims that it is possible on our part
to know something with certitude and we can justify our claims by adequate
supportive grounds. A Nagarjunian sceptic only gives caution to these and
shows flaws of antinomies in cognitivists' reasonings. Let us now see how
far the sceptical charges be answered from the cognitivistic viewpoint.
Vatsyayana would meet the sceptical charge of infinite regress by saying
that it is not necessary that before functioning as an instrument a thing
must be known first. For example, we become visually aware of something in
front of us by our eyes, the sense of sight but we cannot see the senses
itself. We do not question or doubt about the reality of eyes. This shows
that in practical experience, the establishement of pramana does not arise
and there is no scope for infinite regress, because their truth can be
apprehended directly or immediately . A piece of cognition is said to be
valid if practice based on the assumption of its truth leads to the
attainment of desired end. What Udayana puts with regard to infinite doubt
in another context seems to be relevant here. He is of opinion that
"infinite series of doubt in principle is not possible. It could never be
carried out, since the activity of doubting is possible only against the
background of some area of certainty." (18) Vatsyayana further contends
that there is no rigid distinction between prameya and pramana both of
these have the same source - the root 'ma' (means 'to measure') and both
of them are meaningful only in certain cognive contexts. If we try to
understand the significance of different 'case-inflections' in sanskrit
language, it would be clear that these karakas stand for 'different
role-playing' in the linguistic contruction. (19) When something is called
a pramana, we mean that it has the instrumental role in generating
cognition and in case of prameya, it has the role of accusative case in a
cognitive situation. With this background we think a Nyaya cognitivist may
say that when something is playing the role of a pramana, psychologically
we do not feel the necessity for pramana's validity or establishment.
But here, I think, a Nagarjunian sceptic may argue against the
cognitivists' pursuation by saying that he does not see any good ground
for introducing psychological proof when one is engaged in purely logical
debate. Psychological proof can not be taken to be an adequate gurantee
for objective truth-claims. And it is also true that a cognitive sceptic's
suspension of judgement regarding what is real as mental act need not
distrub his private life. He only exercises his reasoned suspension of
judgement about reality when there is a suitable occasion for it.
The Naiyayika cognitivist may level another fresh charge aginst Nagarjunan
sceptic by saying that it is impossible to carry out the infinite doubt
regarding the validity of pramanas, because when one denies a thesis say
P, as defective, he must have a thesis, it might be a counter-thesis, say
'not-P', that is not defective. Without involving oneself in theoretical
inconsistency, one can not deny the validity of pramanas as such.
Uddyotkara in the 'Nyaya-vartika' carried this charge in a much more
straightforward way and brings the charge of self-stultification against a
cognitive sceptic. (20) The charge is this : If you deny everything, then
you can not deny the fact that 'you are denying'. If you do not deny the
fact that 'you are denying' then you are not denying everything.
What seems to me convincing here is that a cognitive sceptic like
Nagarjuna would not mind for these charges. A close study of Nagarjuna's
arguments would reveal that he would be pleasant in seeing that by this
charge, the cognitivist misunderstands him again and are trying to grasp
what the sceptic intends to convey. That is to say, what cannot be stated,
one must not state it or advocate a theory about it. It is another
significant aspect of Buddha's mysterious silence regarding metaphysical
issues, the Madhyamika unfolds. In defence of Nagarjuna, one might argue
that by sceptical arguments Nagarjuna examines all the possible views
about the establishment of pramanas and finds that to any 'pro-argument'
for a doctrine, there can be 'contra-argument' and thus he dose not have
any other choice but to stop advancing another thesis regarding prama,
prameya and pramana. He has engaged himself in epistemological debate
because it is on the basis of such epistemology, different metaphysical
theories can come into being. A cognitivist like Goutama, considers valid
cognition of reals (tattva) as that which leads to the highest good
(nihsreyasah). Nagarjunian scepticism may be considered as a caution that
points to the inadequacy of such soteriological claim on the basis of
their epistemological stand.
As regards the cognitivists' charge of self-stultification, a cognitive
sceptic like Nagarjuna would react that this comes out from a
misunderstanding of the exact significance of his refutation. It is to use
a term from classical Indian epistemology, a 'prasajya pratisedhah', that
is to say, a rejection of the possibility without (even a least)
implificatory significance to assert another or counter possibility. It is
different from 'paryyudasapratisedhah'. In paryyudasa-pratisedhah' the
assertion of the counter thesis motivates the very act of rejection of any
thesis. (21) This consideration is enough to show that the cognitivists'
charge of theoretical incoherence in sceptcial rejection is not tenable.
From this it appears that theoretically scepticism is irrefutable. A
cognitive
sceptic like Nagarjuna would only try to unfold the drama of the logical
consequences of the cognitivists' epistemological framework. To be more
specific, Nagarjuna tries to undermine the foundations of speculative
metaphysics. The language Nagarjuna uses is 'meta-language' and by this
type of linguistic expression about statements that make 'objective
truth-claims', he can answer the charge of self-stultification against
him. As a result when all statements of 'object-level' are shown to be
unwarranted, that does not affect the truth-status of the meta-level
statement of Nagarjuna. The remedy suggested by Nagarjuna is the awareness
of 'sunyata', the rejection of language empirical determinations as an
adequate instrument for any veridical description of the real. Nagarjuna's
dialectics merely "shows" the structure of reality but does not "say" or
"assert" anything about reality. Had he been aquainted in the linguistic
phrasology of Wittgenstein, he might probably have expresed it in the same
vein "whereof one can not speak, thereof one must be silent.' (22)
3. Concluding Remarks
From what has been discussed in fore-going paragraphs, a crucial question
may be raised at this point. How can such a (logically irrefutable)
sceptical position be consistently carried out in practice ? Can it make
'adequate sense' in 'belief-behaviour'. Does it (the sceptical position)
not overthrow the foundation of all practical activity ? Can we live
without the guidance of some inherent position what we accept ? A
cognitive sceptic of Nagarjuian type might react to such questions by
saying that it would be an exercise of dogmatism if something with
reference to actual state of practics is introduced as the ultimate resort
when somebody is engaged in purely theoretical discourse with his
philosophical opponents. (23)
It is however, true that a Nyaya cognitivgist's pre-suppositions for
pluralistic metaphysics and its description through epistemological
frame-work seem to initiate the sceptical approach in Indian Philosophy in
order to dismantle the main fabric of many dogmatic assertions. An
important question may arise here : Can there be any commonly sharable
point on which a Nyaya cognitivist and a Nagarjunian sceptic can meet ?
Our humble answer to this question would be in the negative. When a
Nagarjunian sceptic is asking for the pramana's pramana he is demanding
for the absolute causal proof as the ground for claiming truth (in the
absolute sense) regarding the object of knowledge. A cognitive sceptic
uses the term 'indubitability' strictly in the logical sense 'which imputs
the intrinsic doubtfulness of all contingent statements.' (24) He
criticises the concepts required to justify any knowledge-claim. But a
Nyaya cognitivist does not make cognitive claim in its absolutistic sense;
he would rather say that he seeks pramana whenever he feels necessity for
this in actual state of practice. For him, it is somehow 'nonsensical' to
seek reason after reason, that is, to go on seeking where there is no
'psychological requirement' for this in actual state of practice. Again,
for a Nyaya cognitivist, the concepts like pramana (causal means of
knowing), prameya (knowable) etc. are not absolute but relative to the
context of their specific 'role playing'. (25) A pramana is considered as
the causal and instrumental ground for yielding knowledge (prama) which is
of the nature of an effect, in certain context about a certain knowable
(prameya); it does not mean that in certain other contexts it can not act
as a knowable (prameya). In view of this Nagarjuna's demand for explaining
the cause of placing pramana in a 'sacrosanct class' seems; to be
unwarranted. The same term seems to be used by the cognitivist and the
sceptic in two different senses; the former uses it in the 'relative
sense' whereas the later uses it in the 'absolute sense. For a Nyaya
cognitivist, all logical queries are to be preceded by some psychological
factors like 'dubiousness' about the exact character of the knowable and
this state of doubt is to be eradicated by the application of a pramana
(s) that can causally justify the truth of a specific cognitive episode as
devoid of doubt. And an evidential justification in the sense of causal
ways and means of knowing is considered as 'justification' as long as it
is coherent with the practicability. But a Nagarjunian sceptic whose sole
interest lies in 'refutation exclusively' does not care for this and
devotes so much to clear the way to travel that he almost forgets the
destination. Facing the difficulty in meeting the psychological ground for
the endless logical enquiry, a Nagarjunian sceptic and the Nyaya
cognitivist use 'reason' in different senses; for the former, it is 'pure
theoretical reason' ; for the latter it is 'practice-oriented' reason that
springs from 'our form of life' (26) It also appears that Nagarjuna's
sceptical approach is an attempt to show the limitation of the
applicability of 'practice -oriented' reason to assert the nature of
reality with absolute certitude. Though a sceptic like Nagarjuna may say
that in 'theoretically oriented' debate it is irrelevant to introduce the
element of pragmatic efficacy; a Nyaya cognitivist may remind his sceptic
friend here that without accepting the validity of some common principles
even no 'theoretically oriented' debate can begin at all. But in turn, a
Nagarjunian sceptic would say that he is ready to accept the validity of
the so-called principles only as an 'adhoc' arrangement which is to be
rejected ultimately. But since there seems to be no commonly sharable
platform for both a cognitive sceptic and a Nyaya cognitivist, does it
suggest that the sceptic does leave the arena of knowledge emptyhanded?
Our answer to this, would be in the negative. In fact, Nagarjuna's
sceptical charges in Indian philosophy directly or indirectly; I believe,
have been cautions to the tendency of 'closed-door thinking' on the part
of some cognitivist and placed them on the alert. Aksapada Goutama claims
knowledge as that which leads to the attainment of the highest good
(nihsreyasah). Nagarjuna's sceptical arguments egarly point out that such
soteriological assertions on the basis of empirical foundation of
epistomological 'superstructure' are unwarrented. As a result of this
probably in latter commentaries and subcommentaries on Nyaya philosophy we
see that meticulous care have been taken to re-structure the definition of
prama, pramana etc. (27) Opening the way of 'free enquiry' and shaking the
ground for dogmatic faith cognitive scepticism of Nagarjuna type has
directly or indirectly given momentum to clear 'hindrance to genuine'
cognition. (28) The force of sceptical arguments makes many Indian
philosophers purturbed as to whether it is possible to speak of truth and
knowledge with emprical foundation. This seems to be a great disservice to
the later development of epistemological subtleties in Indian Philosophy.
29


Notes
(1) Scepticism is, indeed a wide term which may mean two board types of
epistemogical attitude. In the wider sense it would mean an
epistemological attitude that suspends all calaims for the possibility of
knowledge and in this sense a sceptic carries doubt and "seeks nothing
beyond uncertainty". But there is a special type of epistmological
attitude/grounds through which we can dispute the validity of so-called
"knowledge-claim" in all its aspects. The word "knowledge'' has been used
throughout this paper in order to mean (what is called prama in sanskrit
in Indian epistomology) true and sure piece of presentational cognition
and 'knowledge' in this sense is always known by certain causual ways and
means of knowing (usually called in sanskrit pramana).
(2) Philosophers who claim the possibility of knowledge (pramana) on the
basis of one or some casual instruments of knowing (pramana) are called
pramanavadins, the nearest word for which in western philosophy may be
'cognitivists'. All cognitivists agree that whatever be the case of a
knowable, it must be yielded by certain pramanas. But Indian philosophical
heritage is also gifted with some philosophers who do not admit the
reality of pramana itself and consequently question all claims in favour
of the possibility of knowledge on the basis of pramana. Nagarjuna,
Jayarasi and Sriharsa are three important philosophers who do not accept
the validity of any pramana and if the reality of pramana itself is
questioned or refuted the claim to possibility of knowledge stands
rufuted. For details see. B. K. Matilal, Perception (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1986) P. 64.
(3) Ludig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Trans. GEM Asncombe,
Oxford Blackwell 1958 Sect. 65) P. 31
(4) Vatsyayana in his commentary on Goutama's Nyaya-sutra 1.1.1. thus
says, "pramananata' rthapratipattu pravrttisamarthyadorthavatpramanam
..... Arthavati ca pramane pramataprameyampramitityarthavanti bhavanti
...... Catusrsucaivabvidhasu tattvamparisamapyate". It is to be noted here
that all these four naming as pramana, premeya etc. are due to the
particular 'prakara'. In other wards, something is a pramana in a
particular unit of knowledge and it may play the role of prameya in some
other unit of knowledge. But the Nagarjunian sceptic accepts pramana as
something in the rigid sense of its function, that is to say always it
acts as causal ways and means of knowing irrespective of variation in
contexts of use.
(5) It is to be noted in this connection that in Indian philosophical
heritage from early days various knowledge claims were made regarding
ethical and religious matters. There were also thinkers like Sanjaya who
questioned vehemently about the metaphysical assertions or claims. To meet
such challenges in different phases of time various cognitivistic account
or pramana theories have come into existance. Gradually the very tradition
of questioning the truth-claims with regard to metaphysical and moral
matters led to the development of sceptical arguments against the
possibility of any 'knowledge-claim'. The Nyaya cognitivistis on the
otherhand, developed a cognitivistic attitude and claimed that 'what is
existent is knowable, even nameable' But in order to know it, the
existance of a pramana or various pramanas must be a priorily admitted.
They may be compared with axioms for a logical system and their validity
is not questionable within this cognitivistic system. For details about
Sanjayas method of philosophy, one may see my paper titled;
Amaraviksepavada; The Philosophical Method of Sanjaya, Silchar, Journal of
Assam University vol. 4, no 1, 1999.
(6) The sanskrit word 'anavastha' literally means 'lack of a firm
foundation. Nagarjuna brings this charge against paratah / paraparatah
pramanyavada in the following words : "Anyair yadi pramanaih pramana
sidhir bhavettadanavastha / Nadeh siddhitatrasti naiva madhyasyanantasya
/-Vigrahavyavartani" (hence forth VV) No. 32.
(7) Nagarjuna notes all these possible instances in his vrtti (verse 51)
(8) It is interesting to note in the passing that Jayantabhatta in
Nyayamanjari likeother cognitivists also holds that knowledge (prama) is a
piece of true and indubitable awareness. But the concept of indubitability
has both psychological and logical senses of use. For the Nyaya, the
psychological sense of use is satisfied by the element of 'pragmatic
success' (arthakriyakaritva) and the logical sense of use is satisfied by
introducing the casual justificatory grounds (pramanas). In the first
sense the term; 'indubitable' is taken to mean that one is subjectively
convinced that 'p' whereas in the second sense it imputs to contingent
propositions', 'inherent dubitableness'. A Nagarjunian sceptic seems to
capitalise mostly on the second sense and thus brings the charge of
infinite regress. Vatsyayana, however tries to meet the sceptical
challenge of infinite regress to psychological pursuation. He argues that
when we prove A by B and B by C, it dose not invite the blemish of
infinite regress, because at certain level, say at C, the further question
of validity (regarding C) becomes irrelevant. Where there is no query,
there can not be any necessity of searching for a further justificatory
ground.
(9) Sapaksa : Niscitasadhyavana paksena saha vartamanah sapaksa
-yathaparvate dhumena vanhi sadhane mahanasah' - Nyayakosah Ed. By M. M.
Bhimacharya Jhalakikar, revised by M. M. Vasudeva Sastri Abhankar,
(Oriental Institute, Puna, 1929) P. 952.
(10) Yadi ca svaparatmanau tvadvavanena prakasyatyagnih / paramiva
nanvatmanam svam paridhakasyatyapi hutasah // vv. No. 35.
(11) Yadi ca svaparatmanau tvadvavanena prakasyatyagnih / pracchadayisyati
tamah svaparatmanau hutasaiva // vv. No. 36.
(12) Pradipah svaparatmanau samorkasyayate yad / tomo' pi svaparatmanau
chadayisyatyasamsayam // Maddhyamika - karika-Ch.vii 12; also see in the
commentry on Vigrahavyavartani verse No. 36.
(13) Anapeksya hi prameyanarthan yadi te pramanasidhiriti / nabhavanti
kasyacidevamimanitanipramanam // v. v. No. 41
(14) Madhyamika-karika : 1.5 (Ed. P. L. Vaidya, Mithila Institute,
Darbhanga 1960)
(15) Atha tu pramansiddhirbhavatyapekasyaiva te prameyani / Vyatyaya evam
sati te dhruvam pramana prameyanam te pramanasiddhya premeya siddhih
prameya siddhyaca / bhavati pramana siddhirnastyu bhayasyapi te siddhih//
v. v. verse 45-6
(16) Pitra yadyutpadyah putriyadi tenaciva putrena / Utpadyah sa yadi pita
vada tatrotpadyati kah kam ? Kasca pita kah putrastara tvam bruhi
tavubhayapi ca/ Pitrputralaksanadharau yato bhavati no samdehah // v. v.
verses 49-50
(17) Naiva svatah prasiddhirna parasparatah parapramanar va / Na bhavati
na-ca prameyairna capyakasmat pramananam II v. v. No 51. Comparable :Na
svatah na paratah no dvabhuyam napyahetutah / Utpannajatu vidyante bhavah
kvacana kecan // Madhyamika karika 1. 1.
(18) Drstyadrstorna sandeho bhavabhava viniccayat / Adrstivadhine heto
pratyakasamapi durlabam Nyayakusumanjali Ch. 3, Verse 6, (Ed. P. Updhyaya
& D. Shastri, Varanasi, Chowkhamba, 1957).
(19) See : Vatsyayana's commentary on Nyaya-sutra-2. 1.9. (Na pradipa
prakasa siddhivat tat siddheh) By the sanskrit word 'na' the Naiyayika
refutes the possibility of sceptical charge and then the compares the
casual means (pramana) with light. Though light is exclusively required
for the illumination of other objects, light itself is sufficient for
illumination. According to Vatsyayana the sceptical arguments shows that
pramanas can not be accepted as proof for prameyas unless we admit
pramanas as either apriori or simultaneous to prameyas and on examination
none of the alternatives can be accepted. But this charge is not directly
mentioned in Vigrahavyavartani nor does Vatsyayana mention any name as the
propounder of this objection. However, we may subsume it under
'Visesahetusca vaktavyam'.
(20) Nyaya-vartika- 2.1.12. (Ed. V. P. Dvibedin, Varanasi, Chowkhamba,
1915) P. 189.
(21) Prasajya pratisedhah is similar to J. R. Searle's illocautionary
nagation which is meant to negate 'illocutionary force' (See, Speech Acts
: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1969, PP 32-3) Sabdakalpadruma (Vol. 3, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series,
1967, P. 298 & 264 explanation goes thus : Apradhanyam vidheryatra
pratisedhe pradhanata / prasajya pratisedho 'savkriyaya saha yatra nan //
Pradhanyam hi vidheryatra pratisedhe' pradhanata / paryyudasa sa vijneyo
yatrottarapadena nan //.
(22) L. Wittgenstein : Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus ( Kegal Paul,
London, 1947) P. 189.
(23) According to J. W. N. Watkins, the pragmatic consideration or
difficulty cannot be an adequate rebuttal for a sceptic engaged in
cognitively (theoritically oriented) questioning. Question of 'praxis
orientation' is also irrelevant here, because it is noncognitive. For
details see : Science and Scepticism (Hutchinson, London, 1984) P. 36. One
may also see in this context : R. N. Ozick : Philosophical Explanations
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981) P. 197
(24) Quinton distinguishes five uses of 'indubitableness' in philosophical
enterprise. See : A. M. Quintion : The Nature of Things (London, 1975) PP.
144-9
(25) See : Vatsyayana's commentary on 'Nyaya-Sutra 2.1.19
(26) See : T. K. Sarkar : Knowledge, Truth and Justification (Calcutta,
Allied Pub. & Jadavpur University, 1992) P. 203
(27) It is to be noted here that we see some refinement in using
philosophical concepts in the later writing of the same Nyaya School. When
in the Navyanyaya (Neo-school of Nyaya) the term knowledge (prama) is
prefixed by the term asandigdha (non-dubious) it does not mean 'knowledge
must be certain', rather it implies that a genuine piece of knowledge
(prama) will never be vitiated by the presence of 'dubiety' about the
absence of knowledgehood (pramatva) and this is precisely meant by the
saying 'apramanya jnananaskandita'. However, the Nyaya cognitivists in
later days have tried to develop a casual theory of knowledge with many
technicalities where a pramana is operative as intrumental case of
generating knowledge (prama) and there is no room for getting knowledge
(as something 'non-dubious and truth hitting mental episode') from a
faulty pramana or pseudo-pramana.
(28) For details see: Rashvihari Das : Philosophical Essays (Ed. R. Das,
University of Calcutta, Calcutta 1994) PP. 1.8.21.
(29) To support our contention let us quote from S. N. Dasgupta, a noted
historian of Indian Philosophy. Dasgupta states : "Unlike the older Nyaya,
later Nyaya writers like Gangesa, Raghunatha and others were mainly
occupied in investing suitable qualificatory adjuncts and phrases by which
they could define their categories in such a way that the undersirable
applications and uses of their definitions, pointed out by the criticism
of their opponents could be avioded" - A history of Indian Philosphy, Vol
- 2 (Cambridge 1951) P. 146

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BAUDRILLARD


Baudrillard uses the metaphor "earthquake"
to describe a "form of catastrophy" which
according to him is typical of our times.
The play of destruction and resurrection
("volcanic eruption") will be replaced by the
blasting apart of almost inseparable things, the
cracked surface shifting, changing, drifting apart.
Baudrillard: "This all serves to acquaint us
with the horizontal age of sensations without
consequences, where the last act is staged
almost like a parody by Nature itself."


Jean Baudrillard
THE SEISMIC ORDER
The seismic order is the future. It constitutes the congenital order of
catastrophy in the age of simulation (I don't know why) - an unfathomable
and bottomless form of the crevice the rupture and the crack, the order of
bursting and brittle objects; the order by which immense masses of earth
and entire regions slide over the other, producing violent surface
tremors. We are no longer taken aback by the destructive lava: a
fire-spitting mouth covering the earth and bringing with it punishment and
purification.
Here, it is not the Flood that is being referred to, but rather a primal
catastrophy as the beginning of the world: to be exact the great,
legendary and mythical orders which are forever monopolizing our
attention. The explosion which culminated as an order (principle) in the
frenzy following the nuclear catastrophy, appears to have more to do with
the present (conversely it also backed up the myth of the Big Bang als
being the origin of the universe). The earthquake, the seismic order has,
one could say, a more modern and more topical nature confirming yet again
that catastrophies adapt themselves to their relevant cultural order.
Cities also distinguish themselves through a certain order of catastrophy
relative to them, constituting in each case the keen fascination of the
city in question. For New York it is King-Kong, black-out and the vertical
bombardment. Towering inferno. Los Angeles represents a horizontal break
and the gliding away of California into the Pacific. Earthquake.
Today we are confronted with an order which is even closer to mind: it
belongs to the system of fissions and immediate diffusion; comparable to a
system of waves, a spasmodic order and direct (polar) reversal. The sky no
longer falls on our heads, but the ground is now slipping away from under
our feet.
 

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Buddhism Glossary




A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T |
U | V | W | X | Y| Z



A
Amitabha Buddha*
The name of the bodhisattva who established the Pure Land form of Buddhism.
The power he gained from his merit as a bodhisattva enabled him to establish
the Pure Land and now allows him to help others enter the Pure Land. The laity
in particular can now enter the Pure Land with Amitabha's help, they do not
have to get there on their own power. All they need do is to chant and believe
the Amida Butsu.
Amida Butsu *
In Japanese, the term by which devotees call on Amitabha Buddha. They usually
say "Praise to the Buddha Amitabha," i.e., "Namu Amida Butsa," which can be
shortened to "Nembutsu."
anatman/anatta *
The Buddhist notion that there is no eternal soul, unlike in Hinduism.
Instead, each living person is an association of five skandas, which fly apart
at death. Linguistically, "atta" is Pali for "atman" while "an" is the
negative. The term literally means "no soul."
arhat/arhant/arahat/arahant *
A term used primarily in Theravada Buddhism to signify a person who has
fulfilled its ultimate goal, the attainment of nirvana. Upon death, the arhat
will become extinguished. The arhat, as an individual, has attained full
enlightenment, peace and freedom. This should be contrasted to Mahayana
Buddhism, in which the ultimate goal is to become a bodhisattva--someone who
uses the power they gain from enlightenment to help others.
Asura *
This term is often translated as "ogre" or "titan." They are one of the six
states of existence that are in samsara. Different types of Buddhism view them
differently. Asura is usually seen as positive, resulting from good karma like
human beings and gods. In this interpretation, they dwell in the lower
heavens. Other views treat the asuras as resulting from bad karma and hence
they are seen as the enemies of the gods. Some types of Buddhism ignore this
category altogether and have only five states of existence.
Avalokiteshvara*
Popularly known as the Bodhisattva of Compassion. He has reincarnated in this
world numerous times (in both male and female forms) and therefore plays many
roles depending on which strand of Buddhism one follows. First, in Mahayana
Buddhism, he is considered to be the manifestation of Amitabha Buddha, the
founder of the Pure Land school of Buddhism, and is often represented at
Amitabha's right hand. As such he is available to help all in dire need.
Second, in China, she appears as Kuan Yin, the Goddess of Compassion. In folk
belief, she keeps people safe from natural catastrophe. Third, in Tibet, he
appears in several forms. The most important of these are as Chenrezig (the
male partner of the couple who gave birth to the Tibetan people), Tara, and as
the Dalai Lama.
Awakening
A Zen term for enlightenment.



B
bhikkhu, bikkhuni *
A Buddhist monk, a Buddhist nun.
bodhi*
See Enlightenment.
Bodhisattva*
In Mahayana Buddhism, a person who has achieved enlightenment, but has who has
chosen to remain in this world to help those who are suffering, instead of
going on to nirvana. This is the highest ideal. Kuan Yin is an important
Chinese bodhisattva; her full name means "Hearing World's Cries Bodhisattva."
Amitabha Buddha is an important Bohisattva in the Mahayana form of Buddhism
called Pure Land. The idea of the bodhisattva should be contrasted to the
arhat of Theravada Buddhism.
Buddha *
(1) The Buddha is Siddartha who was the founder of Buddhism. He was the first
to attain enlightenment, and then taught others how to attain it. His first
name is Siddartha, his family name was Gautama. He was a member of the Shakya
clan, and hence is called Shakyamuni, "the wise one of the Shakyas." He is
also known as Tathagata, "the Enlightened One." (2) Mahayana Buddhism holds
that there are five Buddhas who have/will manifest themselves in the earthly
realm. The fifth Buddha, who will come in the future, is known as Maitreya.
(3) In Mahayana, a buddha is someone who has attained enlightenment.
Buddha-fields *
The Buddha-fields are the infinite number of paradises which are populated by
uncountable Buddhas and bodhisattvas. The Buddha-fields are beyond the realm
of samsara. Those within them have reached enlightenment, but have not yet
attained nirvana. This is where Amitabha has his Pure Land.



C
Chan Buddhism
The Chinese name for Zen Buddhism.
Chenrezig *
The Tibetan form of Avalokiteshvara, the Bodhisattva of Compassion. Chenrezig
is viewed as the founding father of the Tibetan people, and has had several
manifestations among them. The most famous are King Songtsen Gampo who brought
Buddhism to Tibet in the seventh century, and the Dalai Lama. His female
aspect is Tara. The mantra associated with him (om mane padme hum) was the
first to enter Tibet.



D
Dalai Lama*
The bodhisattva who is the reincarnation of Avalokiteshvara, a.k.a. Chenrezig,
the bodhisattva of Compassion. He is a single being who has been reincarnated
14 times as the Dalai Lama. See also lama. The Dalai Lama has always been a
combination the chief spiritual leader and the chief political leader of
Tibet. The present Dalai Lama lives in exile in Nepal; he remains spiritual
leader of his people, even under their oppression by the Chinese government.
For further information, click here.
Dharma/ Dhamma*
The teachings of the Buddha.
dhyana
Another way of spelling jhana.
dorje
See Thunderbolt.
dukkha *
The Buddhist understanding of the nature of life, especially human life. It is
suffering, pain, misery, and death. To see how dukkha is explained within
Theravada Buddhism, click here.



E
Eightfold Path*
The Noble Eightfold path consists of the eight steps by which a person can
achieve Nirvana. This is the path by which one ceases to desire and thereby
ceases to suffer (see dukkha). This path leads to a form of meditation which,
similar to Raja Yoga in Hinduism, enables a person to reach enlightenment. The
eight stages are:
1) Right Views.
2) Right Intent.
3) Right Speech.
4) Right Conduct.
5) Right livelihood.
6) Right effort.
7) Right mindfulness.
8) Right concentration.
To see how the Eightfold Path is described within Theravada Buddhism, click
here.
Emptiness*
Emptiness is usually the description of Enlightenment. To the western mind,
this description is often difficult to comprehend, leading to the idea that it
is "nothing," and therefore quite unattractive. Two points will help correct
this view. First, "emptiness" can be understood as the Buddhist way of saying
that Ultimate Reality is incapable of being described, much the way that many
Christian theologians view the Christian God as beyond our human attempts to
describe. Second, the "emptiness" should not be thought of an another place.
Instead, it is identical to the world or universe humans experience in this
life. In this way, it is much like the Hindu notion that this world is simply
maya (illusion), which prevents humans from seeing the true unity of the
cosmos (which in Hinduism means the identity of Atman and Brahman). Thus
emptiness and the phenomena of this world are the same, or as the Heart Sutra
says, "Form is emptiness, emptiness is form."
Enlightenment*
This is the usual English translation of the Sanskrit word "bodhi," which
literally means "awakening." It is achieved by following the Eight-fold path,
and therefore constitutes freedom from all desires. Enlightenment gives the
person who achieves it the wisdom of perceiving the ultimate reality, which
entails the power and the ability to work to change that reality in certain
ways--especially to help people in need. For example, Amitabha created the
western land--the Pure Land--as a heaven for his followers. Enlightenment is
often described as emptiness. This is the final step before nirvana. Gaining
Enlightenment can be likened to breaking through a wall. At first, only a
small hole may be created, through which one can briefly see a small part of
the other side. Ultimately, the whole wall may be destroyed and all will be
visible.



F
Factors of Conditioned Rising
There are twelve factors of conditioned arising: death, birth, craving,
ignorance, consciousness, becoming, contact, sensation, the six senses,
grasping, the power of formation, and mind and body.
Five Precepts *
The minimum set of moral rules for Buddhism, practiced by both the lay people
and the monks of the sangha. They forbid (1) theft, (2) improper sexual
practices (adultery for lay people, sexual activity of any kind for monks),
(3) killing, (4) lying and deceiving, and (5) drinking alcoholic drinks. To
see how the Five Precepts are laid out within Theravada Buddhism, click here.
Four Noble Truths *
The most basic statement of Buddhist belief:
(1) All is suffering (dukkha).
(2) Suffering is caused by desire.
(3) If one can eliminate desire, they can eliminate suffering.
(4) The Noble Eight-fold Path can eliminate desire.
To see how the Four Noble Truths are explained within Theravada Buddhism,
click here.



G
Gautama *
The Buddha's family name, or last name. His first name was Siddhartha.
Guru *
A teacher or guide for a novice. This is an important activity in Vajrayana
Buddhism.



H
Heart Sutra *
One of the central sutras in Mahayana Buddhism. It is particularly important
in Zen because of its teaching about emptiness. The key idea of this teaching
is: "Form is no other than emptiness, emptiness is no other than form." For an
on-line translation of the Heart Sutra, click here.
Hinayana
The term literally means "the Little Way." It is a derogatory term put onto
Theravada Buddhism by those who follow Mahayana, which means "the Great Way
(or vehicle, or raft)."
Hungry Ghost *
These ghosts are a state of existence, a type of rebirth. This state stems
from negative karma. The ghosts live between the earth and hell. They are
called hungry because they have large stomachs and tiny mouths. This is one of
the six states of existence.



I
Impermanence
(Sanskrit: anitya, Pali: anicca) This term refers to the Buddhist notion that
all things of samsara are impermanent. Once created, they decay and pass away.
Although this is particularly true for human illness and death, the idea
refers to the nature of all things. It is one of the reasons for suffering and
is considered one of the three marks of existence.



J
Jhana/dhyana
A jhanais one of the highest levels of awareness that can be reached by the
practice of samadhi. There are four jhanas, which together essentially are
enlightenment. This is where the monk attains supernormal powers, sees his
past lives, and gains wisdom of the true character of reality.



K
Karma/Kamma *
For Buddhism, as in Hinduism, this is the moral law of cause and effect.
People build up karma (both good and bad) as a result of their actions. This
then determines the state of existence to which one is reborn after birth. In
Buddhism, the different levels can include hells, humans or animals in this
world, or one of several heavens.
koan *
A riddle-like puzzle used for teaching in Zen Buddhism. It cannot be solved by
reason, but instead forces the student to solve it through a flash of insight.
A well-known example is the question, "What is the sound of one hand
clapping?" For a collection of koans, click here.
Kuan Yin *
The Chinese manifestation of Avalokiteshvara, the Bodhisattva of Compassion.
Although originally depicted as male, he gradually became represented as
female. She appears to all who need her help, especially those threatened by
water, demons, sword or fire. Childless women often turn to her for help.



L
Laity*
An English word used to refer to the general members of a religion (in
Buddhism, Christianity, etc.) as opposed to religious specialists such as
monks or priests. In Buddhism, the opposite of laity is the sangha.
Lama*
In Vajrayana, the term for teacher or guru. He is usually the head of a
monastery or perhaps several monasteries. Some important lamas are considered
to be bodhisattvas, such as the Dalai Lama.
Lotus Sutra
The Lotus Sutra is probably the most important text of Mahayana Buddhism. It
describes a lecture the Buddha gave and the ideas and thoughts. He discusses
all the things that differentiate Mahayana Buddhism from Theravada, such as
the idea of a bodhisattva, in particular the bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara, the
merit of the people who venerate the Lotus Sutra, and the key to nirvana and
Buddhahood.



M
Mahakala
This is the wrathful form of Avalokiteshvara, the Bodhisattva of Compassion.
He protects from dangers and bad influences that might hinder a monk's
approach to enlightenment. Mahakala is seen as the protector of the Dalai
Lamas.
Mahayana Buddhism *
Mahayana means "The Great Raft" or "The Great Vehicle." It is the largest and
most influential of the three main forms of Buddhism (the other two being
Theravada and Vajrayana ). It is practiced in China, Japan and Korea.
Vajrayana derived from it and shares many similarities with it. Mahayana
emphasizes the idea of the bodhisattva over that of the arhat. The goal of an
individual is therefore not to pass out of this world into nirvana, but to
attain enlightenment--with the wisdom, understanding and power that goes with
it--and then to show compassion by returning to this world to help those in
need. Amitabha Buddha did this to establish Pure Land Buddhism. In comparison
to Theravada, Mahayana Buddhism emphasizes the help that gods and bodhisattvas
can give to people to help them escape samsara. It has elaborate descriptions
of how this works and emphasizes prayers and rituals that enable people to
seek this help. Zen is another branch of Mahayana Buddhism.
Maitreya *
The buddha who is expected to come in the future, known to all schools of
Buddhism. He is worshipped as a being who guides those who confess their
wrongs, and teachers who become discouraged. He is sometimes depicted as the
"Laughing Buddha" with his hands stretched over his head, a smile on his face,
and a large, bare stomach. He represents all-encompassing love.
mandala *
In general, an art form based on the closed circle, which is the symbol on
eternal continuity. In Trantric Buddhism (Vajrayana), it is a painting or
tapestry based on concentric circles. Within the circles, the Buddha usually
appears with other deities, bodhisattvas, and other symbolic imagery. For the
monk, a mandala serves as a focus of meditation, and a symbolic representation
of the reality of the identity of samsara and nirvana. In popular religion,
the mandala is often the focus of worship--or, to put it another way, the
Buddhas and deities depicted in a mandala become the object(s) of worship. For
further information about mandalas, click here.
Manjushri
The Bodhisattva of Wisdom (prajna), one of the two key Mahayana concepts; the
other is compassion (represented by Avalokiteshvara). His two main symbols are
the sword of knowledge and a book of the Prajna-Paramita Sutra. His wisdom
casts away the darkness of ignorance.
mantra *
A sound that is used as a focus for mediation or worship. Similar to Hinduism.

Marks of Existence *
There are three marks of existence: suffering (dukka), impermanence (anitya),
and "no-soul" (anatman). For a fuller discussion of these in Theravada
Buddhism, go here
Merit *
Merit is essentially "good Karma." It can be gained in a number of ways. Many
of these involve interaction between the sangha and the laity. For example,
when a lay person gives a monk food, they gain merit. Acting in a moral
manner, teaching the proper belief, preaching, and chanting also gain an
individual merit. Worship of the Buddha can also bring merit. The notion of
merit plays the largest role in Theravada Buddhism.
Moon days *
Every lunar month has four moon days. The most important are the New Moon
(which begins the month) and the Full Moon (which is the middle of the month).
On these days the sangha gathers to read the rules of monk behavior and each
monk examines himself to see if they have violated any of the rules. The other
two moon days are halfway in between these two. Thus, there is therefore a
moon day every seven days. Members of the laity often gather at the monastery
on these days for religious activity.
mudra *
Symbolic hand gestures used in ritual or dance. The Buddha is often depicted
with his hands in the meditation mudra or in the mudra symbolizing teaching.
In Vajrayana, the gestures enlarge to involve the entire body, and they enable
the gesturer to interact with Tantric deities.



N
Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna was the first Buddhist thinker who attempted to systematize Buddhist
belief. He wrote extensive commentaries on the the Prajna-Paramita Sutra. He
probably lived during the second century ce. Although he founded a Mahayana
school, the Madhyamikas, his systematization was much more important, being
used by many Mahayana schools and as one of the intellectual bases of
Vajrayana Buddhism.
Nembutsu
In Japanese, the term by which devotees call on Amitabha Buddha. They usually
say "Praise to the Buddha Amitabha," i.e., "Namu Amida Butsa," which can be
shortened to "Nembutsu."
nirvana/nibbana *
It is the cessation of suffering, the liberation from karma, and therefore the
passing over into another existence. The best way to think about nirvana is
that it is the final goal of Buddhism, and that Enlightenment is the step
immediately before it. Thus one becomes aware of the nature of Ultimate
Reality in Enlightenment, and then one becomes unified with that reality in
nirvana. Thus the Buddha, when he died, passed into Nirvana, having previously
attained Enlightenment during his life and sharing it with humanity. A
bodhisattva is one who has attained Enlightenment, but rather than passing
over into nirvana, chose to come back to this world to use their power to help
other people.



O
Ogre
A translation of the word asura.



P
Pali and Pali Canon
Pali is a dialect of Sanskrit and is thought to be the language the Buddha
spoke; it is also the language of Therevada Buddhism. The Pali Canon (of
Therevada) is the sacred. Buddhist exts written in this dialect, the
Tripitaka.
paramita
These are the six virtues, or "perfections," that the bodhisattva perfects
during his development. They are: generosity, discipline, patience, energy,
meditation (jhana) and wisdom (prajna). The fifth paramita is meditation, or
jhana. It refers to the attainment of the four levels of jhana in which
non-duality is experienced. The sixth paramita is that of supreme wisdom
(prajna).
prajna
This term, meaning wisdom, is the supreme wisdom considered by Mahayana
Buddhism to be outside human experience and incapable of being conveyed in
this-world categories. The key experience of prajna is insight into Emptiness,
the true nature of the cosmos. This is usually attained during enlightenment.
Prajna-Paramita Sutra
This term refers to a collection of 40 Mahayana sutras which all deal with
prajna and its attainment. This was the focus of Nagarjuna's writing and
commentaries. The best known of the 40 is the Heart Sutra.
preta
The Sanskrit word usually translated as hungry ghost, one of the six states of
existence.
puja *
A act of worship or devotion to a buddha or a bodhisattva.
Pure Land Buddhism *
The form of Buddhism focuses on the Buddha Amitabha and the "Pure Land" he
created. Appearing in China in the fourth century c.e. and later in Japan,
Korea and other nations, this form of Buddhism has the largest following of
all the different types of Buddhism. Pure Land is aimed at the average person
in its recognition that most people cannot achieve enlightenment and so are
doomed forever to stay in samsara. So Amitabha set up a "Pure Land" in the
"west"--a paradise--to which people can go when they die. To gain entrance,
people simply have to call on the power of Amitabha. This is done by uttering
a phrase such as "Namu Amidha Butsu," (the Nembutsu) which is Japanese for
"Praise to Amitabha Buddha."



Q



R
Rain Retreat *
In the earliest centuries of Buddhism, monks were itinerant, wandering for
nine months of the year. When the monsoons began, in July, they gathered
together for teaching, instruction, meditation and encouragement. Theravada
Buddhism, which is in the area of the monsoons, still keeps the rain retreats,
even though its monks have long ago ceased to wander.
Rinpoche
This is an honorific term applied to lamas in Vajrayana (Tibetan) Buddhism. It
literally means "greatly precious" and is given to masters who are highly
valued for their spiritual knowledge. A Rinpoche is often believed to be the
reincarnation of a lama, guru, or even a bodhisattva or a buddha. For
introductions to some Rinpoches, go here.



S
Sakya, Sakymuni
The Sakya is the clan into which the Buddha was born. "Sakyamuni" means "wise
one of the Sakya," which was a title given to the Buddha.
Samadhi *
A form of meditation widely practiced in Theravada Buddhism in which the mind
is concentrated on a single object and gradually calmed until only the object
is known. The ultimate goal of this meditation is to enter the state of
samadhi which is when the distinction between the object and the meditator
disappears, which is the realization of non-dualism. This state is a
prerequisite to entering the four levels of jhana and enlightenment.
samgha
See sangha.
samsara *
The continual cycle of death and rebirth. This death and rebirth is of course
into this world of suffering and this is viewed in a negative manner.
sangha/samgha *
A general term that refers to the monks (Bhikkhus) as a whole.
Sanskrit
The spoken language of ancient India, which belongs to the class of the
Indo-European languages. It is used both in Hinduism and in some forms of
Buddhism..
Sanzen *
This is the twice-daily meeting between the student and the master in Zen
Buddhism to discuss the student's progress in meditation. The main purpose is
to determine whether the student has solved their koan. If not, the incorrect
answer is rejected, and the master must then spur the student on to find a
correct solution.
Satori
Zen Buddhism's term for enlightenment.
Siddhartha *
The Buddha's given name, or first name. His surname was Gautama.
Sila/shila
This term means precept or rule. It usually is used in reference to the Five
or Ten Precepts which form the basic guidelines for the sangha's behavior.
skandhas *
The five elements of a human which come together at birth and separate at
death: body, feelings/senses, perceptions, habits and inclinations, and
consciousness. This is linked to the notion of "no-soul."
States of Existence *
There are six states of existence (gati). The highest three are the gods, the
asuras, and human beings; they result from good karma. The lowest three are
animals, hungry ghosts, and demons (hell-dwellers); they result from bad
karma. Some forms of Buddhism view the asuras as stemming from bad karma and
other ignore them completely, having only five states of existence.
stupa *
A shrine in which relics of the Buddha are kept. The center is a raised temple
which is usually surrounded by a series of terraces.
Suffering *
See dukkha.
sutra/sutta *
(1) As in Hinduism, a term meaning sacred text. (2) The Sutra Pitaka is one of
the three divisions of the tripitaka. It contains the words and teachings of
Buddha himself. (3) The Sutras are the foundational texts for Mahayana
Buddhism, which differentiate Mahayana from Theravada Buddhism. Two important
Sutras are the Heart Sutra and the Lotus Sutra.



T
Tantrayana
See Vajrayana.
Tantrism *
Tantrism and tantric ideas begin with notions in line with all forms of
Buddhism, namely, the idea that Ultimate Reality is a singular Unity. It is
not the apparent multiplicity of the present world around us (maya). Tantrism,
which is a key component of Vajrayana, then goes beyond these notions to their
representation in the symbol of the sexual union between male and female (see
yab-yum). This union is a symbol of the identity of the multiple nature of
this world (maya), which is represented by the male, with the unity and wisdom
of cosmos, represented by the female. In some schools, the symbol of
intercourse is reenacted as part of meditation.
Tara *
A female manifestation in Tibet of Avalokiteshvara, the Bodhisattva of
Compassion, whose Tibetan form is Chenrezig. She can appear in 21 different
forms, which differ in attributes and are known by their color. She appears in
both peaceful and wrathful manifestations. The most commonly appearing forms
are Green Tara and White Tara. She is often revered as a yidam, guiding
Vajrayana monks towards enlightenment. Included in her earthly manifestations
are the two consorts of King Songtsen Gampo who brought Buddhism to Tibet in
the seventh century, who is himself considered an manifestation of Chenrezig.
Tathagata
A term for the Buddha (Siddartha) which means "The Enlightened One."
Ten Precepts *
This is the code of monastic discipline for the monks. It consists of the Five
Precepts (no stealing, sexual activity, killing, lying, or alcohol) which
apply to all Buddhists, and five further restrictions designed specifically
for members of the sangha. These are:
(6) Not to take food from noon to the next morning.
(7) Not to adorn the body with anything other than the monk's robe.
(8) Not to participate in or watch public entertainments.
(9) Not to use high or comfortable beds.
(10) Not to use money.

To see how the Ten Precepts are laid out within Theravada Buddhism, click
here.
Theravada Buddhism *
Literally, "the path of the Elders." Of the three major branches of Buddhism,
this was the earliest to crystallize into form. In contrast to Mahayana and
Vajrayana, Theravada emphasizes the individual over the group, holding that it
is the individual who must reach nirvana on their own. Its central virtue is
thus wisdom, which is to be achieved by the arhat who attains enlightenment in
this life and nirvana upon death. It discourages speculation about the nature
of the cosmos, enlightenment, and nirvana, instead focusing on meditation to
achieve enlightenment. The main social group is therefore the sangha, the
gathered monks and nuns who support and teach each other as each one strives
to achieve enlightenment.
The Three Vows, also known as The Three Refuges or The Three Jewels *
1) I take refuge in the Buddha.
2) I take refuge in the Dharma.
3) I take refuge in the Sangha.
Thunderbolt *
The English word often used to translate the Sanskrit word "vajra" (Tibetan,
"dorje"), which is key symbol for Vajrayana Buddhism. It means literally
"Diamond Thunderbolt." It symbolizes the indestructible character of
emptiness, the true nature of all things. Tibetan Buddhists use a crafted
metal image of a thunderbolt in their rituals. For a picture of Vajrasattva
holding thunderbolts in his hands, click here.
Titan
A translation of the term asura.
tripitaka, also tipitaka. *
The three main sacred scriptures of Buddhism. A "pitaka" is a basket and so
the term refers to the "three baskets." The first basket is the teachings of
the Buddha. The second is the discipline for the sangha. The third is that of
special teachings. For further information about the tripitaka, click here.



U



V
Vajrayana *
Since a "vajra" is a diamond, this term means "The Diamond Way." It refers to
the third form of Buddhism (after Theravada and Mahayana), which is practiced
largely in Tibet. It is also known as Tantric Buddhism. The main claim of
Vajrayana is that it enables a person to reach nirvana in a single lifetime.
It is able to do this by using all of a person's powers (including those of
the body) to achieve that goal.
Vipassana
This form of meditation is widely practiced in Theravada Buddhism. Its goal is
the realization of the three marks of existence: suffering, impermanence, and
"no-soul." It leads to the realization of the true character of Emptiness.
Vipassana and Samadhi are considered prerequisites for attaining nirvana by
Theravada Buddhism.



W
Wheel of Life *
(Sanskrit: Bava Chakra) In Tibetan Buddhism especially, the Wheel of Life is a
symbol consisting of three concentric circles held by Yama, the God of the
Underworld. It signifies samsara. The inner-most circle contains symbols of
the three sources of suffering: the pig (ignorance), the snake (hate), and the
cock (desire). The next circle is divided into six sections, each depicting
one of the six states of being. The outside ring is divided into twelve
sections, each representing a symbol of one of the twelve factors of
conditioned arising (death, birth, craving, ignorance, consciousness, etc.).
Wisdom *
This is the usual translation of prajna.



X



Y
yab-yum *
In Tibeten Buddhism, or Vajrayana Buddhism, this is the symbol of the male and
female sexual union--usually a union of a god or a bodhisattva and his
consort--which represents the completeness of the cosmos. The male represents
action, usually that of compassion, in this finite world, and the female
represents wisdom, the unity of the Infinite. The male is seen as passive and
the female as active.
yidam *
A bodhisattva or other "deity" assigned to a Vajrayana monk by his guru as his
personal guide and protector. Once established, this link will last the monk's
lifetime, and will help him work towards attaining enlightenment.

Z
Zazen *
In Zen Buddhism, the practice of extended periods of mediation, usually in a
group in a meeting hall. The monks sit quietly for long periods of time in the
cross-legged Lotus position. While different individuals will be meditating
with different goals, often meditation focuses on solving a koan. For more
information than you ever wanted to know about zazen, click here.
Zen Buddhism*
A branch of Mahayana Buddhism which was brought to China (where it was called
Chan) in 520 CE by Bodhidarma and arrived in Japan in the twelfth century. It
is probably the most common form of Buddhism in the West. Practitioners of Zen
must usually devote themselves to a life as a monk, for it requires extensive
periods of meditation. It concentrates on making clear that reality is beyond
words and language and beyond logic. To accomplish this, it makes use of the
koan, zazen, and sanzen. The word "zen" derives from the Sanskrit term for the
concept of jhana.



A |B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U
| V | W | X | Y | Z


To send comments to the professor, please email PFlesher@uwyo.edu.
Copyright &copy: 1996, 1997 Paul V. M. Flesher.
This glossary was written by Paul V. M. Flesher; it is not drawn from any
published work. It is for use with the course RELI 1000, Introduction to
Religion, taught at the University of Wyoming.
m<<&WP Floppy 1:Buddhism HTML:Bglossry.htm@Ä
 

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Buddhist Philosophies

Historical Perspective


Buddhism was created by Siddhartha Gautama, the historical Buddha (the
"Enlightened One"), after his enlightenment. He had awakened to the truths of
the suffering (duhkha), the craving/hatred/ignorance which is the cause of the
suffering, the elimination of the causes of the suffering, and the eightfold
path to eliminate them.
12.1 India enjoyed a great civilization in every respect at the time of the
Buddha.
12.2 After the Buddha, the council of monks were called in several times over
centuries to recall and collect his teachings. Buddhist philosophies evolved
through the attempts to reconcile the different views of various sects.
12.3 Hinduism and Buddhism
HinduismBuddhism
Accept the authority of the Vedas No way
varnano varna
samsarasamsara
karma - it determines next varnakarma, but no varna
AtmanNo Atman
moksha - termination of samsara. This is attained when one realizes the
true nature of self (Atman).nirvana - termination of samsara. Since there
is no Atman, this is attained by completely extinguishing one’s desires.

12.4 Hinayana (Theravada) and Mahayana
Hinayana - a lesser vehicle for an arhant- saves oneself only. Mahayana - a
greater vehicle of a bodhisattva - wants to save all the suffering creatures.
There are three types of perfect beings (The Lotus of the Good Law): arhants
(hearers) and private buddhas are ideals of Hinayana; but, for Mahayana,
bodhisattvas.
12.41 Bodhisattva (‘Being of Wisdom’) - (1) Previous incarnations of the
historical Buddha --- self-sacrifices of a Bodhisattva, etc., (2) Enlightened
One who wants to save the suffering creatures.
12.42 Differences between Hinayana and Mahayana
Hinayana (Theravada)Mahayana
The BuddhaSiddharta GautamaThe eternal and omnipresent Buddha. Siddharta
was only one of the manifestations.
ScripturesThe historical Buddha’s teachings recalled and recited+ new
scriptures attributed to the historical Buddha
Communitymonastery+ the secular world
The Paththe Noble Eightfold Path of the practitioner+ the six surpassing
virtues (paramitas) to save all the suffering beings: generosity,
morality, patience, vigor, meditation, wisdom
Faiththe Buddha, his teachings, and the community+ a host of celestial
beings
Realityinterdependent arising+ Emptiness (Void)

cf. The Lotus of the Good Law - "I (the Buddha) desire to enable all living
beings to attain the same way with me."
Mahayana does not really reject Hinayana as something inferior; rather, the
former includes the latter as a part of its teachings and practices.
12.43 The Essential Tension
Why should the enlightened one take care of the suffering creatures? Was the
Buddha’s decision to teach and save the creatures consistent with his doctrine
of non-attachment? The fundamental tension and conflict existed even at the very
moment of Siddharta Gautama’s enlightenment. (cf. the story of Seong-Cheol)
12.5 Philosophical Problems: The basic Buddhist teachings of no-self,
impermanence, and nirvana gave rise to ‘interesting’ philosophical problems.
12.51 The problem of no-self: If there is no self, who or what is it that
transmigrates? If nothing remains the same and everything changes constantly,
how can the same person, that must change at every instant, suffer at one time,
and achieve nirvana later to terminate the cycle of birth and rebirth? If there
is no self, how can anyone be reborn at all? If existence is simply a bundle of
karma (or burning desires, or interrelated experience), what is it that gives
this bundle its unity and continuity? The denial of self makes moral
responsibility unintelligible.
12.52 The problem of impermanence: If everything changes constantly and nothing
persists, things lack being. There is nothing that really exists. If everything
lacks being, how can the Buddha’s existence be real? How is the chain of
causation possible unless real beings are admitted? What causes what, if nothing
really exists? Without the causal chain, the transition from the suffering to
nirvana is impossible.
12.53 The problem of knowledge: If the self and things are not real, how is
knowledge possible that is a certain relation between the self and things?
Without knowledge, how can we overcome the ignorance that causes the suffering?
12.6 Sarvastivada: The self and ordinary things are unreal because they are
constructions; but the ultimate units (dharmas) out of which they are
constructed are ultimately real, not dependent on anything else.
12.7 Madhyamaka (Doctrine of Middle Position): Nagarjuna
A mendicant monk with defective eyesight may imagine that he sees flies in his
begging bowl, and they have full reality for the percipient. Though the flies
are not real, the illusion of flies is. All beings labor under the constant
illusion of perceiving things where in fact there is only emptiness. This
Emptiness or Void is all that truly exists. But the phenomenal world is true
pragmatically, and therefore is qualified as reality for practical purposes. Yet
the whole chain of existence is only real in this sense, for it is composed of a
series of transitory events, and these, being impermanent, cannot have reality
in themselves.
Emptiness (Void): It is not something, but it is not nothing either (negative
definition used to refute rival theories) --- it is that which mysteriously/well
exists somewhere between existence and nonexistence. (cf. Everything is empty;
that everything is empty is empty; ... that that everything is empty is empty is
empty...)
In China, Madhyamaka came to turn into a very positive philosophical doctrine:
Emptiness - never changes - absolute truth - absolute being - nirvana - the Body
of Essence of the Buddha. The ultimate Emptiness is here and now, everywhere and
all-embracing. Void is the phenomenal world; and all beings are already
participants of the Emptiness that is nirvana; all beings are already Buddhas if
only they realize it: all beings have the Buddha-nature in them and can be
saved.
cf. A Vision of Nirvana Here and Now
cf. "Mountain is mountain, water is water" - acceptance of the beautiful nature
as it is in Chinese culture.
12.8 Yogacara (Consciousness-Only School): Vasubandhu
There are two kinds of consciousness: (1) the cognitive action itself, the
activity of consciousness itself; (2) the contents of consciousness, the
representation or ideation. (Yogacara is one of pure idealisms, though John
Koller disagrees.)
"All depends on the mind.": the fact of illusion - the case of flies in the
begging bowl, the experience of dreams, the conjuration of visions having equal
vividness and semblance of truth with the perception; but all these have no
objective reality. Perception is no proof of objective reality.
Suchness (Tathata) - One entity that exists independently of human thought. A
pure and integral being without characteristics: Practice meditation and yoga
cleaning up all the karmas, traces of impressions, in the store of
consciousness. Realize, by conjuring up visions, that our usual perceptions do
not have objective reality. The distinction of subject and object is only the
representation of consciousness. If you clean up all the karmas, even all the
traces of them, in the consciousness, you are identical with the pure
consciousness. pure consciousness - pure being - the true suchness - the
ultimate emptiness (Void)
12.9 Ch’an (Son or Zen) Buddhism in China, Korea, and Japan: Ch’an focuses on
the practices (e.g., meditation) facilitating enlightenment. Buddha-nature is
omnipresent, in everyone and in everything: so, anyone can get enlightened, and
anything can serve as an occasion for realizing enlightenment. Meditative
sitting has been emphasized to have all concerns, distractions, and dualities
fall away. Ch’an also introduced kung-an (koan) as a part of practice: koans are
paradoxical sayings that are to be taken seriously; but conceptualization cannot
help understand the truth of the saying, and the student is driven beyond the
conceptualizing (and differentiating) mind to a deeper, spontaneous, and
undivided awareness. Some school emphasized sudden enlightenment.
Some examples of koans: "There is a reflection of the moon on the surface of the
water. Is that the moon or water?", "Buddha is dogshit".
13 The Buddha’s Life and Teachings
The story of his birth... Prophesies... The unification war... His
enlightenment... Massacre of his tribe... 40 years’ teaching... Nirvana
13.1 The Four Signs
old age... sickness... death... the life of those who have gone forth
(cf. birth)
13.2 Finding a Middle Way
Neither hedonistic nor ascetic. Two extremes should be avoided.
(cf. Carvaka, Epicuros, Self-mortification)
13.3 The First Sermon: Setting in Motion the Wheel of Truth
The Noble Fourfold Truth
1. The world is the sea of suffering (duhkha).
2. Craving causes suffering.
3. Suffering can be eliminated by removing its cause (craving).
4. The removal of craving is possible by following the Middle way constituted by
the Noble Eightfold Path.
13.4 The Noble Eightfold Path
Right view, Right intention, Right speech, Right action, Right livelihood, Right
effort, Right mindfulness, Right concentration
13.5 The Last Words of the Buddha
"What I have taught and laid down... as Doctrine and Discipline this will be
your teacher when I am gone.
"Transient are conditioned things. Try to accomplish your aim with diligence."
14 The Chain of Causation (lit. Interdependent Arising, or Dependent
Origination)
Everything changes constantly, and nothing remains the same (the doctrine of
impermanence: anicca). The way our existence changes is expressed in the
Buddha’s teaching of dependent origination. The basic philosophical concept
underlying this teaching is the causal chain of existence.
cf. Heraclitus: "Can we step on the same river twice?"
cf. Anicca and Anatman(no self): How are they related? - a half of the story
cf. the philosophical importance of the notion of causality:
regularity, counterfactual approach, instrumentalism...
14.1 Twelvefold formulation of interdepedent arising
The world consists of a series of constant changes. What is going to happen is
dependent on what has happened; in this way, everything is related, and nothing
exists independently of other things. What we believe to be our self exists only
as the following twelve stages on dependent origination (Refer to the Wheel of
Becoming on BB p. 154):
1. Ignorance
2. Karma (action, volition)
3. Consciousness
4. Name and form (mind-body)
5. Six Senses (eye/seeing, ear/hearing, nose/smelling, tongue/tasting,
body/touching, mind/thinking)
6. Contact
7. Sensation (Feeling)
8. Desire (Craving)
9. Attachment (Grasping)
10. Existence (Becoming)
11. Birth
12. Old age and death
The Buddha’s teaching on how to cease suffering: Upon the cessation of ignorance
ceases karma; upon the cessation of karma ceases consciousness, ..., ceases old
age and death. These are an elaboration of the second and third of the Four
Noble Truths (how to extinguish craving, and hereby eliminate suffering).
14.2 Three Poisons (three interrelated forces that drive the whole wheel of
becoming): Craving (Grasping), Aversion (Hatred), and Ignorance
Get rid of these poisons, and stop the suffering!
14.3 Types of Existence: (Heavenly) Deities, Hell, (Fighting) Demons, Animals,
Humans, (Hungry and Thirsty) Ghosts.
These are the regions where different beings belong; but they are usually
compared to the kinds of people and the way they live in the human society.
14.4 The Doctrine of Anatman (no self): Chariot Analogy of Milindapanda (RB.
pp.222-225) - the conversations of the Greek king Milinda and the Buddhist
priest Nagasena.
The term "chariot" does not refer to the pole, the axle, the wheels, the
chariot-body, the banner-staff, the yoke, or any part of the chariot. It does
not refer to all of them united, either. Nor does it refer to something else
besides them. The word "chariot" is only a way of counting, term, appellation,
convenient designation, and name for pole, axle, wheels, chariot-body, and
banner-staff. In the absolute sense, there is no chariot.
Similarly, when we use the term "Nagasena", it does not refer to any of five
aggregates: form, sensation, perception, predisposition (motivation or will), or
consciousness. It does not refer to all of them united, either. Nor does it
refer to something else besides them. In the absolute sense, there is no
Nagasena (his self).
14.5 No-Self and Transmigration
Lighting Analogy: RB p. 228
14.6 No-Self and Karma
Fire Analogy: RB p. 229
16 Madhyamaka: The Middle Way Tradition
The core of Madhyamaka thought is the teaching of Emptiness (sunyata). Emptiness
is that which comes midway between two extreme views of existence: (1) Existence
is permanent, self-existing things with their own essences, and (2) Nothing
exists, and the appearance of this is merely an illusion. Koller: "... things
exist as processes, continuously arising and ceasing in dependence on each
other. It is this vision, taught by the Buddha as interdependent arising, and
taught by the Madhyamakas as emptiness, that is the heart of the Middle Way
tradition..."
16.1 Perfection of Wisdom (prajnaparamita) Tradition: Diamond Sutra and Heart
Sutra
Perfect wisdom is distinguished from both ordinary knowledge and wisdom (deep
knowledge) because both are rooted in conceptual activity. (1) In ordinary
knowledge --- Our congnition imposes the construction of experience. Our
percepts and concepts separate the objects we experience from other objects,
abstract them from their continuous stream of change. The separation of these
objects from ourselves as subjects having the experience creates a duality of
subject and object. (2) Wisdom (prajna) results from deep, penetrating insight
and careful reflection.
Perfect wisdom transcends the conceptual knowledge. As perfect (paramita), this
wisdom goes beyond the indirect awareness achieved through concepts and theories
to an immediate, direct realization of the fullness of experience.
A tension: the Perfection of Wisdom authors had to find a way of using
conventional truths (conceptual knowledge) found in the constructions of
ordinary knowledge to talk about the ultimate truth that transcends them. One
way of doing this is to use the three-stage of construction, deconstruction, and
reconstruction illustrated in the Diamond Sutra: "... heap of merit, no heap of
merit..."
16.11 Diamond Sutra (Vajracchedika): the diamond that cuts through the illusion
that the conceptual is the real. Concepts are incapable of capturing reality;
they only function as signs that point to reality.
"However many species of living beings there are..., we must lead all these
beings to the ultimate nirvana so that they can be liberated... And when this
infinite number of beings has become liberated, we do not, in truth, think that
a single being has been liberated." Why? --- "If, Subhuti, a bodhisattva holds
on to the idea that a self, a person, a living being, or a life span exists,
that person is not an authentic bodhisattva." The doctrines of no self,
impermanence, and interdependent arising teach that there is no independent,
separate existence such as a self, a person, etc.
"As far as I have understood the Lord Buddha’s teachings, there is no
independently existing object of mind called the highest, most fulfilled,
awakened mind, nor is there any independently existing teaching that the
Tathagata gives." "The teachings that the Tathagata has realized and spoken of
cannot be conceived of as separate, independent existences and therefore cannot
be described." They transcend the conceptual knowledge.
The meaning of the dialectic of the Diamond Sutra is that for something to be
what it is, it cannot be just what it is by itself; to be what it is it must
interexist with everything else
16.12 Heart Sutra
Refer to our RB!
16.2 Middle Way Philosophy of Nagarjuna: In his book Fundamental Verses on the
Middle Way, Nagarjuna (1) shows that explanations of the topics in Buddhism,
such as causality, the Buddha, samsara and nirvana, in terms of absolutes are
self-refuting, and (2) offers an explanation consistent with interdependent
arising.
Nagarjuna’s method used to refute absolutist views is showing their absurdity by
revealing internal inconsistencies. It proceeds with the reductio ad absurdum.
Nagarjuna wants to prove that S (the Buddha, causality, etc.) does not
self-exist. In order to lead to this claim, he supposes the negation of this,
that is, that S self-exists; he then shows that this supposition results in an
absurd consequence, and so concludes that the supposition is wrong. That way, he
proves that S does not self-exist.
cf.) the logical rule of reductio ad absurdum
Bill Gates is rich. To prove this, suppose that he is not rich. If he is not
rich, it is impossible that he has billions of dollars. But he has billions
of dollars. So, it is not the case that he is not rich (- the supposition is
negated). Therefore, Bill Gates is rich.
After refuting the mistaken absolutist views with this method, he proceeds to
explain the topics, relying on emptiness that is in accord with the teaching of
interdependent arising.
16.21 Causality
Nagarjuna shows (1) the impossibility of causality if it is interpreted as
something called a cause, having the power to produce another thing called the
effect, and (2) how it is possible to understand the arising and ceasing of
things by knowing the conditions of arising and ceasing, conditions which have
no inherent self-existence and which have no essential causal power.
Regarding (1), there are four possible ways that effects can be produced by
causes: (1) an effect produces itself; (2) an effect is produced by something
other than itself; (3) an effect both produces itself and is produced by
something other than itself; (4) an effect is produced without a cause.
Nagarjuna shows that none of these are possible if causality is viewed as the
production of an effect by a causal power that inheres in a self-existent cause.
Comments: (1) Causality is a relation between two things/events. (2) How could
an effect come from a totally different thing? (3) ‘(1) & (2)’ is false because
each conjunct is false. (4) We firmly believe that there are causal
relationships.
Nagarjuna’s positive view of causality is that things arise, exist, and cease in
dependence on conditions, but that none of these conditions are self-existent
causes. There are four kinds of conditions on which change (the arising and
ceasing of things) depend: (1) efficient conditions, (2) percept-object
conditions, (3) immediate conditions, and (4) dominant conditions. Notice that
no essences or causal powers are invoked here. Only if causes are seen as empty
of self-existence and causal power can they produce effects. But this emptiness
means that they are not causes in the usual sense, but simply conditions of
change. And this is fully in accord with the teaching of interdependent arising.

16.22 Self
Nagarjuna argues against the essentialist view of the self. The self, if it is a
self-existent, enduring entity, must either be identical with its five
aggregates or it must be different from them. If the self is identical with the
five components, the constantly changing aggregates will make the self change
constantly, which is absurd. If the self is different from them, then no change
in them can have any effect on the self, which is also absurd. Therefore, the
essentialist view of the self is not true.
16.23 The Buddha and Nirvana
The Buddhist views of the Buddha and nirvana are also conceptual constructs. All
conceptions are empty of ultimate reality (although they constitute signs that
point to reality --- cf. skillful means).
Even the Buddha is empty of self-existence. Our ordinary understanding of the
Buddha is conceptual; and the Buddha’s existence as we know it is empty of
independent, permanent existence. Grasping at the conceptual construct of the
Buddha will not reveal the reality of the Buddha. (The Buddha can be known
directly through mindfulness.)
Since emptiness means that nothing exists by itself independently of others,
everything exists as interdependently arisen. In other words, emptiness is
actually interdependent arising.
Nirvana is not an independently real entity. It is just ordinary existence in
this world, but without the duhkha that arises from ignorance. But suffering and
nirvana are not two. And "(Nagarjuna) [T]here is not the slightest difference
between samsara and nirvana." "(Koller) If samsara and nirvana were completely
different kinds of existence, then the Buddha’s attainment of nirvana would have
meant that he could not have continued to live in this world, teaching the
Middle Way for forty years."
17. Yogacara: Asanga and his brother Vasubandhu
As their name suggests (‘the practice of discipline’), the Yogacarins emphasize
on the practice of meditation to become a Bodhisattva. On its theoretical side,
Yogacara is known for its idealist view that only consciousness exists (it is
also called ‘Cittamatra’ meaning Consciousness Only).
Ignorance is the primary affliction that gives rise to the afflictions of
grasping and hatred, and these three poisons underlie all suffering (duhkha).
Enlightenment is possible by the removal of ignorance: so, Yogacara is
interested in understanding what ignorance is and how it arises, and what
enlightenment is and how we can achieve it. Since both ignorance and
enlightenment pertain to consciousness, Yogacara is naturally led to investigate
the nature and function of consciousness. Their two primary foci are the nature
of knowledge and the processes of consciousness that produce ignorance and
knowledge.
Yogacara accepts the Mahayana doctrine of emptiness. Everything is empty of
self-existence (or self-nature); and emptiness is the interdependent arising.
Yogacara also agrees with Madhyamaka on its claim that there is no difference
between nirvana and samsara except that a person’s ignorance has been
transformed into enlightenment. But Yogacara is not satisfied with this
explanation ‘except that...’. Madhymaka explains merely how a Bodhisattva should
understand emptiness (that is, in terms of interdependent arising); but that is
where they stop explanation. However, Yogacara tries to explain how ignorance
can be transformed into enlightenment by examining (1) what ignorance is and how
it arises, (2) what enlightenment (perfect wisdom) is and how it arises, and (3)
how ignorance and enlightenment are related. Thus Yogacara focuses on the
processes of consciousness that produce both ignorance and knowledge to show how
to achieve enlightenment.
One prominent contribution of Yogacara to Buddhist philosophy is that it gives
an account of the continuity of consciousness between different states of
consciousness (between ignorance and enlightenment). Without this continuity,
all Buddhist practice would be meaningless. Yogacara develops its theory of the
store consciousness (alaya vijnana) to explain how personal continuity is
possible and how it is compatible with the doctrine of emptiness.
17.1 Three Aspects (Natures) of Things
Asanga attempted to overcome the nihilistic understanding of the doctrine of
emptiness by distinguishing among the three natures of things. A thing can be
known as (1) something conceptually constructed, (2) something conditioned by
other things, or (3) something as it is in itself (tathata), free of conceptual
construction.
The analogy of mirage in which water is seen --- There is no real water. What is
perceived as water is just the flow of perceptions (the dependent aspect). This
flow of perceptions is taken to be real water (the conceptually constructed
aspect). But there is no water, although it is present in the flow of
perceptions (the perfected aspect).
17.11 Things known by conceptual construction: "Do not mistake the finger that
points to the moon for the moon itself!"
The mind imposes concepts on things as it attempts to know them. In ordinary
cognition, this conceptually constructed things appear to a cognizing subject as
a separate, self-existent object; but this is a mentally constructed and
illusory nature of things known, recognized by the wise to be empty of intrinsic
reality. The conceptual construction is only a sign that points to the thing,
not the thing itself.
17.12 There is a relative nature of things as they depend on each other and on
the mind. The object is conceptually constructed out of the flow of
interdependent mental phenomena that arises in the presence of the conditioned
thing that is perceived.
17.13 The perfected aspect of the known thing is realized in mindfulness when
all conceptual construction is left aside, when the meditational insight of yoga
practice has gone beyond all conceptual dualities. The flow of experience is
realized to be simply a flow, entirely empty of objects and subject. Conceptual
constructions can represent the thing that is known; but only the insight of
direct awareness in the full mindfulness can reveal it as it really is.
17.2 Knowledge of Reality
Asanga distinguishes among four kinds of knowledge:
1. what is universally accepted by ordinary beings;
2. what is universally accepted by reason, or logic;
3. that which is the sphere of cognitive activity completely purified of the
obscurations of defilement, and
4. that which is the sphere of cognitive activity completely purified of
obscurations to the knowable.
Asanga does not reject 1 or 2 as knowledge; it is just that these kinds of
knowledge are regarded as lower because they are less revealing of reality.
Higher knowledge requires self-purification and training in the methods of
insight.
cf. Knowledge, Wisdom, Smartness
17.21 Ordinary Knowledge: "the shared opinion of people based on habitual
association of names and things"
Ordinary knowledge is rooted in the assumption that names or verbal descriptions
correspond to the things they name or describe. However, knowing the name of
something and knowing what that something is are two different things. (cf. ‘Who
are you?’, ‘What are you?’...)
17.22 Scientific Knowledge: "well-analyzed knowledge wherein the thing being
investigated is established and proven by demonstration and proof," "This is the
knowledge of people governed by reason, skilled in logic, highly intelligent,
who are skillful investigators with great reasoning power."
This knowledge is regarded as inferior because it is based on discursive
thought. Discursive thought cuts the seamless flow of reality by concepts, and
then splice them together into a theory about reality. The things themselves
cannot be encountered with this thinking. In their suchness, things totally
interpenetrate with other things. Everything is present in any given thing, and
any given thing is present in everything else --- interdependent arising. This
is actually experienced in mindfulness.
17.23 Knowledge Free of Personal Defilements: knowledge free of ignorance,
grasping, and hatred
These three contaminates the ways in which a person acts and thinks. By defiling
a person’s consciousness and volitions, they give rise to all of the attitudes
and action that produce duhkha. Ignorance is of course the root of all these
defilements. The defilements obscure our understanding of the true nature of
reality; the knowledge free of these defilements provides the understanding of
no separate self, the noble fourfold truth, and so on.
17.24 Knowledge Free from Discursive Thought: the highest kind of knowledge that
Buddhas and bodhisattvas have of reality.
Through rigorous discursive thought, they know of the doctrine of no-self,
emptiness...; but they also know that discursive thought itself is merely
conceptual construction. They further know, through direct insight, the great
means of enlightenment, the actual reality of the things (that is, emptiness)
that are merely represented by the conceptual constructions of discursive
thought. In other words, the highest kind of knowledge reveals that the ways
things really are is neither existent nor nonexistent, but midway between
existence and nonexistence.
17.3 Nature and Function of Consciousness
There are two ways consciousness functions: (1) Ordinary dualistic consciousness
functions in terms of knowing subject and known objects. Since it moves between
its subject and its objects, it is referred to as discursive consciousness. This
consciousness knows a given thing by representing it as an object to the
subject; however, the object known is only a mental representation; and the
knowing subject is also a mental representation. (2) Non-dualistic consciousness
functions where knowledge is immediate and direct. The representations of
subject and object are not involved in this consciousness/ knowledge. In
(nondualistic) mindfulness this second way consciousness functions is
experienced directly. Words cannot describe it: for, to talk about it is
unavoidably to talk about it as an object known by a subject.
This distinction is also closely related to conceptualization/ differentiation.
17.31 Store Consciousness (alayavijnana)
Yogacarins refer to a fundamental consciousness called store consciousness to
explain the origins and continuity of ordinary consciousness. Intentional
(discursive) consciousness refers to its object (grasped) and subject(grasper);
by contrast, store consciousness is not discursive or intentional; it functions
beyond the dualities of subject and object.
17.32 Eight Kinds of Consciousness
The first six produce the awareness of the various objects of the senses and the
mind: sight, sound, smell, taste, feel, and thought. The seventh kind (called
defiled consciousness) recognizes the store consciousness but mistakes it for an
object which it wrongly views as a permanent, independent self. These seven
kinds are all intentional and dualistic.
The eighth kind is the store consciousness that underlies the other kinds and
functions of consciousness. When completely purified, this fundamental
consciousness becomes directly aware of itself (--- enlightenment) transcending
the differentiation of the subject and the object.
17.321 The store consciousness collects and stores the effects or seeds of
experience until they mature and give rise to new experiences. All experiences
arise from these seeds. The particular intentional consciousnesses are only
manifestations of the great ocean of store consciousness, out of which they
arise and to which they return.
17.322 How do ignorance and enlightenment arise? Ignorance arises because
intentional (discursive) consciousness mistakes the subject and the object of
knowledge for the reality they merely represent. The truth is that both
object-consciousness and self-consciousness are manifestations of store
consciousness. "This transformation of consciousness is a discrimination, and as
it is discriminated, it does not exist, and so everything is perception-only."
In mindfulness, duality is overcome as both the subject and the object of
experience are dissolved in the immediacy of the experience itself. The
enlightenment arises when the subject and the object are seen to be empty of the
reality in the fundamental consciousness of mindfulness.
17.323 The theory of store consciousness explains the continuity of the person:
(1) The store consciousness collects the fruits of past experience and then
reissues the new experiences. This explains the continuity between past,
present, and the future activities of consciousness. (2) An ignorant person
becomes enlightened if the defiled seeds are purified, through practice of
perfections, within the continuing store consciousness.
17.324 An explanation of karma, the retribution of effects of actions to the
doer is also possible because the effects of action are stored in the store
consciousness as seeds from which future experiences arise.
18 Zen
The origin of the wordless transmission of true teaching: "Long ago when the
Buddha was at Mount Gridhrakuta to give a talk, he held up a flower before the
assemblage. At this all remained silent. The Venerable Maha Kashyapa alone broke
into a smile. The Buddha said, ‘I have the all-pervading True Dharma,
incomparable Nirvana, exquisite teaching of formless form. It does not rely on
letters and is transmitted outside scripture. I now hand it to Maha Kashyapa.’"
The legendary Bodhidharma symbolizes the emphasis on sitting meditation, sudden
enlightenment, and the wisdom beyond words that give Zen its unique character
--- his 9 year long sitting meditation, gazing at a wall in a cave. The
experience of enlightenment, precisely because it goes beyond the dualities of
thought constructs, cannot be grasped or communicated intellectually; only
profound silence can express it.
18.1 Aims of Zen
Zen is a way of life that has a certain aims, prescribes various practices, and
rests upon an understanding of reality. As a way of life, Zen is training not in
doing something, but training in not doing. For example, zazen (sitting
meditation) is not thinking, but letting go of thinking.
Zen emphasizes the integrity and completeness of the present experience (here
and now) wherein there is no distinction between subject and object. Dogen says,
"Put your whole mind into the practice of the Way. Remember that you are alive
only today in this moment." The ultimate is not separate from the everyday; and
ordinary things, when rightly seen, are the supreme reality. Enlightenment does
not take us beyond the ordinary things of life, but allows us to experience them
in a new light, revealing their profundity. The real aim of Zen is to live
ordinary life fully, rather than to transcend it. -- Mahayana...
18.2 Practice
18.21 Zazen (sitting meditation)
Three Aims of Zazen: (1) Concentration. (2) Satori (the awakening of
enlightenment that sees directly into one’s own existence and the existence of
others) --- the enlightenment of satori may come like a flash, but it
presupposes intensive training for most people through, e.g., koan. cf.) Read
the poems of BB p. 217 --- To the enlightened mind, reality is dynamic and
whole, not passive and divided. (3) Living Enlightenment --- Enlightenment is
not just a momentary experience. It is to be lived; every action and every
moment should be an action and a moment lived in enlightenment. cf.) Read the
poems of BB P.218 --- In the state of nonseperation, self is experienced as
present in all things and all things are experienced as present in oneself.
18.22 Koan Practice --- Koans are paradoxical sayings that are to be taken
seriously; but conceptualization cannot help understand the truth of the saying,
and the student is driven beyond the conceptualizing mind to a deeper,
spontaneous, and undivided awareness.
All definitions of enlightenment are inadequate. Even negative descriptions,
which point out what it is not, presuppose the dichotomy between is and is not.
Without experiencing at least a degree of enlightenment, perhaps the only way to
get a sense of the experience is to talk with people who have achieved satori or
to read their biographies.
18.23 Teachings --- zazen, koan, and question-and-answer sessions.
 

top

 
Anarchism - Philosophy
by George Woodcock

A social philosophy that rejects authoritarian government and maintains
that voluntary institutions are best suited to express man's natural
social tendencies. Historically the word "anarchist," which derives from
the Greek an archos, meaning "no government," appears first to have been
used pejoratively to indicate one who denies all law and wishes to promote
chaos. It was used in this sense against the Levelers during the English
Civil War and during the French Revolution by most parties in criticizing
those who stood to the left of them along the political spectrum. The
first use of the word as an approbatory description of a positive
philosophy appears to have been by Pierre Joseph Proudhon when, in his
Qu'est-ce-que la propriete? (What Is Property?, Paris, 1840), he described
himself as an anarchist because he believed that political organization
based on authority should be replaced by social and economic organization
based on voluntary contractual agreement. Nevertheless, the two uses of
the word have survived together and have caused confusion in discussing
anarchism, which to some has appeared a doctrine of destruction and to
others a benevolent doctrine based on a faith in the innate goodness of
man. There has been further confusion through the association of anarchism
with nihilism and terrorism. In fact, anarchism, which is based on faith
in natural law and justice, stands at the opposite pole to nihilism, which
denies all moral laws. Similarly, there is no necessary connection between
anarchism, which is a social philosophy, and terrorism, which is a
political means occasionally used by individual anarchists but also by
actionists belonging to a wide variety of movements that have nothing in
common with anarchism.

Anarchism aims at the utmost possible freedom compatible with social life,
in the belief that voluntary cooperation by responsible individuals is not
merely more just and equitable but is also, in the long run, more
harmonious and ordered in its effects than authoritarian government.
Anarchist philosophy has taken many forms, none of which can be defined as
an orthodoxy, and its exponents have deliberately cultivated the idea that
it is an open and mutable doctrine. However, all its variants combine a
criticism of existing governmental societies, a vision of a future
libertarian society that might replace them, and a projected way of
attaining this society by means outside normal political practice.
Anarchism in general rejects the state. It denies the value of democratic
procedures because they are based on majority rule and on the delegation
of the responsibility that the individual should retain. It criticizes
Utopian philosophies because they aim at a static "ideal" society. It
inclines toward internationalism and federalism, and, while the views of
anarchists on questions of economic organization vary greatly, it may be
said that all of them reject what William Godwin called accumulated
property.

Attempts have been made by anarchist apologists to trace the origins of
their point of view in primitive nongovernmental societies. There has also
been a tendency to detect anarchist pioneers among a wide variety of
teachers and writers who, for various religious or philosophical reasons,
have criticized the institution of government, have rejected political
activity, or have placed a great value on individual freedom. In this way
such varied ancestors have been found as Lao-Tse, Zeno, Spartacus, Etienne
de La Boetie, Thomas Munzer, Rabelais, Fenelon, Diderot, and Swift;
anarchist trends have also been detected in many religious groups aiming
at a communalistic order, such as the Essenes, the early Christian
apostles, the Anabaptists, and the Doukhobors. However, while it is true
that some of the central libertarian ideas are to be found in varying
degrees among these men and movements, the first forms of anarchism as a
developed social philosophy appeared at the beginning of the modern era,
when the medieval order had disintegrated, the Reformation had reached its
radical, sectarian phase, and the rudimentary forms of modem political and
economic organization had begun to appear. In other words, the emergence
of the modem state and of capitalism is paralleled by the emergence of the
philosophy that, in various forms, has opposed them most fundamentally.

Although Proudhon was the first writer to call himself an anarchist, at
least two predecessors outlined systems that contain all the basic
elements of anarchism. The first was Gerrard Winstanley (1609-c. 1660), a
linen draper who led the small movement of the Diggers during the
Commonwealth. Winstanley and his followers protested in the name of a
radical Christianity against the economic distress that followed the Civil
War and against the inequality that the grandees of the New Model Army
seemed intent on preserving. In 1649-1650 the Diggers squatted on
stretches of common land in southern England and attempted to set up
communities based on work on the land and the sharing of goods. The
communities failed, but a series of pamphlets by Winstanley survived, of
which The New Law of Righteousness (1649) was the most important.
Advocating a rational Christianity, Winstanley equated Christ with "the
universal liberty" and declared the universally corrupting nature of
authority. He saw "an equal privilege to share in the blessing of liberty"
and detected an intimate link between the institution of property and the
lack of freedom. In the society he sketched, work would be done in common
and the products shared equally through a system of open storehouses,
without commerce.

Like later libertarian philosophers, Winstanley saw crime as a product of
economic inequality and maintained that the people should not put trust in
rulers. Rather, they should act for themselves in order to end social
injustice, so that the land should become a "common treasury" where free
men could live in plenty. Winstanley died in obscurity and, outside the
small and ephemeral group of Diggers, he appears to have wielded no
influence, except possibly over the early Quakers.

A more elaborate sketch of anarchism, although still without the name, was
provided by William Godwin in his Enquiry Concerning Political Justice
(1793). Godwin differed from most later anarchists in preferring to
revolutionary action the gradual and, as it seemed to him, more natural
process of discussion among men of good will, by which he hoped truth,
would eventually triumph through its own power. Godwin, who was influenced
by the English tradition of Dissent and the French philosophy of the
Enlightenment, put forward in a developed form the basic anarchist
criticisms of the state, of accumulated property, and of the delegation of
authority through democratic procedure. He believed in a "fixed and
immutable morality," manifesting itself through "universal benevolence";
man, he thought, had no right "to act anything but virtue and to utter
anything but truth," and his duty, therefore, was to act toward his fellow
men in accordance with natural Justice. Justice itself was based on
immutable truths; human laws were fallible, and men should use their
understandings to determine what is just and should act according to their
own reasons rather than in obedience to the authority of "positive
institutions," which always form barriers to enlightened progress. Godwin
rejected all established institutions and all social relations that
suggested inequality or the power of one man over another, including
marriage and even the role of an orchestra conductor. For the present he
put his faith in small groups of men seeking truth and justice; for the
future, in a society of free individuals organized locally in parishes and
linked loosely in a society without frontiers and with the minimum of
organization. Every man should take part in the production of necessities
and should share his produce with all in need, on the basis of free
distribution. Godwin distrusted an excess of political or economic
cooperation; on the other hand, he looked forward to a freer intercourse
of individuals through the progressive breaking down of social and
economic barriers. Here, conceived in the primitive form of a society of
free landworkers and artisans, was the first sketch of an anarchist world.
The logical completeness of Political Justice, and its astonishing
anticipation of later libertarian arguments, make it, as Sir Alexander
Gray said, "the sum and substance of anarchism."

However, despite their similarities to later libertarian philosophies, the
systems of Winstanley and Godwin had no perceptible influence on
nineteenth-century European anarchism, which was an independent
development and which derived mainly from the peculiar fusion of early
French socialist thought and German Neo-Hegelianism in the mind of Pierre
Joseph Proudhon, the Besancon printer who has been called the father of
anarchism. This tradition centered largely on a developing social
revolutionary movement that attained mass dimensions in France, Italy, and
Spain (where anarchism remained strong until the triumph of Franco in
1939), and to a lesser extent in French-speaking Switzerland, the Ukraine
and Latin America. Apart from Proudhon, its main advocates were Michael
Bakunin, Prince Peter Kropotkin, Errico Malatesta, Sebastien Faure, Gustav
Landauer, Elisee Reclus, and Rudolf Rocker, with Max Stirner and Leo
Tolstoy on the individualist and pacifist fringes respectively. Also,
there arose among nineteenth-century anarchists a mystique that action and
even theory should emerge from the people. Libertarian attitudes,
particularly in connection with the anarchosyndicalism of France and
Spain, were influenced by the rationalization and even romanticization of
the experience of social struggle; the writings of Fernand Pelloutier and
Georges Sorel in particular emanate from this aspect of the anarchist
movement. Nineteenth-century anarchism assumed a number of forms, and the
points of variation between them lie in three main areas: the use of
violence, the degree of cooperation compatible with individual liberty,
and the form of economic organization appropriate to a libertarian
society.

Individualist anarchism lies on the extreme and sometimes dubious fringe
of the libertarian philosophies since, in seeking to assure the absolute
independence of the person, it often seems to negate the social basis of
true anarchism. This is particularly the case with Max Stirner, who
specifically rejected society as well as the state and reduced
organization to a union of egoists based on the mutual respect of "unique"
individuals, each standing upon his "might." French anarchism during the
1890s was particularly inclined toward individualism, which expressed
itself partly in a distrust of organization and partly in the actions of
terrorists like "Ravachol" and Emile Henry, who alone or in tiny groups
carried out assassinations of people over whom they had appointed
themselves both judges and executioners. A milder form of individualist
anarchism was that advocated by the American libertarian writer Benjamin
Tucker (1854-1939), who rejected violence in favor of refusal to obey and
who, like all individualists, opposed any form of economic communism. What
he asked was that property should be distributed and equalized so that
every man should have control over the product of his labor.

Mutualism, developed by Proudhon, differed from individualist anarchism in
its stress on the social element in human behavior. It rejected both
political action and revolutionary violence — some of Proudhon's disciples
even objected to strikes as a form of coercion — in favor of the reform of
society by the peaceful spread of workers' associations, devoted
particularly to mutual credit between producers. A recurrent mutualist
plan, never fulfilled, was that of the people's bank, which would arrange
the exchange of goods on the basis of labor notes. The mutualists
recognized that workers' syndicates might be necessary for the functioning
of industry and public utilities, but they rejected large-scale
collectivization as a danger to liberty and based their economic approach
as far as possible on individual possession of the means of production by
peasants and small craftsmen united in a framework of exchange and credit
arrangements. The mutualists laid great stress on federalist organization
from the local commune upward as a substitute for the national state.
Mutualism had a wide following among French artisans during the 1860s. Its
exponents were fervently internationalist and played a great part in the
formation of the International Workingmen's Association in 1864; their
influence diminished, however, with the rise of collectivism as an
alternative libertarian philosophy.

Collectivism is the form of anarchism associated with Michael Bakunin. The
collectivist philosophy was developed by Bakunin from 1864 onward, when he
was forming the first international organizations of anarchists, the
International Brotherhood and the International Alliance of Social
Democracy. It was collectivist anarchism that formed the principal
opposition to Marxism in the International Workingmen's Association and
thus began the historic rivalry between libertarian and authoritarian
views of socialism. Bakunin and the other collectivists agreed with the
mutualists in their rejection of the state and of political methods, in
their stress on federalism, and in their view that the worker should be
rewarded according to his labor. On the other hand, they differed in
stressing the need for revolutionary means to bring about the downfall of
the state and the establishment of a libertarian society. Most important,
they advocated the public ownership and the exploitation through workers'
associations of the land and all services and means of production. While
in mutualism the individual worker had been the basic unit, in
collectivism it was the group of workers; Bakunin specifically rejected
individualism of any kind and maintained that anarchism was a social
doctrine and must be based on the acceptance of collective
responsibilities.

Collectivism survived as the dominant anarchist philosophy in Spain until
the 1930s; elsewhere it was replaced during the 1870s by the anarchist
communism that was associated particularly with Peter Kropotkin, although
it seems likely that Kropotkin was merely the most articulate exponent of
a trend that grew out of discussions among anarchist intellectuals in
Geneva during the years immediately after the Paris Commune of 1871.
Through Kropotkin's literary efforts anarchist communism was much more
elaborately worked out than either mutualism or collectivism; in books
like La Conquete du pain (The Conquest of Bread, 1892) and Fields,
Factories and Workshops (1899) Kropotkin elaborated the scheme of a
semiutopian decentralized society based on an integration of agriculture
and industry, of town life and country life, of education and
apprenticeship. Kropotkin also linked his theories closely with current
evolutionary theories in the fields of anthropology and biology;
anarchism, he suggested in Mutual Aid (1902), was the final stage in the
development of cooperation as a factor in evolution.

Anarchist communism differed from collectivism on only - one fundamental
point—the way in which the product of labor should be shared. In place of
the collectivist and mutualist idea of remuneration according to hours of
labor, the anarchist communists proclaimed the slogan "From each according
to his means, to each according to his needs" and envisaged open
warehouses from which any man could have what he wanted. They reasoned,
first, that work was a natural need that men could be expected to fulfill
without the threat of want and, second, that where no restriction was
placed on available goods, there would be no temptation for any man to
take more than he could use. The anarchist communists laid great stress on
local communal organization and even on local economic self-sufficiency as
a guarantee of independence.

Anarchosyndicalism began to develop in the late 1880s, when many
anarchists entered the French trade unions, or syndicates, which were just
beginning to re-emerge after the period of suppression that followed the
Paris Commune. Later, anarchist militants moved into key positions in the
Confederation Generale du Travail, founded in 1895, and worked out the
theories of anarchosyndicalism. They shifted the basis of anarchism to the
syndicates, which they saw as organizations that united the producers in
common struggle as well as in common work. The common struggle should take
the form of "direct action," primarily in industry, since there the
workers could strike most sharply at their closest enemies, the
capitalists; the highest form of direct action, the general strike, could
end by paralyzing not merely capitalism but also the state.

When the state was paralyzed, the syndicates, which had been the organs of
revolt, could be transformed into the basic units of the free society; the
workers would take over the factories where they had been employees and
would federate by industries. Anarchosyndicalism created a mystique of the
working masses that ran counter to individualist trends; and the stress on
the producers, as distinct from the consumers, disturbed the anarchist
communists, who were haunted by the vision of massive trade unions
ossifying into monolithic institutions. However, in France, Italy, and
Spain it was the syndicalist variant that brought anarchism its first and
only mass following. The men who elaborated the philosophy of
anarchosyndicalism included militants, such as Fernand Pelloutier, Georges
Yvetot, and Emile Pouget, who among them created the vision of a movement
arising from the genius of the working people. There were also
intellectuals outside the movement who drew theoretical conclusions from
anarchosyndicalist practice; the most important was Georges Sorel, the
author of Reflexions sur la violence (Reflections on Violence, 1908), who
saw the general strike as a saving "social myth" that would maintain
society in a state of struggle and, therefore, of health.

Pacifist anarchism has taken two forms. That of Leo Tolstoy attempted to
give rational and concrete form to Christian ethics. Tolstoy rejected all
violence; he advocated a moral revolution, its great tactic the refusal to
obey. There was much, however, in Tolstoy's criticisms of contemporary
society and his suggestions for the future that paralleled other forms of
anarchism. He denounced the state, law, and property; he foresaw
cooperative production and distribution according to need.

Later a pacifist trend appeared in the anarchist movement in western
Europe; its chief exponent was the Dutch ex-socialist, Domela Nieuwenhuis.
It differed from strict Tolstoyism by accepting syndicalist forms of
struggle that stopped short of violence, particularly the millenarian
general strike for the abolition of war.

Despite their differences, all these forms of anarchism, were united not
merely in their rejection of the state, of politics, and of accumulated
property, but also in certain more elusive attitudes. In its avoidance of
partisan organization and political practices, anarchism retained more of
the moral element than did other movements of protest. This aspect was
shown with particular sharpness in the desire of its exponents for the
simplification of life, not merely in the sense of removing the
complications of authority, but also in eschewing the perils of wealth and
establishing a frugal sufficiency as the basis for life. Progress, in the
sense of bringing to all men a steadily rising supply of material goods,
has never appealed to the anarchsts; indeed, it is doubtful if their
philosophy is at all progressive in the ordinary sense. They reject the
present, but they reject it in the name of a future of austere liberty
that will resurrect the lost virtues of a more natural past, a future in
which struggle will not be ended, but merely transformed within the
dynamic equilibrium of a society that rejects Utopia and knows neither
absolutes nor perfections.

The main difference between the anarchists and the socialists, including
the Marxists, lies in the fact that while the socialists maintain that the
state must be taken over as the first step toward its dissolution, the
anarchists argue that, since power corrupts, any seizure of the existing
structure of authority can only lead to its perpetuation. However,
anarchosyndicalists regard their unions as the skeleton of a new society
growing up within the old.

The problem of reconciling social harmony with complete individual freedom
is a recurrent one in anarchist thought. It has been argued that an
authoritarian society produces antisocial reactions, which would vanish in
freedom. It has also been suggested, by Godwin and Kropotkin particularly,
that public opinion will suffice to deter those who abuse their liberty.
However, George Orwell has pointed out that the reliance on public opinion
as a force replacing overt coercion might lead to a moral tyranny which,
having no codified bounds, could in the end prove more oppressive than any
system of laws.


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SKEPTICISM, ANCIENT AND MODERN

 To Tom
Nickles's Home Page
nickles@unr.edu




[NOTE. 'Skepticism' is also commonly spelled 'scepticism', with a 'c' in place
of the 'k'. These notes on skepticism are based mostly on Richard Popkin, The
History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza, 1979.]
The so-called Modern Period in Western philosophy and culture is supposed to run
from Bacon and (especially) Descartes through Kant. However, the French
skeptic, Pierre Bayle, said in his notoriously irreverent Skeptical and Critical
Dictionary (1697) that modern philosophy begins with the reintroduction of
Pyrrhonism into Europe in the 16th century -- Pyrrhonism being a strong form of
skepticism. I agree.
As far as we know, it was the ancient Greeks who first made skepticism into a
secular philosophy as opposed to unsystematic doubts about religious claims,
medical claims, and whatnot. Dogmatists of various kinds claimed that some
knowledge claims about the world or about human nature could be completely
justified. Two different schools of skepticism attacked the dogmatists, and
each other. Thus three basic positions vied for supremacy:
Dogmatism: We can achieve absolutely certain knowledge about the cosmos and/or
human beings. (Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics)
Academic skepticism: We can know for sure only that we do not know. (Socrates,
Carneades, Cicero)
Pyrrhonian skepticism: We can know nothing for sure, not even that we do not
know; so academic skepticism retains an unjustified, dogmatic component.
(Pyrrho, Sextus Empiricus)
The first form of skepticism is called Academic skepticism because it was
developed by members of Plato's Academy around 250 BCE, a century after Plato's
death in 343. The best known early Academic skeptic is Carneades, who died in
129 BCE. Later Cicero, the famous Roman politician and orator, popularized this
form of skepticism.
The Academic skeptics took their cue from Socrates, Plato's skeptical teacher,
who claimed that the only thing he knew is that he did not know. The Academic
skeptics attacked Stoics, Aristotelians, and even Platonists who made positive
claims to know, with certainty, something about the cosmos or about human
nature. They advanced a series of arguments that showed the unreliability of
both sense perception and reason. Thus neither sensory information nor reason
provided a reliable justification for knowledge claims. Hence we can trust no
claims to know other than the claim itself -- that there are no trustworthy
knowledge claims and trivial claims that something seems to be the case.
Most of the interesting claims made about the world (by scientists, artists,
politicians, or anybody) are not claims about what we immediately and
conclusively experience -- see, hear, smell, etc., and cannot be justified fully
either by sense experience or reason. As examples, consider the claims that "A
new way of detecting neutrinos will be developed by 1997" and "Italy is
currently undergoing a major political transition." Since simple observation is
not enough to establish such claims, we can say that they are underdetermined by
reasons or evidence. (The more precise way of stating this point is to say that
the set of relevant observation statements does not logically entail that claim;
in other words, the claim could be false even though all the observation
statements were true.) Accordingly, such claims may possibly be false and so
they cannot constitute genuine knowledge (episteme in ancient Greek, scientia in
Latin, the root of our 'science'). They are at best probable and could be
called opinion or probable opinion. (But do not read too much into 'probable'
here. The elementary calculus of probability and the modern notions of
empirical evidence were not developed until the 17th century, by such people as
Fermat, Pascal, and Huygens.)
The problem of the criterion. Another powerful move of the Academic skeptics
was to raise the problem of the criterion, which reflexively turns the problem
of knowledge back on itself. How are we to discriminate the true from the false
with absolute reliability? To do that, we need a criterion of truth, a kind of
filter that passes only true claims. But for any proposed criterion (e.g.,
sensory information, rational proof) we can ask the same question over again:
How do we know that the criterion is true or correct? Obviously, the criterion
cannot establish its own correctness, upon pain of vicious circularity. So we
need a second, more fundamental criterion to justify the first. But then the
new criterion equally needs justification in turn. So we are stuck either with
blatant vicious circularity (also called "begging the question" and petitio
principii -- or just petitio for short) or with a vicious, infinite regress.
Such a regress is an unending series of moves in which the problem keeps popping
up again, unsolved, at every new stage. And since an infinite series of steps
cannot be humanly completed in any case, such justification is worthless.
[NOTE. A circular argument is one that assumes the very thing that was to be
proved and is said to "beg the question" at issue. The conclusion is already
assumed (possibly in different words) as one of the premises. But be careful!
In any valid deductive argument, the conclusion is entirely contained in the
premises collectively. Obviously, assuming the conclusion in one, single
premise would remove any "purchase" or "leverage" that the argument might have
in persuading others, for no one who doubts the conclusion will accept that
premise, and no one who already accepts the premise needs proof of it anyway.
Here is a brief example of a circular argument.
Julie. "We know that God exists, for His actions in history are described in
the Bible."
Reggie. "But how do you know that what the Bible says is true?"
Julie. "Simple. The Bible is the word of God."
In the first line, Julie claims as her conclusion that God exists on the basis
of the premise that God's actions are described in the Bible. She is using the
Bible as a sufficient criterion of truth. However, Reggie questions her
criterion; he doubts her premise and requests that it be justified (as a
conclusion of further reasons that he does accept). When Julie replies that the
Bible is the word of God, she is begging the question by already assuming God's
authorship and hence God's existence -- the very thing that she claimed to be
proving.
Another short example of a more down-to-earth variety:
Bartender. "Okay, Buddy, let's see some ID."
Jon. "Here it is."
Bartender. "Hmmm. How do I know this is really yours?"
Jon. "Oh, I assure you that it is mine. It's not borrowed or a fake."
The doubtful bartender (noting Jon's youthful appearance, which also does not
exactly match the picture on the ID) seeks independent confirmation, not just
Jon's repetition that the ID is his.]
The other variety of skepticism emerged even earlier than Academic skepticism --
with Pyrrho of Elis (d. 275 BCE); however, it only received its definitive
theoretical formulation much later. The surviving texts are those of Sextus
Empiricus, who lived in Alexandria, Egypt, about 200 CE. Although in Egypt,
Alexandria was a Greek city founded (and named for) Alexander the Great during
his conquests. The area controlled by ancient Greece during this period is
called Magna Grecia or Greater Greece and includes Southern Italy as well.
(Some of the best-preserved Greek temples are found in Sicily.)
The Pyrrhonists aimed to achieve a suspension of judgment about every question,
every claim, that was non-evident. They did this by developing a series of
techniques for countering every piece of evidence by another piece, and every
positive argument by a counter-argument. The idea is that every argument that
purports to justify a knowledge claim can be countered by an argument that
undermines the claim. The skeptics did not claim that their own arguments (or
counter-arguments) could be trusted as reliable (which would amount to a
dogmatic knowledge claim), only that their undermining arguments were no worse
than the positive arguments of their opponents.
Unlike the Academic skeptics, the Pyrrhonists did not conclude that their
opponents were definitely wrong, that nothing is knowable, for such a statement
is itself dogmatic. Theirs was an attempt at a reflexively consistent
skepticism, that is, a position that applies to itself. They treated skepticism
as a cure for dogmatism, a kind of purge of everything, including itself (as
Popkin says). Descartes will try to turn the tables by showing that radical
skepticism is incoherent, that it is not reflexively consistent but
self-undermining, something so corrosive that it destroys itself (and thus
purges in an unintended way!).
The skepticism of Pyrrho and his followers was an attempt to live life
completely undogmatically, living naturally in accordance with the seeming
patterns of nature and society but without commitment of any sort to the
correctness of such patterns. It was an ultimate sort of "going with the flow."
Yet we must not equate Pyrrhonism with mere social conformity, for conformists
do commit themselves dogmatically to all kinds of doctrines and practices. The
Pyrrhonist makes no judgment about anything. That is what it means to "suspend
judgment." This suspension of judgment, called ataraxia (Gk. ataraktos = calm;
'ataraxy' in English), was a state of quietude in which one is completely
unperturbed.
Question 1 for you: Can one really live while suspending all judgment? Doesn't
even "natural" action commit you to something dogmatically? After all, as they
say, "actions speak louder than words." What could a skeptic reply?
Question 2: Does skepticism, with its doubts, really produce this sort of
tranquility, in the thought that all inquiry is in vain? Or does it, on the
contrary, induce inquietude, a disturbance that is only quelled by belief, by
conviction? [The American pragmatist philosopher, Charles Peirce, would claim
around 1880 that doubt amounted to a biological tension that could only be
resolved in belief -- and securely resolved only in justified belief.]
Because of their more thoroughgoing rejection of dogmatism than the Academic
skeptics, the Pyrrhonian version of the problem of the criterion was, if
anything, even more severe. Here is Sextus Empiricus's statement of the
problem, from his Outlines of Pyrrhonism.
. . . in order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we
must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the
dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the
criterion must first be decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to
a form of circular reasoning the discovery of the criterion becomes
impracticable, since we do not allow them [the Dogmatic philosophers] to adopt
a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by a
criterion we force them to a regress ad infinitum. (Book II, Chap. IV; quoted
from Popkin, pp. 3-4]
It may help to imagine the criterion as an epistemic or semantic filter that
allows only true statements to pass. We dump in whatever candidate claims we
like, and the filter passes only the true claims. The problem is, how could we
know that we had such a filter? How do we know the correct filter is the "red"
one rather than the "blue" one or the "green" one? And would it help if we
dumped in the claim: "I am the one true filter!" -- and the filter passed the
claim? What if another filter passed it as well?
The 16th century (1500s) was a time when the old social and religious
institutions came under heavy critical attack. One reason is that life and
culture were changing rapidly with the growth of cities, the increasing
importance of urban life, and what we can now identify as the decline of
feudalism and the emergence of a new, more capitalistic business life. In the
absence of the mutual relations of support between a medieval serf and the lord
of the manor, an urban individual was no longer guaranteed a livelihood but was
thrown out into the world on his/her own. Politically, the new unit of the
nation-state was forming, especially in England and France.
If you stop and think about it, every single major institution (religious,
educational, political, military, economic, etc.) was crumbling or under attack.
Meanwhile, the voyages of discovery were opening up new lands to exploration
and exploitation, while challenging received reviews about the earth and the
cosmos. The so-called Copernican Revolution continued this challenge at a
high-intellectual level. According to Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and a few
other early Copernicans, the earth containing us humans is not at the center of
a small, comfortable universe that seems expressly designed for us. Just as
there are lands across the seas, previously unknown to us, so there may be other
worlds out in space. Did Jesus go to those worlds, too, and die over and over
again for their sins? Over the next couple of centuries, it became increasingly
doubtful that the universe was designed by God expressly as a home for us.
Another reason for the critical dissatisfaction of the 16th century was the
rediscovery of the skeptical writings of Sextus Empiricus, which helped give
intellectual expression to the general dissatisfaction with old institutions and
the uncertainty of the future. We can even speak of a crise Pyrrhonienne, a
Pyrrhonist crisis. The major example was Martin Luther and the Protestant
Reformation. Luther, in effect, raised the problem of the criterion in urgently
practical terms -- religious and political terms -- when he challenged the
epistemic authority of the Catholic Church. From there the problem of
justification spread until it generated a paralyzing, general intellectual
crisis (to which we shall return in the section on Montaigne). Notice that that
is a "back-door" way in which a skeptic such as Socrates or Pyrrho can win -- by
so paraylzing the opponent that the stunned, confused opponent cannot assert
anything and so, by default, falls into ataraxy.
[The next few paragraphs are repeated from the section on the Reformation.] At
the beginning, in posting his ninety-five theses on the church door at
Wittenburg in 1517, Luther only attempted to show that the Church was corrupt by
its own standards, by its own criteria, and specifically by its "rule of faith"
that gave the Pope and the teachings of various Church councils supremacy in
determining what it was correct to believe. The Church declared them (that is,
declared itself!) to be absolute, unchallengeable authorities. But Luther
gradually became more radical and denied that the Pope and the councils were
supreme authorities. In other words, Luther challenged the so-called "rule of
faith" or criterion of religious knowledge established by the Church, the rule
that determined how correct belief was to be fixed in the community. The
authority of scripture, insisted Luther, outranks all other authority, be it the
teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas, the instruction of official councils, or even
the latest edicts of the Pope himself, speaking ex cathedra (that is, in his
official pronouncements as Pope and not as his own opinion).
Luther's challenge to the traditional rule for fixing belief helped provoke the
acute intellectual crisis of skepticism in the 16th century. For, to repeat, to
settle any dispute seems to require a criterion of truth, a standard of correct
reasoning and correct perception. But then the question arises, How do we
decide which of the many possible criteria of truth is correct? This seems to
require appeal to a yet higher criterion, which needs its own justification in
turn, and so we get a vicious, infinite regress. Or else we simply stop at some
point and say that our criterion is self-justifying, but such a move seems
viciously circular and proves nothing.
By challenging the Church's rule of faith, based on centuries of tradition and
authority that had rarely been doubted during all that time, Luther opened up
the whole question of whether there could be any religious or theological
knowledge at all. "To claim that the traditional standards could be wrong was
like denying the rules of logic" (Popkin 1960, 3). Luther's sort of challenge
to traditional epistemic authority quickly spread from religious disputes to
political disagreements and to intellectual debates in general.
Luther's own criterion was that whatever the individual conscience is compelled
to believe from reading the holy scripture is true. He thereby treated human
individuals less like children and more like autonomous, responsible adults
capable of thinking for themselves, than did the Church. In line with the
discussion below of the interiorization of the mental, this made subjective
certainty the criterion of religious knowledge. For how could anything but
inner conviction justify acceptance of religious views (Popkin 1960, 8), or
indeed political views or deep beliefs about anything? For was not all the
relevant information that we possessed encapsulted in our beliefs?
Since it is far easier to attack one's opponent than to provide a positive proof
of one's own position (which in this case is probably impossible), the debate
quickly took on a negative, hypercritical aspect, with each side claiming that
adopting the criterion of truth of the other side would lead to disaster.
Luther, for example, pointed out inconsistencies in the Church's position.
Since an inconsistent position is logically absurd and cannot possibly be true,
Luther was confident that he had shown the Catholic rule to be without merit.
But does Luther's own rule fare any better? Wherein lies the pretended logical
superiority of Luther's position? Why should we think Luther's appeal to
scripture any more justified than the Church's appeal to its tradition and the
authority of the pope? How can Luther or any other "innocent" reader know that
the so-called scripture is really the word of God rather than a compilation of
humanly written texts by people who thought they heard God speaking to them,
texts that had gone through the hands of so many copyists, translators, and
interpreters who could make mistakes? Even if the scripture were the exact word
of God, how could Luther or anyone else really be certain what God meant by
these words? Luther's answer is that the scriptures themselves attest to their
own authenticity and meaning; they are self-justifying.
To the Catholic critics, taking scripture as its own justification was viciously
circular. Even if all readers agreed, why should we think that their subjective
certainty necessarily reflected the truth about the universe? There is a
logical gap between subjective certainty and external truth. But, secondly,
what reason did Luther have to expect, so optimistically, that sincere but
autonomous (self-ruled, self-governed) readers would in fact agree? The great
scholar Erasmus of Rotterdam pointed out that it was difficult to interpret key
passages of scripture and that Luther's own interpretations did not seem,
always, to be the best. In particular, how are we to resolve a dispute between
two sincere readers of the scriptures who disagree? The Church was surely
correct to challenge this part of his case? (At the very least a Church council
is a community rather than a single person and allows some critical discussion
before coming to agreement.) How could we decide which position is correct?
Indeed, the numbers of Protestant sects multiplied rapidly, each disagreeing
with the others on one or another fundamental matter. (Compare mathematical
knowledge.)
Erasmus believed that simple religious piety was more important than theological
disputation over matters of esoteric doctrine. He was sympathic to Luther's
call for reform but wanted to resolve the dispute without breaking with the
Church. He invoked skepticism to argue that since human beings can never be
certain about complex theological theses, it is better to remain within the
established tradition of the Church. Although the Church cannot be proved
correct, we have no sufficient rational basis for leaving the Church, no proof
that Luther's great disruption of religious life would be superior. Thus
Erasmus appeal to skepticism in order to dampen heated controversy and to
produce harmony, albeit in a manner favorable to the status quo.
Luther scathingly rejected Erasmus's appeal to tradition on the ground that we
have sufficient knowledge to know that the tradition is bankrupt. Luther
insisted that genuine faith had to have theological content in the form of
absolutely certain knowledge, and that anyone who read the scriptures with
sympathy would find the religious truths revealed there. And what conscience
compels us to believe upon reading the scriptures -- that is the criterion of
truth. For Luther, Erasmus's skepticism was the exact opposite of Christianity.
No Christian could be a skeptic without being an outright atheist. No genuine
faith without knowledge! Faith has an essential cognitive (belief, knowledge)
component. Here Luther is attracted to a claim that would, in the very
different context of the Enlightenment, would become a fundamental principle:
Contrary to Montaigne and skepticism, human life cannot flourish without
well-founded knowledge.
The next great Reformation leader was the French-speaking Jean (John) Calvin of
Geneva, Switzerland, who argued that there is a double illumination by the Holy
Spirit for those readers of the scriptures who are truly elect. This double
illumination (1) assures them that the scriptures are the word of God and hence
certainly true; (2) discloses the actual meanings of the scriptures. Thus
appeal to the scriptures by the elect makes the scriptures self-validating,
self-certifying. Scripture is the rule of scripture. The scripture itself
certifies that it is scripture and also what it means (how it is to be
interpreted).
Neat -- except that it still is not clear how anything can be self-certifying
without committing the logical fallacy of circularity. Indeed, we are very
close to the above example of circular reasoning: the scriptures prove God's
existence, and God's existence in turn proves the veracity of the scriptures.
(Descartes himself will use this example.)
Second, note that Calvin restricts this self-certainty just to readings by the
elect, those genuinely infused by the Holy Spirit. So he actually invokes a
separate criterion here. And how can we tell for sure whether someone has
received this divine illumination of the Holy Spirit and so is reading
correctly? What it basically comes down to is arbitrary authority -- Calvin's
saying that the reading is correct. It is correct as long as it agrees with
what I, John Calvin, say it means. In a famous case, Michael Servetus, a
sincere reader of the scriptures, claimed to find no adequate scriptural basis
for the doctrine of the Trinity (the hard-to-understand claim that God is
three-in-one, God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost), so he
concluded that that doctrine was false. Servetus was convicted of heresy and
burned at the stake by the self-assured John Calvin. Philosophy can be a matter
of life and death!
A version of Calvin's problem can be found on the Catholic side. According to
the highest Catholic theologians, only a church council of selected cardinals --
and later only the Pope alone -- is infallible. But then the problem becomes
that of who, really, are the legitimate members of the council ("the elect"), or
who is really the Pope, in the eyes of God. For all human modes of selection
are fallible, i.e., mistake-prone.
Ironically, the Protestant break with the Church did not lead to greater
tolerance of individual belief but less. Protestants were even more dogmatic
than Catholic authorities had been until the Reformation pushed Catholic
officials to the wall. Protestants were very much committed to the quest for
certainty. Ordinary, everyday reasonableness was not enough. As Luther's
attack on Erasmus suggests, Protestants feared that even a hint of skepticism
would propagate rapidly through the entire system of religious "knowledge,"
polluting it beyond recovery and leading to complete atheism. Thus, by their
lights, one could combat skepticism only by being a complete dogmatist. This
was, then, a defensive dogmatism, for underlying it was the problem of the
criterion -- the chief weapon in the Pyrrhonist arsenal! As a matter of fact,
their Catholic opponents routinely accused the Protestants of being skeptics in
sheep's clothing -- Pyrrhonists in religion.
The crucial question is whether there is any stable ground between complete
certainty and complete, Pyrrhonian skepticism. Can't one be reasonable without
being certain-sure? Or does any half-way house tend to collapse into either
dogmatism or utter skepticism?
Erasmus's solution had been to skeptically suspend judgment in theoretical
matters but to "go with the flow" (as we say) in practical affairs -- to retain
the usual customs and traditions, in this case those of the deeply entrenched
Catholic Church. Insofar as Erasmus commited himself to any theological
doctrines, it was on the basis of faith, not reason. Does Erasmus's position --
a limited faith that goes beyond reason but that does not fly flagrantly in the
face of skepticism -- furnish a possible alternative to complete dogmatism on
the one hand, and complete skepticism on the other? One chief use of skepticism
by theologians (and others) has been to attack all positive philosophy (and
science), all scholarly pretensions based on reason (and empirical evidence) and
argument, in order to defend faith as the only (or primary) basis of belief.
These questions pass from theology to philosophy and become key questions of
epistemology or theory of knowledge in the 17th century. Meanwhile, Montaigne
will also struggle with them in the 16th century.

The agonistic, critical intellectual attacks on opposing positions can be seen
as a continuation of military conflict by other means (and this was historically
the case as the religious wars gradually gave way to theological and
philosophical debate). As long as each side attempts to undermine the other,
with reference to a standard of infallibility or absolute perfection, neither
side can get very far. Is there any possibility of introducing a spirit of
tolerance, cooperation, of playing a cooperative game?


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Ancient Skepticism



Used in its most specific sense, the expression "ancient skepticism" refers to
two movements in ancient philosophy. One is Pyrrhonism, which claims Pyrrho of
Elis (4th-3rd c. B.C.) as its founder but was especially prominent during and
after the 1st c. B.C. The other is Academic Skepticism, which encompasses a
skeptical phase in the history of Plato’s Academy (3rd to early 1st c. B.C.).
Used more broadly and more loosely, the term "skepticism" is sometimes used in
conjunction with a great many ancient thinkers who are not tied to these two
movements, but are characterized by significant skeptical inclinations. The most
important of these are Protagoras and Socrates, but one might also include
Gorgias, Democritus, Aristippus and Diogenes of Sinope (the "Cynic"). While the
views of these figures are sometimes mentioned in the present article, it
focuses on the narrow notion of "ancient skepticism" and the figures and schools
that it encompasses.
An Overview
The Historical Context
Pyrrho and Equanimity
Appearances
Arcesilaus in the Academy
Carneades in the Academy
Carneades as Dialectician
The Arguments for Later Pyrrhonism
The Practical Criterion
The Logic of Ancient Skepticism
Bibliography
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries



An Overview
Following Sextus Empiricus, we can say that the ancient "skeptic" (from a Greek
verb meaning "to examine carefully") was an "investigator." He was someone who
investigated the questions of philosophy but "suspended judgment" because he was
unable to resolve the contrary attitudes, opinions and arguments that
characterized the debated topics of philosophy, hence unable to arrive at a
definitive position of his own on any of them. Instead of adhering to some
standard philosophical position, the skeptic therefore described himself as
someone who continues to investigate -- a "zetetic."
Sextus (end 2nd c. A.D.) describes Pyrrhonian skepticism’s relationship to other
ancient philosophies in the opening passage of his Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH).
When people search for something, the likely outcome is that either they find
it or, not finding it, they accept that it cannot be found, or they continue
to search. So also in the case of what is sought in philosophy, I think, some
people have claimed to have found the truth, others have asserted that it
cannot be apprehended, and others are still searching. Those who think that
they have found it are the Dogmatists, properly so called -- for example, the
followers of Aristotle and Epicurus, the Stoics, and certain others. The
followers of Clitomachus and Carneades, as well as other Academics, have
asserted that it cannot be apprehended. The Skeptics [skeptikoi] continue to
search [i.e., investigate]. (PH 1.1-3, Mates)
Two aspects of these remarks warrant special comment. One is Sextus’ suggestion
that the Pyrrhonian leaves open the possibility of apprehending truth. While
consistency forces him to speak this way -- for continuing to investigate makes
no sense unless it might conceivably lead to the discovery of some definitive
solution to the problems investigated -- one might reasonably wonder whether the
ancient skeptic was genuinely open to this possibility. Certainly it must be
said that the Pyrrhonian stance one finds in Sextus is an overwhelmingly
negative one which functions primarily as a negative critique of any attempt to
establish truth.
Sextus’ comments on Carneades, Clitomachus and other Academic skeptics are also
controversial. His suggestion that they maintain that truth cannot be
apprehended (which might imply that they inconsistently maintain they have
apprehended that this is true) is most plausibly interpreted as an attempt to
drive a wedge between Pyrrhonism and what at Sextus’ time was recognized as a
competing school of skepticism. In the present context, it is enough to say that
these Academics would be skeptics in the sense in which we use the term even if
they did adopt the negative dogmatism which Sextus ascribes to them, for it
still constitutes a comprehensive rejection of any claim to have apprehended
what is true.
The conviction (or deep-seated suspicion) that philosophical claims to apprehend
some truth are inherently uncertain is, therefore, the heart of ancient
skepticism. The ancient skeptics propounded and defended this conviction by
opposing any and all positions with contrary positions, each of which is said to
demonstrate the other’s uncertainty. Sextus describes the "method of antithesis"
this implies when he explains later Pyrrhonism’s practice of epoche (suspending
judgment):
Broadly speaking, this [suspension of judgement about all things] comes about
because of the setting of things in opposition. We oppose either appearances
to appearances, or ideas to ideas, or appearances to ideas. We oppose
appearances to appearances when we say "The same tower seems round from a
distance but square from near by." We oppose ideas to ideas when someone
establishes the existence of providence from the orderliness of the things in
the heavens and we oppose to this the frequency with which the good fare badly
and the bad prosper, thereby deducing the non-existence of providence. We
oppose ideas to appearances in the way in which Anaxagoras opposed to snow’s
being white the consideration: snow is water, and water is black, therefore
snow is black too. On a different scheme, we oppose sometimes present things
to present things, but sometimes present things to past and future things...
(PH 1.31-5, Long & Sedley)
Diogenes Laertius (1st half of 3rd c. A.D.) associates a similar method of
antithesis with Academic skepticism when he writes that Arcesilaus (mid-3rd c.
B.C.) "was the originator of the Middle Academy, being the first to suspend his
assertions owing to the contrarieties of arguments, and the first to argue pro
and contra" (4.28-44, Long & Sedley). The most famous of the Academic skeptics,
Carneades (mid-2nd c. B.C.), is reported to have demonstrated his ability to
argue for opposing views on a famous trip to Rome, where he is said to have
argued impressively for justice on one day and on the next to have argued with
equal force against it (Lactantius, Div. Ins., 5.16, 6.6). Judging by Cicero’s
account in De Finibus, the attitude of opposition which this reflects played an
integral role in lessons in the skeptical Academy, where the teacher proceeded
by opposing a thesis enunciated by a student (e.g., "The Chief Good in my
opinion is pleasure"). In a more technical way, antithesis is evident in the
Academics’ argument against the Stoics’ "cataleptic" impressions, which paired
alleged examples of such impressions with equally forceful, but
indistinguishable impressions which are false.
We might recognize the emphasis on opposition and antithesis which characterized
ancient skepticism by describing it as a rejection of our ability to apprehend
truth which was founded on the attempt to oppose other philosophies, both by
opposing their arguments and positions, and by devising general strategies of
opposition.
The Historical Context
It is sometimes said that skeptical doubts characterize times of social upheaval
(not only in ancient times but also in the fourteenth century and in
contemporary philosophy). Whether these kinds of considerations can help explain
the rise of ancient skepticism is very difficult to say, in part because the
role which social influences play in determining any philosophical position is
inherently complex and obscure. In view of this, it can best be said that
ancient skepticism is a natural extension of many of the trends and movements
that characterize mainstream ancient philosophy.
Skepticism’s affinity to other ancient philosophies is most evident in the kinds
of considerations that convince the skeptic that he should suspend judgment on
the truth of any philosophical claim. For though skeptical conclusions (that on
given issues the truth is uncertain) are at odds with the "dogmatist"
philosophies the skeptics criticize, these philosophies were frequently founded
on a similar concern with opposition, antithesis, and opposing points of view.
One might, for example, easily compare the Pyrrhonian conviction that there are
equally convincing arguments for and against any claim to the Protagorean
conviction that one can argue convincingly on both sides of any question. This
similarity reflects similar philosophical concerns even though Protagoras’
conclusion (at least as it is reported by Plato in the Theaetetus) that opposing
points of view are true is diametrically at odds with the skeptic’s rejection of
all claims to truth.
The situation is similar in many other cases. Opposing points of view played an
important role in the development of Greek atomism, which can be seen as an
attempt to explain such opposition by hypothesizing atoms which impact on
different kinds of bodies in different kinds of ways. Opposites which include
opposing points of view are also emphasized in Heracleitean and Platonic
metaphysics. Even Aristotle recognized the possibility of arguing for
conflicting points of view in his work on rhetoric.
In other cases, ancient philosophers anticipated skepticism by stressing the
difficulties inherent in the search for truth. Xenophanes was known for his
claim that no one can know clear truth. Democritus maintained that "bastard"
knowledge gained through our senses exists only by convention. Plato rejected
everyday opinions, comparing them to shadows in a cave. Diogenes of Sinope,
Epictetus and similar moralists dismiss philosophical speculation on the grounds
that practical demonstration is what matters. Such philosophers did not endorse
a full fledged skepticism, but their views clearly added impetus to the
skeptics’ moves in this direction.
Much more generally, ancient skepticism flourished in an intellectual climate
which was naturally conducive to skeptical conclusions. In marked contrast with
modern science, ancient science did not, for example, boast the kinds of
practical and theoretical successes we now take for granted. In part because of
this, a bewildering array of opposing philosophical perspectives characterized
ancient philosophical inquiry and important philosophers were famous for their
ability to construct dazzling arguments for paradoxical conclusions (that motion
is impossible, that nothing exists, that time is an illusion, etc.). An interest
in foreign cultures drew attention to opposing customs and traditions, mysticism
and irrationalism flourished as powerful cultural forces, and opposing interests
and perspectives were manifest in war, political rivalries and a religion and
mythology which pitted god against god, man against man and even god against
man. In the midst of the opposing views that this implies, it cannot be judged
surprising that radical skepticism in a variety of forms became a prominent
philosophical perspective.
Pyrrho and Equanimity
The movements that make up ancient skepticism begin with Pyrrho (ca. 365-ca. 275
B.C.). In marked contrast to modern skeptics, he proposed skepticism as a way of
life which functioned as a route to equanimity and contentment. He left no
writings, and except for what has survived of his pupil Timon’s exegetical
writings ancient reports about him are heavily colored by anachronism drawn from
the philosophical outlook of the Pyrrhonian "revival" in the 1st c. B.C. (see
below, "The Arguments for Later Pyrrhonism"). Sextus is, for example, noticeably
reticent when he declares that "Pyrrho appears to us to have applied himself to
Skepticism [i.e. Pyrrhonian skepticism as Sextus knew it] more thoroughly and
more conspicuously than his predecessors" (PH1.7, Bury). We find a less hedged
view of Pyrrho and his views in the following fragment of Aristocles
(Peripatetic of uncertain date, perhaps 1st c. B.C.-A.D., perhaps 2nd c. A.D.).
He [Pyrrho] himself has left nothing in writing, but this pupil Timon says
that whoever wants to be happy must consider these three questions: first, how
are things by nature? Secondly, what attitude should we adopt towards them?
Thirdly, what will be the outcome for those who have such an attitude?
According to Timon, Pyrrho declared that things are equally indifferent,
unmeasurable and inarbitrable. For this reason neither our sensations nor our
opinions tell us truths or falsehoods. Therefore for this reason we should not
put our trust in them one bit, but should be unopinionated, uncommitted and
unwavering, saying concerning each individual thing that it no more is than is
not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not. The outcome for those
who actually adopt this attitude, says Timon, will be first speechlessness
[aphasia], and then freedom from disturbance; and Aenesidemus says pleasure.
(Eusebius, Prep. Ev. 14.18.2-5, Long & Sedley)
According to Diogenes Laertius (9.76), Timon explained Pyrrho’s formula ou
mallon ("no more is than is not") as a way of expressing a decision to suspend
judgment and determine nothing. The practical result of the indifference to
opinions and sensations which results is Pyrrho’s "peace of mind" (D.L. 9.65).
The Life of Pyrrho which Diogenes Laertius includes in his Lives of Eminent
Philosophers suggests that Pyrrho lived a life in accord with his own emphasis
on equanimity and indifference. Among other things, he lived like a recluse, did
not "so much as frown" when treated with disinfectants, surgery and cautery,
voluntarily adopted a life of piety and poverty, and performed menial tasks to
show his indifference. According to one anecdote, he was criticized when he
failed to maintain his composure when a cur rushed at him and terrified him
(Pyrrho answered that it is difficult to strip oneself of human nature). The
citizens of his native Elis rewarded him with honors, making him a high priest,
raising a statue in his honor (Pausanias 6.24.5), on his account passing a law
which exempted philosophers from taxes (D.L. 9.64).
Flintoff locates the origins of Pyrrho’s philosophy in India, where Pyrrho
travelled with the court of Alexander the Great and was in this way exposed to
Indian ascetics and their commitment to an enlightened state of mind. Certainly
it is likely that Pyrrho was impressed with the indifference of India’s
gymno-sophists (the "Naked Philosophers"). This much being granted, it can still
be said that his skepticism has Greek origins which are plausibly located in
Democritean atomism.
Looked at from the point of view of earlier Greek philosophy, Pyrrho’s
skepticism is a natural evolution of Democritus’ doubts about ordinary opinions,
which Democritus rejected as purely "conventional" on the grounds that they are
contradictory and truth resides in atoms and the void. It is in keeping with
this that Pyrrho’s teacher is the Democritean Anaxarchus (whom he followed to
India); his formula ou mallon is borrowed from atomism (DeLacy); his goal of
equanimity reflects Democritean practical ideals; and he is said to have admired
Democritus above all others (D.L. 9.67). But Pyrrho takes skeptical inclinations
one step further than Democritus and rejects atomism as well ordinary opinions,
in the process giving up on philosophy and on all attempts to establish what is
true (D.L. 9.69,65; cf. Sextus, PH 1.28-29; AM [Adversus Mathematicos] 11.1). As
Aristocles puts it, "if we are so constituted that we know nothing, then there
is no need to continue enquiry into other things.... Pyrrho of Elis was ... a
powerful spokesman of such a position" (Eusebius, 14.18.1-2, Long & Sedley).
Sextus describes Pyrrhonism’s ties to equanimity (ataraxia) with an anecdote
which probably relates events which occurred during Pyrrho’s time with
Alexander’s court. It tells how Apelles, Alexander’s court painter, was
frustrated by his inability to paint the froth on a horse’s mouth and in
exasperation threw a sponge at his painting, accidentally producing the effect
he wanted. "So, too, the Skeptics were hoping to achieve ataraxia by resolving
the anomaly of phenomena and noumena, and, being unable to do this, they
suspended judgment. But then, by chance as it were, when they were suspending
judgment the ataraxia followed, as a shadow follows the body." (PH 1.29, Mates)
Apparently, equanimity accompanies skepticism "like a shadow" for two reasons.
First, because it eliminates the anxiety that accompanied the study of
philosophy in the hope of arriving at an apprehension of the truth about reality
and what is good and bad in human life. Second, it promotes indifference to the
misfortunes and calamities that disturb our peace of mind, for the skeptic
concludes that misfortunes and calamities can’t be known to be bad. In the
context of his actual life, Pyrrho probably maintained his attitude of calm
composure by using the method of antithesis outlined in the following fragment
of Democritus:
[In order to achieve cheerfulness]... one must keep one’s mind on what is
attainable, and be content with what one has, paying little heed to things
envied and admired, and not dwelling on them in one’s mind. Rather must you
consider the lives of those in distress, reflecting on their intense
sufferings, in order that your own possessions and condition may seem great
and enviable, and you may, by ceasing to desire more, cease to suffer in your
soul... One must... [compare] one’s own life with that of those in worse
cases, and must consider oneself fortunate, reflecting on their sufferings, on
being so much better off than they. If you keep to this way of thinking, you
will live more serenely (fr. 191, cf. fr. 3; Kirk, Raven and Schofield).
The exercises here proposed allow one to be content by continually opposing
one’s misfortunes with comparisons that make one seem well off. The relativity
of value judgments -- a natural component of skepticism -- can in this way
provide a psychological basis for peace of mind. As the old saw goes, "I was
upset about my lack of shoes until I met a man with no feet."
Pyrrho’s own use of such tactics is implied by the report that he was fond of
Homer’s lines (Il. 21.106-7): "Ay friend, die thou; why thus thy fate deplore?
Patroclus, thy better, is no more" -- lines that combat upset with one’s own
fate with the thought that one does not deserve anything better, since the great
warrior Patroclus has suffered the same. Oppositions of this sort are probably
implied when it is said that Pyrrho "talked to himself" when he trained himself
to be good (D.L. 9.64, cf. 69). The same method and ideals are reflected in an
incident in which his teacher Anaxarchus cures Alexander’s despondency after he
has killed a friend (Plutarch, Alex., 52), and in Anaxarchus’ own fame as "the
happy one," which is in part founded on (or perhaps the basis for) the story
that he was unflappable even when he sufferred a horrible death at the hands of
the tyrant Nicocreon (D.L. 9.59-60).
Appearances
Pyrrho’s philosophy raises a number of issues which reverbate throughout the
history of skepticism. Questions about the consistency of the skeptical
perspective are particularly significant. As Aristocles says, "in admonishing us
to have no opinion, they [the skeptics] at the same time bid us to form an
opinion, and in saying that men ought to make no statement they make a statement
themselves: and though they require you to agree with no one, they command you
to believe themselves..." (Eus. Prep. Ev. 14.18, Gifford).
Other commentators ask how Pyrrho survived the pitfalls of day to day life --
much less achieved supreme contentment -- if he refused to believe the truth of
his sense impressions. According to one ancient report, this was a practical as
well as a theoretical issue, for Pyrrho accepted skepticism "in his actual way
of life, avoiding nothing and taking no precautions, facing everything as it
came, wagons, precipices, dogs, and entrusting nothing whatsoever to his
sensations. But he was looked after... by his disciples, who accompanied him"
(D.L. 9.62, Long & Sedley).
Though the consistency of skepticism is open to debate, not much is to be made
of this account of Pyrrho’s actions, which can be grouped with many other
unbelievable stories which Diogenes Laertius reports -- that Pythagoras
descended into Hades, that Apollo appeared to Plato’s father, that Zeno of Elea
(and, again, Aristarchus) bit off his tongue and spat it at a tyrant who was
persecuting him, and so on. Laertius has a penchant for such stories and is
happy to stretch himself to include them -- in this case he does so by citing as
his authority "those around" Antigonus of Carystus (3rd c. B.C. author of Lives
of Philosophers), making this account of Pyrrho little more than a rumor.
As Hallie says, we can usefully contrast the claim that Pyrrho rejected the
senses with Posidonius’ account (1st c. B.C.) of his actions when he was caught
in a wild storm at sea (D.L. 9.68). Confronted with other passengers wailing and
cringing with horror, Pyrrho is said to have remained calm and pointed to a
small pig which was calmly eating on the deck, saying that its attitude
demonstrated the unperturbed state of the wise man. Even though Timon included
"sensations" as well as "opinions" within the scope of Pyrrho’s skepticism, this
suggests that it is human fears and frailties, not sense impressions, which
Pyrrho was concerned to expunge by skeptical inquiry.
It can still be asked how Pyrrho could consistently embrace his senses and his
skeptical conclusions. Timon answers that the Pyrrhonian guides himself by
"appearances" (phainomena -- what "appears to be the case"). This suggests that
Pyrrho rejected claims to truth and viewed his skepticism and his day to day
beliefs as a mere acceptance of appearances that stops short of claims to truth.
As Diogenes Laertius puts it:
...the dogmatists say that they [the skeptics] abolish life, in the sense that
they throw out everything that goes to make up a life. But the skeptics say
that these charges are false. For they do not abolish, say, sight, but only
hold that we are ignorant of its explanation.... We do sense that fire burns,
but we suspend judgement as to whether it is fire’s nature to burn.... "We
only object," they say, "to the non-evident things added on to the phenomena
[the appearances].... For this reason, Timon in his Pytho says that he has not
diverged from what is customary. And in his Likenesses he says, "But the
apparent utterly dominates wherever it goes." And in his work On the Senses he
says, "That honey is sweet I do not posit; that it appears so I concede."
(D.L. 9.104-5, Inwood & Gerson)
Such claims suggest that we should interpret early Pyrrhonian claims -- and even
Pyrrho’s claim that things "are" indifferent, unmeasurable and inarbitrable --
as claims about what appears to be the case. Whether such moves can, in the end,
save the skeptic from the charge of inconsistency is a matter of much debate
(for two sides of this debate, see Frede and Burnyeat).
Arcesilaus in the Academy
Pyrrho’s impact on his immediate contemporaries seems quite limited. Timon is
his only student of repute and ancient skepticism’s next phase is not Pyrrhonian
but Academic. No doubt the Academy became a school of skepticism by exploiting
the skeptical aspects of Plato’s philosophical writings -- Socrates’ heroic
skepticism in the early dialogues; the questioning of the forms in the
Parmenides; Plato’s pessimism about "ordinary" knowledge; and the indeterminate
nature of his dialogues which are intrinsically open to many interpretations.
Cicero, who defends a late version of Academic skepticism, says Plato is a
skeptic because he is always arguing pro and contra, states nothing positively,
inquires into everything, and makes no certain statements (Ac 1.46).
The first of the Academic skeptics is Arcesilaus (316/315-242/241 B.C.), the
head of what Diogenes Laertius calls the "Middle" Academy. He was influenced by
Plato, Pyrrho and Diodorus Cronus (a dialectician of impressive skill). Ariston
(3rd c. Stoic philosopher) described him as "Plato in front, Pyrrho behind,
Diodorus in the middle" (D.L. 4.33). According to Sextus, his skepticism is
"virtually identical" with Pyrrhonism (PH 1.232). While Arcesilaus was no
ascetic (see, e.g., D.L. 4.37-42), he still held that skepticism aims at
happiness (AM 7.158) and some of the anecdotes we find in Plutarch suggest that
he, like Pyrrho, believed we should deal with misfortune and unhappiness by
finding opposing ways of looking at trying situations (see "On Controlling
Anger," 461E and "On Tranquillity of Mind," 470A-B).
Arcesilaus’ arguments focus primarily on Stoic epistemology. According to
Couissin, he has no views of his own on the epistemological topics he disputes
with the Stoics, and offers his arguments merely as a reductio ad absurdum of
the Stoic point of view. It is difficult (perhaps impossible) to judge whether
this is so in the context of scanty evidence almost 2000 years later, especially
as it is never easy to tell how a philosopher intends a particular argument or
position (Caton has even argued that Descartes is not committed to the cogito in
the Meditations).
However one interprets it, the crux of Arcesilaus’ attack on Stoic epistemology
is his attack on the "cataleptic" impression (the kataleptike phantasia).
According to the Stoics, such an impression is clear and distinct and -- in
virtue of its clearness and distinctness -- reveals certain truth. As such, it
becomes the criterion or foundational guarantee of truth. According to
Arcesilaus, there is no such impression (and no impression can be a guarantee of
truth), for any allegedly cataleptic impression can be paired with an impression
which is equally clear and distinct but nonetheless mistaken -- because it is
experienced in dreaming, hallucinating, etc. (Ac. 2.77; AM 7.252).
According to Sextus, Arcesilaus combines his skeptical arguments with a
commitment to "the reasonable" (the eulogon) which he propounds as a practical
criterion in day to day affairs.
... since it was necessary ... to inquire into the conduct of life which
naturally cannot be directed without a criterion, upon which happiness too,
that is, the goal of life depends for its reliability, Arcesilaus says that he
who suspends judgment about everything regulates choices and avoidances and,
generally, actions by reasonableness, and, proceeding according to this
criterion, will act correctly. For happiness arises because of prudence, and
prudence resides in correct actions, and a correct action is that which,
having been done, has a reasonable defence. Therefore, he who adheres to
reasonableness will act correctly and will be happy. (AM 7.158, Inwood &
Gerson)
Those who, like Couissin, see Arcesilaus as a purely negative dialectician do
not believe that he actually endorsed such views, at any rate not on the basis
of an independent examination of the issues (as against what would reasonably
follow from Stoic assumptions). Sextus, however, does not frame his report of
Arcesilaus’ views in this way, and seems to claim that the use of the
"reasonable" as a criterion of choice was Arcesilaus’ own philosophical
position, which he proposed as an alternative to a reliance on the Stoics’
"cataleptic impression." In any case, some such commitment makes good
philosophical sense (see Hankinson, 86-91), especially in a historical context
in which philosophy is expected to provide a practical guide to life.
One might, of course, still debate whether Arcesilaus’ skepticism was consistent
with an acceptance of the "reasonable" or, much more fundamentally, the actions
which daily life requires (for one might argue that eating, drinking, moving,
etc. require beliefs that skepticism undermines). That this was a heated issue
already in ancient times is evident in Plutarch’s Against Colotes (2nd c. A.D.),
which takes Colotes (3rd c. B.C.) to task for his attack on Arcesilaus and other
philosophers in a book entitled On the fact that the doctrines of the other
philosophers make it impossible even to live. Colotes’ book also attacked
Democritus, Aristotle, Parmenides, and Socrates -- indeed, virtually everyone
but his mentor, Epicurus -- so he was not concerned especially with Arcesilaus.
But Plutarch includes a notable defense of Arcesilaus in his response. It argues
that the soul has three movements: sensation, impulse, and assent, and that
Arcesilaus allows us to accept sensation and impulse so long as we stop short of
assent and opinion (Mor. 1122C-D). According to an angry Plutarch, it follows
that Arcesilaus’ views in this way provide a basis for action and get from
Colotes the kind of unappreciative attention that a performance on the lyre gets
from an ass (Mor. 1122B).
Carneades in the Academy
After Arcesilaus, the leadership of the Academy passed to Lacydes, to Telecles
and Evander, and then to Hegesinus. Little is known about their views, but it
seems that they preserved Arcesilaus’ skepticism. The next phase in the history
of ancient skepticism begins with Carneades (214/213-129/128 B.C.), who Diogenes
Laertius describes as the head of the "New" Academy. Though he wrote nothing, he
appears to have been a remarkably successful philosopher. So much so that
Numenius (2nd c. A.D. Platonist) says, in a fragment in Eusebius (a 3rd-4th c.
A.D. Christian bishop), that he was victorious on every issue. According to
Diogenes Laertius, he became so famous attacking Stoic arguments that he said,
"if Chrysippus had not existed neither would I," mimicking the Stoic maxim, "if
Chrysippus had not existed, neither would the Stoa" (D.L. 4.62, cf. 7.183).
One finds an account of two of Carneades’ central arguments against the
"criterion" of knowledge (including especially the Stoic "cataleptic
impression") in Sextus’ work, "Against the Logicians" (AM7.159-165). According
to Sextus’ account, they were addressed against all of Carneades’ (dogmatic)
predecessors. The first maintained that there can be no criterion of certain
truth because reason, the senses, and any other supposed criterion can play us
false. The second argued that the impressions (or "presentations") that inform
our judgments are not purely objective, but reflect also their own subjective
nature -- as light shows both itself and the things it illuminates. It appears
that the subjectivity of impressions which this second argument emphasizes was
underscored by an appeal to the by now standard argument that any impression
which appears true can be paired with (and opposed by) an indistinguishably
similar impression which is false.
Though Carneades’ cleverness in argument (rather than the moral austerity we
associate with Pyrrho) is the most notable feature of extant evidence about him,
Cicero implies that he used antithesis to promote equanimity when he says that
Carneades criticized Chrysippus for approving of a passage in which Euripides
recounts the pain of life. According to Carneades, Chrysippus was promoting
depression whereas the passage should instead be used to bring comfort to the
ill-disposed by reciting the misfortunes of others (Tusc. Disp. 3.59-60). A
similar concern with equanimity is evident in Carneades’ claim that we should
oppose the expected with the unexpected -- health with the possibility of
sickness, safety with the possibility of accident, etc. -- because the
unexpected causes us grief when it catches us off guard (Plutarch, Tranq.
474F-75A). In a famous speech Carneades demonstrated how to use opposing
arguments as a means of promoting peace of mind by arguing, for the sake of
Clitomachus in the wake of the destruction of his native Carthage, that the wise
man is not distressed even at the loss of his native city (Cicero, Tusc. Disp.
3.54).
Despite his arguments against all criteria of certain truth, Eusebius says that
Carneades did not suspend judgment on all matters (Prep. Ev. 14.7.15), but
distinguished between things that are "non-evident" (non-apparent) and those
that are "non-apprehensible." According to this account, he held that everything
is non-apprehensible but that some things are not non-evident. It is tempting to
compare this alleged commitment to "evident" things with the Pyrrhonian
commitment to appearances, but this is difficult given that Carneades (unlike
the Pyrrhonians) is said to rank different kinds of impressions as more and less
persuasive.
In "Against the Logicians," Sextus, in conjunction with his report of Carneades’
attacks on the Stoic theory of cataleptic impressions, says that Carneades
adopted the pithanon (the "plausible") as a practical criterion and
distinguished between impressions which are: (i) implausible; (ii) plausible
(i.e. appear true "to an intense degree"); (iii) irreversible (i.e. plausible
and confirmed by other impressions); and (iv) tested (i.e. irreversible and
tested by the scrutiny of surrounding circumstances). One might argue that this
is an improvement on Stoic epistemology, insofar as it suggests that they should
propose as their criterion, not the merely "clear and distinct" impressions, but
those that are irreversible, and tested as well. According to Sextus’ account of
Carneades’ views, he added some further sophistication to his criterion of
choice by holding that different levels of plausibility are appropriate in
different kinds of circumstances. While he proposed plausible impressions as a
guide in matters of no importance, for example, he is said to hold that weighty
matters call for impressions which are irreversible and tested (AM 7.184).
Sextus illustrates Carneadean plausibility with an illuminating example:
On seeing a coil of rope in an unlighted room a man jumps over it, conceiving
it for the moment to be a snake [i.e. judging this to be plausible], but
turning back afterwards he inquires into the truth, and on finding it
motionless he is already inclined to think that it is not a snake [for this
impression seems reversible], but as he reckons, all the same, that snakes too
are motionless at times when numbed by winter’s frost, he prods at the coiled
mass with a stick, and then, after thus testing the impression received, he
assents to the fact that it is false to suppose that the body presented to him
is a snake. (AM 7.187-88, Bury)
Judging by Sextus and some of our other ancient sources, Carneades tried to make
the pithanon compatible with his skepticism by emphasizing that plausibility is
inherently subjective and a criterion of choice but not a measure of objective
probability or truth. Clitomachus thus writes that "The Academic school holds
that there are dissimilarities between things of such a nature that some of them
seem plausible and others the contrary; but this is not an adequate ground for
saying that some things can be apprehended [or grasped as true] and others
cannot, because many false objects are plausible..." (Cicero Ac. 2.103, Rackham,
tr. altered; cf. 104 and AM 7.169). This makes Carneadean assent to something’s
plausibility consciously subjective and, in view of this, more constrained than
the assent which seems to be implied by claims to truth.
Though Carneades may in this way have avoided claims to truth, his account of
plausible and implausible impressions still drives an important wedge between
his views and those of the Pyrrhonians, for the Pyrrhonians attempt to accept
appearances with a minimum (one might say ascetic) inclination that seems
incompatible with the conviction that some of the things assented to are highly
plausible. As Sextus puts it, "[A]lthough both the [later] Academics and the
Skeptics say that they are persuaded of certain things, here too the difference
of the philosophies is very evident. For ‘to be persuaded’ has different senses:
on the one hand, it means not to resist but simply to follow without much
proclivity or strong pro feeling, as the child is said to be obedient to his
teacher; but sometimes it means assent to something by choice and with a kind of
sympathy due to strong desire, as when a profligate man is persuaded by one who
approves of living extravagantly. Since, therefore, the followers of Carneades
and Clitomachus say both that they are strongly persuaded and that things are
strongly persuasive [i.e. plausible, pithanon], whereas we say that we simply
make a concession without any strong feeling, we would differ from them in this
respect, too." (PH 1.230, Mates). This difference highlights the much more
significant role that ascetic indifference plays in Pyrrhonian -- as opposed to
Carneadean -- skepticism.
Carneades as Dialectician
Some commentators on ancient skepticism argue that Carneades did not endorse the
positive philosophy implied in the suggestion that we should follow the
"plausible" impression, which Sextus seems to ascribe to him. According to this
reading, Carneades proposed the plausible merely "for the sake of argument" --
to show that alternatives to dogmatic epistemology as a basis for living an
active life are in principle possible (Striker’s views in this regard are
notable). On this interpretation, Carneades was a dialectician, and a skeptic
only in the sense that he never committed himself to any of the premisses from
which he argued, or to any of the conclusions he drew from them. It follows that
he was not a full fledged skeptic, in the sense of one who believed that no
certain knowledge was possible, or who (given that) advocated a skeptical way of
life in dependence on mere "belief" in "plausible" ("irreversible," or "tested")
impressions. On this view his achievement was not a skeptical philosophy but a
dialectical ability to argue for (and primarily against) any point of view.
The issue is a thorny one, as any philosopher is likely to act as a dialectician
at some time or other, and dialectical argument is an integral part of ordinary
skepticism, which continually propounds particular points of view "for the sake
of argument." Sextus is a case in point, for he spends very little time
expounding his own philosophy and instead propounds a huge catalogue of
arguments with conclusions to which he is not, in the final analysis, committed.
If we had lost only a few pages of his extant works, we could easily have been
left with texts which were completely dialectical.
In this context, it may be useful to consider Cicero, Academica 2.78, where
Philo (of Larissa, Cicero’s Academic teacher) and Metrodorus (a pupil of
Carneades’) are said to attribute to Carneades a skepticism which holds that the
wise man cannot apprehend anything (grasp it as true) but may accept an opinion
nonetheless. Cicero says he prefers the view of Clitomachus, who holds that
Carneades "did not so much accept this view as advance it in argument." This
clearly suggests that Carneades offered such a view only for dialectical
purposes (as an account of what, given premisses they would accept, one should
say about the "wise man" of the Stoics and other philosophers), but it provides
limited evidence for the dialectical interpretation, for it does not show that
this is Carneades’ only mode of argument (cf. Hankinson, 94).
The most important textual evidence in favor of the dialectical interpretation
is found at Academica 2.139, where Cicero says that Clitomachus used to declare
that he had never been able to understand what Carneades did accept (see
Striker, 55; Hankinson, 94; Inwood & Gerson, 165; Long & Sedley, Vol 1, 455).
This is not the claim that Carneades was a dialectician, however, and it is
compatible with the possibility that Clitomachus believed that Carneades
accepted some claims, but he was not sure which. More importantly perhaps,
Cicero’s report is embedded in a discussion of the good, in which Carneades is
said to have defended Calliphon’s view that the good is pleasure with such zeal
"that he was thought actually to accept it (although Clitomachus used to declare
that he had never been able to understand what Carneades did accept)" (tr.
Rackham). Taken in this context, the parenthetical comment about Clitomachus’
view of Carneades can be interpreted as the claim that Clitomachus did not
understand what Carneades held in this regard. It does not, therefore, provide
definitive evidence for the claim that Carneades was a dialectician and did not
have definite views of his own on disputed questions of philosophy.
The dialectical interpretation of Carneades does have the advantage that it
saves Carneades from inconsistency (for if he has no positive philosophical
views, he need not render anything he says in one argument consistent with what
he may say in another), though this advantage gained in this regard is earned by
turning Carneades’ philosophy into a purely negative philosophy which provides
no basis for action. One might therefore try to excuse Carneades from
inconsistency without abandoning the claim that he is a skeptic (in the sense
that he believes certain knowledge impossible), by emphasizing (as Sextus
suggests) the qualified and subjective nature of the assent that he endorsed. So
understood, his commitment to persuasiveness ("plausibility") and the assent
that this implies is, in virtue of its subjectivity, an attempt to formulate a
conception of belief which is compatible with a rejection of claims to objective
truth.
The Arguments for Later Pyrrhonism
Carneades’ successor as head of the Academy was Clitomachus (d. 110/9 B.C.), the
author of exegetical writings (now lost) reporting and explaining Carneades’
arguments and his skepticism -- writings referred to in Cicero’s Academica. He
was succeeded by Philo of Larissa (d. 84/3 B.C.). The latter taught, on the
basis of Carneades’ notion of "plausible" impressions, an epistemology which
allowed one to adopt whatever position on a disputed philosophical question
seemed to oneself most persuasive, after thorough examination of arguments on
all sides -- provided that one carefully refrained from claiming to have
established the truth on the matter in question with certainty. As we can see
from his pupil Cicero’s philosophical writings, this meant in practice the
adoption (in this tentative spirit) of many Stoic positions.
The next important ancient skeptic was Aenesidemus, who defected from Philo’s
Academy and revived Pyrrhonism in the early years of the first century B.C. "The
Academics," he said, "especially the ones now, sometimes agree with Stoic
opinions and, to tell the truth, appear to be just Stoics in conflict with
Stoics" (Photius, Bibl. 212, Inwood & Gerson). In response, his eight books of
Pyrrhonian Arguments propounded the view that "the Pyrrhonist determines
nothing, not even this, that he determines nothing" (ibid.). It is perhaps
ironic that he himself is reported to have given up on Pyrrhonism, and to have
finished his career as a Heracleitean, apparently on the grounds that skeptical
antithesis should be seen as a road leading to the realization that reality is
full of opposites (PH 1.210, compare AM 7.349, 9.336-67, 10.216, and Tertullian,
De Anima 9.5, 14.5).
Though Aenesidemus’ books on Pyrrhonism do not survive, they are summarized by
Photius (9th c. A.D.), whose account suggests that they systematized Pyrrhonism
by establishing standard argumentative strategies and collecting an array of
arguments, puzzles and conundrums borrowed from the whole of Greek philosophy.
We know of later Pyrrhonism primarily through three surviving works of Sextus
Empiricus (ca. 200 A.D.): The Outlines of Pyrrhonism; a second work Against the
Dogmatists, consisting of "Against the Logicians" (2 books), "Against the
Physicists" (2 books), and one book "Against the Ethicists;" and a third work
called Against the Learned (Adversus Mathematicos), combining the latter five
books with six further ones attacking the epistemological pretensions of
mathematicians, grammarians, etc. The relations between these books are complex
and not yet well explored (in Sextus 1997, Bett argues for a reading of Against
the Ethicists which would make it propound a very different skepticism than the
Outlines of Pyrrhonism).
Aenesidemus’ most important arguments are the ten modes (or "tropes") which
Sextus attributes to "the older skeptics" at PH 1.35-163. They create antitheses
and promote epoche by contrasting:
(i) the opposing perceptions and views of the world which characterize
different species: "For how could one say, with regard to touch [for example],
that animals are similarly affected whether their surfaces consist of shell,
flesh, needles, feathers or scales? And, as regards hearing, how could one say
that perceptions are alike in animals with a very narrow auditory canal and in
those with a very wide one, or in those with hairy ears and those with ears
that are hairless... [P]erfume seems very pleasant to human beings but
intolerable to dung beetles and bees, and the application of olive oil is
beneficial to human beings but kills wasps and bees." (PH 1.50, 55, Mates)
(ii) the opposing perceptions and views of the world which characterize
different individuals: "...the greatest indication of the vast and limitless
difference in the intellect of human beings is the inconsistency of the
various statements of the Dogmatists concerning what may be appropriately
chosen, what avoided, and so on." (PH 1.85-86, Mates)
(iii) the opposing perceptions and views of the world which characterize
different sense organs: "Pictures seem to the sense of sight to have
concavities and convexities," for example, "but not to the touch," and "Let us
imagine someone who from birth has ...lacked hearing and sight. He will start
out believing in the existence of nothing visible or audible, but only of the
three kinds of quality he can register. It is therefore a possibility that we
too, having only our five senses, only register from the qualities belonging
to the apple those which we are capable of registering. But it may be that
there objectively exist other qualities" (PH 1.92, 96-7, Mates).
(iv) the opposing perceptions and views of the world which characterize
different circumstances: "Thus, things affect us in dissimilar ways depending
on whether we are in a natural or unnatural condition, as when people who are
delirious or possessed by a god seem to hear spirits but we do not.... And the
same water that seems to us to be lukewarm seems boiling hot when poured on an
inflamed place.... Further, if someone says that an intermingling of certain
humors produces, in persons who are in an unnatural condition, odd phantasiai
[impressions] of the external objects, it must be replied that since healthy
people, too, have intermingled humors, it is possible that the external
objects are in nature such as they appear to those persons who are said to be
in an unnatural state, but that these humors are making the external objects
appear to the healthy in a natural people other than they are. (PH 1.101-2,
Mates).
(v) the opposing perceptions and views of the world that characterize
different positions and distances and places: for example, "lamplight appears
dim in sunlight but bright in the dark. The same oar appears bent in water but
straight when out of it" (PH 1.119, Mates).
(vi) the opposing perceptions and views of the world that characterize
mixtures: "[W]e deduce that since no object strikes us entirely by itself, but
along with something, it may perhaps be possible to say what the mixture
compounded out of the external object and the thing perceived with it is like,
but we would not be able to say what the external object is like by itself...
The same sound appears one way when accompanied by a rarefied atmosphere,
another way when accompanied by a dense atmosphere" (PH 1.124, 125, Mates).
(vii) the opposing perceptions and views of the world due to different
quantities and structures: "[I]ndividual filings of a piece of silver appear
black, but when united with the whole they affect us as white... And wine,
when drunk in moderation, strengthens us, but when taken in excess, disables
the body..." (PH 1.129, 131, Mates).
(viii) the opposing views possible because of the relativity of all things:
"...since all things are relative, we will suspend judgment about what things
exist absolutely and in nature... This has two senses. One is in relation to
the judging subject [different subjects perceiving differently]... The other
in relation to the conceptions perceived with it..." (PH 1.135, Mates).
(ix) the opposing perceptions and views of the world due to constancy or
rarity of occurrence: "The sun is certainly a much more marvelous thing than a
comet. But since we see the sun all the time but the comet only infrequently,
we marvel at the comet so much as even to suppose it a divine portent, but we
do nothing like that for the sun. If, however, we thought of the sun as
appearing infrequently and setting infrequently, and as illuminating
everything all at once and then suddenly being eclipsed, we sould find much to
marvel at in the matter." (PH 1.141, Mates). And
(x) the opposing perceptions and views of what is right and wrong which
characterize different ways of life, laws, myths and "dogmatic suppositions":
"among the Persians sodomy is customary but among the Romans it is prohibited
by law; and with us adultery is prohibited, but among the Massagetae it is by
custom treated as a matter of indifference, as Eudoxus of Cnidos reports...
and with us it is forbidden to have intercourse with one’s mother, whereas
with the Persians this sort of marriage is very much the custom. And among the
Egyptians men marry their sisters, which for us is prohibited by law. (PH
1.152, Mates).
Later Pyrrhonian modes more clearly isolate the basic epistemological issues
which are raised by the traditional ten modes. The five modes of Agrippa (date
unknown; later than Aenesidemus), discussed at PH 1.164-77 (which are analyzed
in detail by Barnes) promote the suspension of judgment by invoking:
-- disagreement, for among philosophers and ordinary people there is
interminable disagreement;
-- regress ad infinitum, for the skeptic asks for a proof of a claim, a proof
of the reliability of this proof, and so on ad infinitum;
-- relativity, for things are relative to both one’s subjective nature and the
concepts one employs in judging them;
-- hypothesis, for the skeptic does not allow us to take as our starting point
something which is taken for granted;
-- circular reasoning, for the skeptic rejects proofs that are circular, as
when sense impressions are used to establish the veracity of the senses.
The standard modes are reduced even further in a basic set of two modes
propounded in the following section of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism (1.178-79).
There it is argued that everything which is apprehended (as true) must be
apprehended through itself or some other thing. But according to the
Pyrrhonians, the first alternative is undermined by the "controversy among
philosophers" and the second by a demand for justification which entails a
regress ad infinitum which can be stopped only by claiming that something is
apprehended as true in virtue of itself (a possibility undermined by the first
mode).
The various sets of Pyrrhonian modes systematize ancient arguments against
dogmatic philosophical positions, but we should not exaggerate the role they
played in ancient skepticism. Judging by Sextus, they are usually backed -- and
very frequently supplanted -- by an enormous catalogue of other, specific
arguments which were used to argue for epoche on whatever topic happens to be at
hand (space, time, the good, the gods, fate, the meaningfulness of standard
conceptions of human nature, and so on and so forth). No encyclopedia article
can fully convey the spirit of the seemingly endless assortment of claims and
counter claims that Sextus is ready to marshal on any topic.
The Practical Criterion
In the midst of Sextus’ attack on other philosophers, it is easy to forget that
he, like Pyrrho, proposed skepticism as a way of life (an agoge). Its practical
merits are said to include its alleged ability to undermine useless and
unfounded speculation which is claimed to characterize dogmatist philosophy.
Like Hume, the later Pyrrhonians in this way attempt to supplant philosophical
speculation with mundane matters of practical concern. The spirit of this
rejection is well captured at PH 2.241-44, where Sextus condemns the convoluted
arguments and conundrums of ancient dialectic:
As regards sophisms the exposure of which is useful, the dialectician will not
have a word to say, but will propound such arguments as these -- "If it is not
so that you both have fair horns and have horns, you have horns; but it is not
so that you have fair horns and have horns, therefore you have horns." "If a
thing moves, it moves either in the spot where it is or where it is not; but
it neither moves in the spot where it is (for it is at rest) nor in that where
it is not (for how could a thing be active in a spot where it does not so much
as exist?); therefore nothing moves." "Either the existent becomes or the
non-existent; now the existent does not become (for it exists); nor yet does
the non-existent (for the becoming is passive but the non-existent is not
passive); therefore nothing becomes." "Snow is frozen water; but water is
black; therefore snow is black."
And when he has made a collection of such trash he draws his eyebrows
together, and expounds Dialectic and endeavours very solemnly to establish for
us by syllogistic proofs that a thing becomes, a thing moves, snow is white,
and we do not have horns, although it is probably sufficient to confront the
trash with the plain facts, smashing up their positive affirmation by means of
equally weighty contradictory evidence derived from the appearances. (PH
2.241-44, Bury, revised, cf. Timon’s attitude reported in D.L. 9.111, 2.107)
Appealing to a precedent which was set by early Pyrrhonism, later Pyrrhonians
propose that we replace philosophical attempts to establish what is true with an
acceptance of appearances which provides a basis for ordinary actions and
skeptical assertions. As Diogenes Laertius writes:
Aenesidemus too in the first book of his Pyrrhonian Arguments says that Pyrrho
determines nothing dogmatically because of the existence of contradictory
arguments, but rather follows appearances. He says the same thing in Against
Wisdom and On Investigation. And Zeuxis, an associate of Aenesidemus, in On
Twofold Arguments and Antiochus of Laodicea and Apellas in his Agrippa posit
the phenomena alone. Therefore, according to the skeptics, the appearance is a
criterion, as Aenesidemus too says. (D.L. 9.106, Inwood & Gerson)
According to Sextus, "when we question whether the external object is such as it
appears, we grant that it does appear, and we are not raising a question about
the appearance but rather about what is said about the appearance; this is
different from raising a question about the appearance itself. For example, the
honey appears to us to be sweet. This we grant, for we sense the sweetness...
And even when we do present arguments in oppostion to the appearances, we do not
put these forward with the intention of denying the appearances but by way of
pointing out the precipitancy of the Dogmatists..." (PH 1.19, Mates).
The later Pyrrhonian commitment to appearances is consolidated in a "Practical
Criterion" which was used to establish a "standard of action" which allows the
Pyrrhonian to "perform some actions and abstain from others" while not adopting
any beliefs in support of so choosing and acting.
Holding to the appearances, then, we live without beliefs but in accord with
the ordinary regimen of life, since we cannot be wholly inactive. And this
regimen of life seems to be fourfold: one part has to do with the guidance of
nature (physis), another with the compulsion of the pathe [feelings,
affections of the soul], another with the handing down of laws and customs,
and a fourth with instruction in arts and crafts (techne). Nature’s guidance
is that by which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought; compulsion
of the pathe is that by which hunger drives us to food and thirst makes us
drink; the handing down of customs and laws is that by which we accept that
piety in the conduct of life is good and impiety bad; and instruction in arts
and crafts is that by which we are not inactive in whichever of these we
acquire. (PH 1.23-4, Mates)
Like the early Pyrrhonians, the later Pyrrhonians claimed that skeptical
arguments and the Pyrrhonian acceptance of appearances could provide the basis
for a happy life characterized by peace of mind. As Diogenes Laertius puts it,
"The skeptics say the goal is suspension of judgement, upon which freedom from
anxiety follows like a shadow, as Timon and Aenesidemus and their followers put
it." (D.L. 9.107, Inwood & Gerson, cf. PH 1.29). According to Sextus, the telos
of skepticism is tranquillity of mind (ataraxia) and "moderate" feeling "in
respect of things unavoidable." (PH 1.26)
We do not... take Sceptics to be undisturbed in every way -- we say that they
are disturbed by things which are forced upon them; for we agree that at times
they shiver and are thirsty and have other feelings of this kind. But in these
cases ordinary people are afflicted by two sets of circumstances: by the
feelings themselves, and no less by believing that these circumstances are bad
by nature. Sceptics, who shed the additional opinion that each of these things
is bad in its nature, come off more moderately even in these cases. (PH
1.29-30, Annas & Barnes)
Mates has criticized this aspect of Pyrrhonism, writing that "It is hard to find
much plausibility in the general claim that the person who, on a given occasion,
thinks ‘this appears to me to be very, very bad’ will be any less upset than if
he thought ‘this is very, very bad’" (63). One might answer that the Pyrrhonian
acceptance of appearances is more constrained than this suggests, for it takes
place within the context of equally convincing arguments for and against the
view that things are as they appear (the equal force of opposing arguments --
isostheneia -- thus plays a central role in Pyrrhonian thinking). In this way
the Pyrrhonians purposely try to eliminate thoughts like "This appears very,
very bad," trying to substitute in their place thoughts like "This appears bad,
but I have equally convincing reasons for thinking it may not be so" (this is
clearly manifest in Sextus’ rejection of Carneadean plausibility). It is hard to
say whether this suffices but the qualifications which Pyrrhonism thus
introduces do in this way provide a more substantial psychological basis for the
detached and distant "following" of appearances which is supposed to nurture
Pyrrhonian equanimity.
Given the practical goals of Pyrrhonism, the psychological force of Pyrrhonian
arguments is in some ways as important as their logical force, for it functioned
as a way to constrain the extent of the Pyrrhonian’s conviction when he followed
his appearances. This highlights an important difference between ancient and
modern skeptical arguments. For though the former were employed as logical
devices that establish epistemological conclusions, they were also used as
psychological tools which were designed to break down attachment to belief and
in this way foster ataraxia. In explaining why the skeptic’s collection of
arguments includes some which are weak, Sextus therefore says that the skeptic
uses arguments of different strengths "just as doctors have remedies of
different strengths for bodily ailments and for those suffering excessively
employs the strong ones and for those suffering mildly the mild ones" (PH 3.280,
Inwood & Gerson).
The Logic of Ancient Skepticism
How radical is ancient skepticism?
Though Sextus makes much of the skeptic’s open-minded attitude to the
possibility of apprehending truth, it is clear that the arguments that he and
other skeptics employed can be used to raise questions about any claim to have
established certain truth. At one point Sextus says that the skeptic will not,
for example, assent even if he can find no fault with a position. For "[W]hen
someone propounds to us a theory which we are unable to refute, we say to him in
reply ‘Just as, before the birth of the founder of the School to which you
belong, the theory it holds was not as yet apparent as a sound theory... so
likewise it is possible that the opposite theory to that which you now propound
is... not yet apparent to us, so that we ought not as yet yield assent to this
theory which at the moment seems to be valid.’" (PH 1.33-34, Bury)
The extent of the ancient skeptic’s concerns is also evident in the modes of
skepticism (and especially the later modes), which are universally applicable
and can in principle be used to question all of our beliefs. Even the skeptics’
constant appeals to other ancient philosophies allowed for far more radical
doubt than we normally engage, for ancient philosophy contained many extreme
points of view. An example is Gorgias’ argument for the conclusions that nothing
exists, that if it did we could not know so, and if we knew so we could not
communicate it. In his work, Sextus takes a special interest in this argument
(and preserves one version of our most important fragment) precisely because it
raises radical doubts about all things. In a similar vein, we find him
exploiting for skeptical ends the opinions of obscure thinkers like Xeniades of
Corinth -- who, he says, maintained that every impression and opinion is false
(AM 7.53, cf. 48: a disconcerting view but arguably no more so than the
Protagorean view that every opinion is true).
Mates has underscored the radical nature of the questions that the ancient
skeptics, emphasizing that Sextus will not even grant that we have coherent
concepts of the external world, soul, body, sense impressions, etc. As he puts
it in discussing the Sextus’ attitude to the external world, "His own deep
skepticism leaves him in a state of epoche, not only as to whether there are any
such things as ‘external objects,’ but even as to whether these terms of the
Dogmatists have any intelligible meaning at all." (55)
How relevant is ancient skepticism?
The fact that ancient skepticism raises radical questions about all opinions and
beliefs does not prove that it is relevant to modern and contemporary
philosophy. A positive answer to the question whether the questions raised by
the skeptics remain relevant must instead be founded on a recognition that they
raise doubts that are still taken seriously in mainstream philosophical inquiry.

In this regard it can be said that ancient skepticism contains many arguments
which remain of central importance, even though these arguments are frequently
obscured by foreign philosophical terminology and ancient ways of speaking. In
view of this, many commentators have explored and demonstrated the significance
of ancient skepticism in the context of modern philosophy (see, e.g., Popkin,
Schmitt, Jardine, Groarke, Fosl). Though the ancient skeptics do not as clearly
anticipate modern and contemporary responses to skeptical concerns (skepticism’s
apparent tie to liberal political concerns, for example), it can be said that
they achieved a very clear understanding of the basic epistemological issues
raised by the attempt to build a rational basis for belief. The problem of the
criterion and the later modes in particular ask pointed questions about our
ability to establish a basis for justified belief which still resonate with us
today.
One answer to skepticism which appears unique to contemporary philosophy is the
suggestion that it can in some way be linguistically dissolved. Wittgenstein,
Putnam and many others thus argue that skeptical claims in some way violate the
norms that govern meaningful language and in view of this can be rejected as
nonsensical. In ancient times, Aristocles wrote that skepticism is inconsistent
with the assumption that the skeptic understands language (Eus., Prep. Ev.
14.18) but there is no close analogue of this linguistic answer to skepticism
within ancient thought. How serious an omission this is depends on whether one
believes that attempts to undermine skepticism in this way are plausible or
successful (for a negative assessment, see Mates, 68-85).
Is ancient skepticism consistent?
Arguably the most significant question which needs to be asked about skepticism
is a recurring feature of the skeptical/anti-skeptical debate. It is the
question whether ancient skepticism is consistent. Or is it untenable because
inconsistent? More specifically, we might ask how the skeptic’s suspension of
judgment allows him to come to the conclusion that we have no certain knowledge,
or that certain knowledge is unattainable. Judging by the extant evidence we
have, the skeptics themselves answered that their views are consistent because
they accept skepticism in some "undogmatic" way which does not contradict their
rejection of claims to truth (see Frede) -- by endorsing appearances, the
eulogon, the pithanon, the Pyrrhonian practical criterion, and so on.
This is not the place for a detailed discussion of such issues, but one
cautionary comment is in order. It is in this regard important to remember that
the ancient skeptical attack on truth assumes a particular conception of truth.
Burnyeat in particular emphasizes that this ancient conception is thoroughly
"realist." It suggests that a claim is true if it corresponds to a real
objective world that is not subjective, but exists, as we might now put it, from
"a god’s eye point of view." As Burnyeat writes:
In the controversy between the skeptic and the dogmatists over whether any
truth exists at all, the issue is whether any proposition of a class of
propositions can be accepted as true of a real objective world as distinct
from mere appearance. For "true" in these discussions means "true of a real
objective world"; the true, if there is such a thing is what conforms with the
real, an association traditional to the word alethes since the earliest period
of Greek philosophy (cf. AM XI 221).
Now clearly, if truth is restricted to matters pertaining to real existence,
as contrasted with appearance, the same will apply [to related skeptical
conceptions]... The notions involved, consistency and conflict,
undecidability, isostheneia, epoche, ataraxia, since they are defined in terms
of truth, will all relate, via truth to real existence rather than appearance.
(Burnyeat, "Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism," p. 121)
Burnyeat’s point should play a central role in contemporary attempts to assess
ancient skepticism, for it makes such skepticism an attack on realist truth
which has affinities to modern and contemporary anti-realism. In the context of
questions about consistency, it provides a possible answer to the charge that
the skeptics were inconsistent. For in attempting to understand the skeptics, we
must recognize that belief, at least in contemporary philosophical parlance,
need not mean "accepting something as true" in the realist sense. It follows
that the ancient skeptic’s decision to suspend judgment on claims to (realist)
truth in principle leaves room for anti-realist forms of belief and assent which
are now commonplace in epistemological discussion. Rather than eschew all belief
(i.e. belief in our sense), this suggests that the ancient skeptic rejects a
particular kind of belief to which contemporary epistemology offers a variety of
alternatives (founded on coherence accounts of truth, etc.). Unlike the
contemporary anti-realist, the ancient skeptic retained a realist conception of
"truth" and "belief" and therefore expressed his position as the rejection of
belief and the adoption of a weaker following of appearances, subjective
impressions, and so on. This difference notwithstanding, the move away from
realist conceptions of belief is similar in both cases.
The extent to which the analogy between ancient skepticism and contemporary
anti-realism can be carried is open to debate, but it is an important
comparison, for it suggests both that skepticism is not fatally inconsistent
(for it rejects realist truth and endorses an anti-realist conception of belief)
and that the positive account of belief that it proposes is, like many of its
arguments against claims to truth, relevant to modern and contemporary
philosophical concerns.
Bibliography
Annas, Julia & Jonathan Barnes. The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and
Modern Interpretations. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Barnes, Jonathan. The Toils of Scepticism. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1990.
Burnyeat, Myles, ed. The Skeptical Tradition. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1983.
Burnyeat, Myles. "Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism?" In Schofield, et. al.,
1981; Reprinted in Burnyeat, 1983; and Burnyeat & Frede, 1997.
Burnyeat, Myles & Michael Frede, eds. The Original Sceptics: A Controversy.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Inc., 1998.
Carroll, Lewis. "What the Tortoise Said to Achilles." Copi & Gould, Readings
on Logic. New York: Macmillan, 1972.
Caton, Hiram. The Origin of Subjectivity: An Essay on Descartes. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1973.
Cicero. Academica. H. Rackham, tr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Loeb
Classical Library, 1961.
Couissin, P. "The Stoicism of the New Academy." In Burnyeat, ed.
DeLacy, Phillip. "Ou Mallon and the Antecedents of Ancient Scepticism."
Phronesis 3 (1958).
Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. 2 Vols. R.D. Hicks. Loeb
Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925.
Eusebius. Preparation for the Gospel. Edwin Hamilton Gifford. 2 vols. Grand
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1981 (reprint of the 1903 Clarendon edition).
Fogelin, R.J. Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1994.
Fosl, Peter S. "The Bibliographic Bases of Hume’s Understanding of Sextus
Empiricus and Pyrrhonism," Journal of the History of Philosophy. Vol. 36, No.
2, 1998.
Flintoff, Everard. "Pyrrho and India." Phronesis. 25 (1980) 88-108.
Frede, Michael. "The Sceptic’s Beliefs." In Burnyeat & Frede, eds.
Frede, Michael. "The Sceptic’s Two Kinds of Assent." In Burnyeat & Frede, eds.

Groarke, Leo. Greek Scepticism: Anti-Realist Trends in Ancient Thought.
Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990.
Groarke, Leo. "Descartes’ First Meditation: Something Old, Something New,
Something Borrowed." Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol 22, No. 2,
1984.
Hallie, Philip P., Sanford G. Etheridge, Donald R. Morrison. Sextus Empiricus:
Selections from the Major Writings on Scepticism, Man & God. Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing, Co., 1985.
Hankinson, R.J. The Sceptics. New York: Routledge, 1995.
Hiley, David R. Philosophy In Question: Essays on a Pyrrhonian Theme. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1988.
Inwood, Brad & L.P. Gerson. Hellenistic Philosophy. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Co., 1988; 2nd ed. 1997.
Jardine, Lisa. "Lorenzo Valla: Academic Skepticism and the New Humanist
Dialectic." In Burnyeat, ed.
Long, A.A. & D. N. Sedley. The Hellenistic Philosophers. 2 Vols. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Mates, Benson. The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Popkin, Richard H. The High Road to Pyrrhonism. Ed. by Richard A. Watson &
James E. Force. San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1980.
Popkin, Richard H. The History of Scepticism: from Erasmus to Spinoza.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.
Putnam, Hilary. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981.
Robin, Leon. Pyrrhon et le Scepticisme Grec. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1944 (Reprinted by Garland Publishing, New York, 1980).
Schmitt, Charles B. Cicero Scepticus: A Study of the Influence of the
‘Academica’ in the Renaissance. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
Schmitt, Charles B. "The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times."
In Burnyeat, ed.
Schofield, Malcolm, Myles Burnyeat, Jonathan Barnes. Doubt and Dogmatism:
Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.
Sextus Empiricus. 4 Vols. tr. by R. G. Bury. Loeb Classical Library.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933-1949.
Sextus Empiricus. Against the Ethicists (Adversus Mathematicos XI). tr. with a
commentary by Richard Bett. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
Sextus Empiricus. Against the Grammarians (Adversus Mathematicos I). tr. with
a commentary by D.L. Blank. New York: Oxford, 1998.
Sextus Empiricus. Against the Musicians (Adversus Musicos). tr. with an
introduction by Denise Davidson Greaves. Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1986.
Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Scepticism. tr. Julia Annas & Jonathan Barnes.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Stough, C.L. Greek Scepticism: A Study in Epistemology Berkeley: UCLA Press,
1969.
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Evanston: Harper & Row, 1969.
Other Internet Resources
Perseus Project
Related Entries
appearance vs. reality | Plato | Sextus Empiricus | skepticism | Socrates |
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Copyright © 1997, 1998 by
Leo Groarke
Wilfrid Laurier University
lgroarke@wlu.ca


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SUTRA SPOKEN BY THE SIXTH PATRIARCH ON THE HIGH SEAT OF "THE TREASURE OF THE LAW"
Chapter II. On Prajna
Translated by A.F.Price and Wong Mou-Lam

Next day Prefect Wei asked the Patriarch to give another address. Thereupon, having taken his seat and asked the assembly to purify their mind collectively, and to recite the Maha Prajnaparamita Sutra, he gave the following address:

Learned Audience, the Wisdom of Enlightenment (Bodhiprajna) is inherent in every one of us. It is because of the delusion under which our mind works that we fail to realize it ourselves, and that we have to seek the advice and the guidance of enlightened ones before we can know our own Essence of Mind. You should know that so far as Buddha-nature is concerned, there is no difference between an enlightened man and an ignorant one. What makes the difference is that one realizes it, while the other is ignorant of it. Now, let me talk to you about Maha Prajnaparamita, so that each of you can attain wisdom.

Learned Audience, those who recite the word 'Prajna' the whole day long do not seem to know that Prajna is inherent in their own nature. But mere talking on food will not appease hunger, and this is exactly the case with these people. We might talk on Sunyata (the Void, Emptiness) for myriads of kalpas, but talking alone will not enable us to realize the Essence of Mind, and it serves no purpose in the end.

The word 'Mahaprajnaparamita' is Sanskrit, and means 'great wisdom to reach the opposite shore' (of the sea of existence). What we have to do is to put it into practice with our mind; whether we recite it or not does not matter. Mere reciting it without mental practice may be likened to a phantasm, a magical delusion, a flash of lightning or a dewdrop. On the other hand, if we do both, then our mind will be in accord with what we repeat orally. Our very nature is Buddha, and apart from this nature there is no other Buddha.

What is Maha? It means 'great'. The capacity of the mind is as great as that of space. It is infinite, neither round nor square, neither great nor small, neither green nor yellow, neither red nor white, neither above nor below, neither long nor short, neither angry nor happy, neither right nor wrong, neither good nor evil, neither first nor last. All Buddha ksetras (lands) are as void as space. Intrinsically our transcendental nature is void and not a single dharma (thing) can be attained. It is the same with the Essence of Mind, which is a state of 'Absolute Void' (i.e., the voidness of non-void).

Learned Audience, when you hear me talk about the Void, do not at once fall into the idea of vacuity, (because this involves the heresy of the doctrine of annihilation). It is of the utmost importance that we should not fall into this idea, because when a man sits quietly and keeps his mind blank he will abide in a state of 'Voidness of Indifference'.

Learned Audience, the illimitable Void of the universe is capable of holding myriads of things of various shape and form, such as the sun, the moon, stars, mountains, rivers, men, dharmas pertaining to goodness or badness, deva planes, hells, great oceans, and all the mountains of the Mahameru. Space takes in all of these, and so does the voidness of our nature. We say that the Essence of Mind is great because it embraces all things, since all things are within our nature. When we see the goodness or the badness of other people we are not attracted by it, nor repelled by it, nor attached to it; so that our attitude of mind is as void as space. In this way, we say our mind is great. Therefore we call it 'Maha'.

Learned Audience, what the ignorant merely talk about, wise men put into actual practice with their mind. There is also a class of foolish people who sit quietly and try to keep their mind blank. They refrain from thinking of anything and call themselves 'great'. On account of their heretical view we can hardly talk to them.

Learned Audience, you should know that the mind is very great in capacity, since it pervades the whole Dharmadhatu (the sphere of the Law, i.e., the Universe). When we use it, we can know something of everything, and when we use it to its full capacity we shall know all. All in one and one in all. When our mind works without hindrance, and is at liberty to 'come' or to 'go', then it is in a state of 'Prajna'.

Learned Audience, all Prajna comes from the Essence of Mind and not from an exterior source. Have no mistaken notion about that. This is called 'Self-use of the True Nature'. Once the Tathata (Suchness, the Essence of Mind) is known, one will be free from delusion forever.

Since the scope of the mind is for great objects, we should not practice such trivial acts (as sitting quietly with a blank mind).

Do not talk about the 'Void' all day without practicing it in the mind. One who does this may be likened to a self-styled king who is really a commoner. Prajna can never be attained in this way, and those who behave like this are not my disciples.

Learned Audience, what is Prajna? It means 'Wisdom'. If at all times and at all places we steadily keep our thought free from foolish desire, and act wisely on all occasions, then we are practicing Prajna. One foolish notion is enough to shut off Prajna, while one wise thought will bring it forth again. People in ignorance or under delusion do not see it; they talk about it with their tongues, but in their mind they remain ignorant. They are always saying that they practice Prajna, and they talk incessantly on 'Voidness'; but they do not know the 'Absolute Void'. 'The Heart of Wisdom' is Prajna, which has neither form nor characteristic. If we interpret it in this way, then indeed it is the wisdom of Prajna.

What is Paramita? It is a Sanskrit word, meaning 'to the opposite shore'. Figuratively, it means 'above existence and non-existence'. By clinging to sense objects, existence or non-existence arises like the up and down of the billowy sea, and such a state is called metaphorically 'this shore'; while by non-attachment a state above existence and non-existence, like smoothly running water is attained, and this is called 'the opposite shore'. This is why it is called 'Paramita'.

>Learned Audience, people under illusion recite the 'Mahaprajnaparamita' with their tongues, and while they are reciting it, erroneous and evil thoughts arise. But if they put it into practice unremittingly, they realize its 'true nature'. To know this Dharma is to know the Dharma of Prajna, and to practice this is to practice Prajna. He who does not practice it is an ordinary man. He who directs his mind to practice it even for one moment is the equal of Buddha.

For ordinary man is Buddha, and klesa (defilement) is Bodhi (enlightenment). A foolish passing thought makes one an ordinary man, while an enlightened second thought makes one a Buddha. A passing thought that clings to sense-objects is klesa, while a second thought that frees one from attachment is Bodhi.

Learned Audience, the Mahaprajnaparamita is the most exalted, the supreme, and the foremost. It neither stays, nor goes, nor comes.

By means of it Buddhas of the present, the past, and the future generations attain Buddhahood. We should use this great wisdom to break up the five skandhas [material qualities - matter, sensation, perception, dispositions or tendencies, and consciousness], for to follow such practice ensures the attainment of Buddhahood. The three poisonous elements (greed, hatred and illusion) will then be turned into Sila (good conduct), Samadhi and Prajna.

Learned Audience, in this system of mine one Prajna produces eight-four thousand ways of wisdom, since there are that number of 'defilements' for us to cope with; but when one is free from defilements, wisdom reveals itself, and will not be separated from the Essence of Mind. Those who understand this Dharma will be free from idle thoughts. To be free from being infatuated by one particular thought, from clinging to desire, and from falsehood; to put one's own essence of Tathata into operation; to use Prajna for contemplation, and to take an attitude of neither indifference nor attachment towards all things - this is what is meant by realizing one's own Essence of Mind for the attainment of Buddhahood.

Learned Audience, if you wish to penetrate the deepest mystery of the Dharmadhatu and the Samadhi of Prajna, you should practice Prajna by reciting and studying the Vajracchedika (Diamond) Sutra, which will enable you to realize the Essence of Mind. You should know that the merit for studying this Sutra, as distinctly set forth in the text, is immeasurable and illimitable, and cannot be enumerated in details. This Sutra belongs to the highest School of Buddhism, and the Lord Buddha delivered it specially for the very wise and quick-witted. If the less wise and the slow-witted should hear about it they would doubt its credibility. Why? For example, if it rained in Jambudvipa (the Southern Continent), through the miracle of the celestial Naga, cities, towns, and villages would drift about in the flood as if they were only leaves of the date tree. But should it rain in the great ocean the level of the sea as a whole would not be affected by it. When Mahayanists hear about the Diamond Sutra their minds become enlightened; they know that Prajna is immanent in their Essence of Mind and that they need not rely on scriptural authority, since they can make use of their own wisdom by constant practice of contemplation.

The Prajna immanent in the Essence of Mind of every one may be likened to the rain, the moisture of which refreshes every living thing, trees and plants as well as sentient beings. When rivers and streams reach the sea, the water carried by them merges into one body; this is another analogy. Learned Audience, when rain comes in a deluge, plants which are not deep-rooted are washed away, and eventually they succumb. This is the case with the slow-witted, when they hear about the teaching of the 'Sudden' School. The Prajna immanent in them is exactly the same as that in the very wise man, but they fail to enlighten themselves when the Dharma is made known to them. Why? Because they are thickly veiled by erroneous views and deep-rooted defilements, in the same way as the sun may be thickly veiled by a cloud and unable to show his light until the wind blows the cloud away.

Prajna does not vary with different persons; what makes the difference is whether one's mind is enlightened or deluded. He who does not know his own Essence of Mind, and is under the delusion that Buddhahood can be attained by outward religious rites is called the slow-witted. He who knows the teaching of the 'Sudden' School and attaches no importance to rituals, and whose mind functions always under right views, so that he is absolutely free from defilements or contaminations, is said to have known his Essence of Mind.

Learned Audience, the mind should be framed in such a way that it will be independent of external or internal objects, at liberty to come or go, free from attachment and thoroughly enlightened without the least beclouding. He who is able to do this is of the same standard required by the Sutras of the Prajna School.

Learned Audience, all sutras and scriptures of the Mahayana and Hinayana Schools, as well as the twelve sections of the canonical writings, were provided to suit the different needs and temperaments of various people. It is upon the principle that Prajna is latent in every man that the doctrines expounded in these books are established. If there were no human beings, there would be no Dharmas; hence we know that all Dharmas are made for men, and that all Sutras owe their existence to the preachers. Since some men are wise, the so-called superior men, and some are ignorant, the so-called inferior men, the wise preach to the ignorant when the latter ask them to do so. Through this the ignorant may attain sudden enlightenment, and their mind thereby becomes illuminated. Then they are no longer different from the wise men.

Learned Audience, without enlightenment there would be no difference between a Buddha and other living beings; while a gleam of enlightenment is enough to make any living being the equal of a Buddha. Since all Dharmas are immanent in our mind there is no reason why we should not realize intuitively the real nature of Tathata (Suchness). The Bodhisattva Sila Sutra says, "Our Essence of Mind is intrinsically pure, and if we knew our mind and realized what our nature is, all of us would attain Buddhahood." As the Vimalakirti Nirdesa Sutra says, "At once they become enlightened and regain their own mind."

Learned Audience, when the Fifth Patriarch preached to me I became enlightened immediately after he had spoken, and spontaneously realized the real nature of Tathata. For this reason it is my particular object to propagate the teaching of this 'Sudden' School, so that learners may find Bodhi at once and realize their true nature by introspection of mind.

Should they fail to enlighten themselves, they should ask the pious and learned Buddhists who understand the teaching of the Highest School to show them the right way. It is an exalted position, the office of a pious and learned Buddhist who guides others to realize the Essence of Mind. Through his assistance one may be initiated into all meritorious Dharmas. The wisdom of the past, the present and the future Buddhas as well as the teachings of the twelve sections of the Canon are immanent in our mind; but in case we fail to enlighten ourselves, we have to seek the guidance of the pious and learned ones. On the other hand, those who enlighten themselves need no extraneous help. It is wrong to insist upon the idea that without the advice of the pious and learned we cannot obtain liberation.

Why? Because it is by our innate wisdom that we enlighten ourselves, and even the extraneous help and instructions of a pious and learned friend would be of no use if we were deluded by false doctrines and erroneous views. Should we introspect our mind with real Prajna, all erroneous views would be vanquished in a moment, and as soon as we know the Essence of Mind we arrive immediately at the Buddha stage.

Learned Audience, when we use Prajna for introspection we are illumined within and without, and in a position to know our own mind. To know our mind is to obtain liberation. To obtain liberation is to attain Samadhi of Prajna, which is 'thoughtlessness'. What is 'thoughtlessness'? 'Thoughtlessness' is to see and to know all Dharmas (things) with a mind free from attachment. When in use it pervades everywhere, and yet it sticks nowhere. What we have to do is to purify our mind so that the six vijnanas (aspects of consciousness), in passing through the six gates (sense organs) will neither be defiled by nor attached to the six sense-objects. When our mind works freely without any hindrance, and is at liberty to 'come' or to 'go', we attain Samadhi of Prajna, or liberation. Such a state is called the function of 'thoughtlessness'. But to refrain from thinking of anything, so that all thoughts are suppressed, is to be Dharma-ridden, and this is an erroneous view.

Learned Audience, those who understand the way of 'thoughtlessness' will know everything, will have the experience all Buddhas have had, and attain Buddhahood. In the future, if an initiate of my School should make a vow in company with his fellow-disciples to devote his whole life without retrogression to the practice of the teachings of this 'Sudden' School, in the same spirit as that for serving Buddha, he would reach without failure the Path of Holiness. (To the right men) he should transmit from heart to heart the instructions handed down from one Patriarch to another; and no attempt should be made to conceal the orthodox teaching. To those who belong to other schools, and whose views and objects are different from ours, the Dharma should not be transmitted, since it will be anything but good for them. This step is taken lest ignorant persons who cannot understand our system should make slanderous remarks about it and thereby annihilate their seed of Buddha-nature for hundreds of kalpas and thousands of incarnations.

Learned Audience, I have a 'formless' stanza for you all to recite. Both laity and monks should put its teaching into practice, without which it would be useless to remember my words alone. Listen to this stanza:

A master of the Buddhist Canon as well as of the teaching of the

Dhyana School

May be likened unto the blazing sun sitting high in his meridian

tower.

Such a man would teach nothing but the Dharma for realizing the

Essence of Mind,

And his object in coming to this world would be to vanquish the

heretical sects.

We can hardly classify the Dharmas into 'Sudden' and 'Gradual',

But some men will attain enlightenment much quicker than others.

For example, this system for realizing the Essence of Mind

Is above the comprehension of the ignorant.

We may explain it in ten thousand ways,

But all those explanations may be traced back to one principle.

To illumine our gloomy tabernacle, which is stained by defilement,

We should constantly set up the Light of Wisdom.

Erroneous views keep us in defilement

While right views remove us from it,

But when we are in a position to discard both of them

We are then absolutely pure.>

Bodhi is immanent in our Essence of Mind,

An attempt to look for it elsewhere is erroneous.

Within our impure mind the pure one is to be found,

And once our mind is set right, we are free from the three kinds of

beclouding (hatred, lust and illusion).

If we are treading the Path of Enlightenment

We need not be worried by stumbling-blocks.

Provided we keep a constant eye on our own faults

We cannot go astray from the right path.

Since every species of life has its own way of salvation

They will not interfere with or be antagonistic to one another.

But if we leave our own path and seek some other way of salvation

We shall not find it,

And though we plod on till death overtakes us

We shall find only penitence in the end.

If you wish to find the true way

Right action will lead you to it directly;

But if you do not strive for Buddhahood

You will grope in the dark and never find it.

He who treads the Path in earnest

Sees not the mistakes of the world;

If we find fault with others

We ourselves are also in the wrong.

When other people are in the wrong, we should ignore it,

For it is wrong for us to find fault.

By getting rid of the habit of fault-finding

We cut off a source of defilement.

When neither hatred nor love disturb our mind

Serenely we sleep.

Those who intend to be the teachers of others

Should themselves be skilled in the various expedients which lead

others to enlightenment.

When the disciple is free from all doubts

It indicates that his Essence of Mind has been found.

The Kingdom of Buddha is in this world,

Within which enlightenment is to be sought.

To seek enlightenment by separating from this world

Is as absurd as to search for a rabbit's horn.

Right views are called 'transcendental';

Erroneous views are called 'worldly'.

When all views, right or erroneous, are discarded

Then the essence of Bodhi appears.

This stanza is for the 'Sudden' School.

It is also called the 'Great Ship of Dharma' (for sailing across the

ocean of existence).

Kalpa after kalpa a man may be under delusion,

But once enlightened it takes him only a moment to attain Buddhahood.

Before conclusion, the Patriarch added, "Now, in this Ta Fan Temple, I have addressed you on the teaching of the 'Sudden' School. May all sentient beings of the Dharmadhatu instantly understand the Law and attain Buddhahood."

After hearing what the Patriarch said, the Prefect Wei, government officials, Taoists and laymen were all enlightened. They made obeisance in a body and exclaimed unanimously, "Well done! Well done! Who would have expected that a Buddha was born in Kwangtung?"
 

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The Doctrine of Non-duality in the Vimalakiirti Nirde’sa
By Dharmachari Ratnaguna


The Doctrine of Non-duality - A Restatement of the Buddha’s Teaching of The Middle Way.
One of the alternative titles for the Vimalakiirti Nirde’sa (Teaching of Vimalakiirti) is The Reconciliation of Dichotomies[1], an idea which is scattered throughout the text, but which is exemplified most fully in chapter nine, The Dharma Door of Non-duality, in which thirty one Bodhisattvas each propose a dichotomy, which they then resolve with a ‘Dharma Door of Non-duality’. The chapter ends with Ma~nju’srii, the Bodhisattva of Wisdom, asking Vimalakiirti to give his own ‘entrance into Non-duality’, his answer being the famous ‘thunderous silence’.

But what is duality, and what is Non-duality? And why does duality need to be resolved into Non-duality? Duality consists (usually, but not always) of a pair of opposites, whereas non-duality is the Middle Way which is between, and which also transcends, these opposites. In the Dhammachakkappavattana-Sutta[2], The First Turning of the Wheel of the Dharma, the Buddha taught the Middle Way between the extremes of attachment to sense pleasures on the one hand, and self-mortification on the other - the Middle Way between the two being the Noble Eightfold Path leading to Enlightenment. This teaching is a practical application of the central insight of Buddhism, an insight which is put in metaphysical terms in another discourse - the Kaccaayanagotta-Sutta.[3] In this sutta Kaccaayana asks the Buddha what he means by the term right view (sammaa-di.t.thi) and the Buddha answers “This world, Kaccaayana, usually bases [its view] on two things: on existence and on non-existence....... Everything exists:- this is one extreme. Nothing exists:- this is the other extreme. Not approaching either extreme, the Tathaagata teaches you a doctrine by the middle [way].” [4] But what did the Buddha mean by existence and non-existence? Existence (atthitaa) means absolute existence - that is the idea that things have eternal existence, and need no other conditions for their existence. Non-existence is absolute non-existence - that is, things don’t have any existence at all - they are completely illusory. The Middle Way between and above these two extremes is expressed in the doctrine of Conditioned co-production (pra.titya-samutpaada) which states that all things arise in dependence on conditions, and cease when those conditions cease. Things have neither absolute existence nor absolute non-existence - they have relative existence.

Vimalakiirti, like The Buddha , is not concerned with philosophical problems for their own sake. His main concern is the alleviation of suffering, which is achieved by treading the path to Enlightenment, so the question arises, what does this metaphysical discussion have to do with suffering and its alleviation? The answer occurs in chapter 5 of the text - The Consolation of the Invalid. Vimalakiirti is ill, or at least pretends to be, his illness being a metaphor for suffering (dukkha). At one point he says,

Thus, recognizing in his own suffering the infinite sufferings of these living beings, the Bodhisattva correctly contemplates these living beings and resolves to cure all sicknesses. As for these living beings, there is nothing to be applied, and there is nothing to be removed; one has only to teach them the Dharma for them to realize the basis from which sicknesses arise. What is this basis? It is object perception. Insofar as apparent objects are perceived, they are the basis of sickness. What things are perceived as objects? The three realms of existence are perceived as objects. What is the thorough understanding of the basic, apparent object? It is its non-perception, as no objects exist ultimately. What is non-perception? The internal and the external object are not perceived dualistically. Therefore, it is called nonperception.[5]

What Robert Thurman translates as ‘object perception’, Sara Boin, in her English rendering of Etienne Lamotte’s French translation, uses ‘the grasping of an object’. Thus:

What is the foundation of sickness? The foundation of sickness is the grasping of an object. This grasping being the foundation, as long as there is grasping, there is sickness.[6]

I have quoted Boin’s rendering of Lamotte’s French because it makes clear the connection between the metaphysical and the practical levels of the Middle Way: because we imagine that things have absolute existence, we grasp them. In other words we have in this statement of Vimalakiirti the first two of the Four Noble Truths: Sickness = suffering (dukkha). Object perception = grasping (ta.nhaa).

So far then Vimalakiirti’s message is the same as the Buddha’s - the extremes of attachment to sense pleasures and self-mortification, and absolute existence and absolute non-existence, are to be avoided and transcended. The first through following the path to Enlightenment, the second by thoroughly comprehending the truth of Conditioned Co-production. However, Vimalakiirti takes the idea further than this:

What is the elimination of sickness? It is the elimination of egoism and possessiveness. What is the elimination of egoism and possessiveness? It is the freedom from dualism. What is freedom from dualism? It is the absence of involvement with either the external or the internal. What is absence of involvement with either external or internal? It is nondeviation, nonfluctuation, and non-distration from equanimity. What is equanimity? It is the equality of everything from self to liberation. Why? Because both self and liberation are void. How can both be void? As verbal designations they are both void, and neither is established in reality. Therefore one who sees such equality makes no difference between sickness and voidness; his sickness is itself voidness, and that sickness as voidness is itself void.[7]

In the first part of this statement we are still on very familar ground: suffering arises due to egoism (aatmagraaha - self-grasping) and possessiveness (aatmiiyagraaha - grasping that which I believe to be mine). To overcome this we need to overcome the duality of ‘involvement with the external and the internal’[8] - the belief in an enduring and separate self on the one hand, and the corresponding belief in enduring and separate objects on the other. How do we do this? Through “nondeviation, nonfluctuation, and nondistraction from equanimity.” Here Vimalakiirti introduces a crucial idea in the text, one which stretches the Buddha’s practical teaching of the Middle Way between opposites to include all categories whatsoever. “Equanimity” in Thurman’s translation Lamotte Sanskritizes as samataa, which means sameness, and this sameness includes

everything from self to liberation (Nirvaa.na). Why? Because both self and liberation are void. How can both be void? As verbal designations (naamadheya) they are both void.[9]

Verbal designations, or concepts, are all the same because they are all empty - empty that is, of absolute existence. Therefore the ideas (verbal designations) of both self and Enlightenment are a duality which has to be transcended. Once Vimalakiirti has said this, he is free to set up any (and all) categories as dualistic, including all the categories of the Dharma, which is exactly what he does. He does this because at every stage of the path to Enlightenment the practitioner is confronted with the two extremes of existence and non-existence at ever more subtle levels. The skilful treading of the path consists in recognizing these subtle dichotomies and choosing the Middle Way between, or better, above them. Existence and non-existence are basic categories of thought and we can’t help but think in those terms, even when talking about ideas or experiences which transcend those categories. So, even though the Buddhist is aware that Nirvaa.na is neither eternal existence nor annihilation, he cannot help but imagine it to be, in some subtle way, either one or the other of these two options, that is, as being either an eternal continuation or the annihilation of the self. (The literature of the Paali Canon tends to veer towards non-existence in its depiction of Enlightenment, even though there are many passages which deny this, whereas some of the Mahaayaana schools tend to depict it as a state of eternal existence).

Skill In Means.
Vimalakiirti’s resolution of dichotomies is one of the aspects of his Skill In Means (Upaaya kau’salya), which is the Bodhisattva’s ability to adapt the Buddha’s teaching to suit the capabilities, inclinations, and spiritual development of whoever he is talking to. In other words, skill in means is the skill to teach the Dharma appropriately. Vimalakiirti himself is a master of this skill - in fact he is the supreme exemplar of it. In chapter two, called Inconceivable Skill In Means (acintya upaaya kau’salya) the text tells us that

He was liberated through the transcendence of wisdom. Having integrated his realization with skill in means, he was expert in knowing the thoughts and actions of living beings. Knowing the strength or weakness of their faculties, and being gifted with unrivalled eloquence, he taught the Dharma appropriately to each.[10]

Throughout the text we see him employing this skill again and again, and we see him exhorting others, Disciples and Bodhisattvas, to do the same.

In chapter two, Inconceivable Skill In Means, we meet him for the first time, and we see him pretending to be ill. This is itself a Skill In Means in order to get the people of the city of Vai’saalii to visit him so that he can teach them the Dharma. To them he gives a teaching on the unsatisfactoriness of the physical body:

Friends, this body is so impermanent, fragile, unworthy of confidence, and feeble. It is so insubstantial, perishable, short-lived, painful, filled with diseases, and subject to changes. Thus, my friends, as this body is only a vessel of many sicknesses, wise men do not rely on it.

And thus he goes on for two paragraphs, ending with

Therefore, you should be revulsed by such a body. You should despair of it and should arouse your admiration for the body of the Tathaagata..[11]

What is this body of the Tathaagata?

Friends, the body of the Tathaagata is the body of Dharma, born of gnosis. The body of a Tathaagata is born of the stores of merit and wisdom. It is born of morality, of meditation, of wisdom, of the liberations, and the knowledge and vision of liberation. It is born of love, compassion, joy, and impartiality. It is born of charity, discipline, and self-control.[12]

And so on for a full paragraph. Here Vimalakiirti is pointing out the dichotomy of attachment to sense pleasures, and its inevitable concommitant - suffering. The Middle Way between the two is the aspiration for the Body of the Tathaagata - a body which is not physical, and so not subject to physical pain.

At the beginning of chapter three Vimalakiirti thinks

I am sick, lying on my bed in pain, yet the Tathaagata, the saint, the perfectly accomplished Buddha, does not consider me or take pity on me, and sends no-one to enquire after my illness.[13]

The Buddha knows what Vimalakirti is thinking, and proceeds to ask each of the disciples (500 in all) and the Bodhisattvas (how many? The text doesn’t tell us) to visit Vimalakiirti. Every one of them admits that they are reluctant to visit Vimalakiirti, and to explain their reluctance they each tell a story of a time when Vimalakiirti approached them as they were practising or teaching the Dharma. In each case he took them to task for practising or teaching wrongly, that is, inappropriately. It was not that any of the practices they were enaged in, or teachings they were giving, were wrong in themselves, it was that they were not appropriate - they were not suited to the people who were practising or hearing the Dharma at that time.

In chapter five, The Consolation of the Invalid, the Buddha at last finds someone who is willing to visit him - Ma~nju’srii, the Bodhisattva of Wisdom. Even Ma~nju’srii, we are given to believe, has to overcome his reluctance -

Lord, it is difficult to attend upon the Licchavi Vimalakiirti. He is gifted with marvellous eloquence concerning the law of the profound. He is extremely skilled in full expressions and in the reconciliation of dichotomies. His eloquence is inexorable, and no one can resist his imperturbable intellect....Thus, although he cannot be withstood by someone of my feeble defences, still, sustained by the grace of the Buddha, I will go to him and converse with him as well as I can.[14]

The Vimalakiirti Nirde’sa is a drama, and here the tension is being built up - Ma~nju’srii, the Bodhisattva of Wisdom, is about to meet Vimalakiirti. What is going to happen?

Thereupon in that assembly, the Bodhisattvas, the great disciples, the ‘Sakras, the Brahmaas, the Lokapaalas, and the gods and the goddesses, all had this thought: ‘Surely the conversations of the young prince Ma~nju’srii and that good man will result in a profound teaching of the Dharma’[15],

and they all follow Ma~nju’srii to listen.

Vimalakiirti, meanwhile, is lying sick on his couch, but he knows that Ma~nju’srii is coming and transforms his house into emptiness.

Even the doorkeeper disappeared. And, except for the invalid’s couch upon which Vimalakiirti was lying, no bed or couch could be seen anywhere.[16]

This is not only dramatic, it is also highly significant. Vimalakiirti has just been teaching the good people of Vai’saalii about the suffering inherent in the physical body, and exhorting them to aspire to the body of the Tathaagata. Now he transforms his house into emptiness. Emptiness, (‘suunyataa) is non-dualistic. It is beyond the realm of this and that, good and bad, skilful and unskilful. In transforming his house into emptiness Vimalakiirti is preparing us for a shift in the content of his teaching, and it comes immediately:

Ma~nju’srii! Welcome Ma~nju’srii! You are very welcome! There you are, without any coming. You appear, without any seeing. You are heard, without any hearing.” Ma~nju’srii declared, “Householder, it is as you say. Who comes, finally comes not. Who goes, finally goes not. Why? Who comes is not known to come. Who goes is not known to go. Who appears is finally not to be seen. [17]

What does this mean? Vimalakiirti and Ma~nju’srii are giving expression to the fact that, as far as they are concerned, such ideas as Vimalakiirti, Ma~nju’srii, coming, appearing, seeing, hearing, and going, are empty - they are merely ‘verbal designations’, and as such not to be taken very seriously. We have moved from the simple Middle Way of the Buddha’s teaching to the more philosophically sophisticated Non-duality of the Perfection of Wisdom literature.

Ma~nju’srii then comes to the point of his visit - he asks Vimalakiirti about his sickness, and Vimalakiirti utters what has become, in China and Japan, a very famous reply:

Ma~nju’srii, my sickness comes from ignorance and the thirst for existence and it will last as long as do the sicknesses of all living beings. Were all living beings to be free from sickness, I also would not be sick. Why? Ma~nju’srii, for the Bodhisattva, the world consists only of living beings, and sickness is inherent in living the world. Were all living beings free of sickness, the Bodhisattva would also be free of sickness.....Ma~nju’srii, the Bodhisattva loves all living beings as if each were his only child. He becomes sick when they are sick and is cured when they are cured. You ask me, Ma~nju’srii, whence comes my sickness; the sickness of the Bodhisattvas arise from great compassion.[18]

(Remember that sickness here is a metaphor for suffering (dukkha). Try substituting the word sickness for suffering in the above and other passages where Vimalakiirti is expounding on sickness and notice the effect.)

Ma~nju’srii then asks Vimalakiirti a number of questions, one of which is “Householder, how should a Bodhisattva console another Bodhisattva who is sick?” Vimalakiirti’s reply is very important:

He should tell him that the body is impermanent, but should not exhort him to renunciation or disgust. He should tell him that the body is painful, but should not encourage him to find solace in liberation.[19]

This is rather different to what Vimalakiirti said in chapter two, to the people of Vai’saalii. There, you will remember, he told them that the body was impermanent, painful and insubstantial, and that they should therefore feel revulsion for it, renounce their attachment to it, and should aspire to the Body of the Tathaagata, which is liberation. Here though, in speaking to a Bodhisattva he says that, although the body is impermanent, he should not exhort him to renunciation or disgust. Even though the body is painful (dukkha), he should not encourage him to find solace in liberation. What should he do then?

He should encourage his empathy for all living beings on account of his own sickness, his remembrance of suffering experienced from beginningless time, and his consciousness of working for the welfare of living beings.[20]

To the people of Vai’saalii Vimalakiirti points out the suffering inherent in having a physical body so that they will aspire to Enlightenment. To the Bodhisattvas he does so so that they will feel compassion for other living beings - just as they suffer, so all other living beings suffer, so rather than aspire to Enlightenment for their own sake, they should try to alleviate the suffering of others. However, Vimalakiirti is not here telling Bodhisattvas to choose a path of altruism instead of the path to Enlightenment. That would be to choose one side of a dichotomy rather than another and Vimalakiirti is the great reconciler of dichotomies.

Ma~nju’srii’s next question allows Vimalakiirti to explain further what he means. He asks

Noble sir, how should a sick Bodhisattva control his own mind? Vimalakiirti replies, Ma~nju’srii, a sick Bodhisattva should control his own mind with the following consideration: Sickness arises from total involvement in the process of misunderstanding from beginningless time. It arises from the passions that result from unreal mental constructions, and hence ultimately nothing is perceived that can be said to be sick. Why? The body is the issue of the four main elements, and in these elements there is no owner and no agent. There is no self in this body, and, except for arbitrary insistence on self, ultimately no ‘I’ which can be said to be sick can be apprehended........What is the elimination of this sickness? It is the elimination of egoism and possessiveness. What is the elimination of egoism and possessiveness? It is the freedom from dualism.[21]

The Bodhisattva’s compassion is based on Wisdom - the Wisdom which sees through the deluded notion of a separate self, from which delusion there arises the apparent dichotomy of either gaining Enlightenment or helping others. A little later in the text Vimalakiirti makes this clear in a passage about bondage and liberation, in which he stresses the importance of integrating Wisdom and Skill In Means.

What is bondage, and what is liberation? To indulge in liberation from the world without employing skill in means is bondage for the bodhisattva. To engage in life in the world with full employment of skill in means is liberation for the bodhisattva....Wisdom not integrated with skill in means is bondage, but wisdom integrated with skill in means is liberation. Skill in means not integrated with wisdom is bondage, but skill in means integrated with wisdom is liberation.[22]

In other words, any ideas of gaining Enlightenment for oneself without also helping others result in bondage, not liberation. Conversely, any ideas about helping others without also working one one’s own spiritual development also result in bondage. Both sides of that dichotomy result in bondage because they are based on false notions of self and other, which is the basis of all ‘sickness’, i.e. suffering.

The Dharma Door To Non-duality
Vimalakiirti though, is not content to restrict his teachings to reconciling the basic duality of self and other, and throughout the text many other dualities are ‘reconciled’. This reconciliation of dichotomies is explored most fully in Chapter nine, The Dharma Door of Non-duality, where Vimalakiirti asks the Bodhisattvas present to “explain how the Bodhisattvas enter the Dharma-door of Non-duality.”[23] Thirty one Bodhisattvas, including Ma~nju’srii, give their own sets of dualities, which they then reconcile into Dharma Doors of Non-duality. For instance,

The Bodhisattva ‘Sriigandha declared, ‘“I” and “mine” are two. If there is no presumption of a self, there will be no possessiveness. Thus, the absence of presumption is the entrance into nonduality.[24]

Other Bodhisattvas take different Dharmic categories:

The Bodhisattva ‘Saantendriya declared, ‘It is dualistic to say ‘Buddha’, ‘Dharma’, and ‘Sa.ngha’. The Dharma is itself the nature of the Buddha, the Sangha is itself the nature of the Dharma, and all of them are uncompounded. The uncompounded is infinite space, and the processes of all things are equivalent to infinite space. Adjustment to this is the entrance into nonduality.’[25]

The Bodhisattva Subaahu declared,

‘Bodhisattva-spirit’ (bodhisattvacitta) and ‘Disciple-spirit’ (‘sraavakacitta) are two. When both are seen to resemble an illusory spirit (citta), there is no Bodhisattva-spirit, nor any Disciple-spirit. Thus the sameness of natures of spirits is the entrance into nonduality.’[26]

So far this is quite uncontroversial. However, some of the Bodhisattvas say some quite shocking things, apparently demolishing Buddhism itself. Ma.nikuu.taraaja, for instance, says,

It is dualistic to speak of good paths (maarga) and bad paths (kumaarga). One who is on the path (maarga) is not concerned with good or bad paths. Living in such unconcern, he entertains no concepts of ‘path’ or ‘nonpath’. Understanding the nature of concepts, his mind does not engage in duality. Such is the entrance into nonduality.[27]

Or Vidyuddeva, who says,

‘Knowledge’ (vidyaa) and ‘ignorance’ (avidyaa) are dualistic. The natures of ignorance and knowledge are the same, for ignorance is undefined, incalculable, and beyond the sphere of thought. The realization of this is the entrance into nonduality.[28]

Or Ti.sya, who says,

‘Good’ (ku’sala) and ‘evil’ (aku’sala) are two. Seeking neither good nor evil, the understanding of the nonduality of the significant and the meaningless is the entrance into nonduality.[29]

Why should they say such things? What do they mean, and of what benefit could they be to anyone? One of the Vimalakiirti Nirde’sa’s main concerns is to try to get people to let go of their various attachments, and this is really all that Vimalakiirti himself does throughout the whole of the text - his Skill In Means consists solely in encouraging, cajoling, and exhorting people to go forth from their attachments, whatever they are, and to take the next step in their spiritual development, whatever that might be. In the Paali Canon there is a list of four kinds of attachment (upaadaana)[30], and it may be useful see the Vimalakiirti Nirde’sa as an assault on each of these. They are: attachment to sensuous pleasures (kaama); to views (di.t.thi); to ethics (siila) and external observances (bbata) merely for their own sakes; and to the belief in a ‘soul’ or unchanging essence to phenomena (attavaada). Depending on who he is talking to Vimalakiirti tries to get his hearers to give up one or more of these attachments. So, for instance, in the second chapter he encourages the people of Vai’saalii to give up their attachment to their physical bodies, which are the source of both sensuous pleasure and suffering, and also, to a large extent, their belief in a fixed and separate self. In the following chapters, when he is speaking to Disciples and Bodhisattvas, he tries to get them to let go of the last three kinds of attachment: to views; ethics and external practices (merely for their own sakes); and self-view - it being understood that they have already renounced attachment to sensuous desire.

So when ‘Saariputra is meditating at the foot of a tree Vimalakiirti tells him that he is meditating wrongly:

You should absorb yourself in contemplation in such a way that you can manifest all ordinary behaviour without forsaking cessation. You should absorb yourself in contemplation in such a way that you can manifest the nature of an ordinary person without abandoning your cultivated spiritual nature.[31]

‘Saariputra has got attached to a ‘view’ about meditation - that it consists in the rejection and abandonment of certain aspects of life, when meditation is actually the embracing of all. When Mahaamaudgalyaayana is teaching the Dharma to some householders Vimalakiirti tells him that he is teaching them wrongly, i.e. with the idea that there is a really existent self teaching really existent people:

there is no teacher of the Dharma, no one to listen, and no-one to understand. It is as if an illusory person were to teach the Dharma to illusory people.[32]

Mahaamaudgalyaayana is still subtly attached to the notion of a self. Mahaakaa’syapa is famous for his asceticism, and made it his practice to beg food only from the poor - these being in more need of merit than the rich. This is what he is doing when Vimalakiirti confronts him, telling him that he is guilty of “partiality in benevolence”, and that he should

dwell on the fact of the equality of things, and ... should seek alms with consideration for all living beings at all times.[33]

Mahaakaa’syapa has become attached to external observances.

It is important to remember that here, as in all other parts of the text, Vimalakiirti is practising Skill In Means - he is adapting the Dharma to the capabilities, inclinations, and spiritual development of whoever he is talking to. What he says to ‘Saariputra, Mahaamaudgalyaayana, and Mahaakaa’syapa is probably not what he would say to you or I. ‘Saariputra is meditating in the forest, Mahaamaudgalyaayana is teaching the Dharma, and Mahaakaa’syapa is practising renunciation and compassion. These are very skilful actions which the vast majority of Buddhists would do well to try to put into practice. Because Vimalakiirti points out the limitations of their respective practices to these three great disciples, this should not give us any reason for not practising, or for giving up our practice prematurely. Nor should it give us any reason to feel superior to the Disciples - if we feel that then we have completely missed the point the text is trying to make. On the contrary, we should feel the greatest respect, admiration and devotion towards them. After all, how many of us have reached their level of spiritual development? How many of us are ready for such teachings that Vimalakiirti gave to them? In criticizing them in these ways Vimalakiirti is paying them the highest compliment.

Let us return now to the ninth chapter, The Dharma-Door of Non-Duality, and try to understand the Bodhisattvas statements in the light of all I have just said. Once again, it is important to remember the context of these statements - who is talking to who? Bodhisattvas are speaking to Bodhisattvas, and they are very advanced Bodhisattvas:

Their mindfulness, intelligence, realization, meditation, incantation, and eloquence were all perfected. They were free of all obscurations and emotional involvements, living in liberation without impediment....They were expert in knowing the spiritual faculties of all living beings....They were experts in the way of the Dharma....They were endowed with the wisdom that is able to understand the thoughts of living beings, as well as their comings and goings.… [34].

Each of the Bodhisattvas’ Dharma Doors are concerned with letting go of attachment to views, many of them views about the Dharma - about the spiritual life.

In the Mahaacattaariisaka Sutta[35] the Buddha discusses three kinds of view (di.t.thi): wrong view, and two kinds of right view:

there is right view that is affected by the taints, partaking of merit, ripening on the side of attachment; and there is right view that is noble, taintless, supramundane, a factor of the path.

The first kind of right view is that understanding of the Dharma which has not yet been informed by Transcendental Insight, while the second kind has. In a sense the second kind of right view is not a view at all, in the sense of an opinion, or doctrine, but is a direct understanding of Reality. So there is a hierarchical arrangement: we have to move from wrong view to the first kind of right view, and from there to the second kind of right view. One of the characteristics of the first kind of right view is that it ripens “on the side of attachment” - we can possess right view while at the same time being subject to attachment, including, presumably, attachment to views, even right views. This attachment to right views, although helpful in the early stages of our development, later becomes a hindrance, because we have eventually to let go of all attachments, even skilful ones. The Buddha makes this clear in his Parable of the Raft,[36] when he says,

You should understand, monks, from the Parable of the Raft that good things (dhamma) must be left behind, much more so evil things (adhamma).[37]

We need the raft to cross over the river, but once we reach the other side we have to leave it behind.

The Bodhisattvas in the Vimalakiirti Nirde’sa are very close to Enlightenment - they are at the stage where they need to start leaving the raft behind. To leave the raft behind means to let go of one’s attachment to it. The Bodhisattvas have to let go of their attachment to those doctrines and practices which have helped them progress on the path - not let go of the doctrines and practices themselves:

The Bodhisattva Ma.nikuu.taraaja declared, ‘It is dualistic to speak of good paths (maarga) and bad paths (kumaarga). One who is on the path (maarga) is not concerned with good or bad paths. Living in such unconcern, he entertains no concepts of ‘path’ or ‘nonpath’. Understanding the nature of concepts, his mind does not engage in duality. Such is the entrance into non-duality’.

In his first sentence Ma.nikuu.taraaja proposes ‘good paths’ and ‘bad paths’ as a duality which has to be reconciled. In his next he says that he who is on the path is not concerned with good paths or bad paths. The word Thurman translates as ‘good path’ is the same as the one he translates as ‘path’ - maarga. Presumably he does this to show that the Bodhisattva who is on the path does not make a conceptual distinction between good paths and bad paths. But in doing this he obscures a very important point - that it is only from the viewpoint of the ‘good path’ that the Bodhisattva is able to see through the conceptual distinction between ‘good paths’ and ‘bad paths’. It is not that the Bodhisattva leaves the path, it is that he has let go of his attachment to the concept of the path. Put in another way the Bodhisattva has moved from the first kind of right view - that is “right view that is affected by taints, partaking of merit, ripening on the side of attachment” - to the second kind, “right view that is noble, taintless, supramundane.”

If this all seems rather abstract, perhaps a mundane analogy would help. Someone learning to drive a car has to think about each action that they make - turn the ignition key while pressing down a little with the right foot on the accelarator, press left foot down on the clutch, get into first gear, take off handbreak, look into mirror to see if it is safe to pull out, if it is, put on right hand indicator, press down a litttle more on the accelerator with right foot, and, simultaneously, slowly release pressure from clutch with left foot; as the car starts moving forwards, turn the steering wheel with both hands slightly to the right ...etc. I have been driving cars for 25 years and I do all that automatically, so much so that to write down what I do has cost me some effort of memory and analysis. I may even have made a few mistakes in writing it down, although when I drive I invariably do it all effortlessly, unselfconsciously, and correctly. The Buddhist who is consciously practising the good path is analogous to the learner-driver, whereas the Bodhisattva who is not concerned with the practice of the path is like the skilful driver who no longer thinks (conceptually) about practising the path - he just does it. The analogy is not perfect - even the experienced driver can make a mistake and cause a bad accident, whereas the Bodhisattva who has gone beyond good paths and bad paths will always act skilfully, for it has become his nature.

The Bodhisattva Vidyuddeva is talking from the same standpoint when he says

‘Knowledge’ (vidyaa) and ‘ignorance’ (aavidyaa) are dualistic. The natures of ignorance and knowledge are the same, for ignorance is undefined, incalculable, and beyond the sphere of thought. The realization of this is the entrance into non-duality.

When he says that knowledge and ignorance both have the same natures he does not mean that they have the same value, and that we may just as well be ignorant as wise. After all, ignorance is suffering: “Sickness (suffering) arises from total involvement in the process of misunderstanding from beginningless time”[38] and the Vimalakiirti Nirde’sa, like all Buddhist texts, is concerned to alleviate ignorance because it is concerned to alleviate suffering. Vidyuddeva means that someone who possesses Knowledge (the second kind of right view) lets go of his attachment to the concepts of knowledge and ignorance. But he can only do that because he is wise - someone who is ignorant cannot afford to let go of the concept of knowledge.

We can understand the Bodhisattva Ti.sya’s statement in the same way:

‘Good’ (ku’sala) and ‘evil’ (aku’sala) are two. Seeking neither good nor evil, the understanding of the non-duality of the significant and the meaningless is the entrance into non-duality.

I have already mentioned the Buddha’s threefold distinction of wrong view and the two kinds of right view. Elsewhere the Buddha makes a similar distinction, but in terms of ethical behaviour (siila): here the disciple has to move from unethical behaviour to ethical behaviour, at which point unethical behaviour ‘ceases without remainder’. But he then has to move to the point where even ethical behaviour ‘ceases without remainder’. In answer to the question ‘where do skilful moral actions (kusala-siila) cease without remainder?’ the Buddha replies: when one ‘possesses virtue (siilavant), not when one is regulated by virtue (siilamaya).’[39] One who possesses virtue no longer has to practice virtue - they have become virtuous.

Chapter nine ends with a climax, and it is the climax of the whole text. When thirty Bodhisattvas have all proposed their own Dharma Doors of Non-Duality they ask Ma~nju’srii to give his own Dharma Door. He replies,

Good sirs, you have all spoken well. Nevertheless, all your explanations are themselves dualistic. To know no one teaching, to express nothing, to say nothing, to explain nothing, to announce nothing, to indicate nothing, and to designate nothing - this is the entrance into nonduality.[40]

Ma~nju’srii then asks Vimalakiirti to give his own entrance in the Dharma Door of Non-duality, and

the Licchavi Vimalakiirti kept his silence, saying nothing at all. The crown prince Ma~nju’srii applauded the Licchavi Vimalakiirti: “Excellent! Excellent, noble sir! This is indeed the entrance into nonduality of the Bodhisattvas. Here there is no use for syllables, sounds, and ideas.[41]

The Danger of Pseudo Non-duality
Although this is the climax of the text, it is not the end - there are three chapters left, and the next chapter, ‘The Feast Brought by the Emanated Incarnation’ is very significant. Vimalakiirti magically emanates an incarnation-Bodhisattva and sends him to the universe Sarvagandhasugandhaa (Sweetly Perfumed with all Perfumes) to ask the Buddha of that universe, Sugandhakuu.ta (Mountain of Perfume) for the remains of his meal. The ninety-million Bodhisattvas of that universe wish to go back with the incarnation-Bodhisattva to see the Buddha ‘Saakyamuni, Vimalakiirti and the other Bodhisattvas, and they ask the Buddha Sugandhakuu.ta for permission. He allows them to go, but warns them to go without their perfumes, “lest those living beings become mad and intoxicated”.[42] The incarnation-Bodhisattva, along with the ninety-million Bodhisattvas, returns to this universe with the remains of Sugandhakuu.ta’s meal, and Vimalakiirti invites ‘Saariputra and the other great disciples to eat it, which they do, as do all the Bodhisattvas, ‘Sakras, Brahmaas, Lokapaalas, gods and goddesses. As a result of eating this food they all experience great bliss, and a wonderful perfume pervades from the pores of their skin. Vimalakiirti then asks the Bodhisattvas from Sarvagandhasugandhaa how their Buddha teaches the Dharma. They reply,

The Tathaagata does not teach the Dharma by means of sound and language. He disciplines Bodhisattvas only by means of perfumes. At the foot of each perfume-tree sits a Bodhisattva, and the trees emit perfumes like this one. From the moment they smell that perfume, the Bodhisattvas attain the concentration called ‘source of all Bodhisattva-virtues’. From the moment they attain that concentration, all the Bodhisattva-virtues are produced in them.[43]

Those Bodhisattvas then ask Vimalakiirti how the Buddha of this universe, ‘Saakyamuni, teaches the Dharma. He replies,

Good sirs, these living beings here are hard to discipline. Therefore he teaches them with discourses appropriate to the disciplining of the wild and uncivilized. How does he discipline the wild and uncivilized? What discourses are appropriate? Here they are:

‘This is hell. This is the animal world. This is the world of the lord of death. These are the adversities. These are the rebirths with crippled faculties. These are physical misdeeds, and these are the retributions for physical misdeeds. These are verbal misdeeds, and these are the retributions for verbal misdeeds. These are mental misdeeds, and these are the retributions for mental misdeeds. This is killing. This is stealing. This is sexual misconduct. This is lying. This is backbiting. This is harsh speech. This is frivolous speech. This is covetousness. This is malice. This is false view. These are their retributions. This is miserliness, and this is its effect. This is immorality. This is hatred. This is sloth. This is the fruit of sloth. This is false wisdom, and this is the fruit of false wisdom. These are the transgressions of the precepts. This is the vow of personal liberation. This should be done and that should not be done. This is proper and that should be abandoned. This is an obscuration and that is without obscuration. This is sin and that rises above sin. This is the path and that is the wrong path. That is virtue and that is evil. This is blameworthy and that is blameless. This is defiled and that is immaculate. This is mundane and that is transcendental. This is compounded and that is uncompounded. This is passion and that is purification. This is life (sa.msaara) and that is liberation (nirvaa.na)’.[44]

This is one of the most powerful passages in the whole book, not least because of where it comes in the text. After all those Bodhisattvas’ statements on Non-duality, ending with Vimalakiirti’s ‘thunderous silence’, we have come to inhabit a rarefied world where all dualistic distinctions are refined away to nothing. This is followed by the episode in which the emanated incarnation travels to the wonderful universe of perfumes, where Bodhisattvas sit at the foot of perfume-trees, imbibing the Dharma by means of beautiful fragrances - an image which strengthens our sense of subtle non-dualism and adds to it the refined attractions of beauty and pleasure. At this point Vimalakiirti brings us down to earth with an unpleasant shock, reminding us of the suffering involved in the world, and warning us not to let go of our dualistic frameworks prematurely. Highly advanced Bodisattvas may be able to play with the concepts of good paths and bad paths, knowledge and ignorance, good and evil, but we badly need them. We see things dualistically and we must hold fast to the positive side of the duality, otherwise we suffer:

This is hell. This is the animal world. This is the world of the lord of death. These are the adversities. These are the rebirths with crippled faculties.

This reminds me of another of the Buddha’s teachings - the Parable of the Water Snake, which the Buddha used, significantly, just before he told the Parable of the Raft.[45] A man goes in search of a water snake, finds one, and grabs it by the tail. The snake rears round and bites the man, and he suffers agonizing pain before eventually dying of the poisoned bite. Another man goes in search of a water snake, finds one, but carefully catches it by the neck so that it cannot bite him. The first man is like the man who misunderstands the Dharma - it causes him suffering. The second man is like the one who understands the Dharma - he comes to no harm. Naagaarjuna used this simile in his Verses on the Middle Way, when he warned that a wrong grasp of the doctrine of Emptiness (‘suunyataa) will lead to suffering,[46] and the same could be said about the doctrine of Non-duality in the Vimalakiirti Nirde’sa. The passage I have just quoted is Vimalakiirti’s warning to us, and the danger is very real.

Conclusion
I have argued that the doctrine of Non-duality is essentially a re-statement of the Buddha’s teaching of the Middle Way. However, I have also stated that the Vimalakiirti Nirde’sa takes this doctrine further than did the Buddha, stretching the application of it to include all concepts whatsoever, including those (necessarily dualistic) concepts which constitute the doctrines of Buddhism. Whereas the Buddha spoke simply of the Middle Way between the extremes of indulgence in sense pleasures and self-mortification, or, more metaphysically, between (absolute) existence and (absolute) non-existence, the Vimalakiirti Nirde’sa teaches the Middle Way (Dharma Door of Non-duality) between such things as skilful and unskilful, knowledge and ignorance, good paths and bad paths. This ‘stretching’ of the idea of Non-duality is dangerous, the danger being that people reading the text may assume that such teachings are appropriate to their level of spiritual development when they are not. Of course that danger is often present when we read a Buddhist text, even in the ‘basic’ or ‘simple’ teachings of the Buddha that we find in the Paali Canon. (That is why the Buddha told the parable of the water snake). When we read those texts we should constantly bear in mind that the Buddha was often talking to a particular person, and what may be good for that person may not be good for us. However, the danger inherent in The Vimalakiirti Nirde’sa’s Dharma Doors of Non-duality is particularly acute, because to some people it could appear to be saying that all those doctrines and practices which make up the Buddhist path to Enlightenment are to be discarded because they are dualistic: there is no difference between good paths and bad paths, skilful and unskilful actions, knowledge and ignorance. Hence, some Buddhists may dismiss such ‘basic’ teachings as the five precepts, or the necessity for renunciation, with the retort “Oh, but that is dualistic isn’t it?” Or “There is no path, and no-one to tread it”. Such a misunderstanding is tantamount to seizing the poisonous water snake by the tail, or stepping off the raft in midstream, only to drown in the deep waters of Sa.msaara.

If the teachings in the Vimalakiirti Nirde’sa such as those in chapter nine are only for advanced Bodhisattvas and Arahants, not for ordinary Buddhists, the question could be asked, is there any point in us reading and studying it (assuming that we are neither advanced Bodhisattvas nor Arahants)? I think there is, as long as we do not assume that all the teachings in it are meant for us. First of all, the text is a great piece of Buddhist literature - it is profound, moving, funny, shocking, and inspiring. Vimalakiirti himself is a wonderful character, absolutely uncompromising, delighting in taking the ground from underneath the feet of the mighty, but with a light touch, with great wit and humour.

But what about those teachings meant for advanced Bodhisattvas and Arahants? I have just referred to the humour in the text. Usually the humour is at the expense of one of the great Arahants or Bodhisattavas, as Vimalakiirti exposes the limitations of their way of practising, or their literal mindedness. There is no reason why we shouldn’t sit back and laugh at these episodes - they are meant to be enjoyed. But it might also be useful if we asked ourselves what Vimalakiirti might say to us if he turned up at our place one day - which particular weakness, attachment, or pretension would he expose to ridicule?

There is one more thing we can gain from reading this text. I have pointed out that in chapter nine, The Dharma Door of Non-duality, highly advanced Bodhisattvas are talking to highly advanced Bodhisattvas. However, they have an audience - 500 great disciples, as well as a great number of ‘Sakras, Brahmaas, Lokapaalas, and many hundreds of thousands of gods and goddesses are listening, and I assume that not all of these beings are spiritually advanced. What can they, (or we), get from listening to these Bodhisattvas expound on Non-duality? It is worth listening to great minds conversing even though we may not understand what they say, or put into practice what they do. It is valuable because, although we may not understand them, we are able to catch a glimpse of a reality far beyond our own. The great Bodhisattvas are leaving the raft. We must hang on to it for the time being. But it can be very inspiring to watch them step off it onto the other shore. In reading the Vimalakiirti Nirde’sa we are witnessing living beings of all kinds - with differing capacities, inclinations, and at different levels of spiritual development, from the people of Vai’saalii, to the gods and goddesses, to the great Disciples and Arahants - we are witnessing them letting go of their attachments and experiencing a new freedom. In watching them we take our own place in the spiritual hierarchy, and can ourselves be inspired to let go of our own particular attachments and take our next step towards freedom.

For this process to be most effective I would recommend that the whole text be read in a ritual context, that is, in the context of meditation, chanting, and ritual. Listening to a good reading of chapter nine, for instance, in a concentrated and devotional state of mind can be an extraordinary experience - at least I have found it so. At first, as the first few Bodhisattvas propose and resolve different sets of dualities, your discursive mind tries its best to follow them. After a few minutes however, it becomes too much - there are too many of them coming too quickly, one after another - and you eventually have to give up and relax into a calm, non-discursive state in which you can hear what is being said, but you are not thinking about each statement. In this state of mind it is possible to get a feeling for, even to catch a glimpse of, a mind which has let go of everything - a mind which is completely free.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Yamakavyatyastaahaara.

[2] According to tradition the first and, by implication, the most fundamental teaching by the Buddha. Sa.myutta-Nikaaya, v. 420.

[3] Sa.myutta Nikaaya. ii, 17.

[4] Trans. Woodward. Paali Text Society.

[5] P. 45 of Robert Thurman’s translation. Pennsylvania State University Press. I have used Thurman’s translation throughout, except where stated. I have also used alternative renderings to some of Thurman’s translations of key terms. See for instance, note 10.

[6] P. 124. Paali Text Society. From the French translation by Etienne Lamotte, rendered into English by Sara Boin. There are no extant versions of the original Sanskrit text - Thurman and Lamotte have translated from Tibetan and Chinese translations. Lamotte ‘Sanskritises’ all the key terms, in this case the term being adhyaalambana - alambana meaning object, adhyaa meaning to move towards. Therefore both Thurman’s and Lamotte/Boin’s translations are correct, although Lamotte/Boin’s brings out the Buddhist connotation - there is nothing wrong with ‘perception’ in itself, it is the ‘grasping’ that causes suffering.

[7] P. 45 (Thurman’s translation).

[8] External = bahirdhaad.r.s.tii. Internal = adhyaatmad.r.s.ti.

[9] Ibid. p. 45.

[10] P.20. I have used the term ‘skill in means’ in place of Thurman’s ‘liberative technique’. Lamotte Sanskritises the term into upaaya kau’salya..

[11] P. 22.

[12] P. 23.

[13] P. 24.

[14] P. 42.

[15] P. 42.

[16] P. 43.

[17] P. 43.

[18] P. 43.

[19] P. 44. I have changed Thurman’s ‘miserable’ to ‘painful’ (dukkha).

[20] P.44.

[21] P.45.

[22] P.46.

[23] P.73.

[24] P.73.

[25] P.75. Here is an example of a ‘duality’ made up not of opposites, but of a triad of complementaries - in this case, the Three Jewels - the highest values for all Buddhists.

[26] P.73.

[27] P.76.

[28] P.74.

[29] P.74.

[30] See, for instance, Sammaadi.t.thi Sutta, Mn. i.50.

[31] P.24.

[32] P.25.

[33] P.26.

[34] P.10.

[35] Mn. iii.70 Wisdom Publications. Translation by ~Naa.namoli and Bodhi.

[36] Alagadduupama Sutta. MN.i.135.

[37] Damien Keown’s translation, from The Nature of Buddhist Ethics. P. 101. From chapter 4, ‘The Transcendency Thesis’. Here Keown argues that the idea that ethics is merely a stage on the path that eventually has to be left behind stems from a misunderstanding of the Parable of the Raft, based on I.B. Horner’s interpretation.. In telling his disciples that they have to leave the raft behind the Buddha is not, according to Keown, saying that an Enlightened being is ‘beyond good and evil’. He is saying that we have, at some point in our spiritual lives, to renounce our attachment even to Buddhist practices.

[38] P.45.

[39] Sama.nama.ndikaaputta Sutta (MN. ii.27). Robert Morrison’s translation, from Nietzsche and Buddhism. OUP.

[40] P.77.

[41] P.77.

[42] P.80.

[43] P.81.

[44] P.82.

[45] Alagadduupama Sutta. MN. i.133. It is significant that the Buddha told the Parable of the Water Snake just before the Parable of the Raft, because in doing so he made it clear that the doctrines and practices have to be grasped first of all. Only later in our spiritual careers should we let go of them.

[46] Muulamadhyamakaarikaa. XXIV.11.

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 Nietzschean Anarchy & the Post-Mortem Condition
by Max Cafard*
 

"In a friend one should have one's best enemy" says Zarathustra [Z168]1,
and Nietzsche certainly proves himself to be the best friend and the best
enemy of anarchism.
Even a cursory survey of Nietzsche's works reveals that the term
"anarchist" is for him invariably a term of abuse. He sees anarchism as
one of the most baneful expressions of that psychic malaise called
ressentiment, and a symptom of modern society's grave and perhaps terminal
illness--destructive nihilism. What better friend could anarchists
possibly wish for than this brilliant and uncompromising enemy?
Yet there is beyond, and indeed beneath, Nietzsche's anarchophobia a
Nietzschean Anarchy that is infinitely more anarchistic than the anarchism
he assails.
It is nothing like the Nietzschean Anarchy that some recent observers have
discovered. We will call these observers "Post-Mortemists" and their view
from the crypt "Post-Mortemism." We will call these Post-Mortemists the
"Waking Dead," because of their peculiar celebration of death. They find
themselves to be "in the wake" of death. They consider their morbid
celebration to be "a wake" for the dead. I say none of this in accusation:
I only recount what they repeat endlessly about themselves. Ces revenants.
Endlessly. For the spirit of Post-Mortemism is pervaded by a certain kind
of repetition compulsion, a fixation on certain images, certain figures of
speech, even certain catch phrases (though in fact they catch little). For
Nietzsche, "the scholar is the herd animal in the realm of knowledge," one
who speaks and thinks as he does "because others have done so before him."
[WP 226] The Post-Mortemists, these sheep in wolves' clothing, are just
such herd animals, despite their ferocious exterior, despite their
howling, wild enough to wake the dead.
Nietzschean Anarchy is not the Anarchy of Post-Mortem wakes, but rather
the Anarchy of the Awakened Mind (a pre-Ancientist idea). The
Post-Mortemist wake is the Party of Death. The Nietzschean Anarchist Party
is the Party of Life.
We will call the Post-Mortemists the "Anarcho-Cynicalists." Cynicism is
the disease of preference of our age, and Nietzsche has the distinction of
being one of the first to diagnose its onset. Post-Mortemism is one of the
most exotic growths to blossom in the decaying social body. It attacks the
reigning cynicism on behalf of a more radical cynicism. The uncharitable
Nietzsche would reserve a special contempt for those Post-Mortemists "who
lost their high hope" and then "slandered all high hopes" [PN 156] using a
borrowed tongue--often, ironically, a tongue borrowed from Nietzsche
himself.
For many, Nietzsche is a Post-Mortemist anarchist who inspires the somber
celebration of the Death of God. But for us--Pre-Ancientists and
Surre(gion)alists--Nietzsche is a Pre-Ancientist anarchist who celebrates
the eternal Rebirth of the Gods.
"For us," I say. But what right do we have to claim "Nietzsche" as our
own? None at all, and we will not raise a hand if you attempt to carry off
this rotten corpse to put it in some museum or reliquary .
Yet we will claim him anyway, justifying this outrage by our full
recognition of the multiplicity of Nietzsches. Of course, it is a
comonplace that there are as many Nietzsches as there are readers of
Nietzsche. But beyond this, there are many Nietzsches within Nietzsche,
and within the many Nietzsches. As the philosopher himself comments, there
is a chaos within the creative self. And as the phiosophical joker Chuang
Tzu told in his Pre-ancient story, brutal interference, however well
intended, causes the Body of Chaos (Hun-Tun) to die. We recognize then
that we must refrain from violence against the chaotic body--the Body of
Nature, the Social Body, the Spiritual Body. We recognize that we can have
no knowledge of "self," except as we explore the regions of self, regions
that have no clear boundaries of selfhood, which extend deeply beneath the
surface of selfhood, and outward beyond the borders of selfhood.
So our present surre(gion)al journey will explore--not "Nietzsche"--but
certain Nietzschean regions. Regions that we might call, collectively,
Anarchica. You are invited along on this voyage: "Travel to Anarchica and
stalk the Cold Monster!"
In our exploration we will be guided by the strict science of
Psychogeography. The earliest Psychogeographers discovered that not only
does one never step into the same river twice, but that one never arrives
at a single source. Whether this be the Source of the Nile, or the Source
of Nihilism.
For this reason nothing would be more more pointless than to seek some
true Nietzsche who "is" or "is not" an anarchist. A Prof. Basinski (under
the influence of Martin "Dr. Death" Heidegger)2, assures us that Nietzsche
never believed in the Will to Power, Eternal Recurrence, and the
Übermensch. These were, we are told, no more than metaphysical illusions
he created to hide his own nihilism.3
Of course Nietzsche didn't believe in any of it! And the good Prof.
Basinski cannot possibily believe any of these silly rumors he's speading
about Nietzsche.
So we forsake the quest for the Promised Land of Nietzsche. There is no
compass that could direct us to such a destination. Here as everywhere,
Nagarjuna's radical Awakened-Mind dialectic must be our guide. As we cross
the non-existent borders of the Nietzschean regions, we find that we might
explore the Nietzsche who is an anarchist, the Nietzsche who is not an
anarchist, the Nietzsche who both is and is not an anarchist, and the
Nietzsche who neither is nor is not an anarchist. Or more accurately, we
might explore the ways in which the many Nietzsches are and are not all of
these.
In what follows, we will hear from some of these Nietzsches.4
The Antichrist Versus The Anarchist
Bakunin said, "the urge to destroy is a creative urge also." But as
Nietzsche pointed out, sometimes the urge to destroy is--let's face it--an
Urge to Destroy.
Of course, Nietzsche is well aware of the truth in Bakunin's insight. In
fact he expressed the same idea much more eloquently than did Bakunin:
"The desire for destruction, change and becoming can be an expression of
an overflowing energy that is pregnant with future . . . ." [GS 329] So,
yes, it can be creative.
"But," he adds, "it can also be the hatred of the ill-constituted,
disinherited, and underprivileged, who destroy, must destroy, because what
exists, indeed all existence, all being, outrages and provokes them. To
understand this feeling, consider our anarchists closely." [GS 329] This
is almost touching: "our anarchists." How many philosophers have been
willing to claim as their own these oft-scorned stepchildren of politics?
Nietzsche does, and even seeks to understand their feelings! What he
discovers is that "our anarchists," poor souls that they are, are in the
grips of a nihilistic rage against reality.
When he speaks of "our anarchists," Nietzsche has in mind a certain kind
of anarchist. His model is not the anarchist who is a fanatic for freedom,
but rather the one who is obsessed with injustice. For him, this anarchist
is just the extreme type of a certain kind of revolutionary, one who
expresses vicerally the revolt of the masses, of the downtrodden, of the
"underprivileged." The anarchist is thus the purest and most spiritually
contaminated expression of a certain kind of reactivity, the perfect
embodiment of reactive revolt. Nietzsche's stinging charge against such an
anarchism is that it is, at its deepest level, reactionary. Reaction is
not the exclusive preserve of the right, in Nietzsche's perceptive
analysis.
Though Nietzsche doesn't hestitate to cast aspersions on the
"underprivileged" and their self-ordained champions, his critique is no
simplistic defense of "privilege." He can as well as anyone attack and
demolish the smug pretensions of the privileged. After all, it is those
very "privileged" who overturned the old order of privilege to create the
mass society and herd morality that Nietzsche detests so fervently. He
sides neither with the established order nor with those who struggle to
topple it. For Nietzsche, to paraphrase Bierce, conservatives are those
who heroically defend the old absurdities, while "our anarchists" are
those who strive mightily to replace them with new ones. His critique is
thus a diagnosis of a sensibility rooted in reactivity, ressentiment, and
one-sided negativity. Those of "our anarchists" who fall prey to such an
insidious sensibility become obsessed with the injustices of the existing
world and with their own powerlessness in the face of such evil. They are
in effect, the mirror image of those slavish souls who are entranced and
corrupted by the awe-inspiring spectacle of power, wealth and privilege.
But in the case of our rebellious little anarchists, the spirit is
poisoned by an impotent, reactive rage.
It is Nietzsche the Antichrist who savagely attacks the Anarchist, since
anarchism for him is a kind of Christianity. He does not, by the way, mean
by "Christianity" the spiritually and socially inflamatory teachings of
Jesus, which he shows to be ironically negated by the entire history of
the Church. He means, rather, the reactive institutional Christianity that
retreats into pessimism and nihilism in its utter dissatisfation with the
world. Nietzsche's indictment of Christianity and anarchism ressembles
Hegel's dissection of the "Beautiful Soul." For Hegel, the moral idealist
creates a dream world with little connection to ethical reality, the
embodiment of good in the actual world. But Nietzsche is much more
scathing in his assault on such idealism. The "Beautiful Soul" is for him
a quite "Ugly Soul," corrupted by its narrowness and alienation from the
truths of experience and the virtues of the world.
If the higher person, the Übermensch, is like a vast sea in which immense
evil is diluted and dissolved, the moral purist is a small stagnant
puddle, in which the most exalted goodness putrifies. "The Christian and
the anarchist: both decadents, both incapable of having any effect other
than disintegrating, poisoning, withering, bloodsucking; both the instinct
of mortal hatred against everything that stands, that stands in greatness,
that has duration, that promises life a future." [A 648] The tragic flaw
in both these character-structures results from an identification of the
self with an ungrounded, ahistorical ideal. The result is a rage against
the the real, in which the most authentic achievements evoke the most
intense reactive hostility, since they threaten the necessity of the
absolute break with what exists, l'ecart absolu, that has become a
psychological necessity.
Nietzsche's image of the anarchist is inspired by the classical anarchist
revolutionary who was the reactive response to the industrializing,
accumulative capitalism and the centralizing, bureaucratically expanding
nation-state of the 19th century. Yet much of what he says also
characterizes--perhaps even better--various strands of Western anarchism
that emerged in the 1960's and which linger on in certain subcultures.
Such an anarchism defines itself practically by what it is against. It
fumes and fulminates against "all forms of domination," by which it means
every one of this fallen world's institutions and social practices, none
of which has any liberatory potential.
This is the anarchism of permanent protest. The anarchism of militant
marginality. The anarchism of sectarian theoretical purity. The anarchism
of grand gestures that become increasingly petty and indeed meaningless as
they are dissolved in the vast Post-Mortem Ocean of Signifiers. As
sophisticated surrealism becomes the stuff of advertising and music
videos, and the entire culture lapses into brutal cynicism tinged with
irony, all homely gestures of resistance, all sighs on behalf of the
oppressed, all "critiques of all forms of domination," all this becomes
low-level noise, lost in a din of background noise (The High Deci-bel
Epoque). Though if any of it happens to be mildly interesting, it can be
recycled as bits and pieces of style.
Nietzsche once pointed out that the interesting question for Kantian
ethics is not what actions are necessary according to the Categorical
Imperative, but why belief in a Categorical Imperative was so goddam
necessary for Kant. Similarly, we might ask why for certain classical
anarchists cataclysmic revolution was an absolute necessity, and for
certain contemporary anarchists sectarian dogmatism and the politics of
permanent protest are a psychological necessity. Why does their spirit
(and perhaps their nervous system) crave it so intensely? It has been
asserted by some anarchists with evident satisfaction (and many more think
it, whether with pride or guilt) that "everything our enemies say about us
is true." According to their Manichean worldview, everything these enemies
think to be so horrifying is in reality quite wonderful, and to be accused
of it should be a source of boundless pride. Such anarchists thus recreate
themselves in the reactive image of the reactive image that reactionaries
have of them. Rather than negating the negation, they affirm the negation,
achieving the bliss of some rather incoherent sort of pure negativity.
The particular anarchists that Nietzsche targets are only one variety of a
nihilistic species that includes all kinds of "slanderers, underminers,
doubters, destroyers." [WP 26] It is for this reason that he places
"anarchism" in a seemingly bizarre list that includes such other symptoms
as "celibacy," "sterility," "hystericism," and "alcoholism." [WP 26]5 Such
an anarchism sees nothing but the negative in what is, yearns for
revolutionary destruction, and finds hope (or perhaps merely a "principle
of hope") only in a post-revolutionary Utopia bearing little connection to
anything that actually exists. Such an anarchism is a kind of Left
Platonism, taking refuge not in Plato's Realm of Eternal Forms, but in an
equally ghostly and disembodied Realm of Eternal Forms of Freedom.
The critique of anarchism is merely a minor variation on Nietzsche's major
theme of the destuctive nature of all varieties of ressentiment. "This
plant," he tells us, "blooms best today among anarchists and
anti-Semites," who seek "to sanctify revenge under the name of justice--as
if justice were at bottom merely a further development of the feeling of
being aggrieved--and to rehabilitate not only revenge but all the reactive
affects in general." [BGE 509-510] The wisest old anarchist I ever met
once said to me (summing up his philosophy of life): "We deserve the
best!" His entire life has been a celebration of as much of this best as
we (all of us--no one is excluded from his Anarchist Party) have
experienced and created. Yet for every anarchist with such a spirit, I
have found many whose whole being proclaims the question, "Why have they
done this to me?" Such an anarchist is a walking complaint.
In the 19th century this ressentiment of revolt was embodied above all in
Nechaev's fanatical and murderous nihilism. But it also found expression
in the side of Bakunin's character that drew him so powerfully to Nechaev,
the lumpenproletariat, and the brigands, and led him to fantasize vast
revolutionary potential in every poorly-organized insurrection. In recent
anarchist sectarianism ressentiment reemerges ("with a vengeance,"
needless to say) in Bookchin's anarcho-negativism, in which political
theory and practice deteriorates into the politics of spleen.6 The cult of
negativity finds its déraison d'etre in ressentiment--not only against
"all forms of domination" but against every existing reality. Every
practical attempt to transform the conditions of life is condemned as
irrelevant, simpleminded, or else some sort of devious reactionary plot.
And the more insidious it is, the more seriously it threatens to
accomplish some good deemed unattainable according to the dictates of
abstract dogmatism.
Post-Mortemists have depicted Nietzsche as the enemy of dialectical
thinking. They presume that merely because he demolishes the sophistries
and self-delusions of dialecticians that he is somehow anti-dialectical.
Yet no one has ever but more teeth into a biting dialectical logic.
"Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not
become a monster. And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also
looks into you." [BGE 279] How many anarchists in their struggle against
the state have reproduced a little state within themselves? How many
leftists in their crusades against domination have turned themselves into
domineering, powerseeking dogmatists? The monster signifies violence,
fanaticism in ideas, rigidity of character, contempt for persons--all of
which have been reproduced in abundance, even in more extreme forms, in
the monster-slayers themselves. The warriors of being fall into the abyss
of nihilism. "We are nothing but we shall be all." But out of nothing
comes nothing!
Such an affirmation of nothingness (a Bad Infinity, to be distinguished
from the Nothingness of Affirmation of Gautame, Böhme, etc.) arises from
the propensity to define oneself in relation to that which one is not; in
this case the system of power and domination. By defining oneself as
powerless, or merely subject to power, one overlooks the marvellous powers
that are slumbering within one's own creative spirit. Just as "power
corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely," powerlessness corrupts
and absolute powerlessness corrupts absolutely. In the case of the
oppressed, or, rather those who allow themselves to be defined by the
conditions of their oppression, their souls are poisoned by their reactive
will to power. Their oppositional perspective comes to absorb their entire
being. They are occasionally dangerous but always tiresome lions. The
spirit of the child has been entirely extinguished in them. Their
creativity, spontaneity, playfulness, and vitality are destroyed.
Nietzsche's message concerning such anarchist sectarians is the same as
his message about all dogmatists, all who wield their truth like a weapon.
"Avoid all such unconditional people! They are a poor sick sort, a sort of
mob: they look sourly at this life, they have the evil eye for this earth.
Avoid all such unconditional people! They have heavy feet and sultry
hearts: they do no know how to dance. How should the earth be light for
them?" [Z 405-406] In effect, Nietzsche says "If I can't dance, I don't
want your anarchism!" Such "unconditional" anarchists, despite all their
ideological purity, despite their incessant talk of "humanity" and
"ecology," cannot love others, and cannot love the earth.
On Monsters Hot and Cold
So Nietzsche proves himself to be anarchism's best friend and enemy. But
his gift to anarchism goes far beyond his amicable hatred. For despite his
scathing attacks on anarchists he shows himself to be not only a good
friend and a good enemy of all anarchists but also to be a good anarchist.
One of the most distinctive characteristics of anarchism is its
voluntarism--its opposition to the imposition of the will of one upon
another through force and coercion. And no anarchist has stated the case
against coercion more perceptively than has Nietzsche. Coercion is
corruptive force, he says. But contrary to the conventional anarchic
complaint, its most significant corrupting effect is on the victims, not
the perpetrators. "Every power that forbids, that knows how to arouse fear
in those to whom something is forbidden, creates a 'bad conscience' (that
is, the desire for something combined with the consciousness of danger in
satisfying it, with the necessity for secrecy, for underhandedness, for
caution. Every prohibition worsens the character of those who do not
submit to it willingly, but only because they are compelled." [WP 391] No
wonder some anarchist rhetoricians become discouraged when their ringing
condemnation of "all forms of domination" falls on deaf ears. They pay far
too much attention to the injustices of the oppressors and to little to
the ways in which power has transformed those who are coerced and
dominated.
Nietzsche's imperious questioning of techne also betrays his deeply
anarchistic spirit. His critique of technical rationality and
technological domination is prophetic. Despite his well-known admiration
for some varieties of "will to power," the will to dominate and manipulate
nature is the object of his most scornful derision. "Our whole attitude
toward nature, the way we violate her with the aid of machines and the
heedless inventiveness of our technicians and engineers, is hubris." [BGE
549] He sees that our will to dominate nature inevitably produces a will
to dominate human nature also. "[O]ur attitude toward ourselves is hubris,
for we experiment with ourselves in a way we would never permit ourselves
to experiment with animals and, carried away by curiosity, we cheerfully
vivisect our souls . . . ." [BGE 549] Certain impeccably anarchistic but
nonetheless simplistic theories onesidedly trace the quest to dominate
nature in the actual domination of "human by human," but dogmatically
dismiss the roots of social domination in the urge to conquer nature. In
reality the relationship between the two dominations is--as Nietzsche,
that great anti-dialectical dialectician, grasped quite well--dialectical.
Nietzsche is not only one of the most devastating critics of the state,
but also one of the most acurately perceptive analysts of that
institution. Few before him were quite so indiscrete in divulging the
origins of the state in force, violence and domination. The state, he
says, "organized immorality--internally: as police, penal law, classes,
commerce, family; externally: as will to power, to war, to conquest, to
revenge." [WP 382] He grasps the ironic truth that "law and order" as
carried out by the state is in fundamental contradiction with the nature
of its subjects. The masses on whose subservience it depends are incapable
of either the banal cruelties or the paroxysms of horror that define the
monster. "How does it happen that the state will do a host of things that
the individual would never countenance?--Through division of
responsibility, of command, and of execution. Through the interposition of
the virtues of obedience, duty, patriotism, and loyalty. Through upholding
pride, severity, strength, hatred, revenge--in short, all typical
characteristics that contradict the herd type." [WP 382-383] This is not
for Nietzsche a reproach against the state, however, but merely a
statement of the brutal truth that the mass of state-worshipers refuse to
recognize. "None of you has the courage to kill a man, or even to whip
him, or even to--but the tremendous machine of the state overpowers the
individual, so he repudiates responsibility for what he does (obedience,
oath, etc.)---Everything a man does in the service of the state is
contrary to his nature." [WP 383] Here he does no more than taunt the good
citizen with the blatant self-deception and hypocrisy on which every state
is founded.
There is perhaps no more powerful assault on the state in Western
philosophical thought than Zarathustra's vilification of "The New Idol."
There Nietzsche indicts the state for its artificial, coercive,
technical-bureaucratic reality that contradicts and undermines what is
most valuable in any culture. "State is the name of the coldest of all
cold monsters. Coldly it tells lies too, and this lie crawls out of its
mouth: 'I, the state, am the people.'" [Z 160] Not only is the state not
"the people" it in fact devours the people and all that they have created.
State versus people is one of the crucial chapters in the epochal story of
the battle between mechanism and organism, between the machine and life.
The Artificial Monster ("that great Leviathan . . . that mortal god,")
consumes any organic culture:
The state tells lies in all the tongues of good and evil; and whatever it
says it lies--and whatever it has it has stolen. Everything about it is
false; it bites with stolen teeth, and bites easily. Even its entrails are
false. Confusion of tongues of good and evil: this sign I give you as the
sign of the state." [Z 161]
All vitality is drained from the living social organism so that the Cold
Creature might live. The Monster is a grotesque parasite, a strange
Gargantuan vampire, and the people understand this. "Where there is still
a people, it does not understand the state and hates it as the evil eye
and the sin against customs and rights." [Z 161]
Nietzsche's diagnosis of the state was still prophetic in the 1880's,
since the the triumphant Monster still had a century to fulfill its deadly
destiny before beginning its precipitous decline and decay. His strident
indictment sounds rather dated, however, in the era of the new Monster,
the corporate Global Golem. "'On earth there is nothing greater than I:
the ordering finger of God am I'--thus roars the monster," [Z 161]
according to Zarathustra. Today such a roar would be met with laughter,
except possibly in some Third-World dictatorship in which the secret
police might be watching. For as Nietzsche himself had quite presciently
begun to realize, in mass society nothing really seems so "great," and
cynicism reigns supreme. The state as "the ordering finger of God?" Ha! In
this sad Post-Mortem world, God has given everything the finger.
So the state may be, as Nietzsche says, the Coldest Monster. But now there
are cold, hot and even luke-warm Monsters at large. The late modern state,
that Post-Mortem Monster, we are coming to discover, is no more than a
Lukewarm Monster. Thus it lies only lukewarmly. It could not with a
straight face say "I the State am the People." It can, however,
half-heartedly tell us that it feels our pain.
The dominion of the great Monster Leviathan has been superceded not by
that of the Lukewarm Monster, but by the ascendency of another Beast. One
that is neither cold nor luke-warm. It has a rather dark, satanic, and hot
interior, but a radiant, divine, and above all cool exterior. It is
Moloch, the Monster that eats its young--the Consuming Monster.
Nietzsche in fact realized that mass society would have little place for
the old authoritarian state. "Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both
require too much exertion." [Z 130] He is slightly less prophetic on the
topic of work, observing that "One still works, for work is a form of
entertainment." [Z 130] Under the reign of Moloch few would confuse the
two. Today one still works not for amusement but because work is a means
toward entertainment. On the other hand, in an ironic reversal of
Nietzsche's aphorism, entertainment has increasingly become a form of
work. Just as producers were once taught to feel shame if their work was
not up to par, consumers now feel suitably guilty if they are not
entertained in the correct manner.
Furthermore, Nietzsche's true object of attack in his assault on the state
is not one particular historical institution but all the forces that are
destructive of life. "State I call, it where all drink poison, the good
and the wicked; state, where all lose themselves, the good and the wicked;
state, where the slow suicide of all is called 'life.'" [Z 162]
Nietzsche's primary target is often statist conformity--the dissolution of
individuality into good citizenship, the homogenization of cultural
diversity into official state Kultur, the merchanization of life in a
techno-bureaucratic world. But he also had strong intimations of where the
corporate state was going, that the accent was to fall more on the
corporate, the economistic, and less on the state, the political.
What is the color of power today? "Behold the superfluous! They gather
riches and become poorer with them. They want power and first the lever of
power, much money--the impotent paupers!" says Zarathustra. [Z 162] As I
read this passage late one night, I heard someone passing by outside my
window, speaking these precise words (for I wrote them down immediately):
"It's not about black and white anymore. It's about power and domination,
and it has no color except . . . ." At this point the voice faded out and
I could not hear the final word. I rushed to the door but found no trace
of the passer-by. I'll call the voice, "The Ghost of Nietzsche."
Zarathustra was already on to the message of this Ghost. The progression
in his successive tirades against "The New Idol" and "The Flies In The
Market Place" prefigures a real historical movement. After warning us
about the dangers of the state, Nietzsche cautions us concerning the
threat of the developing economistic society. "Where solitude ceases the
market place begins; and where the market place begins the noise of the
great actors and the buzzing of the poisonous flies begins too." [Z 163]
Nietzsche foresees the coming of the society of the spectacle, a world of
illusion in which "even the best things amount to nothing without someone
to make a show of them." [Z 163] He heralds the coming of those swarms of
poisonous flies that now overrun the earth, spreading poison everywhere.
They are poisonous indeed! Nietzsche sounds the tocsin for the rising
flood of toxins that inundate the world. If we poison the spirit can the
corruption of the body be far behind (or vice versa)? As Nietzsche
predicted, the masses may have a long life of slow death to look forward
to in this poisonous, Post-Mortem world. Perhaps God was lucky to die
early and avoid the crowds. Or did he?
Nietzsche may have written the obituary for a certain ancient psychopath
who sometimes goes under the alias "God." 7 Yet this same Nietzsche
heralds the coming of a new Post-Mortem God. "Verily he [the actor]
believes only in gods who make a big noise in the world." [Z 164] The
culture of noise, the society of the image, gets the God it needs and
deserves. Nietzsche had a prophetic insight into the coming domination of
spirit and psyche by the what has with suitable irony been called "the
culture industry" (presumably because it produces bacteria). Nietzsche
understood with Blake "that All deities reside in the human breast." But
he also forsaw the day in which the the gods of pandering and publicizing,
the gods of spectacle and sensationalism would supplant the old psychic
Pantheon, the divinities of creative energy and wild imaginings.
Nietzsche is quite explicit in his judgment of the market and the society
of the image. "Far from the market place and far from fame happens all
that is great . . . ." [Z 164] The free market frees the masses from such
burdens as creative imagination, spontaneity, depth of the spirit,
solitude, playfulness, the joy of the present moment--all that is "great"
and good according to the Nietzschean valuation. Freed from these, one is
free to pay for everything else.
According to Nietzsche, culture and the state are "antagonists." "One
lives off the other, one thrives at the expense of the other. All great
ages of culture are ages of political decline: what is great culturally
has always been unpolitical, even anti-political." [TI 509] What Nietzsche
means, what he perceived so acutely under the Reich, was that culture is
the enemy of the "political" in a quite specific sense--it is the enemy of
empire and all that is imperial. Greatness of culture is annihilated by
empire, whether this empire be political or economic.
Nietzsche is thus once again more anarchistic than the anarchists. It is
true that he sounds rather authoritarian in his suggestion that "Genuine
philosophers . . . are commanders and legislators" who say "this shall it
be!" [BGE 326] Yet what he intends is as anarchic as the dictum of the
anarchist poet Shelley in his "Defense of Poetry" that poets are "the
unacknowledged legislators of the world." For Nietzsche's philosophers
also rule through their power of creativity. "Their 'knowing' is creating,
their creating is a legislation . . . ." [BGE 326] And he does not mean
the philosophers of the academy, but rather the philosopher-poets of the
spirit. The question for Niezschean Anarchy is who shall rule: either the
masters of the state and of the market, with their heroic will to plunder
and destroy, or the creators with their generous will to give birth, their
gift-giving virtue.
We shall return to this anarchic Nietzschean question, but first another
question concerning another Nietzschean Anarchy.
Post-Mortemist Nietzsche
"What is Post-Mortemism?" Above all, the "Post-Mortem" is a nihilistic
form of consciousness emerging from forces of decline, separation,
disintegration, negation, and, in short, Thanatos. Post-Mortemism, can
thus, as the expression of an absolute spirit of negation, validly present
itself as the most radical form of theoretical Anarchy. But despite
attempts by Post-Mortemists to claim Nietzsche as one of their prophets,
Post-Mortemism itself falls victim to Nietzsche's anti-anarchist critique.
Nietzsche distinguishes between an "active nihilism" which is "a sign of
increased power of the spirit" and a "passive nihilism" which is "decline
and recession of the power of the spirit." [WP 17] While Nietzsche's most
passionate anarchic dimension expresses his active nihilism, his
destruction for the sake of creation, Post-Mortemist Nietzsche becomes the
passionless prophet of passive nihilism.
Let us consider a favorite proof-text, much beloved by certain Nietzschean
Post-Mortemists:
What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and
anthropomorphisms--in short, a sum of human relations, which have been
enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and
which after long use seem firm, canonical and obligatory to a people:
truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they
are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which
have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.
[TL 46-47]
Post-Mortemists read Nietzsche as if this were all ever said about truth,
as if he had no concern for the truth of the body and the truth of worldly
experience.
According to such a view, "truths are illusions," for Nietzsche, mere
perspectives on reality. There is no "transcendental signified," for we
are bound by our chains of illusion, or perhaps, better, our chains of
allusion, our chains of signification.
And indeed, Nietzsche did recognize the inescapably perspectival nature of
knowledge. Nietzschean perspectivism is the insight that all perception,
all knowing, all valuing come from somewhere. They are arise out of, and
are rooted in, some perspective, some position, some place. But unlike
Nietzschean perspectivism, the Post-Mortem variety is deracinated, à la
dérive. It is the annihilation of place, the view from nowhere.
Nietzsche's view of truth cannot be reduced to a Post-Mortem nihilism, for
it always retains a naturalistic core of pragmatic realism. Signification
arises in the midst of a continuum of experience. "The feeling of
strength, struggle, of resistance convinces us that there is something
that is here being resisted." [WP 290] Nietzsche would dismiss our
contemporary Post-Mortemist theoretical Anarchy as the the latest form of
escape to the dream world of ideas, the terrorism of pure theory, in which
comic revolutionaries fantasize heroic conquests of idea by idea, yet
remain out of touch with a reality that resists their control.8
Post-Mortemist Nietzsche, we are told, is an enemy of the whole. And quite
appropriately (and ironically) this Nietzsche emerges precisely through
the dismembering of the Nietzschean corpus. A dissected Nietzsche-part
does indeed tell us that "Nihilism as a psychological state is reached . .
. when one has posited a totality, a systemization, indeed any
organization in all events, and underneath all events," etc. [WP 12]
Nietzsche attacks the "positing" of a fictitious Totality that can give
value to one who feels valueless "when no infinitely valuable whole works
through him." [WP 12] Yet Nietzsche also shows that when the creative,
gift-giving whole (as opposed to any fictitious Totality) does indeed work
through the person, there is no need for such a "positing."
Post-Mortemists ignore the Nietzsche who speaks of unity-in-diversity and
the dynamic whole. This is the Dionysian Nietzsche:
The word 'Dionysian' means: an urge to unity, a reaching out beyond
personality, the everyday, society, reality, across the abyss of
transitoriness: a passionate-painful overflowing into darker, fuller, more
floating states; an ecstatic affirmation of the total character of life as
that which remains the same, just as powerful, just as blissful, through
all change; the great pantheistic sharing of joy and sorrow that
sanctifies and calls good even the most terrible and questionable
qualities of life; the eternal will to procreation, to fruitfulness, to
recurrence; the feeling of the necessary unity of creation and
destruction. [WP 539]
Nietzsche's attack on "decadence" as "the anarchy of atoms" is aimed at
those forces that produce a the disintegration of the living whole. "The
whole no longer lives at all: it is composite, calculated, artificial, and
artifact." [CW 466] In other words, it is state, spectacle, and
megamachine. In oposition to such a spirit, Nietzsche's Dionysian is based
on an affirmation of one's place in the living whole:
Such a spirit who has become free stands amid the cosmos with a joyous and
trusting fatalism, in the faith that only the particular is loathsome, and
that all is redeemed and affirmed in the whole--he does not negate any
more. Such a faith, however, is the highest of all possible faiths: I have
baptized it with the name of Dionysus. [TI 554]
Nietzsche is quite prophetic concerning the developing spiritual illness
of Post-Mortemism. In fact, he helps us grasp the fact that the
"Post-Mortem" is in fact nothing but the "Late Modern."9 Long before
Post-Mortemism emerged as a seemingly revolutionary social transformation,
Nietzsche saw the accelerating development of many of its salient themes.
Eclecticism, diversification, style, discontinuity, artifice, speed,
superficiality, coolness. An abundance of disparate impressions greater
than ever: cosmopolitanism in foods, literatures, newspapers, forms,
tastes, even landscapes. The tempo of this influx prestissimo; the
impressions erase each other; one instinctively resists taking in
anything; a weakening of the power to digest results from this. A kind of
adaptation to this flood of impressions takes place: men unlearn
spontaneous action, they merely react to stimuli from outside. [WP 47]
An apt diagnosis of the Post-Mortem Condition: in sum, an "artificial
change of one's nature into a 'mirror'; interested but, as it were, merely
epidermically interested . . . ." [WP 47]
And what of the universal will to power? Does this not lend support to
Anarcho-Cynicalism? Does not Nietzsche proclaim that: "Where I found the
living, there I found will to power; and even in the will of those who
serve I found the will to be master." [Z 226] Post-Mortemists often find
in Nietzsche nothing but affirmation of the will and discovery of
powerseeking everywhere. He is of course a "master of suspicion." But is
not suspiciousness a mark of the slave mentality that he detests? Is not
an obsession with power a mark of the inferior sensibility? The highest
metamorphosis of the spirit is the child, and only the most neurotic child
wastes much time on suspicion. Nietzsche exalts the will only to forget
it. "He must still discard his heroic will; he shall be elevated, not
merely sublime: the ether itself should elevate him, the will-less one."
[Z 230] The will attains its greatest power through its own disappearance.
And what about "difference"? Nietzsche, living at the height of
productionist industrial society, thought that the great threat to
individuality and creativity was the imposition of sameness. "No shepherd
and one herd! Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: whoever
feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse." [Z 130] History's
dialectic of absurdity has moved one step beyond Nietzsche, so that the
rage for sameness now takes the form of an obsession with difference. The
consumptionist mind reaches new levels of brilliance in its sensitivity to
difference, which has little to do with excellence, as Nietzsche might
once have assumed. The code of commodity consumption creates a minute
sensitivity to differences of symbolic import, conotation, image and
style. Though sameness is alive and well, huge profits are to be made from
the growing quest to "feel different" by means of an infinite variety of
modes of consumption. Even "going voluntarily into a madhouse" becomes a
form of commodity consumption that can be marketed as a distinctive (and
quite profitable) mode of being different. And in academia, that zoo for
Nietzsche's "herd animals of the intellect," stupidity finds a refuge in
difference. Mediocre intellects pursue their quest for tenure and then
fulfill their publication quotas through mindlessly mouthing the slagans
and mimicking the jargon of Post-Mortemism. And one is subjected to the
tortuous spectacle of Anglo-Saxons, or even more depressingly, Saxons,
engaging in an unintentional parody of Gallic wit. The result has all the
brilliance of a joke translated by a computer program.
But as much as we might wish to bury Post-Mortemist Nietzsche, his Specter
remains very much alive. It has terrified more than one ill-informed
anarchist. Murray Bookchin, certainly the most authoritative voice in
contemporary anarchology, once opposed the idea of a seminar on Nietzsche
at his Institute for Social Ecology on the grounds that it might undermine
his pupil's values. He was terrified that the philosopher might corrupt
the youth of his little polis. In a recent work, Bookchin undertakes the
theoretical demolition of Nietzsche's supposedly pernicious influence. It
turns out that Bookchin's Nietzsche is no more than a parody of
Post-Mortem Nietzsche. At the hands of Bookchin, this genealogist of
culture becomes a zany literary type who sees all of history as merely "a
disjointed, variable, and free-floating collection of narratives."10
Yet Nietzsche went to some lengths to show that realities like
"narratives" are symptoms of realities that are far from
"free-floating"--realities such as systems of power and cultural
institutions that interact with fundamental biological drives and
psychological impulses in shaping the self. Bookchin, in his frenzied
attack on the evils of Post-Mortemism, discovers a Nietzsche that reflects
his own aversion to Post-Mortem textualism more than it reveals anything
particularly Nietzschean. Bookchin's Post-Mortemism is an incoherent
jumble in which A: Derrida says that there's nothing outside the text, and
B: Nietzsche influenced Post-Mortemism, ergo C: Nietzsche must have
believed that history is nothing but textuality.
Anyone who is willing to take the plunge into the murky waters of
Post-Mortemality will search vainly for a Nietzschean view of history in
Derridean textualism. As Nietzsche states in the "preface" to The
Genealogy of Morals, "our ideas, our values, our yeas and nays, our ifs
and buts, grow out of us with the necessity with which a tree bears
fruit--related and each with an affinity to each, and evidence of one
will, one health, one soil, one sun." [GM 452]11 Nietzsche would never say
that "il n'y a pas de dehors du texte." He would say that there is no life
that is without perspective. But every perspective is rooted deeply in
life, in the body, in the earth, in the great "dehors."
We might apply Nietzsche's naturalistic-imaginistic mode of critique to
Bookchin himself. Nietzsche would never dismiss Bookchin's creation of his
own fictitious character "Nietzsche" as a mere "free floating narrative."
Rather, he would situate the Bookchinite imaginary Nietzsche within
Bookchin's own peculiar narrative will to power, his creation of an
authoritative theoretical edifice on behalf of which he must do battle
with, and attempt to annihilate all theoretical (and intensely
emotion-charged) threats. He would also explore the foundations of this
edifice in Bookchin's own seething ressentiment, and indeed the
foundations of this ressentiment itself--the forces that shaped an
imperious will, the underlying states of health and malaise, the qualities
of the soil in which it developed, the nature of that sun that infused it
with energy, or which perhaps hid its face at crucial moments. Finally,
Nietzsche might reflect on why such a marvelous example of the reactive
character structure should have found its place of refuge and its field
for raging self-assertion in anarchism, that most convenient utopia of
self-justifying ressentiment.
Literary Anarchy: Forgetting Nietzsche's Umbrella
"It is the habitual carriage of the umbrella that is the stamp of
respectability."--Stevenson, Philosophy of Umbrellas.
"i forgot my umbrella"--Nietzsche
"Jacques' umbrella is alive and living in Paris."
"Sometimes [an umbrella] is just [an umbrella]."--Freud
There is an Anarchy of the Text. Yet Nietzsche would have no trouble
diagnosing Post-Mortem textual Anarchy as a form of what he calls
"literary decadence." For Nietzsche "the mark" of such decadence is that
"life no longer resides in the whole." Though he would no doubt admire the
brilliant sense of multiplicity that it sometimes achieves, he would
certainly conclude that its focus on diversity comes "at the expense of
the whole" so that "the whole is no longer a whole." Its Anarchy is not
the Anarchy of life, of the organic, of the dynamic whole, but rather "the
anarchy of atoms." [CW 626]
Post-Mortemist Literary Anarchy is a rebellion against the absurd concept
that texts are autonomous totalities, textual organisms in which subtexts
are textual organs, textual cells, textual organelles. But in their haste
to murder the textual organism in order to dissect it, the Post-Mortemist
anarchists ignore the larger ecology of the text. Their urge to
deconstruct is an ecocidal urge also.
Derrida exhibits this impulse, the urge to deconstuct totality transmuted
into an impulse to murder the whole, to deconstruct that which defies
construction. He directs this ecocidal impulse toward a "whole" that he
calls "Nietzsche's text," quite appropriately invoking a Monster.
Referring to a seemingly cryptic "fragment" found among Nietzsche's
papers, Derrida proposes that:
To whatever lengths one might carry a conscientious interpretation, the
hypothesis that the totality of Nietzsche's text, in some monstrous way,
might well be of the type, 'I have forgotten my umbrella' cannot be
denied. Which is tantalount to saying that there is no 'totality to
Nietzsche's text,' not even a fragmentary or aphoristic one.12
Is it possible that a crucial difference between Nietzsche and Derrida
consists in the fact that the former, when he has forgotten his umbrella,
knows that it is in fact an umbrella that he, chaos that he is, has
forgotten. Derrida on the other hand, might think that "il s'agit d'un
texte, d'un texte en restance, voire oublié, peut-être d'un parapluie.
Qu'on ne tient plus dans la main."13 Or as Derrida's English translator
renders this idea, those who seek meaning in Nietzsche's aphorism "must
have forgotten that it is a text that is in question, the remains of a
text, indeed a forgotten text. An umbrella perhaps. That one no longer has
in hand."14
Here we come face to face with the Anarchy of undecidability. We peer into
a anarchic abyss. We are perhaps about to be devoured by the Monster of
Post-Mortemism.
It is striking that Derrida chooses as an example of undecidability a text
that alludes to the forces of nature, and, indirectly, to protection from
the forces of nature. For textualism is itself a metaphysical umbrella
that protects one from those very forces. Such strange Anarchy has lost
touch with the atmosphere. We are dealing here with l'oubli de
l'atmosphère.15
According to Derrida's English translator, "<<I have forgotten my
umbrella.>>"16 is "[f]ragment classified no. 12,175 in the French
translation of Joyful Wisdom, p. 457."17
According to Derrida, "<<J'ai oublié mon parapluie>>."18 is "[f]ragment
classé avec la cote 12,175, tr. fr. du Gai savoir, p. 457."19
According to the original20 German: "ich habe meinen Regenschirm
vergessen" is a note classified "Herbst 1881 12[62]" in Nietzsche's
collected works.21
On examining this "fragment," we find that Nietzsche not only "forgot his
umbrella," he also forgot his punctuation. In this he is unlike Derrida
and Derrida's English translator, both of whom not only remembered this
punctuation, but decided to give it back to Nietzsche. Interestingly, they
appear to be incompetent to give him back his forsaken umbrella (no matter
how severe the weather may be), yet they are perfectly capable of giving
him back these little bits of forgotten text.
Furthermore, in view of Derrida's case for undecidability, the nature of
his (and his translator's) restoration of Nietzsche's text seems highly
ironic. First, he helps restore Nietzsche's ego, for Nietzsche seemingly
defied the laws of punctuation in order to mark his "ich," even though it
begins the statement, with a humble lower case "i". However, Derrida
bestows on Nietzsche a majescule "J" reversing this self-effacement.
Secondly, by restoring the initial capitalization, Derrida helps anchor
the case of the umbrella firmly in time. Our floating forgotten umbrella
affair now has a point of origination or initiation. And finally, in
restoring the "period" he "puts a point" to the whole affair, as if the
forgetting were previously held in suspension, but the umbrella is now,
once and for all, and quite decisively, "forgotten."
Perhaps Derrida is right and this passage is undecidable, that is, in so
far as it is a forgotten text, and therefore perhaps not about a forgotten
umbrella. But how can it be nothing more than a forgotten text? Only in so
far as we make a Derridean decision, a decision not to decide.
Jacques, you need to decide!
So we decide that it is une parapluie. We decide that it isun parasol. We
decide that it is a shield against the domineering light of the Sun, that
image of hierarchical power and domination. We decide that it isune
ombrelle. We decide that it isun nombril. We decide that it is le nombril
du monde. We decide that it is the axis of imagination around which turns
the wheel of fate. We decide it is the vast Nietzschean umbrella, which
points to the heavens, to the heights, to the lightness of Dionysius, and
which opens up to infinity.
We decide, on the other hand, that it is a sad little text signifying that
poor Nietzsche forgot his umbrella.
Nietzsche As Prophet Of Pre-Ancientism
As we have seen, Nietzsche is not much of a Post-Mortemist (though he may
be the Post-Mortemist's best friend!). And we have begun to discover that
he is, at least in his best moments, a Pre-Ancientist. Let us call this
Nietzsche "Pre-Ancientist Nietzsche" or PAN. The allusion to the pagan god
is appropriately Nietzschean. For Pan, "this dangerous presence dwelling
just beyond the protected zone of the village boundary" is the Arcadian
counterpart to the Thracian god Dionysius, Nietzsche's favorite deity.22
And as Bulfinch points out of Pan, "the name of the god signifies all,"
and Pan "came to be considered a symbol of the universe and
personification of Nature," and later to be regarded as "a representative
of all the gods and of heathenism itself."23 PAN is the Nietzsche of pagan
celebration, the Niezsche of love of the Earth, the Nietzsche of
life-affirmation, the Nietzsche of generosity and gift-giving.
PAN celebrates and endows with eternity that which appears. He "saves the
phenomena" or "saves appearances" ("sauve les dehors") so to speak.
A certain emperor always bore in mind the transitoriness of all things so
as not to take them too seriously and to live at peace among them. To me,
on the contrary, everything seems far too valuable to be so fleeting: I
seek an eternity for everything: ought one to pour the most precious
salves and wines into the sea? [WP 547-548] His vision reminds us of
another great Pre-Ancientist and anarchist, William Blake, who famously
"held infinity in the palm of his hand" and saw "Eternity in an hour."
Exactly such an affirmation of being becoming in all its diversity and
particularity is the core of PAN's enigmatic doctrine of the Eternal
Recurrence. It signifies the infinite depth and richness of the present
moment valued for its own being, not for any end beyond itself.24
Accordingly, PAN excludes only one philosopher from his general
condemnation of the history of Western philosophy.
With the highest respect, I except the name of Heraclitus. When the rest
of the philosophic folk rejected the testimony of the senses because they
showed multiplicity and change, he rejected their testimony because they
showed things as if they had permanence and unity. Heraclitus too did the
senses an injustice. They lie neither in the way the Eleatics believed,
nor as he believed--they do not lie at all . . . . But Heraclitus will
remain eternally right with his assertion that being is an empty fiction.
The 'apparent' world is the only one: the 'true' world is merely added by
a lie. [TI 480-481]
PAN gives his fellow Pre-Ancientist Heraclitus well-deserved recognition,
but does the latter an injustice in regard to his view of the senses. For
Heraclitus the senses do and do not lie. And if they lie it is only to
reveal truth through their lies. Heraclitus did the senses complete
justice when he said "he prefers things that can be seen, heard and
perceived."
Pre-Ancientism is a critique of the illusions of centrism. And Nietzsche
is one of the great critics of all centrisms, including anthropocentrism.
"If we could communicate with the mosquito, then we would learn that it
floats through the air with the same self-importance, feeling within
itself the flying center of the world." [TL 42] This is the message of Lao
Tzu also: the universe does not revolve around us (unless we adopt a
metaphysics worthy of a mosquito). "Heaven and Earth are not humane. They
regard all things as straw dogs. The sage is not humane. He regards all
people as straw dogs."25 PAN directs us back to pre-Ancient times, before
the blockheads carved nature up, geometricized the world and prepared it
for domination. The crucial step was the replacement of the multitude of
spiritual centers with a centering of power in the ego.
Yet Nietzsche has been seen as a kind of philosophical egoist. One of the
great Nietzschean ironies is that this critic of the heroic has so often
been reduced to a rather adolescent sort of hero-worshiper. His
reflections on the will point in a quite different direction. According to
Zarathustra, "all 'it was' is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful
accident--until the creative will says to it, 'But thus I willed it.'
Until the creative will says to it, 'But thus I will it; thus shall I will
it.'" [Z 253] One might ask who this self is that can be said to have
willed all things, wills all things, and shall will all things. The small
self with its small will seems to become a great self with a vast will.
What is the meaning of this riddle that Zarathustra poses to us?
We find that this person with "creative will" is one who rejects another
sort of will--the heroic will--and renounces the rebellion against nature.
Such a person is, as that most anarchic of Pre-Ancientists, Chuang Tzu,
calls her, the "man without desire," who "does not disturb his inner
well-being with likes and dislikes," the "true man of old," who "accepted
what he was given with delight, and when it was gone, . . . gave it no
thought."26 Whoever possesses a "creative will" accepts life, experience,
and the flow of being, the appearance of phenomena, as a gift, and
realizes that one can never have a proprietary claim on any gift.27
While Heroic will is bound to the Spirit of Gravity and takes everything
seriously, the creative will expresses the Spirit of Levity, and takes
everything lightly. Nietzschean Anarchy knows the anarchic power of
laughter.28 "Learn to laugh at yourselves as one must laugh!" says
Zarathustra [Z 404] Elsewhere he explains that it is through laughter that
we kill monsters. So as we learn to laugh we learn to kill the self. We
slay the Dragon of the Ego. As I-Hsüan said, "if you seek after the
Buddha, you will be taken over by the Devil of the Buddha, and if you seek
after the Patriarch, you will be taken over by the Devil of the
Patriarch." So:
Kill anything that you happen on. Kill the Buddha if you happen to meet
him. Kill a Patriarch or an Arhat if you happen to meet him. Kill your
parents or relatives if you happen to meet them. Only then can you be
free, not bound by material things, and absolutely free and at ease. . . .
I have no trick to give people. I merely cure disease and set people
free.29
When one laughs at the self one becomes other than the self that is
laughed at. One finally gets the joke that is the ego.
Listen to PAN's diagnosis of the causes of the awful ego-sickness of
ressentimentt:
For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; more
exactly, an agent; still more specifically, a guilty agent who is
susceptible to suffering--in short, some living thing upon which he can,
on some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or in effigy: for the
venting of his affects represents the greatest attempt on the part of the
suffering to win relief, anaesthesia--the narcotic he cannot help desiring
to deaden the pain of any kind.] [BGE 563]
PAN comes to much the same conclusion as does Gautama concerning this
subject: our mental disturbances are rooted in suffering, a false view of
causality, and the illusion of the separate ego. Our constructed ego cuts
us off from the whole, we resist the flow of energies, we fight against
the movement, we seek to step into the same river of selfhood again and
again, we blame reality and time, we seek revenge through whatever
convenient target presents itself.
PAN might have become an even more skilled physician of culture had he
followed Gautama further in exploring the connection between ego,
suffering, and compassion. He travels part of the way on this path as he
reflects on eternal recurrence and amor fati. Just as he goes only part of
the way down the path of that other great old Anarchic Doctor, Lao Tzu.
PAN tears away ruthlessly at some of our most deeply-rooted illusions
about ourselves. "Beyond your thoughts and feelings, my brother, there
stands a mighty ruler, and unknown sage--whose name is self. In your body
he dwells; he is your body." [Z 146] It is true that he here describes the
body as the true self, the "great reason," that acts though the ego and
the "little reason." But he shows also that he sometimes thinks beyond
this body. Zarathustra slips and gives away PAN's more profound view when
he says that "the mighty ruler" not only "is your body," but is also
greater than the body and "dwells in your body." [Z 146] This is the self
of the self of the ego-self, the great reason of the great reason of the
little reason. For PAN, our embodiedness carries us not only beyond our
little self toward a larger self, but beyond our little body toward a
larger body. As Lao Tzu says, "He who loves the world as his body may be
entrusted with the empire."30
It is this wisdom of the body that is at the heart of PAN's anarchic
critique of the domineering ego and its herioc will. Domination has always
rested on the hierarchical exaltation of the "world of man"--the human
world--over the world of nature, and of the "world of man"--the masculine
world--over all that is feminine or childlike. PAN is in accord with Lao
Tzu's anti-hierarchichal prioritizing of the childlike and feminine
aspects of the psyche. Zarathustra praises the child as "innocence and
forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first
movement, a sacred 'Yes.'" [Z 139] Lao Tzu goes one step further,
asserting that "he who possesses virtue in abundance may be compared to an
infant."31 Zarathustra surpasses even this, urging us to "to be the child
who is newly born," and noting that to do this, "the creator must also
want to be the mother who gives birth and the pangs of the birth-giver."
[Z 199] An image that Lao Tzu also evokes when he asks, "can you play the
role of the female in the opening and closing of the gates of Heaven?"32
This is the secret of Nietzschean Anarchy--the opening of oneself to these
forces of spontaneity, creativity, generosity, affirmation.
Nietzschean Anarchy is PAN's Dionysian dance, it is child's play, it is
beginner's mind.



Notes
1References to Nietzsche's works will be indicated in brackets by the
abbreviated title and page number. See the bibliography of Nietzsche's
works below for titles and abbreviations.
2God(is-Dead)Father of Post-Mortemism.
3 Journal of Value Inquiry 42:271.
4The many Nietzsches are often brilliant, witty, satirical, ironic,
incisive, analytical, subtle, intelligent, and profound, but not
infrequently also superficial, pretentious, heavy-handed, pathetic, petty,
fatuous, buffoonish. It would be tempting to turn our surre(gion)al
travelogue into "A Tale of Two Nietzsches." However, we will limit our
visit for the most part to "The Best of Nietzsches." There is, however,
"The Worst of Nietzsches," and this worst can be indeed abysmal. The
abysmal Nietzsche emerges for example in a statement, quite appropriately,
on the topic of "depth." A man, he says, "who has depth, in his spirit as
well as in his desires . . . must always think about women as Orientals
do; he must conceive of woman as a possession, as property that can be
locked, as something predestined for service and achieving her perfection
in that." [BGE 357] And savor the exquisite odor of this statement: "We
would no more choose the 'first Christians' to associate with than Polish
Jews--not that one even required any objection to them: they both do not
smell good." [A 625] On Nietzsche as a pretentious buffoon, see Friedrich
Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, part two, "Why I am So Clever," and part five, "Why
I am Such an Asshole."
5Bizarre, though to be honest, has there ever been a careful study of
anarchist groups to see what proportion of their members are hysterical
celibates or sterile alcoholics? Perhaps there is grant money somewhere.
6Social ecology becomes anti-social egology.
7Though this still redoutable personnage, apparently thinking that rumors
of his demise have been greatly exaggerated, lives on in certain circles
in a state of indefinitely suspended senility. Some have accused the
devotees of the patriarchal authoritarian God with worshiping a "white
male God." But their God really is a white male. How do we know? As
criminologists have pointed out, that's the exact profile for a serial
killer.
8Despite all their anarchic pretentions, the failure of Post-Mortemists to
join in this resistance constitutes a de facto collaborationism.
9PM=late.
10Murray Bookchin, Re-enchanting Humanity: A Defense of the Human Spirit
Against Anti-Humanism, Misanthropy, Mysticism and Primitivism (London:
Cassell, 1995), p. 179.
11Yes, Nietzsche did indeed say that "our buts grow out of us with the
necessity with which a tree bears fruit""--another comment on the decadent
life of the scholar, perhaps.
12Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press), pp. 133, 135.
13Ibid., p. 130.
14Ibid., p. 131.
15See Max Cafard, "Derrida's Secret Name: Or, What Transpired in the
Auditorium of Gaea and Logos" in Exquisite Corpse 38 (1992): 2-3.
16Derrida, p. 123. Guillemets in the original.
17Ibid., p. 159. Reversed italics in the original.
18Ibid., p. 123.
19Ibid., p. 159. Reversed italics in the original.
20N.B.: "the original," that is, as it is represented in a book, and
herewith re-represented. We feel compelled to admit that the following is
not actually Nietzsche's scap of paper.
21Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke, (München and Berlin: Deutscher
Taschenbuch Verlag and Walter de Gruyter, 1980), Band 9, p. 587.
22Joseph Campbell, The Hero With A Thousand Faces (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1968), p. 81.
23Thomas Bulfinch, Bulfinch's Mythology (New York: Modern Library, N.D.),
p. 136.
24 Though some humorists say that it means that everything occurs over and
over and over and . . . . We will call this the Twilight Zone
interpretation.
25Tao te Ching [The Lao Tzu] in Wing-Tsit Chan, A Sourcebook in Chinese
Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Un. Press, 1963), p. 141.
26Chuang-Tzu, Inner Chapters (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 108,
114.
27As Nietzsche states it with unusual eloquence, "no one is free to be a
crab." [TI 547] His point is that we must always go "forward"--even if
"downward" into decadence. A crab (in Nietzsche's particular imaginary
zoology) backs away from and rejects this gift of life, growth, change,
transformation.
28 This does not mean, however, that Nietzsche was funny, for
unfortunately he was not. I once attended a lecture in which a philosophy
professor spoke at great length on the topic of "Nietzsche and Humor." His
thesis was that Nietzsche was a member of that rare species -- the funny
philosopher! The Professor assured the audience that Nietzsche's works
were replete with humorous discussions, funny one-liners and hilarious
episodes. Indeed, he revealed that when he reads Nietzsche he is often
moved to smile, and even to laugh out loud! What he did not reveal was one
single hilarious line from the entire collected works of Nietzsche, though
this did not prevent many members of the audience from smiling broadly and
even chuckling a bit. Apparently, the highly-developed sense of humor
cultivated by certain professors of philosophy allows them to extract a
certain quantum of hilarity from statements like "Nietzsche is funny." Or
did they get the other joke?
29"The Recorded Conversations of Zen Master I-Hsüan" in Chan, p. 447.
30Ibid., p. 145
31Ibid., p. 165.
32Ibid., p. 144.





Works of Nietzsche Cited
AFriedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist in The Portable Nietzsche, trans.
Walter Kauffman (New York: Penguin, 1976).
BGEFriedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil in Basic Writings of
Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1968).
CWFriedrich Nietzsche, The Case of Wagner in Basic Writings of Nietzsche,
trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1968).
GMFriedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals in Basic Writings of
Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1968).
GSFriedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York:
Vintage Books, 1974).
TIFriedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols in The Portable Nietzsche,
trans. Walter Kauffman (New York: Penguin, 1976).
TLFriedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense," in The
Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kauffman (New York: Penguin, 1976).
WPFriedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kauffman (New
York: Vintage, 1968).
ZFriedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra in The Portable Nietzsche,
trans. Walter Kauffman (New York: Penguin, 1976).

cut sections
Nietzsche associates a certain kind of anarchism with nationalism and the
instinct to punish, and finds in all of them an "air of mediocrity,
wretchedness, dishonesty." [WP 8]
What happens when a post-modern Mafioso pays you a visit? He makes you an
offer you can't understand? No, he makes you an offer that makes no
difference. (Or "differance"--you get to choose!)
The Post-Mortemists miss this entirely. As one observer perceptively
comments, Derrida's deconstructionist epigones sometimes go around
signifying as if "human beings were merely Language's way of creating more
speakers." [Kenneh Asher, "Deconstruction's Use and Abuse of Nietzsche" in
Telos 62 (Winter 1994-95): 171.]
A German joke is no laughing matter.
Nietzsche has a lesson for anarchists and everyone else in his perception
of the central place of ethos to the problems of the human condition.
Those who do not understand history are not condemned to repeat it, which
is an impossibility in any case (there are no Eternal Returns in history).
Rather, they are condemned to wasting their lives in merely reacting to
it. This includes those anarchists who have a brilliant perception of
what's wrong with everything, and a marvelous insight into how wonderful
everything could be if only history would shape up and follow their
formulas. What they fail to achieve is an acute sensitivity to the
all-pervasiveness of the ethos and their own vulnerability to it. For
example, that in "an age of disintegration" the psyche is inhabited by
"drives and value standards that fight each other and rarely permit each
other any rest." [BGE 301] One who understands this will understand the
centrality of sedatives to such a culture, and learn to distinguish them
from stimulants.
Nietzsche at one point remarks ironically that his withering critique
"harms virtue" very little, in fact "as little as the anarchists harm
princes: only since they have been shot at do they sit securely on their
thrones again . . ." [WP 179. cf. Z 471] Todays anarchists, of course,
seldom shoot. And instead of throwing their notorious bombs they cast
aspersions.
According to Nietzsche's analysis, the spirit of ressentiment is closely
related to a nihilistic view of reality. "A nihilist is a man who judges
of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of the world as it
ought to be that it does not exist." [WP 318] Nihilism for Nietzsche is
not necessarily pathological. There is a creative nihilism that prepares
the way for the creation of a higher and more vital reality (the "desire
for destruction" that is "pregnant with future"). However, nihilism is
most often a form of the negation of reality.
Nietzsche made one of the most chilling statements in history on the
subject of the significance of "actually-existing socialism": "Indeed, I
should wish that a few great experiments might prove that in a socialist
society life negates itself, cuts off its own roots. The earth is large
enough and man still sufficiently unexhausted; hence such a practical
instruction and demonstratio ad absurdum would not strike me as
undesirable, even if it were gained and paid for with a tremendous
expenditure of human lives." [WP 77-78] Socialists would have done well to
heed Nietzsche's warning and make sure that all the "preconditions" for a
non-murderous socialism had been met before embarking on any experiment
that would verify the Nietzschean hypothesis. Anarchists have been on the
other hand much more prudent: they have made sure that they remain
sufficiently insular, self-obsessed and contemptuous of reality to avoid
having any "great experiments" to put prematurely to the test. The Ideal
remains in its purest state: Absolute Non-Being.
"Not by wrath does one kill but by laughter. Come, let us kill the spirit
of gravity!" [PN 153] But what happens when the laughter becomes hollow?
The laughter of the cynic, the laughter of the desperate and despairing?
Or worse, when the Monster steals our laughter?
The dangers that Nietzsche finds in anarchism are not unique to that
relatively shortlived and marginal tendency. They are inherent in any
movement that bases itself primarily on a reaction to the injustices of
the established order. Of the "preachers of equality" he says that "Out of
every one of their complaints sounds revenge; in their praise there is
always a sting, and to be a judge seems bliss to them." "But I counsel you
my friends: Mistrust all in whom the impulse to punish is powerful. They
are people of low sort and stock; the hangman and the bloodhound look out
of their faces. Mistrust all who talk much of their justice!" [Z 212] His
critique is a diagnosis of all forms of the politics of reactivity.


* This text first appeared in in Exquisite Corpse #62 (2000)




Aucune reproduction à caractère commercial n'est autorisée.
Modif. : 2001-09-04 (296)

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Tao Te Ching by Lao Che

Translated during the summer of 1991 by Charles Muller
Revised, July 1997

When citing please use the URL:

http://www.human.toyogakuen-u.ac.jp/~acmuller/contao/laotzu.htm



1.
The Tao that can be followed is not the eternal Tao.
The name that can be named is not the eternal name.
The nameless is the origin of heaven and earth
While naming is the origin of the myriad things.
Therefore, always desireless, you see the mystery
Ever desiring, you see the manifestations.
These two are the same--
When they appear they are named differently.

This sameness is the mystery,
Mystery within mystery;

The door to all marvels.


2.
All in the world recognize the beautiful as beautiful.
Herein lies ugliness.
All recognize the good as good.
Herein lies evil.

Therefore
Being and non-being produce each other.
Difficulty and ease bring about each other.
Long and short delimit each other.
High and low rest on each other.
Sound and voice harmonize each other.
Front and back follow each other.

Therefore the sage abides in the condition of wu-wei(unattached action).
And carries out the wordless teaching.
Here, the myriad things are made, yet not separated.

Therefore the sage produces without possessing,
Acts without expectations
And accomplishes without abiding in her accomplishments.

It is precisely because she does not abide in them
That they never leave her.


3.
If you do not adulate the worthy, you will make others non-contentious.
If you do not value rare treasures, you will stop others from stealing.
If people do not see desirables, they will not be agitated.

Therefore, when the sage governs,
He clears peoples minds,
Fills their bellies,
Weakens their ambition and
Strengthens their bones.

If the people are kept without cleverness and desire
It will make the intellectuals not dare to meddle.

Acting without contrivance, there is no lack of manageability.


4.
The Tao is so vast that when you use it, something is always left.
How deep it is!
It seems to be the ancestor of the myriad things.
It blunts sharpness
Untangles knots
Softens the glare
Unifies with the mundane.
It is so full!
It seems to have remainder.

It is the child of I-don't-know-who.
And prior to the primeval Lord-on-high.


5.
Heaven and Earth are not jen,
And regard the people as straw dogs.
The sage is not jen,
And regards all things as straw dogs.
The space between Heaven and Earth is just like a bellows:
Empty it, it is not exhausted.
Squeeze it and more comes out.

Investigating it with a lot of talk
Is not like holding to the center.


6.
The valley spirit never dies.
It is called "the mysterious female."
The opening of the mysterious female
Is called "the root of Heaven and Earth."
Continuous, seeming to remain.

Use it without exertion.


7.
Heaven and Earth last forever.
The reason that Heaven and Earth are able to last forever
Is because they do not give birth to themselves.
Therefore, they are always alive.
Hence, the sage puts herself last and is first.
She is outside herself and therefore her self lasts.

Is it not through her selflessness
That she is able to perfect herself?

8.
The highest goodness is like water.
Water easily benefits all things without struggle.
Yet it abides in places that men hate.
Therefore it is like the Tao.

For dwelling, the Earth is good.
For the mind, depth is good.
The goodness of giving is in the timing.
The goodness of speech is in honesty.
In government, self-mastery is good.
In handling affairs, ability is good.

If you do not wrangle, you will not be blamed.


9.
To hold until full is not as good as stopping.
An oversharpened sword cannot last long.
A room filled with gold and jewels cannot be protected.
Boasting of wealth and virtue brings your demise.
After finishing the work, withdraw.

This is the Way of Heaven.


10.
Pacifying the agitated material soul and holding to oneness:
Are you able to avoid separation?
Focusing your energy on the release of tension:
Can you be like an infant?
In purifying your insight:
Can you un-obstruct it?
Loving the people and ruling the state:
Can you avoid over-manipulation?
In opening and closing the gate of Heaven:
Can you be the female?
In illuminating the whole universe:
Can you be free of rationality?

Give birth to it and nourish it.
Produce it but don't possess it.
Act without expectation.
Excel, but don't take charge.

This is called Mysterious Virtue.


11.
Thirty spokes join together in the hub.
It is because of what is not there that the cart is useful.
Clay is formed into a vessel.
It is because of its emptiness that the vessel is useful.
Cut doors and windows to make a room.
It is because of its emptiness that the room is useful.
Therefore, what is present is used for profit.

But it is in absence that there is usefulness.


12.
The five colors blind our eyes.
The five tones deafen our ears.
The five flavors confuse our taste.
Racing and hunting madden our minds.
Possessing rare treasures brings about harmful behavior.
Therefore the sage regards his center, and not his eyes.

He lets go of that and chooses this.


13.
Accept humiliation as a surprise.
Value great misfortune as your own self.

What do I mean by "Accept humiliation as a surprise"?
When you are humble
Attainment is a surprise
And so is loss.
That's why I say, "Accept humiliation as a surprise."

What do I mean by "Value great misfortune as your own self"?

If I have no self, how could I experience misfortune?

Therefore, if you dedicate your life for the benefit of the world,
You can rely on the world.
If you love dedicating yourself in this way,
You can be entrusted with the world.


14.
Look for it, it cannot be seen.
It is called the distant.
Listen for it, it cannot be heard.
It is called the rare.
Reach for it, it cannot be gotten.
It is called the subtle.
These three ultimately cannot be fathomed.
Therefore they join to become one.

Its top is not bright;
Its bottom is not dark;
Existing continuously, it cannot be named and it returns to no-thingness.

Thus, it is called the formless form,
The image of no-thing.
This is called the most obscure.

Go to meet it, you cannot see its face.
Follow it, you cannot see its back.

By holding to the ancient Tao
You can manage present existence
And know the primordial beginning.

This is called the very beginning thread of the Tao.


15.
The ancient masters of the Tao
Had subtle marvelous mystic penetration
A depth that cannot be known.
It is exactly because that they are unknowable
That we are forced to pay attention to their appearance.
Hesitant, like one crossing an ice-covered river.
Ready, like one afraid of his neighbors on all sides.
Dignified, like a guest.
Loose, like ice about to melt.
Straightforward, like an uncarved block of wood.
Open, like a valley.
Obscure, like muddy water.

Who can be muddled, and use clarity to gradually become lucid?
Who can be calm, and use constant application for eventual success?

The one who holds to this path does not crave fulfillment.
Precisely because he does not crave fulfillment
He can be shattered
And do without quick restitution.


16.
Effect emptiness to the extreme.
Keep stillness whole.
Myriad things act in concert.
I therefore watch their return.
All things flourish and each returns to its root.

Returning to the root is called quietude.
Quietude is called returning to life.
Return to life is called constant.
Knowing this constant is called illumination.
Acting arbitrarily without knowing the constant is harmful.
Knowing the constant is receptivity, which is impartial.

Impartiality is kingship.
Kingship is Heaven.
Heaven is Tao
Tao is eternal.

Though you lose the body, you do not die.


17.
From great antiquity forth they have known and possessed it.
Those of the next level loved and praised it.
The next were in awe of it.
And the next despised it.

If you lack sincerity no one will believe you.

How careful she is with her precious words!
When her work is complete and her job is finished,
Everybody says: "We did it!"


18.
When the great Tao perishes
There is jenand justice.
When intelligence is manifest
There is great deception.
When the six relationships are not in harmony
There is filial piety and compassion.
When the country is in chaos
Loyal ministers appear.


19.
Get rid of "holiness" and abandon "wisdom" and the people will benefit a
hundredfold.

Get rid of "altruism" and abandon "Justice" and the people will return to filial
piety and compassion.

Get rid of cleverness and abandon profit, and thieves and gangsters will not
exist.

Since the above three are merely words, they are not sufficient.
Therefore there must be something to include them all.

See the origin and keep the non-differentiated state.
Lessen selfishness and decrease desire.


20.
Get rid of "learning" and there will be no anxiety.
How much difference is there between "yes" and "no"?
How far removed from each other are "good" and "evil"?
Yet what the people are in awe of cannot be disregarded.

I am scattered, never having been in a comfortable center.
All the people enjoy themselves, as if they are at the festival of the great
sacrifice,
Or climbing the Spring Platform.
I alone remain, not yet having shown myself.
Like an infant who has not yet laughed.
Weary, like one despairing of no home to return to.

All the people enjoy extra
While I have left everything behind.
I am ignorant of the minds of others.
So dull!
While average people are clear and bright, I alone am obscure.
Average people know everything.
To me alone all seems covered.
So flat!
Like the ocean.
Blowing around!
It seems there is no place to rest.
Everybody has a goal in mind.
I alone am as ignorant as a bumpkin.
I alone differ from people.

I enjoy being nourished by the mother.


21.
The form of great virtue is something that only the Tao can follow.
The Tao as a "thing" is only vague and obscure.
How obscure! How vague! In it there is form.
How vague! How obscure! In it are things.
How deep! How dark! In it there is an essence.

The essence is so real--therein is belief.

From the present to antiquity, its name has never left it, so we can examine all
origins.
How do I know the form of all origins?

By this.


22.
The imperfect is completed.
The crooked is straightened.
The empty is filled.
The old is renewed.
With few there is attainment.
With much there is confusion.
Therefore the sage grasps the one and becomes the model for all.

She does not show herself, and therefore is apparent.
She does not affirm herself, and therefore is acknowledged.
She does not boast and therefore has merit.
She does not strive and is therefore successful.
It is exactly because she does not contend, that nobody can contend with her.

How could the ancient saying, "The imperfect is completed" be regarded as empty
talk?

Believe in the complete and return to it.


23.
To speak little is natural.
Therefore a gale does not blow a whole morning
Nor does a downpour last a whole day.
Who does these things? Heaven and Earth.
If even Heaven and Earth cannot force perfect continuity
How can people expect to?

Therefore there is such a thing as aligning one's actions with the Tao.
If you accord with the Tao you become one with it.
If you accord with virtue you become one with it.
If you accord with loss you become one with it.

The Tao accepts this accordance gladly.
Virtue accepts this accordance gladly.
Loss also accepts accordance gladly.

If you are untrustworthy, people will not trust you.


24.
Standing on tiptoe, you are unsteady.
Straddle-legged, you cannot go.
If you show yourself, you will not be seen.
If you affirm yourself, you will not shine.
If you boast, you will have no merit.
If you promote yourself, you will have no success.

Those who abide in the Tao call these

Leftover food and wasted action
And all things dislike them.

Therefore the person of the Tao does not act like this.


25.
There is something that is perfect in its disorder
Which is born before Heaven and Earth.

So silent and desolate! It establishes itself without renewal.
Functions universally without lapse.
We can regard it as the Mother of Everything.

I don't know its name.

Hence, when forced to name it, I call it "Tao."
When forced to categorize it, I call it "great."

Greatness entails transcendence.
Transcendence entails going-far.
Going-far entails return.

Hence, Tao is great, Heaven is great, the Earth is great
And the human is also great.

Within our realm there are four greatnesses and the human being is one of them.

Human beings follow the Earth.
Earth follows Heaven
Heaven follows the Tao
The Tao follows the way things are.


26.
Heaviness is the root of lightness.
Composure is the ruler of instability.
Therefore the sage travels all day
Without putting down his heavy load.
Though there may be spectacles to see
He easily passes them by.

This being so
How could the ruler of a large state
Be so concerned with himself as to ignore the people?

If you take them lightly you will lose your roots.
If you are unstable, you will lose your rulership.


27.
A good traveler leaves no tracks.
Good speech lacks faultfinding.
A good counter needs no calculator.
A well-shut door will stay closed without a latch.
Skillful fastening will stay tied without knots.

It is in this manner that the sage is always skillful in elevating people.
Therefore she does not discard anybody.

She is always skillful in helping things
Therefore she does not discard anything.
This is called "the actualization of her luminosity."

Hence, the good are the teachers of the not-so-good.
And the not-so-good are the charges of the good.

Not valuing your teacher or not loving your students:
Even if you are smart, you are gravely in error.

This is called Essential Subtlety.


28.
Know the Masculine, cleave to the Feminine
Be the valley for everyone.
Being the valley for everyone
You are always in virtue without lapse
And you return to infancy.

Know the White, cleave to the Black
Be a model for everyone.
Being the model for everyone
You are always in virtue and free from error
You return to limitlessness.
Know Glory but cleave to Humiliation
Be the valley for everyone.
When your constancy in virtue is complete
You return to the state of the "uncarved block."

The block is cut into implements.
The sage uses them to fulfill roles.

Therefore the great tailor does not cut.


29.
If you want to grab the world and run it
I can see that you will not succeed.
The world is a spiritual vessel, which can't be controlled.

Manipulators mess things up.
Grabbers lose it. Therefore:

Sometimes you lead
Sometimes you follow
Sometimes you are stifled
Sometimes you breathe easy
Sometimes you are strong
Sometimes you are weak
Sometimes you destroy
And sometimes you are destroyed.

Hence, the sage shuns excess
Shuns grandiosity
Shuns arrogance.


30.
If you used the Tao as a principle for ruling
You would not dominate the people by military force.

What goes around comes around.

Where the general has camped
Thorns and brambles grow.
In the wake of a great army
Come years of famine.
If you know what you are doing
You will do what is necessary and stop there.

Accomplish but don't boast
Accomplish without show
Accomplish without arrogance
Accomplish without grabbing
Accomplish without forcing.

When things flourish they decline.

This is called non-Tao
The non-Tao is short-lived.


31.
Sharp weapons are inauspicious instruments.
Everyone hates them.
Therefore the man of the Tao is not comfortable with them.

In the domestic affairs of the gentleman
The left is the position of honor.
In military affairs the right is the position of honor.
Since weapons are inauspicious instruments, they are not the instruments of the
gentleman
So he uses them without enjoyment
And values plainness.

Victory is never sweet.

Those for whom victory is sweet
Are those who enjoy killing.
If you enjoy killing, you cannot gain the trust of the people.

On auspicious occasions the place of honor is on the left.
On inauspicious occasions the place of honor is on the right.
The lieutenant commander stands on the left.
The commander-in-chief stands on the right.
And they speak, using the funerary rites to bury them.

The common people, from whom all the dead have come
Weep in lamentation.
The victors bury them with funerary rites.


32.
The Tao is always nameless.
And even though a sapling might be small
No one can make it be his subject.
If rulers could embody this principle
The myriad things would follow on their own.
Heaven and Earth would be in perfect accord
And rain sweet dew.

People, unable to deal with It on its own terms
Make adjustments;
And so you have the beginning of division into names.
Since there are already plenty of names
You should know where to stop.
Knowing where to stop, you can avoid danger.

The Tao's existence in the world

Is like valley streams running into the rivers and seas.


33.
If you understand others you are smart.
If you understand yourself you are illuminated.
If you overcome others you are powerful.
If you overcome yourself you have strength.
If you know how to be satisfied you are rich.
If you can act with vigor, you have a will.
If you don't lose your objectives you can be long-lasting.

If you die without loss, you are eternal.


34.
The Tao is like a great flooding river. How can it be directed to the left or
right? The myriad things rely on it for their life but do not distinguish it.
It brings to completion but cannot be said to exist.
It clothes and feeds all things without lording over them.

It is always desireless, so we call it "the small."
The myriad things return to it and it doesn't exact lordship
Thus it can be called "great."
Till the end, it does not regard itself as Great.

Therefore it actualizes its greatness.


35.
Holding to the Great Form
All pass away.
They pass away unharmed, resting in Great Peace.

It is for food and music that the passing traveler stops.

When the Tao appears from its opening
It is so subtle, it has no taste.
Look at it, you cannot see it.
Listen, you cannot hear it.
Use it

You cannot exhaust it.


36.
That which will be shrunk
Must first be stretched.
That which will be weakened
Must first be strengthened.
That which will be torn down
Must first be raised up.
That which will be taken
Must first be given.

This is called "subtle illumination."

The gentle and soft overcomes the hard and aggressive.

A fish cannot leave the water.

The country's potent weapons
Should not be shown to its people.


37.
The Tao is always "not-doing"
Yet there is nothing it doesn't do.
If the ruler is able to embody it
Everything will naturally change.

Being changed, they desire to act.

So I must restrain them, using the nameless "uncarved block (original mind)."

Using the nameless uncarved block
They become desireless.
Desireless, they are tranquil and
All-under-Heaven is naturally settled.


38.
True virtue is not virtuous
Therefore it has virtue.
Superficial virtue never fails to be virtuous
Therefore it has no virtue.

True virtue does not "act"
And has no intentions.
Superficial virtue "acts"
And always has intentions.
True jen"acts"
But has no intentions.
True righteousness "acts"
But but has intentions.
True propriety "acts" and if you don't respond

They will roll up their sleeves and threaten you.

Thus, when the Tao is lost there is virtue
When virtue is lost there is jen
When jenis lost there is Justice
And when Justice is lost there is propriety.

Now "propriety" is the external appearance of loyalty and sincerity
And the beginning of disorder.

Occult abilities are just flowers of the Tao
And the beginning of foolishness.

Therefore the Master dwells in the substantial
And not in the superficial.
Rests in the fruit and not in the flower.

So let go of that and grasp this.


39.
These in the past have attained wholeness:

Heaven attains wholeness with its clarity;
The Earth attains wholeness with its firmness;
The Spirit attains wholeness with its transcendence;
The Valley attain wholeness when filled;
The Myriad Things attain wholeness in life;
The Ruler attains wholeness in the correct governance of the people.

In effecting this:
If Heaven lacked clarity it would be divided;
If the Earth lacked firmness it would fly away;
If the spirit lacked transcendence it would be exhausted;
If the valley lacked fullness it would be depleted;
If the myriad things lacked life they would vanish.
If the ruler lacks nobility and loftiness he will be tripped up.

Hence
Nobility has lowliness as its root
The High has the Low as its base.
Thus the kings call themselves "the orphan, the lowly, the unworthy."

Is this not taking lowliness as the fundamental? Isn't it?

In this way you can bring about great effect without burden.
Not desiring the rarity of gems
Or the manyness of grains of sand.


40.
Return is the motion of the Tao.
Softening is its function.
All things in the cosmos arise from being.
Being arises from non-being.


41.
When superior students hear of the Tao
They strive to practice it.
When middling students hear of the Tao
They sometimes keep it and sometimes lose it.
When inferior students hear of the Tao
They have a big laugh.

But "not laughing" in itself is not sufficient to be called the Tao, and
therefore it is said:

The sparkling Tao seems dark
Advancing in the Tao seems like regression.
Settling into the Tao seems rough.
True virtue is like a valley.
The immaculate seems humble.
Extensive virtue seems insufficient.
Established virtue seems deceptive.
The face of reality seems to change.
The great square has no corners.
Great ability takes a long time to perfect.
Great sound is hard to hear.
The great form has no shape.

The Tao is hidden and nameless.

This is exactly why the Tao is good at developing and perfecting.


42.
The Tao produces one, one produces two.
The two produce the three and the three produce all things.
All things submit to yinand embrace yang.
They soften their energy to achieve harmony.

People hate to think of themselves as "orphan," "lowly," and "unworthy"
Yet the kings call themselves by these names.

Some lose and yet gain,
Others gain and yet lose.
That which is taught by the people
I also teach:
"The forceful do not choose their place of death."
I regard this as the father of all teachings.


43.
The softest thing in the world
Will overcome the hardest.
Non-being can enter where there is no space.
Therefore I know the benefit of unattached action.
The wordless teaching and unattached action

Are rarely seen.


44.
Which is dearer, fame or your life?
Which is greater, your life or possessions?
Which is more painful, gain or loss?
Therefore we always pay a great price for excessive love
And suffer deep loss for great accumulation.
Knowing what is enough, you will not be humiliated.
Knowing where to stop, you will not be imperiled

And can be long-lasting.


45.
Great perfection seems flawed, yet functions without a hitch.
Great fullness seems empty, yet functions without exhaustion.
Great straightness seems crooked,
Great skill seems clumsy,
Great eloquence seems stammering.

Excitement overcomes cold, stillness overcomes heat.
Clarity and stillness set everything right.


46.
When the Tao prevails in the land
The horses leisurely graze and fertilize the ground.
When the Tao is lacking in the land
War horses are bred outside the city.
Natural disasters are not as bad as not knowing what is enough.
Loss is not as bad as wanting more.

Therefore the sufficiency that comes from knowing what is enough is an eternal
sufficiency.


47.
Without going out the door, knowing everything,
Without peaking out the windowshades, seeing the Way of Heaven.

The further you go, the less you know.

The sage understands without having to go through the whole process.
She is famous without showing herself.
Is perfected without striving.


48.
In studying, each day something is gained.
In following the Tao, each day something is lost.
Lost and again lost.
Until there is nothing left to do.
Not-doing, nothing is left undone.
You can possess the world by never manipulating it.
No matter how much you manipulate
You can never possess the world.


49.
The sage has no fixed mind,
She takes the mind of the people as her mind.

I treat the good as good, I also treat the evil as good.
This is true goodness.
I trust the trustworthy, I also trust the untrustworthy.
This is real trust.

When the sage lives with people, she harmonizes with them
And conceals her mind for them.
The sages treat them as their little children.


50.
Coming into life and entering death,
The followers of life are three in ten.
The followers of death are three in ten.
Those whose life activity is their death ground are three in ten.
Why is this?
Because they live life grasping for its rich taste.

Now I have heard that those who are expert in handling life
Can travel the land without meeting tigers and rhinos,
Can enter battle without being wounded.
The rhino has no place to plant its horn,
The tiger has no place to place its claws,
Weapons find no place to receive their sharp edges.
Why?

Because he has no death-ground.


51.
Tao gives birth to it,
Virtue rears it,
Materiality shapes it,
Activity perfects it.
Therefore, there are none of the myriad things who do not venerate the Tao or
esteem its virtue.
This veneration of the Tao and esteeming of its virtue is something they do
naturally, without being forced.
Therefore, Tao gives birth.
Its virtue rears, develops, raises, adjusts and disciplines,
Nourishes, covers and protects,
Produces but does not possess,
Acts without expectation,
Leads without forcing.

This is called "Mysterious Virtue."


52.
All things have a beginning, which we can regard as their Mother.
Knowing the mother, we can know its children.
Knowing the children, yet still cleaving to the mother
You can die without pain.

Stop up the holes
Shut the doors,
You can finish your life without anxiety.

Open the doors,
Increase your involvements,
In the end you can't be helped.

Seeing the subtle is called illumination.
Keeping flexible is called strength.
Use the illumination, but return to the light.
Don't bring harm to yourself.

This is called "practicing the eternal."


53.
If I had just a little bit of wisdom
I should walk the Great Path and fear only straying from it.
Though the Way is quite broad
People love shortcuts.

The court is immaculate,
While the fields are overgrown with weeds,
And the granaries are empty.
They wear silk finery,
Carry sharp swords,
Sate themselves on food and drink
Having wealth in excess.
They are called thieving braggarts.

This is definitely not the Way.


54.
The well-established cannot be uprooted.
The well-grasped does not slip away.
Generation after generation carries out the ancestor worship without break.

Cultivate it in yourself and virtue will be real.
Cultivate it in the family and virtue will overflow.
Cultivate it in the town and virtue will be great.
Cultivate it in the country and virtue will abundant.
Cultivate it in the world and virtue will be everywhere.

Therefore, take yourself and observe yourself.
Take the family and observe the family.
Take the town and observe the town.
Take the country and observe the country.
Take the world and observe the world.

How do I know the world as it is?

By this.


55.
One who remains rich in virtuous power
Is like a newborn baby.
Bees, scorpions and venomous snakes do not bite it,
The wild beasts do not attack it,
Birds of prey do not sink their claws into it.
Though its bones are weak
And muscles soft,
Its grip is strong.
Without knowing of the blending of male and female
S/he is a perfect production,
The ultimate in vitality.
S/he cries all day without getting hoarse.
S/he is the ultimate in harmony.

Understanding harmony is called the Constant.
Knowing the Constant is called illumination.
Nourishing life is called blessing.
Having control of your breath is called strength.

After things blossom they decay, and
This is called the non-Tao.

The non-Tao expires quickly.


56.
One who knows does not speak.
One who speaks does not know.
Close your holes, shut your doors,
Soften your sharpness, loosen your knots.
Soften your glare and merge with the everyday.

This is called mysteriously attaining oneness.

Though you cannot possess it, you are intimate with it
And at the same time, distant.
Though you cannot possess it, you are benefitted by it,
And harmed by it.
You cannot possess it, but are esteemed through it
And humbled by it.

Therefore the world values you.


57.
*** Use fairness in governing the state.
Use surprise tactics in war.
Be unconcerned and you will have the world.
How do I know it is like this?
Because:
The more regulations there are,
The poorer people become.
The more people own lethal weapons,
The more darkened are the country and clans.
The more clever the people are,
The more extraordinary actions they take.
The more picky the laws are,
The more thieves and gangsters there are.

Therefore the sages say:
"I do not force my way and the people transform themselves.
I enjoy my serenity and the people correct themselves.
I do not interfere and the people enrich themselves.

I have no desires

And the people find their original mind.


58.
When the government is laid back
The people are relaxed.
When the government is nitpicking
The people have anxiety.
Misfortune depends upon fortune.
Fortune conceals misfortune.
What has a definite delimitation?
Or abnormality?
The normal reverts to strangeness.
Goodness reverts to perversion.

People certainly have been confused for a long time.

Therefore the sage squares things without cutting.
Edges without separating.
Straightens without lining up.

Shines but does not glare.


59.
In governing the country and serving Heaven
There is nothing like frugality.
Only by being frugal can you recover quickly.
When you recover quickly you accumulate virtue.
Having accumulated virtue,
There is nothing you can't overcome.
When there is nothing you can't overcome
Who knows the limits of your capabilities?
These limits being unfathomable
You can possess the country.

The Mother who possesses the country can be long-living.
This is called "planting the roots deeply and firmly."

The way to long life and eternal vision.


60.
Ruling a large country is like cooking a small fish.
When you govern people with the Tao
Demons will have no power.
Not that they don't have power,
But their power will not harm people.

Since the sage doesn't harm people,
The two will not harm each other.

Here their power merges and returns.


61.
The great state should be like a river basin.
The mixing place of the world,
The feminine of the world.
The feminine always overcomes the masculine by softness
Because softness is lesser.
Therefore if a large state serves a small state
It will gain the small state.
If a small state serves a large state
It will gain the large state.

Therefore some serve in order to gain
And some gain despite their servitude.

The large state wants nothing more
Than to unite and feed its people.
The small state wants nothing more
Than to enter into the service of the right person.
Thus both get what they want.

Greatness lies in placing oneself below.


62.
The Tao is hidden deeply in all things.
It is the treasure of the good
And the refuge of the not-so-good.
With skillful words you can be successful.
With honorable actions you can be included.

People may not be so good, but how can you deny them?

Therefore, even though there are great jewels brought in by teams of horses at
the coronation of the emperor and the installation of the three princes,
This is not as good as staying where you are
And advancing in this Tao.

Why did the ancients so value the Tao?

You can't say that it was for seeking gain
Or to have punishments to deter crime.

Therefore it is the most prized in the world.


63.
Do without "doing."
Get involved without manipulating.
Taste without tasting.
Make the great small,
The many, few.
Respond to anger with virtue.
Deal with difficulties while they are still easy.
Handle the great while it is still small.

The difficult problems in life
Always start off being simple.
Great affairs always start off being small.
Therefore the sage never deals with the great
And is able to actualize his greatness.

Now light words generate little belief,
Much ease turns into much difficulty.
Therefore the sage treats things as though they were difficult,

And hence, never has difficulty.


64.
That which is at rest is easy to grasp.
That which has not yet come about is easy to plan for.
That which is fragile is easily broken.
That which is minute is easily scattered.
Handle things before they arise.
Manage affairs before they are in a mess.

A thick tree grows from a tiny seed.
A tall building arises from a mound of earth.
A journey of a thousand miles starts with one step.
Contriving, you are defeated;
Grasping, you lose.

The sage doesn't contrive, so she isn't beaten.
Not grasping, she doesn't lose.
When people are carrying out their projects
They usually blow it at the end.

If you are as careful at the end
As you were at the beginning,
You won't be disappointed.

Therefore the sage desires non-desire,
Does not value rare goods,
Studies the unlearnable
So that she can correct the mistakes of average people
And aid all things in manifesting their true nature

Without presuming to take the initiative.


65.
The ancients who were skillful at the Tao
Did not illuminate the people
But rather kept them simple.
When the people are difficult to rule
It is because of their cleverness.
Therefore
If you use cleverness to rule the state
You are a robber of the state.
If you don't use cleverness to rule the state
You are a blessing to the state.

If you understand these two points, you know the proper norm for governing To be
continuously understanding the proper norm is called
Mysterious Virtue.
How deep and far-reaching Mysterious Virtue is!
It makes all return

Until they reach the Great Norm.


66.
The reason the river and sea can be regarded as
The rulers of all the valley streams
Is because of their being below them.
Therefore they can be their rulers.
So if you want to be over people
You must speak humbly to them.
If you want to lead them
You must place yourself behind them.

Thus the sage is positioned above
And the people do not feel oppressed.
He is in front and they feel nothing wrong.
Therefore they like to push him front and never resent him.

Since he does not contend

No one can contend with him.


67.
The reason everybody calls my Tao great
Is because there is nothing quite like it.
It is exactly because it isgreat
That there is nothing quite like it.
If there were something that were consistently like it

How could it be small?

I have three treasures thatI hold and cherish.
The first is compassion,
The second is frugality,
The third is not daring to put myself ahead of everybody.

Having compassion, I can be brave.
Having frugality, I can be generous.
Not daring to put myself ahead of everybody
I can take the time to perfect my abilities.
Now if I am brave without compassion
Generous without frugality, or
Go to the fore without putting my own concerns last,
I might as well be dead.

If you wage war with compassion you will win.
If you protect yourself with compassion you will be impervious.
Heaven will take care of you,

Protecting you with compassion.


68.
The best warrior is never aggressive.
The best fighter is never angry.
The best tactician does not engage the enemy.
The best utilizer of people's talents places himself below them.

This is called the virtue of non-contention.
It is called the ability to engage people's talents.
It is called the ultimate in merging with Heaven.


69.
Strategists have a saying:
"I prefer to be able to move, rather than be in a fixed position
Prefer to retreat a foot rather than advancing an inch."
This is called progress without advancing;
Preparing without showing off;
Smashing where there is no defense;
Taking him without a fight.

There is no greater danger than under-estimating your opponent.
If I under-estimate my opponent
I will lose that which is most dear.
Therefore
When opponents clash

The one who is sorry about it will be the winner.


70.
My words are easy to understand
And easy to practice.
Yet nobody understands them or practices them.
My words have an origin;
My actions have a principle.
It is only because of your not understanding this
That you do not understand me.
Since there are few who understand me
I am valued.
Therefore the sage wears coarse clothes.
Yet hides a jewel in his bosom.


71.
There is nothing better than to know that you don't know.
Not knowing, yet thinking you know--
This is sickness.
Only when you are sick of being sick
Can you be cured.
The sage's not being sick

Is because she is sick of sickness.

Therefore she is not sick.


72.
When the people do not fear your might
Then your might has truly become great.
Don't interfere with their household affairs.
Don't oppress their livelihood.

If you don't oppress them they won't feel oppressed.

Thus the sage understands herself
But does not show herself.
Loves herself
But does not prize herself.
Therefore she lets go of that

And takes this.


73.
If you are courageous in daring you will die.
If you are courageous in not-daring you will live.
Among these two, one is beneficial and the other is harmful.

Who understands the reason why Heaven dislikes what it dislikes?
Even the sage has difficulty in knowing this.

The Way of Heaven is to win easily without struggle.
To respond well without words,
To naturally come without special invitation,
To plan well without anxiety.

Heaven's net is vast.
It is loose.

Yet nothing slips through.


74.
If the people don't fear death
How will you scare them with death?
If you make the people continuously fear death
By seizing anybody who does something out of the ordinary
And killing them,
Who will dare to move?

There is always an official executioner to handle this.
If you play the role of the official executioner
It is like cutting wood in the capacity of Master Carpenter.

There are few who will not cut their hands.



75.
The reason people starve
Is because their rulers tax them excessively.
They are difficult to govern
Because their rulers have their own ends in mind.

The reason people take death lightly
Is because they want life to be rich.
Therefore they take death lightly.
It is only by not living for your own ends
That you can go beyond valuing life.


76.
When people are born they are gentle and soft.
At death they are hard and stiff.
When plants are alive they are soft and delicate.
When they die, they wither and dry up.
Therefore the hard and stiff are followers of death.
The gentle and soft are the followers of life.

Thus, if you are aggressive and stiff, you won't win.
When a tree is hard enough, it is cut. Therefore
The hard and big are lesser,
The gentle and soft are greater.


77.
The Way of Heaven
Is like stretching a bow.
The top is pulled down,
The bottom is pulled up.
Excess string is removed
Where more is needed, it is added.

It is the Way of Heaven
To remove where there is excess
And add where there is lack.
The way of people is different:
They take away where there is need
And add where there is surplus.

Who can take his surplus and give it to the people?
Only one who possesses the Tao.

Therefore the sage acts without expectation.
Does not abide in his accomplishments.
Does not want to show his virtue.



78.
Nothing in the world is softer than water,
Yet nothing is better at overcoming the hard and strong.
This is because nothing can alter it.

That the soft overcomes the hard
And the gentle overcomes the aggressive
Is something that everybody knows
But none can do themselves.
Therefore the sages say:
"The one who accepts the dirt of the state
Becomes its master.
The one who accepts its calamity
Becomes king of the world.

Truth seems contradictory.


79.
After calming great anger
There are always resentments left over.
How can this be considered as goodness?
Therefore the sage keeps her part of the deal
And doesn't check up on the other person.

Thus virtuous officials keep their promise
And the crooked ones break it.

The Heavenly Tao has no favorites:

It raises up the Good.


80.
Let there be a small country with few people,
Who, even having much machinery, don't use it.
Who take death seriously and don't wander far away.
Even though they have boats and carriages, they never ride in them.
Having armor and weapons, they never go to war.
Let them return to measurement by tying knots in rope.

Sweeten their food, give them nice clothes, a peaceful abode and a relaxed life.
Even though the next country can be seen and its doges and chickens can be
heard,

The people will grow old and die without visiting each others land.


81.
True words are not fancy.
Fancy words are not true.
The good do not debate.
Debaters are not good.
The one who really knows is not broadly learned,
The extensively learned do not really know.
The sage does not hoard,
She gives people her surplus.
Giving her surplus to others she is enriched.

The way of Heaven is to help and not harm.

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The Core of the Teachings of J. Krishnamurti


The following statement was written by
Krishnamurti on October 21, 1980.
“The core of Krishnamurti’s teaching is contained in the statement he made
in 1929 when he said: ‘Truth is a pathless land’. Man cannot come to it
through any organization, through any creed, through any dogma, priest or
ritual, not through any philosophic knowledge or psychological technique.
He has to find it through the mirror of relationship, through the
understanding of the contents of his own mind, through observation and not
through intellectual analysis or introspective dissection. Man has built
in himself images as a fence of security – religious, political, personal.
These manifest as symbols, ideas, beliefs. The burden of these images
dominates man’s thinking, his relationships, and his daily life. These
images are the causes of our problems for they divide man from man. His
perception of life is shaped by the concepts already established in his
mind. The content of his consciousness is his entire existence. This
content is common to all humanity. The individuality is the name, the form
and superficial culture he acquires from tradition and environment. The
uniqueness of man does not lie in the superficial but in complete freedom
from the content of his consciousness, which is common to all mankind. So
he is not an individual.
“Freedom is not a reaction; freedom is not a choice. It is man’s pretense
that because he has choice he is free. Freedom is pure observation without
direction, without fear of punishment and reward. Freedom is without
motive; freedom is not at the end of the evolution of man but lies in the
first step of his existence. In observation one begins to discover the
lack of freedom. Freedom is found in the choiceless awareness of our daily
existence and activity.
“Thought is time. Thought is born of experience and knowledge, which are
inseparable from time and the past. Time is the psychological enemy of
man. Our action is based on knowledge and therefore time, so man is always
a slave to the past. Thought is ever-limited and so we live in constant
conflict and struggle. There is no psychological evolution.
“When man becomes aware of the movement of his own thoughts, he will see
the division between the thinker and thought, the observer and the
observed, the experiencer and the experience. He will discover that this
division is an illusion. Then only is there pure observation which is
insight without any shadow of the past or of time. This timeless insight
brings about a deep, radical mutation in the mind.
“Total negation is the essence of the positive. When there is negation of
all those things that thought has brought about psychologically, only then
is there love, which is compassion and intelligence.”


© Copyright 2000 – KFA™; All Rights Reserved Krishnamurti Foundation of
America™.
Founded in 1969 by J. Krishnamurti
Privacy Policy
 

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Toward a Buddhist Philosophy of Science: Resources on Philosophy by John D. Caputo

Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, Fordham
1997

This is probably the only book where I've managed to read more than a page of
Derrida's writing. The first 24 pages are the transcript of a Q&A with
Derrida. The rest is a commentary by Caputo. It sure does seem like there is
some resonance here with Buddhism, which other have also noted. Anyway, try
the following mapping:
khora = emptiness
differance = interdependence
Messiah = Buddha nature
Perhaps a significant difference with Buddhism is that the Messiah is always
projected into the future, whereas Buddha nature is always already present
though obscure.

Fred Dallmayr
Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter, (SUNY 1996)
from p. 195:
The conception of democratic staging as an empty place resonates deeply with
the Buddhist notion of sunyata (as outlined above). As in the case of
Buddhism, democratic emptiness does not denote nihilism or sheer negativity
but rather a kind of inner lining or hidden foil allowing democratic
politics to emerge in its suchness. If sunyata is seen as a core ingredient
of Buddhism (at least in its Mahayana version), then contemporary politics
offers the spectacle of a curious East-West encounter: just at the time when
Western-style democracy is experiencing a worldwide affirmation allowing us
to speak of a process of global democratization, democratic politics
discovers in itself a non-actuality or hidden hollow, a hollow whose
understanding can be greatly assisted by the rich Buddhist legacy of
sunyata.

John Dewey
The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action
(Putnam 1929)
from pp. 104-105
Only when the older theory of knowledge and epistemology is retained, is
science thought to inform us that nature in its true reality is but an
interplay of masses in motion, without sound, color, or any quality of
enjoyment and use. What science actually does is to show that any natural
object we please may be treated in terms of relations upon which its
occurence depends, or as an event, and that by so treating it we are enabled
to get behind, as it were, the immediate qualities the object of direct
experience presents, and to regulate their happening, instead of having to
wait for conditions beyond our control to bring it about. Reduction of
experienced objects to the form of relations, which are neutral as respects
qualitative traits, is a prerequisite of ability to regulate the course of
change, so that it may terminate in the occurence of an object having
desired qualities.
from p. 215:
Intelligence within nature means liberation and expansion, as reason outside
nature means fixation and restriction.

Richard King
Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and 'The Mystic East'
(Routledge 1999)
from p. 28:
It has become commonplace in the modern era to consider mystics, their
writings and the phenomenon of mysticism in general as being in some sense
antithetical to rationality. Specifically the characterization of Indian
religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism as mystical has also tended to
support the exclusion of Hindus and Buddhists from the realm of rationality.

David Michael Levin
The Body's Recollection of Being: Phenomenolgical Psychology and the
Deconstruction of Nihilism, (Routledge Kegan Paul 1985)
from p. 230:
Our traditional way of teaching morality is, I think, an inherently
mechanizing, technologically willfull way: it attempts to teach a morality
of autonomy, but does so by implicitly heteronomous means, i.e., by imposing
precepts and principles not derived from the child's own body of morally
perceptive feeling, and by addressing moral education to the child's
tool-like nature, rather than to a creative reserve of sensibility which is
not reducible to its being as an instrument of moral culture, and which may
suffer very seriously from the instrumental strategy. When precepts are
imposed and not derived, it is not only that we betray our own principles by
treating the child as a tool, but that, since we are giving him no
understanding of moral evaluation as a process of articulating a body of
implicitly moral feeling, we are actually encouraging and rewarding a
tool-like nature, rigid, constant, reliable, fixed, docile, and essectially
reactive, rather than thoughtful and responsive. This educational method is
therefore implicitly technological, and tends to reproduce itself in a
character which is easily manipulated, and which knows by example only those
kinds of relationship that involve the manipulation of others. We
desparately need a method of moral education which will avoid the chains of
calculative ratiocination and subvert the technological reduction of human
nature and comportment.
The Listening Self: Personal Growth, Social Change and the Closure of
Metaphysics
The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern Situation

David Loy
Lack and Transcendence: The Problem of Death and Life in Psy
Nonduality: A Study in Comparative Philosophy

Robert Magliola
Derrida on the Mend, (1984 Purdue)
from pp. 87-88:
At the very outset of this discussion, however, I wish to dispel two
vitiating suspicions - one suspicion which is rooted in a covert bigotry but
is nonetheless commonplace among Western intellectuals who are not
Orientalists,... The first suspicion would have it that the principles of
Buddhist throught in general are too 'escapist', too 'other worldly' in the
perjerotive sense of the term, too preposterously removed from the real, to
be worthy of attention, and consequently, that any comparison of Derrida and
Nagarjuna can only result in miscarriage; or, in a variation which is a
little more generous, that Buddhist thought is too alien to Western
sensibilities, and on this count well nigh irrecuperable, so that a putative
comparison of these two thinkers is de facto meaningless. Let me assure such
supicious ones that Buddhist thought, and the Hindu thought which
chronologically precedes and accompanies it, are as spectacularly diverse
and profound and rigorous and challenging and indeed relevant as European
thought; that the activity of Greek pre-Socratic schools found their
counterpart in the intense metaphysical debates of the early and middle
Upanishadic periods - that Indian philosophy divided into materialist,
evolutionist, atomistic, idealist, and other schools; that Aristotelian and
scholastic logic were matched by the elaborate Indian Nyaya and he Chinese
"canons of Mo Tzu"; and that the Western medieval and renaissance periods
were also tenures of breathtaking esthetic, philosophic, and religious
activity in the East. What is more, traditional Oriental thought is
experiencing revived and new growth in contemporary times, especially in the
non-Marxist Orient and in large part through fertile dialogue with Western
specialists: Chinese logicians with Gernman logicians, Indian philosophers
with American philosophers, Buddhist monks with Catholic monks, Japanese
poets with Brazilian poets, and so on.
On Deconstructing Life-Worlds: Buddhism, Christianity, Culture, (Scholars
Press 1997)

Mary Midgley
Wisdom, Information and Wonder: What is Knowledge for? (Routledge 1989)
from p. 135
The metaphor of foundations has got quite out of hand here. It expresses the
notion that the items we can know can be arranged in a single,
one-dimensional series in order of their certainty. In this case, what we
would have to do would be to get them piled up in that order, resting the
less certain always upon the more certain to make the whole set form a
pyramid. In order to manage this, we would have first to find something
intrinsically undoubtable to put at the bottom, something both immovable and
large enough to support the whole pyramid. Philosophers have long noticed
that Descartes's Cogito cannot really fill this place, and no other likely
candidate has ever been found. Indeed, it seems implicit in the
gravitational metaphor that none ever can be found, since there is no end to
the progress that is possible downwards.
from pp. 157-158
This mention of how the facts sometimes seem to vary with the values does
not tip us into helpless scepticism. It simply calls attention to the unity
of the moral enterprise, to the web of conceptual links between all its
various facets. The process of change could, of course, be described just as
well the other way round, in the form in which it often appeared to those
who underwent it, as a recognition of the fats which entailed a rejection of
slavery. What was happening was a single complex process with three
conceptually linked aspects: a changing view of the facts, a change of
feeling, and a change in action, arising out of a changed sense of what
action could be decently contemplated. It has been a real misfortune, not
just for philosophy but for our civilization itself, that philosophers in
the tradition we are discussing have tended to concentrate entirely on
separating these factors and putting them in competition with each other,
rather than on investigating the relations between them.

Barbara Herrnstein Smith
B elief and Resistance: Dynamics of Contemporary Intellectual Controversy,
(Harvard 1997)
from p. 80:
It appears (on the evidence of, among other things, alternative
introspections) that ideas such as "inescapable presuppositions," "intuitive
preunderstanding," and "truth absolute" are neither universal nor
inescapable. On the contrary, it is possible to believe (as statements in
this book testify) that such concepts and the sense of their inherent
meanings and deep interconnectedness are, rather, the products and effects
of rigorous instruction and routine participation in a particular conceptual
tradition and its related idiom. It is also possible to believe,
accordingly, that instruction (more or less rigorous) in some other
conceptual tradition, and familiarity with its idiom, would yield other
conceptions and descriptions of "the fundamental nature" of "thought itself"
and of what is "presupposed" by "the very act of assertion." Or, one might
say (in the alternative idiom of one such alternative tradition), different
personal/professional histories are likely to make different descriptions
and accounts of the operations of human cognition and communication appear
coherent and adequate.

Joan Stambaugh
The Finitude of Being
Formless Self
Impermanence is Buddha-nature: Dogen's Understanding of Temp
The Real is Not the Rational, (SUNY 1986)
from p. 98:
Whereas in most Western philosophy, for example, in Descartes, the point of
departure and the method to reach the nature of reality are clearly defined,
i.e., to start with the res cogitans (thinking thing), prove the existence
of God, and finally regain some certainty about the outside world. Given his
philosophical enterprise of finding a fundamentum inconcussum (unshakeable
foundation) for knowledge, Descartes could not have proceeded any other way
than he did. His method is discursive, step by step, and analytical. In
Buddhism, when there is a fundamental concept, for example, suffering or
pain (duhkha), all the essential concepts relative to it manifest all at
once. And if there is real understanding of the "access" to reality, the
reality itself is present.
Having stated these difficulties at the outset, let us attempt to see where
Buddhism "starts." Descartes started with methodological doubt, and arrived
at himself, at the thinking thing. Buddhism starts with the Four Noble
Truths, which involve neither a self nor thinking, nor a thing. In the
statement that life is suffering, the first of the Four Noble Truths, we
already have the other two fundamental statements running through any form
of Buddhism, be it Indian, Chinese or Japanese, that all is impermanent and
that there is no self. The fundamentum inconcussum of Buddhism is
unshakable, but, so to speak, unshakable the way an abyss is unshakable. You
cannot "shake" what you cannot take hold of. The "foundation" here is
bottomless. The only thing "foundational" about it is its absolute
givenness. It is, so to speak, a foundation which envelopes us, not
something on which we can reach the stability of a "stand".

Stanley Tambiah
Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality

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 Introducing the Buddhist Community


MultiFaithNet
On-Line Publications
Religions in the UK: A Multi-Faith Directory

INTRODUCING THE BUDDHIST COMMUNITY

KEY BUDDHIST BELIEFS

Four Noble Truths

The Catur Aryasatya/Cattari Ariyasaccani (Four Noble Truths) are at the
heart of Buddhism. These truths are: duhkha/dukkha (unsatisfactoriness),
samudaya (the origin of unsatisfactoriness), nirodha (the cessation of
unsatisfactoriness) and marga/magga (the way leading to contentment).

Duhkha (Unsatisfactoriness)

Duhkha has often been translated as "suffering". However, suffering is
only one of its meanings and it is better understood in terms of
"unsatisfactoriness", a word that also implies imperfection and
impermanence. In his first teaching, the Buddha said: "Birth is duhkha,
ageing is duhkha, sickness is duhkha, death is duhkha; sorrow,
lamentation, grief and despair are duhkha; association with what one
dislikes is duhkha; separation from what one likes is duhkha; not to get
what one wants is duhkha. "
Duhkha is one of the Three Signs of Being or characteristics of existence,
the other two are anitya/anicca (impermanence), and anatman/ anatta
(no-self). One cannot expect to find permanent happiness from impermanent
causes. Anitya (impermanence or change) means all conditioned phenomena
are impermanent and are "coming to be and ceasing to be". Change is a
constant characteristic of all things. Anatman is the teaching that there
is no permanent or immortal self.
An "everyday self" is recognised but is seen as an ever-changing composite
of five skandhas/khandhas (aggregates) which are themselves forever
changing. They are: rupa (material form), vedana (feelings), samjna/sanna
(perceptions), samskaras/sankharas (mental configurations), and
vijnana/vinnana (discriminatory consciousness).

Samudaya (Origin of Unsatisfactoriness)
The origin of duhkha is seen by Buddhists to lie in trishna/tanha. This is
a powerful thirsting or craving which, of its very nature, can never be
satisfied and goes on reproducing itself. It manifests itself as desire
for, and attachment to, material things and mental objects; including a
thirst for continued existence and its opposite desire for non-existence.
Such craving or thirst results in duhkha and in behaviour which will lead
to undesired rebirth. This rebirth is not understood as the transmigration
of a soul, which would be inconsistent with the teaching of anatman.
Rather, the habits which are reinforced by craving are to bring about a
"rebecoming", instead of a continuation of a soul.

Nirodha (Cessation of duhkha)
The transcendence of trishna (craving) leads to the cessation of duhkha
and is known as nirvana. The full meaning of nirvana cannot adequately be
described. In literal terms it means the "quenching" or "extinction" of
the thirst and craving that results in duhkha. It does not therefore mean,
as it has often been misunderstood to mean, a state of annihilation. The
"quenching" and "extinction" to which it refers is rather that of the
fires of greed, hatred, ignorance and craving which cause duhkha. It is
seen as deliverance from samsara (see below), which is the world in which
duhkha holds sway. Buddhists affirm that this deliverance can be realised
in this life, as in the case of Gautama Buddha himself.

Marga (The Way)
The first three Noble Truths analyse the human condition and affirm the
possibility of transcending duhkha. The fourth, more fully known as the
Arya Ashtangika Marga/Ariya Atthangika Magga (The Noble Eightfold Path -
see section below on "Buddhist Life"), is a way of life to be practised
and leads out of samsara. This path is often known as the Middle Way, the
course between and beyond the excesses of self-indulgence and self-denial.

Dependent Origination
Dependent origination is a sequence or consequence according to which all
phenomena arise in dependence upon interrelated causes. In relation to
sentient beings, it is often seen in terms of a chain with twelve links,
each link/cause depending upon the previous one and leading to the next.

Karma and Vipata
Karma/Kamma (literally meaning "deed") is understood in Buddhism as a law
of consequences inherent in the nature of things. Technically, karma is
the deed and vipata the consequence, but popularly karma refers to both
deeds and consequences. All deliberate actions have their consequences and
whether a particular action has useful or negative karmic/kammic effects
depends predominately upon the intentions.

Samsara
Samsara (the wheel of birth and death) is not the reincarnation or
transmigration of a soul because, as we have seen, Buddhism does not posit
the continuing existence of such a substantial or permanent soul or self.
This is because the individual is understood to be a cluster of various
aggregates held together by desire. Buddhists therefore usually speak of a
"rebirth" or "rebecoming" of these aggregates rather than of the
transmigration of an entity.
This rebirth is possible on a number of levels (not just the human) and
throughout aeons. The "wheel" of birth and death is divided into six
realms or states illustrative of these possibilities. Depending on the
karma accumulated in one lifetime the rebirth or rebecoming will be of
different kinds. The principal concern is ultimately not to gain a better
future rebirth, but to escape altogether from this wheel of rebirth and
death and to attain nirvana.
Being born as a human being is viewed as a precious opportunity since it
is believed that from the human state there is no better chance that
deliverance can be achieved. In Mahayana Buddhism, having escaped from the
wheel of birth and death the enlightened being may compassionately return
to the world, without being karmically bound to it, in order to assist
others to awaken.

Shunyata/Sunnata
Shunyata (Voidness or Emptiness) is a concept of great importance in the
Mahayana tradition where the idea of anatman or no-self has undergone
further development. In the Mahayana view, all that exists is devoid of
any abiding essence, and "empty" of any ultimate characteristics. To
understand this is to recognise the ultimately fluid and inter-connected
nature of all phenomena. The deep realisation of shunyata is believed to
end fear.

Bodhi
Bodhi literally means "awakening" and refers to Enlightenment. This is the
state of Buddhahood or spiritual perfection which is the goal of the
Buddhist spiritual life. It comes about with the perfection of
prajna/panna (wisdom) and karuna (compassion). It brings a complete seeing
into the ultimate nature of existence and a totally self-less and
compassionate response to all beings and situations.

TRADITIONS IN BUDDHISM

The central teachings are common to all the traditions and schools, but
they contain differences in emphasis, as well as some differences in
practice. The principal traditions are the Theravada (Way of the Elders)
or the Southern Transmission, found principally in South East Asia, and
the Mahayana (often translated as the Great Vehicle - from maha meaning
"great" and yana meaning "vehicle") or Northern Transmission, with its two
main branches of the Far Eastern and Tibetan Buddhism.
Within each of the major traditions there are also many different schools
which emphasise particular beliefs and practices. In the West there are,
also, newer developments which do not fully identify with any one
traditional branch of Buddhism. Some of these are working to evolve new
western styles of Buddhism.

Theravada
The ideal of the Theravada tradition is that of the arahat, an individual
who has found release from the cycle of birth and death. Its hallmarks are
renunciation, self-reliance and a focus upon the historical Buddha. This
tradition is based upon the Pali canon and is today mainly represented in
the Buddhism of the South Asian countries of Sri Lanka, Burma, Laos,
Cambodia and Thailand, as well as in southern Vietnam. It is therefore
sometimes known as the Southern Transmission. Variations within the
Theravada tradition reflect the different cultural contexts in which the
tradition has taken shape rather than the existence of distinctive schools
as such.
In some books on Buddhism the Theravada is sometimes referred to as the
Hinayana (Little Vehicle). However, the origins of the term Hinayana are
to be found in a disparaging contrast with the Mahayana (Great Vehicle).
More properly Hinayana historically refers to spiritual tendencies which
existed in India and were criticised by followers of the Mahayana as being
rigid and limited, rather than to the later developed forms of Theravada
Buddhism found in Sri Lanka and the Southern Transmission. The correct
term for Theravada is Shravakayana (Vehicle of the Heavens).

Mahayana
In addition to the concept of shunyata and a belief in many simultaneously
present Buddhas, the particular characteristics of the Mahayana tradition
include an emphasis on the ideal of the Bodhisattva. A Bodhisattva among
humans is one who vows to practice the Buddhist path totally in order to
help and liberate both themselves and all beings (eg Avalokiteshvara and
Majushri). A Bodhisattva-Mahasattva is a fully perfected Bodhisattva,
greater than any other being except a Buddha. They live permanently in the
realm of "transcendence" and from this position strive constantly for the
welfare of others. Hence the Mahayana is sometimes referred to as the

Bodhisattvayana (the way of the Bodhisattva).
Mahayana is a generic name for a wide movement embracing many different
groups in the northern countries of China, Japan, Vietnam, Korea and
Tibet. It is sometimes known as the Northern Transmission because it came
via the Northen Silk Road and therefore reached these countries first. All
have in common the same basic principles but each grouping has developed
in a different cultural setting or is often associated with one or more of
the great sutras and has thus evolved variations in practice.
Due to repeated persecutions most of these groups became extinct in China
by the 15th century, but many were introduced to Japan and some are still
extant there as the Tendai, Pure Land, Shingon and Zen schools, with one
temple of the Kegon school. In China itself, an amalgamation of the groups
took place within the broader Ch'an tradition (see below).

Tibetan Buddhism
There are four main lineages in Tibetan Buddhism which began in earnest
during the reign of King Trisong Detsen (755-797CE) when it is thought
that Padmasambhava (according to tradition born in what is now Kashmir),
brought Buddhism to Tibet. He is particularly revered by the oldest of the
Tibetan Buddhist schools, the Nyingmapa (literally meaning "the old
ones"), many of whose Lamas today identify with the Rime (non-sectarian)
movement that began in the nineteenth century. The teachings recorded in
The Tibetan Book of the Dead come from this school.
The Sakyapa school traces its tradition back to the Indian saint Virupa
but is not so numerically significant in the UK. The Kagyupa school traces
its origins to Marpa, who is believed to have brought teachings into Tibet
after having been a disciple of the Indian tantric master Naropa. This
school especially reveres Milarepa, after whom the school divided into
four further sub-schools. It tends to stress the attainment of direct
experience and encourages three year isolation retreats to achieve this.
The Gelugpa school has a more gradual approach based on an initial
development of ethical and intellectual understanding. The Dalai Lama is
the head of the Gelupa school and a particularly revered figure.

Ch'an (Chinese) and Zen (Japanese) Buddhism
Ch'an is an abbreviated form of the Chinese word Ch'an-na, which is
derived from the Sanskrit word dhyana which refers to the state of mind
during meditation in which the distinctions between subject and object is
transcended. Zen is a shortened form of zenna, which derives from a
Japanese pronounciation of the word Ch'an-na.
Although meditation is important in all Buddhist schools, Zen stresses the
practice of zazen (sitting meditation) in developing awareness. Zen
affirms that direct insight into true reality is possible through this
practice, hence the Japanese name of satori or kensho, meaning "seeing
into one's true nature".
Shikantaza (or just sitting) was introduced into China by the Indian monk
Bodhidhamma in the 6th century CE, when other Buddhist schools had already
been established. The Rinzai lineage developed in the 9th century. What
was to become Soto Zen was introduced into Japan in the 8th century by
Dosen Risshi. The Rinzai lineage found its way to Japan in the 12th
century CE.
Soto Zen emphasises Shikantaza ("or just sitting"), which is sometimes
known as Serene Reflection Meditation. In the Rinzai tradition, zazen is
combined with the use of koan (questions employed by a Zen Master designed
to engender and test genuine insight).

Pure Land Buddhism
Pure Land Buddhists are devoted to Amitabha, a cosmic Buddha who vowed to
bring liberation to all. In Japanese Buddhism (where Amitabha is known as
Amida) the school has two main branches - the Jodo Shu (Pure Land School)
and the Jodo Shinshu (True Pure Land School, often simply known as Shin).

Both schools are products of an emphasis in Buddhist teaching on
adaptation of the dharma to the world in forms that are most suitable for
people. They therefore offer a path which people can follow in difficult
times, teaching dependence upon the infinite merit of Amida Buddha and his
tariki ("other power").
The difference between the Jodo Shu and the Jodo Shinshu is that the
latter emphasises the complete abandonment of all jiriki (self-effort). As
a central part of their practice both recite the Nembutsu, which is an
invocation of the mantra Namu-Amida-butsu (hail to Amida Buddha).

Nichiren Buddhism
The Nichiren tradition draws upon the teachings of the Japanese teacher
Nichiren (1222-1282CE), who saw the Lotus Sutra as the highest form of
Buddhist teaching, the essence of which could be found in its title.
Nichiren taught that recitation of the sutra's name was all that was
necessary for liberation. Recitation of the mantra having the name of the
sutra, Namu myoho renge-kyo (Veneration to the Lotus of the Good Law), was
therefore introduced as a key practice within this tradition.


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Chan Buddhism



1. The Introduction of Buddhism into China

The Ch'in dynasty gave way to the Han dynasty, which lasted from 202 BCE to 220
CE; it was a period of prosperity and stability in Chinese history. During this
time the Great Wall of China was extended (It was built in the Ch'in dynasty to
keep the less civilized nomadic tribes of central Asia out of China).
Intellectually this period was conservative, unlike the period of the hundred
philosophers. During this time Confucianism dominated the social and religious
life of the people; it provided a basis for social structure that encouraged
stability and unity. Taosim still survived in this period in both its
philosophical form and in what we could call its populist religious form. This
is the intellectual context into which Buddhism began to enter around the time
of Christ (when Buddhism was well established in northern India and was
spreading into southern India and Sri Lanka)
Buddhism made its way into China via the trade routes connecting China to
India (the so-called "Silk Road"). Since the Chinese had a long established
culture with its own indigenous philosophies and religions, at first Buddhism
was not well received; it only gained a foothold in Chinese culture very slowly.
The reason for the initial resistance to Buddhism was due to the fact that in
general Buddhism ran counter to some major presuppositions of Chinese culture:
1. Buddhism tended to be much more pessimistic and other-worldy than the Chinese
were generally; the Chinese tended to be much more this-worldly and positive in
their assessment of individual bodily existence.
2. The Buddhist requirement of withdrawal from domestic life and formation of
monastic communities ran counter to Chinese social norms. Not to marry and
produce children was seen as ignoring one's duty to the ancestors, since the
living have a perennial obligation to maintain the well-being of those who had
died through making food offerings.
3. The Chinese, like most other peoples, believed that human beings had a soul
that survived death; the Buddhist doctrine of anatman (no-soul) was therefore
puzzling and offensive to them.
Nevertheless, in spite of these obstacles, Buddhism did take hold slowly in
Chinese culture; the penetration of Buddhism into Chinese society was aided by
its assimilation of some Taoist and Confucian terminology as a means of
mediating central Buddhist ideas. By the fourth century it was firmly
established in China in various forms
It was the Mahayana forms of Buddhism for the most part that were imported
into China. It usually happened that a text of Mahayana Buddhism would be
translated and studied by a native Chinese who would then lecture on the text
and soon would develop the concepts therein, adapting them to Chinese thought
and expression; this usually resulted in the formation of a school

2. The Ch'an Form of Buddhism

2.1. Origins
The most popular (at least among the intelligentia and Buddhist monks) form of
Chinese Buddhism was : Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism, so called because of it stress on
meditation (Ch'an is the Chinese transliteration of the sanskrit word dhyana,
which means meditation, one of the elements of the Eightfold Path). Ch'an
Buddhism traces its origins in China to Bodhidharma, an Indian Buddhist
missionary who came to China from India c. 520 CE. There are five other
"patriarchs" associated with early Ch'an Buddhism, but the most important, after
Bodhidharma, is Huineng, the sixth patriarch. His work, called the Platform
Sutra, is the major literary expression of Ch'an Buddhism.
2.2. Philosophical Distinctives of Ch'an Buddhism
2.2.1. In Ch'an Buddhism, wisdom (prajna), which leads to (or is) enlightenment,
is transmitted apart from propositional teaching. Since emptiness, the central
idea of Mahayana Buddhism, by definition is ineffable, there can be no teaching
about emptiness. Thus arises the idea in Ch'an Buddhism that wisdom is
transmitted non-verbally from master to student: it is a transmission from mind
to mind without the mediation of words, a direct personal transmission from one
already enlightened to one in need of enlightenment. This means that authority
rests not in canonical texts but in a lineage of masters. In the Platform Sutra
the lineage is traced from the sixth patriarch back to the Buddha himself.
2.2.2. The sudden enlightenment school of Ch'an Buddhism (southern school) (the
school that becomes dominant and the one represented by the Platform Sutra)
embraces an intuitive method of spiritual training aimed at the discovery of a
reality in the innermost recesses of one's being. This reality is the
fundamental unity which pervades all differences and particulars of the world;
thus it is emptiness (sunyata), devoid of all distinctions and thereby
inexpressible, even to say that it is inexpressible. Ch'an Buddhism identifies
this as nirvana, the Buddha-nature or Buddha, the Essence of Mind and suchness
(Tathata) and even the Tao. It is from this original emptiness that all things
emerge and become what they are; thus no thing is real in itself, ontologically
independent and necessary.
The person who comes to enlightenment understands all things as a
manifestation of this unity, so that the things experienced are understood as
neither existing in the ultimate sense nor as not existing (This is another
application of the middle way). The realization of the emptiness of all things
leads to a non-attachment to all things. It must be stressed, however, that the
goal is not to withdraw from the plurality of things by emptying the mind of its
objects; this is not true enlightenment. Rather one continues to experience the
plurality of "things," but with the realization of their emptiness, their
ultimate lack of reality. In other words, one denies the self-existence of all
things, i.e., by "affirming" sunyata, since no distinctions are ultimately real.
This leads one to associate with "things," but to do so as without attachment
to them.
There is a tendency in Ch'an Buddhism to de-objectify all referents of
Buddhist philosophy: whatever is said to be true externally and objectively is
actually true internally and subjectively.
2.2.3. In Ch'an Buddhism the Absolute is identified with the individual mind
or, more exactly, what the unenlightened wrongly take to be the individual mind.
The sentient being who is enlightened understands his mind or consciousness as
identical to the Absolute, without duality, especially between subject and
object. All things are one and the one is all things. As already noted, this
means that the Absolute is impervious to discursive thought and cannot be
expressed propositionally (so that what I am doing now is really futile). (This
is similar to the identification of atman and brahman and teaching on maya in
the Upanishads.) Thus the enlightened person recognizes the unreality or
relative reality of the phenomenal world, the world constituted by a subject
being aware of objects that are not the self. Being so aware of the illusion of
plurality, such a person becomes unattached to it.
One could call Ch'an Buddhism is a form of absolute idealism, because, in
continuity with the certains schools of Mahayana Buddhism, such as the
Yogacaran, it affirms that the Essence of Mind is the origin of all phenomena,
i.e., the phenomenal world; there is no independent existence of non-sentient
beings, whereas all sentient beings are really one, an original mind prior to
the manifestation of duality, even that of subject and object.
2.2.4. In the sudden enlightement school of Ch'an Buddhism, meditation serves
the purpose of calming the (individual) mind and eliminating all conscious
(i.e., dualistic) thought, in order that the one meditating may understand
reality as it truly is, i.e., non-dualistic and undifferentiated, and thereby
become enlightened. Enligtenment is sudden because the Absolute is one and
therefore indivisible, so that it makes no sense to speak of gradually becoming
enlightened. One can prepare for sudden enlightenment by reading the sutras and
practicing meditation (dhyana), but, when it comes, Enlightenment comes all at
once, suddenly; in fact, study and meditation are not even necessary
preconditions for attaing Enlightenment. Since the attainment of enlightenment
is intuitive and not through discursive thought, a Master may attempt to wean
his disciple from discursive reasoning by a type of "shock therapy." This is the
role of the "riddle" (kung-an) in Ch'an Buddhism: a Master will pose a question
for which there is no rational answer (e.g., "What is the sound of one hand
clapping?; "How do you get a goose out of a bottle without breaking the
bottle?") in order to move the disciple away from the dualism of discursive
thinking.

2.3. Selections from Platform Sutra

Our body is the Bodhi-tree,
And our mind a mirror bright.
Carefully we wipe them hour by hour,
And let no dust alight.
______________
There is no Bodhi-tree,
Nor stand of a mirror bright.
Since all is Void,
Where can the dust alight?

The fifth patriach, invited each monk under his direction to formulate a
stanza (gatha) that expresses the essence of dharma. The first stanza quoted
above is that formulated by Shen hsiu. According to him, the essence of (Ch'an)
Budhism is to remove from the mind all content that would obscure the nature of
reality. To this end, the Taoist image of cleaning the dust off a mirror is
used: just as only when a mirror is clean can it reflect reality, the mind can
reflect reality only when it is pure of defilements, i.e., ignorance. The
religious goal is to see the original purity of the mind and then retain that
vision by removing all defilements. The fifth patriarch, however, found the
stanza of Shen hsiu it to be deficient, and therefore an indication that he had
not yet attained enlightenment. The second stanza is that of Hui neng; it is
designed as a modification and refutation of that of Shen hsiu. He rejects the
central premise of Shen hsiu's stanza that there is an individual (a body with a
mind) to be concerned about keeping the mind clean of defilement; in fact the
most significant defilement is the mistaken notion that there is a mind to keep
undefiled. Being attached to the idea of a mind to be kept pure will prevent
enlightenment. Since all things are empty of ontological independence, then
ultimately there can be no individual mind: "Since all is Void, Where can the
dust alight?" The realization of this is enlightenment.


"To attain supreme enlightenment, one must be able to know spontaneously
one's own nature or Essence of Mind, which is neither created nor can it
be annihilated. From ksana to ksana (thought-moment to thought-moment),
one should be able to realize the Essence of Mind all the time. All things
will then be free from restraint (i.e., emancipated). Once the Tathata
(Suchness, another name for the Essence of Mind) is known, one will be
free from delusion forever; and in all circumstances one's mind will be in
a state of 'Thusness'. Such a state of mind is absolute Truth. If you can
see things in such a frame of mind you will have known the Essence of
Mind, which is supreme enlightenment.

In a private conversation with Shen hsiu, the fifth patriarch explains that
until he understands his own nature as the Essence of Mind, he will continue to
be unenlightened. He means that what Shen hsiu does not understand is that his
mind or consciousness is identical with the Absolute (Essence of Mind, Tathata),
which is neither created nor can it be destroyed. To understand that all things
as a manifestation of Essence of Mind continually, from moment to moment is to
be in a state of enlightenment; this is called having one's mind in a state of
"thusness."


Knowing what his message meant, in the third watch of the night I went
to his room. Using the robe as a screen so that none could see us, he
expounded the Diamond Sutra to me. When he came to the sentence, "One
should use one's mind in such a way that it will be free from any
attachment," I at once became thoroughly enlightened, and realized that
all things in the universe are the Essence of Mind itself.
"Who would have thought," I said to the Patriarch, "that the Essence of
Mind is intrinsically pure! Who would have thought that the Essence of
Mind is intrinsically free from becoming or annihilation! Who would have
thought that the Essence of Mind is intrinsically self-sufficient! Who
would have thought that the Essence of Mind is intrinsically free from
change! Who would have thought that all things are the manifestation of
the Essence of Mind!"

In a conversation with the fifth patriarch, Hui neng becomes fully enlightened
insofar as he "realized that all things in the universe are the Essence of Mind
itself." In other words, all things are a manifestation of the Absolute. As
the Absolute, Essence of Mind is changeless and self-sufficient (as opposed to
being conditioned, i.e., ontologically dependent). This also means that the
Essence of Mind has no defilements, for what could defile it would be itself,
but it is not defiling. All things are a manifestation of Essence of Mind.


"Since the object of your coming is the Dharma," said I, "refrain from
thinking of anything and keep your mind blank. I will then teach you."
When he had done this for a considerable time, I said, "When you are
thinking of neither good nor evil, what is at that particular moment,
Venerable Sir, your real nature (literally, original face)?"

In order to bring one of his pursuers to enlightenement, Hui neng instructs him
to refrain from thinking of anything and to keep his mind blank. When he had
done this, Hui neng asks him, when his mind has no content, nothing good nor
bad, what that state is. The answered expected is that his original nature is
Essence of Mind. To be conscious of nothing and not even to be conscious of
being conscious of nothing is to understand the Absolute, the undifferentiated
ground of the manifestation of all things; the Absolute is actually the
individual mind. Only the erroneous assumption that one is a individual
consciousness aware of objects different from oneself will prevent one from
seeing one's original nature.


Learned Audience, when you hear me talk about the Void, do not at once
fall into the idea of vacuity, (because this involves the heresy of the
doctrine of annihilation). It is of the utmost importance that we should
not fall into this idea, because when a man sits quietly and keeps his
mind blank he will abide in a state of 'Voidness of Indifference'.
Learned Audience, the illimitable Void of the universe is capable of
holding myriads of things of various shape and form, such as the sun, the
moon, stars, mountains, rivers, men, dharmas pertaining to goodness or
badness, deva planes, hells, great oceans, and all the mountains of the
Mahameru. Space takes in all of these, and so does the voidness of our
nature. We say that the Essence of Mind is great because it embraces all
things, since all things are within our nature. When we see the goodness
or the badness of other people we are not attracted by it, nor repelled by
it, nor attached to it; so that our attitude of mind is as void as space.
In this way, we say our mind is great. Therefore we call it 'Maha'.

In his discourse to the Prefect Wie, Hui neng teaches the Void aof which he
speaks is not nothingness, in the sense of non-being, for to call the Void
nothingness of non-being is to predicate something of the Void, which makes the
Void no longer void. When in meditation, one makes the mind blank, one is then
is the state of "Voidness of Indifference," which seems to mean is a state of
non-duality, so that there are no longer subjects and predicates. He also
teaches that the Void is capable of holding or producing all particular things,
and this is what makes the Essence of Mind, a synonym for Void, great. The
individual mind is great when it is non-attached to its objects; the assumption
is that that individual mind is aware of the emptiness or voidness of all
things, so that attachment is not possible.


Learned Audience, when we use Prajna for introspection we are illumined
within and without, and in a position to know our own mind. To know our
mind is to obtain liberation. To obtain liberation is to attain Samadhi of
Prajna, which is 'thoughtlessness'. What is 'thoughtlessness'?
'Thoughtlessness' is to see and to know all Dharmas (things) with a mind
free from attachment. When in use it pervades everywhere, and yet it
sticks nowhere. What we have to do is to purify our mind so that the six
vijnanas (aspects of consciousness), in passing through the six gates
(sense organs) will neither be defiled by nor attached to the six
sense-objects. When our mind works freely without any hindrance, and is at
liberty to 'come' or to 'go', we attain Samadhi of Prajna, or liberation.
Such a state is called the function of 'thoughtlessness'. But to refrain
from thinking of anything, so that all thoughts are suppressed, is to be
Dharma-ridden, and this is an erroneous view.

As part of his discourse to the Prefect Wei, Hui neng says that the use of
Prajna (Wisdom) will reveal one's own mind, the implication being that one's
mind is really the Absolute. To know that one's own mind is the Absolute is be
liberated from samsara, which is equated with the Samadhi of Prajna, which is
the state of knowing one's identity with the Absolute that results from Prajna
(Wisdom). To be in a state of Samadhi is to exist in thoughtlessness or
nothought; this describes one's non-attachment to all the objects of one's
consciousness; it is enlightened type of knowing in which one is aware of
"things," but not attached to them because one realizes their emptiness. The
goal is not to cease using the mind, but to use it in such a way that the mind
remains undefiled by being unattached to the sense objects. To aim to suppress
all thinking is erroneous presumably because it presupposes that the Absolute is
empty in the sense of being no thing, which is not the case.


Learned Audience, it has been the tradition of our school to take
'Idea-lessness' as our object, 'Non-objectivity' as our basis, and
'Non-attachment' as our fundamental principle. 'Idea-lessness' means not
to be carried away by any particular idea in the exercise of the mental
faculty. 'Non-objectivity' means not to be absorbed by objects when in
contact with objects. 'Non-attachment' is the characteristic of our
Essence of Mind. All things - good or bad, beautiful or ugly - should be
treated as void. Even in time of disputes and quarrels we should treat our
intimates and our enemies alike and never think of retaliation. In the
exercise of our thinking faculty, let the past be dead. If we allow our
thoughts, past, present, and future, to link up in a series, we put
ourselves under restraint. On the other hand, if we never let our mind
attach to anything, we shall gain emancipation.
For this reason, we take 'Non-attachment' as our fundamental principle. To
free ourselves from absorption in external objects is called
'Non-objectivity'. When we are in a position to do so, the nature of
Dharma will be pure. For this reason, we take '